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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for IES Holdings, Inc. (IESC) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score -9 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 69 · Value -61 · Sentiment -53 (timing only, not weighted)
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reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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IES Holdings, Inc.
IESC NASDAQIES Holdings, Inc. is a U.S. holding company that provides integrated electrical and technology systems along with infrastructure products and services. The company serves a broad range of end markets, including data centers, residential housing, and commercial and industrial facilities. Its operations are organized into four business segments: Communications, Residential, Infrastructure Solutions, and Commercial & Industrial. Through these businesses, IES Holdings supports electrical installation, technology infrastructure, mechanical services, and custom-engineered products used across construction and industrial environments. The company is headquartered in Houston, Texas, and focuses on project-based work and service offerings that connect power, communications, and building systems for customers across the United States.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Jun 30, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 22.39
Total Equity: $1.23B
Shares: 20,185,811
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $77.28M
EBITDA: $550.81M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $77.28M
Revenue: $3.99B
Revenue: $3.99B
Revenue: $3.99B
Total Equity: $1.23B
Tax Rate: 24.1%
Equity: $1.23B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $77.28M
Current Liabilities: $941.73M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $1.23B
Shares: 20,185,811
Shares: 20,185,811
CapEx: -$143.03M
Shares: 20,185,811
Stock Price: $316.92
Net Income: $452.04M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 5:06pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.5B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.9B | $3.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.2B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.5B |
| Gross Profit | $288.0M | $318.9M | $444.5M | $696.6M | $859.5M |
| Operating Expenses | $202.4M | $262.9M | $284.8M | $395.7M | $476.0M |
| Operating Income | $85.6M | $56.0M | $159.8M | $300.9M | $383.5M |
| Net Income | $66.7M | $34.8M | $108.3M | $219.1M | $306.0M |
| EBITDA | $107.5M | $81.5M | $189.2M | $338.0M | $430.5M |
| EPS | $3.19 | $1.45 | $4.58 | $10.02 | $15.22 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.15 | $1.44 | $4.54 | $9.89 | $15.02 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 5:06pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | — | — | $75.8M | $100.8M | $127.2M |
| Total Current Assets | $484.2M | $624.4M | $671.3M | $871.7M | $1.1B |
| Total Assets | $766.6M | $934.7M | $981.6M | $1.2B | $1.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $311.6M | $401.9M | $400.6M | $522.6M | $633.4M |
| Long-Term Debt | $39.7M | $81.6M | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $396.1M | $544.2M | $481.7M | $591.9M | $707.7M |
| Total Equity | $370.5M | $390.5M | $499.9M | $652.1M | $888.0M |
| Retained Earnings | $173.1M | $203.2M | $295.8M | $497.8M | $800.8M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 5:06pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $37.9M | $16.3M | $153.9M | $234.4M | $286.1M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$7.4M | -$29.3M | -$17.7M | -$45.2M | -$67.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | $30.5M | -$13.0M | $136.2M | $189.2M | $218.8M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$92.5M | $0 | $0 | -$67.0M | -$52.4M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.3B | -$1.9B | -$2.5B | -$2.9B | -$996.4M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$7.0M | -$18.6M | -$8.3M | -$44.0M | -$41.6M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$30.5M | $1.7M | $50.9M | $25.1M | $26.3M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 5:06pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +41.0% | +9.7% | +21.3% | +16.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +10.7% | +39.4% | +56.7% | +23.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | -34.6% | +185.3% | +88.3% | +27.5% |
| Net Income Growth | -47.9% | +211.5% | +102.3% | +39.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | -24.2% | +132.2% | +78.7% | +27.4% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-17 16:39The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers here are stunning and the models are underselling them. Quarterly revenue went from $775.8M (Sep-24) to $1.24B (Jun-26) — that's a 60% jump in seven quarters, with the most recent quarter accelerating (Jun-26 rev +39% YoY vs Mar-26 +17%). Net margin expanded from 6.7% to 12.4% over the same span, and Jun-26 NI of $153.5M annualizes to ~$614M vs TTM ~$462M implied by the P/E of 14.15 on a $12.95B cap. On the most recent quarter run-rate, this trades at ~21x forward earnings against an EPS that just grew 195% YoY in a single quarter. The synthesis's $271 DCF anchor is using backward-looking cash flows against a business whose Q4 print alone was 27% higher than Q3.
The balance sheet is pristine — zero debt, $127M cash, $888M equity generating 44% ROE and 32% ROIC. FCF of $219M on the FY2025 basis is already stale; the TTM run should be closer to $350–400M given the NI trajectory, putting FCF yield around 2.7–3%. That's not cheap in absolute terms, but for a debt-free compounder growing revenue 20%+ CAGR with expanding margins and 32% ROIC, it's not obviously expensive either. The Market Forces model's "peak cycle" framing needs scrutiny: if this is the peak, why is sequential revenue still accelerating ($871M → $974M → $1.24B in the last three quarters)? Peaks roll over, they don't inflect upward.
