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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Interactive Brokers Group Inc. (IBKR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +23 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 86 · Value -29 · Sentiment 30 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $146.20 vs $88.74 at analysis
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reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Interactive Brokers Group Inc.
IBKR NASDAQInteractive Brokers Group Inc. is a global electronic brokerage firm that provides trading and custody services for individual investors, financial advisors, hedge funds, proprietary trading groups, introducing brokers, and other institutional clients. The company offers access to a broad range of asset classes, including stocks, options, futures, foreign exchange, bonds, mutual funds, and exchange-traded funds across numerous international markets. Interactive Brokers Group Inc. generates revenue primarily from trading commissions, net interest income on client balances, and various ancillary services such as financing, securities lending, and portfolio analysis tools. Its platforms are designed for active and professional traders, featuring advanced order types, algorithmic trading capabilities, and comprehensive market data. Headquartered in Greenwich, Connecticut, and founded in 1978, Interactive Brokers Group Inc. plays a significant role in modern electronic trading infrastructure, connecting clients to global liquidity and providing a scalable solution for both retail and institutional market participants.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.22
Total Equity: $20.47B
Shares: 443,243,243
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $4.96B
EBITDA: $9.09B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $4.96B
Revenue: $10.22B
Revenue: $10.22B
Revenue: $10.22B
Total Equity: $20.47B
Tax Rate: 8.7%
Equity: $20.47B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $4.96B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $20.47B
Shares: 443,243,243
Shares: 443,243,243
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 443,243,243
Stock Price: $88.63
Net Income: $984.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:34am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.9B | $4.2B | $7.8B | $9.3B | $10.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $635.0M | $778.0M | $913.0M | $1.0B | $1.0B |
| Gross Profit | $2.3B | $3.4B | $6.9B | $8.3B | $9.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $289.0M | $288.0M | $351.0M | $454.0M | $387.0M |
| Operating Income | $2.0B | $3.1B | $6.5B | $7.8B | $8.8B |
| Net Income | $308.0M | $380.0M | $600.0M | $755.0M | $984.0M |
| EBITDA | $2.1B | $3.2B | $6.7B | $8.0B | $9.1B |
| EPS | $0.65 | $0.95 | $1.43 | $1.75 | $2.23 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.65 | $0.94 | $1.42 | $1.73 | $2.22 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:34am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.4B | $3.4B | $3.8B | $3.6B | $5.0B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $109.1B | $115.1B | $128.4B | $150.1B | $203.2B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $98.9B | $103.5B | $114.4B | $133.5B | $182.8B |
| Total Equity | $10.2B | $11.6B | $14.1B | $16.6B | $20.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $953.0M | $1.3B | $1.9B | $2.5B | $3.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:34am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $5.9B | $4.0B | $4.5B | $8.7B | $15.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $5.1B | $3.3B | $4.0B | $7.6B | $15.1B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:34am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +42.6% | +85.8% | +19.6% | +9.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +48.1% | +101.3% | +20.7% | +10.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +55.1% | +108.7% | +20.2% | +12.1% |
| Net Income Growth | +23.4% | +57.9% | +25.8% | +30.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +50.6% | +108.5% | +19.8% | +13.4% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:34am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-01 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2026-06-01 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-27 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-29 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-30 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-28 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-29 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-30 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-31 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-29 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-31 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-31 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-28 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-30 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-31 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-31 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-28 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-30 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:59Recovery pays +39%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 52%. Ratio 0.8:1. Caveat: revenue-DCF fits financials poorly (reported revenue omits net interest) — treat the legs as rough.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($88.74) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +31% | 31.4% | $123.75 | +39% |
| Base — stabilizes | +21% | 27.3% | $80.77 | -9% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +10% | 23.2% | $50.95 | -43% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +18% | 14.5% | $42.20 | -52% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The reported margins are nonsensical on their face — quarterly "net income" of $1.17B on $699M revenue (167% margin) versus annual 2025 NI of $984M on $10.22B revenue (9.6% net margin) tells me the quarterly NI line is consolidated/pre-minority-interest or includes trading gains booked differently, while the annual figure strips out the ~90% non-controlling interest that flows to the Peterffy-controlled operating company. This is the classic IBKR data trap and every model above appears to have ignored it. ROE of 4.8% and ROA of 0.48% look terrible until you realize the reported equity/asset base includes customer segregated funds and the minority interest — the economically relevant ROE on public float capital is much higher, which is why ROIC prints 51.7%. Any DCF or PE-based fair value that doesn't reconcile this is suspect, including the synthesis's $90.10 anchor.
That said, the underlying business trajectory is unambiguously strong: annual revenue $2.94B → $4.19B → $7.79B → $9.32B → $10.22B is a 36% CAGR since 2021, and the most recent quarterly cadence ($474M → $507M → $558M → $592M → $578M → $603M → $667M → $699M) shows re-acceleration into the March 2026 print, not deceleration as the "Revenue Confidence" tag claims. Recent YoY is 47% on the latest quarter ($699M vs $474M), not 9.7%. Account growth and margin lending balances are the real drivers here, and neither has rolled over despite the rate-cut narrative. The 40.6x reported PE is misleading for the same minority-interest reason; look-through PE on the consolidated economics is closer to mid-20s, which for a business compounding accounts at ~30% and NII-sensitive but with structural share gains is not demanding.
The contrarian case is real but narrower than the bear story suggests. It's not "zero-commission brokers eat IBKR" — that battle was fought and IBKR won the professional/international/margin-heavy segment decisively. The genuine risk is rate normalization: a material share of segment income is net interest on $100B+ of customer credit balances, and 200bps of Fed cuts would compress that meaningfully even with margin loan growth offsetting. The second risk is that Peterffy is 81 and the founder-stewardship premium is real but finite. Third, at 3.9x sales and ~3.4x EV/revenue for what is fundamentally a rate-sensitive financial, you're paying a tech multiple for a business whose 2026-2027 EPS could be flat-to-down if the curve cooperates for borrowers rather than IBKR.
Where I land: the synthesis's "fair value" call at $90 is directionally right but arrived at through flawed arithmetic — the composite happens to land near spot because the errors partially cancel. Market Forces calling this "fairly valued given rate headwinds" is the most honest read. The narrative layer correctly identifies this as anchored/quiet-quality with minimal story premium, which is exactly right — IBKR trades on numbers, not vibes. I dissent modestly from strict fair value because the Q1 2026 revenue acceleration ($699M, +18% YoY versus the +9% trailing tag the models are using) suggests the deceleration thesis is stale by one quarter, and account growth continues to compound. But I won't call it undervalued at 40x headline / ~mid-20s look-through with a known NII headwind coming. Fair-to-slightly-cheap, with the upside case requiring either (a) rates staying higher-for-longer through 2026 or (b) continued 25%+ account growth offsetting NIM compression. A pullback to the low $80s would be a clearer buy; chasing at $88.63 requires believing the Q1 re-acceleration is the new run rate.
GPT Reading
What jumps out immediately is that the headline valuation debate is being distorted by accounting presentation. The quarterly table shows revenue of just $699 million in the latest quarter against net income of $1.17 billion, implying a nonsensical 167.5% margin; the annual table then shows $10.22 billion of revenue in 2025 but only $984 million of net income, a 9.6% net margin. Those cannot both describe the same economic reality in a clean apples-to-apples way. For a broker, especially one with large interest flows and client-related balances, line-item classifications matter enormously; here, the most useful clues are the annual operating income of $8.79 billion on $10.22 billion revenue and operating cash flow of $15.81 billion. That says IBKR is an unusually cash-generative, capital-light franchise with very little balance-sheet leverage, not a normal 40x-earnings slow grower. I would not lean on the reported P/E of 40.6 as the core valuation anchor when the surrounding statements are internally inconsistent.
The real story in the data is a company still compounding at a healthy rate while retaining extraordinary economics. Annual revenue has grown from $2.94 billion in 2021 to $10.22 billion in 2025, a 36%+ four-year CAGR, while operating income rose from $2.02 billion to $8.79 billion. Even if some of that expansion was helped by higher rates, the slope is too steep to dismiss as purely cyclical. The quarterly revenue progression from $474 million in mid-2024 to $699 million in the latest quarter is about 47% growth over seven quarters, and latest quarter revenue is up roughly 18% year over year versus $592 million in 2025-03-31. Meanwhile, book equity is $20.47 billion and the stock trades at only 1.95x book with no debt and $4.96 billion of cash. For a broker/custodian platform with gross margin near 90% and operating margin near 86%, that multiple is not demanding if the franchise can keep taking share and monetizing client cash balances. The “mature earner” label undersells the operating momentum.
That is why I think the “fair value around $90” conclusion is too complacent. On the supplied numbers, EV/revenue of 3.4x and EV/EBITDA of 3.8x are low for a business that has compounded revenue in the mid-teens at minimum, earnings faster than that, and carries a pristine balance sheet. If you treat the annual net income figure as the primary truth, then yes, 40x earnings looks rich; but if you instead believe the operating profit, cash flow, and quarterly earnings run-rate are closer to economic earnings power, then the stock at $88.63 looks more like a high-quality compounder being screened incorrectly than a fully valued broker. I come out moderately bullish: the market is probably right that lower rates will pressure net interest income, but the valuation already reflects far more normalization anxiety than the rest of the income statement justifies.
The best case against that view is obvious and serious: IBKR may simply be near peak earnings quality because rates have been doing a lot of the work, and the data set may be flattering the business through brokerage-specific accounting quirks. The recent revenue trend is decelerating on the provided signal set, recent annual revenue growth from 2024 to 2025 was only 9.7%, and if normalized earnings really are around the reported $984 million annual number, then a $150.34 billion market cap is wildly expensive. A smart bear would also point to the tiny dividend yield, low reported ROE of 4.8%, and the business mix risk that active trading, margin lending, and client cash sweeps all soften together when rates fall and retail activity cools. On that read, the low EV multiples are a trap created by financial-company statement structure, and the market is not cheap at all — it is paying up for a niche broker whose best cyclical conditions may be behind it.
I weigh those objections differently because the internal consistency of the stronger figures matters more than the surface multiples. A company with no debt, nearly $5 billion cash, $15.8 billion operating cash flow, and operating income of $8.8 billion is not economically weak, even if reported net income appears oddly low. What would change my mind is straightforward: if over the next two to three quarters revenue slips back toward the $550-$600 million range while quarterly net income falls below roughly $900 million and annual operating cash flow stops tracking well above net income, I would assume the apparent earnings power is indeed overstated and that fair value is below today’s price. Conversely, if revenue sustains above $700 million quarterly and annual revenue pushes past $11 billion even as rates ease, then the market is still underestimating how much of this growth is share gain rather than rate windfall.
Grok Reading
The quarterly figures expose the real engine and the real risk at once. What the tape labels as “revenue” in the $474–699M range is clearly the commission-and-fee spine, compounding at a healthy clip (up roughly 18% from the year-ago quarter and still accelerating in absolute dollars through 2026-Q1). That is the durable franchise: low-cost global execution, sticky professional and advisor balances, and operating leverage that has driven operating margins above 85%. Yet reported annual net income attributable to the public company sits at only $984M on $10.22B of total revenue, a 9.6% net margin that looks anemic beside the 86% operating margin precisely because of the well-known Up-C/NCI structure. The market is therefore paying a 40.6x multiple on the thin equity slice while the economic earnings power of the operating partnership is several times larger. That multiple is the entire debate.
The growth arithmetic that got IBKR here is not repeatable. Revenue climbed from $2.94B in 2021 to $10.22B in 2025 largely on the back of the rate cycle; the step-function jumps in 2022–2023 are net-interest income, not commission share gains. Recent revenue growth has already decelerated to 9.7% year-over-year while the pre-flight note correctly flags macro headwinds. A 14.6% revenue CAGR and 28% earnings CAGR look impressive in the rear-view mirror; they embed a once-in-a-decade interest-rate tailwind that is now rolling over. Meanwhile ROE prints at a dismal 4.8% and ROA at 48 bp—structural artifacts of the public float, yes, but still the returns the equity holder actually owns. Paying nearly 2x book and 40x earnings for mid-single-digit ROE with a decelerating top line is not a bargain simply because EV/EBITDA screens at 3.8x; brokerage EV metrics are distorted by customer cash and have misled more than one model.
The valuation synthesis that parks fair value at $90–91 and calls the stock “below its no-growth floor” is internally at war with itself. It simultaneously claims growth is free and that the market has already priced more growth than the fundamentals can deliver. I side with the second statement. At $88.63 the shares sit essentially on top of the composite fair-value estimate, yet that estimate appears to extrapolate elevated net interest margins and continued mid-teens volume growth without a meaningful discount-rate or terminal-margin haircut. Operating cash flow of $15.8B is impressive until one remembers it is dominated by customer-credit-balance swings, not free cash available to equity. With debt at zero and $5B of cash the balance sheet is fortress-like, but fortress balance sheets do not justify 40x earnings when the earnings themselves are rate-cyclical.
The strongest contrary case is straightforward and quantitative: commission revenue is still rising, client accounts and customer equity have historically compounded through rate cycles, the technology and clearing moat is real, and a higher-for-longer rate path would keep NII elevated far longer than the bear case assumes. Earnings are up 30% year-over-year even as headline revenue growth slows, proving the operating leverage remains intact. A smart bull will also note that the 25%-ish public ownership means any buybacks or continued up-C exchanges accrete directly to the listed shares, and that the “quiet-quality” narrative has kept multiple compression modest so far. I weigh this evidence seriously; it keeps me from a high-conviction short. I simply do not believe it supports a 40x exit multiple once the Fed’s terminal rate is fully digested and the easy NII comparisons vanish.
I would reverse to constructive on a clean break of commission revenue back above 15% year-over-year sustained for two quarters, evidence that net interest income has stabilized within 10% of the 2025 peak despite lower fed-funds, or a multiple compression to the high-20s on trailing earnings that resets the starting point. Conversely, two consecutive quarters of sequential decline in net interest income coupled with DARTs or account growth falling into the mid-single digits would confirm the earnings power is more cyclical than the current multiple admits and would push fair value into the $70s.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
IBKR is a mature earner running at extraordinary operating intensity: revenue climbed from $2.94B (2021) to $10.22B (2025), a ~36% CAGR, while operating margin expanded from 68.6% to 86.0% and gross margin reached 89.8%. Net income more than tripled to $984M and FCF hit $15.81B in 2025 (OCF/NI ~13x reflects the broker-dealer balance sheet dynamics, not accrual manipulation). Accruals at -4.8% of assets and $4.96B of liquid cash with zero net debt underline that reported earnings are cash-backed and the franchise is entirely self-funding. Capital discipline is a standout: diluted share count is trending down (-1.7% CAGR) with SBC at just 1.2% of revenue, so per-share value is being concentrated rather than diluted, unusual for a fast-growing financial. The Altman Z of 0.71 is a false positive - the model is calibrated for industrial firms and mis-reads broker-dealers whose balance sheets are dominated by customer assets/liabilities. What is not visible in the data: interest-rate sensitivity of net interest income (a large driver of the 2023-2025 margin surge), regulatory capital detail, and any customer/counterparty concentration. Barring those unknowns, this reads as one of the more durable, high-integrity operators in capital markets.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Share of revenue and pretax income from net interest income vs. commissions/other, and rate sensitivity disclosures
- Structure of the up-C: public float vs. Member interests and any ongoing conversion that would raise reported share count
- Customer/segment concentration - proportion of introducing-broker vs. professional vs. retail balances
- Regulatory capital cushion at IBLLC and non-US subsidiaries
- Detail behind the 2025 FCF of $15.81B - how much is operating vs. changes in customer-related working capital
The e2e composite fair value of $90.10 and signal-adjusted $90.91 sit within 3% of the $88.74 price - that is the textbook definition of fairly valued. The EPV floor of $146.20 looks like a runaway output driven by capitalizing a rate-cycle-peak earnings stream at a low discount rate; I would not lean on it as a margin-of-safety anchor when a big chunk of NIM is cyclically inflated. The anchored-PE of $34 is the other extreme, penalizing a genuinely superior franchise. The composite splitting the difference and landing right at the tape is the honest read.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Segment split of net interest income vs commissions to gauge rate sensitivity
- Guidance on account growth and margin loan balances into a cutting cycle
- Any one-time gains inflating the 86% margin print
- Buyback pace and share count trajectory
The pressure on IBKR right now is mildly positive and unusually clean. The tape is risk-on (VIX 15.8, S&P near highs) and with a 1.34 beta IBKR should benefit from the buoyant backdrop more than a typical financial - high-beta capital-markets names get bid in calm, upward tapes because trading volumes and margin balances feed directly off risk appetite. The narrative is 'quiet-quality' at minimal intensity and durable: there is no cult premium to unwind, no fragile story to crack. That means sentiment is neither a big tailwind nor a big headwind on its own; it just quietly compounds with the tape. Analyst tone is a real, identifiable tailwind: Wall Street is broadly bullish (ABR buy skew), one prominent fair-value model just lifted from $88.27 to $106.97 on strong earnings, and coverage frames the recent 8.6% monthly pullback as a buying opportunity - classic supportive drumbeat. Newsflow is incrementally positive (Brazil futures expansion, AI/MCP integration) - the kind of quiet product-drip stories that reinforce the 'best-in-class execution engine' framing without inflating it. Offsetting: rates at 4.63% and a headline arguing IBKR could be 43% above fair value are genuine headwinds for a name whose margin-financing income is rate-sensitive, and the recent 8.6% monthly drawdown shows the tape can still punish it. Net: a modest tailwind - supportive tape, supportive Street, no narrative fragility, but no mania to ride either.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the fair-value upgrade to $106.97 gets echoed by other sell-side shops or stays a one-off
- Direction of front-end rates - a decisive dovish pivot would flip the margin-financing narrative to a headwind
- July/August brokerage metrics prints - deteriorating DARTs or margin balances would crack the quiet-quality frame
- Whether the 'overvalued' framing gains traction and starts driving downgrade headlines
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 6, 2026, IBKR was $88.74. We expect it to be $95.30 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $75.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 6, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.