Where I'd push back on my own bullishness: the contrarian case is real and specific. First, that Jun-26 quarter is a massive outlier — $1.24B is 27% above the prior quarter, which is not organic; it's either a large acquisition closing or lumpy data center project timing, and margins at 12.4% may not sustain if mix normalizes. Second, insider selling of ~37,500 shares on June 12, 2026 at prices near the highs is the tell — insiders selling into strength right before/after a blowout print suggests they see the setup as unusually favorable and possibly unrepeatable. Third, ~40% of the earnings growth is coming from margin expansion from 6.7% to 12.4%, and electrical contracting is not a structurally 12%+ margin business — Comfort Systems (FIX) and MYR Group run 6-9% net. Reversion to even 9% net margin on $5B run-rate revenue is ~$450M NI, or ~29x forward — expensive. Fourth, the "data center capex" narrative is now consensus and the entire sector (PWR, FIX, MTZ, IESC) has re-rated together; a single hyperscaler capex guide-down would compress the whole cohort.
Net: I dissent partially from the synthesis "fair value" call. The composite $271 DCF is anchored on trailing cash flows and understates the trajectory — if you believe margins hold at even 10% on a $5B revenue run-rate ($500M NI), fair value at 18x is ~$225/sh (still below current); if you believe margins hold at 12% and growth continues at 15%, forward NI of $600M+ at 20x supports $330+. The truth is bimodal and hinges on whether Jun-26's margin is signal or noise. I lean fairly-valued-to-slightly-rich with real upside optionality, but the insider selling and the mathematically implausible sustainability of 27% sequential revenue growth make me refuse to call it undervalued. The models converge on "fair value with downside risk," which is directionally right but understates both the operating momentum and the peak-margin risk. This is a coin-flip on the next two quarters: another $1.2B+ print with 11%+ margins re-rates it toward $400; a normalization quarter ($1.0B, 9% margin) sends it to $240.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not just growth, but the shape of it: IES has gone from a decent contractor to a very high-return, cash-rich operator in a remarkably short span. On a trailing basis through 2026-06-30, revenue is about $3.98 billion, up roughly 23% from the prior-year TTM of about $3.25 billion, while net income has jumped to about $452 million from roughly $261 million, a 73% increase. That is not normal E&C behavior. The more important point is that margin expansion has been steady rather than episodic: quarterly net margin has risen from 6.7% in 2024-09 to 12.4% in 2026-06, and TTM operating margin sits at 12.4% versus 10.5% in fiscal 2025 and 5.7% in 2023. When a construction-adjacent business doubles operating margin in three years while also compounding revenue above 20%, I do not want to dismiss it as “just cyclical” without stronger evidence.
The quarterly progression is especially strong. Revenue stepped from $775.8 million in 2024-09 to $897.8 million in 2025-09, then to $1.24 billion in 2026-06; net income over those same quarters rose from $52.1 million to $96.4 million to $153.5 million. That looks like real operating leverage and favorable mix, not a one-quarter spike. The balance sheet gives this performance more credibility: zero debt, $127 million of cash, and an equity base of $888 million supporting a business now earning more than 50% of that equity base in TTM net income. Even using the older annual cash flow snapshot, free cash flow was $218.8 million on $306.0 million of net income, so conversion was already respectable before the latest profit surge. At $316.92, the stock trades at about 14x TTM earnings and 11.3x EV/EBITDA. For an average contractor, that would be full enough; for a business growing earnings 70%+ with rising margins and no leverage, it is not obviously expensive.
The real debate is whether these are peak numbers masquerading as a new base. I think the market is already discounting that risk too aggressively. A $12.95 billion market cap against about $452 million of TTM earnings implies the market is not paying a “story stock” multiple; it is paying a modest premium to industrial cyclicals for a company with much better recent economics. If IES can merely hold net margins around 10%-11% on something like $4.2-$4.4 billion of revenue over the next year, earnings power is still substantial enough to support today’s price. Given the visible acceleration in the latest quarter, I think fair value is above the current quote, not below it. My bias is that the stock deserves something closer to 16-18x a conservatively normalized earnings base, which gets you comfortably above $316 unless profits collapse quickly.
The best case against that view is straightforward and serious: contractors do not usually sustain 11%-12% net margins, especially through an end-market boom tied to data centers and broader nonresidential capex. The stock’s low P/E may simply reflect that investors do not believe $452 million of TTM earnings is durable. The June-quarter annualized run rate is extreme — $1.24 billion of quarterly revenue and $153.5 million of profit suggest a pace that could flatten or reverse if project timing, customer concentration, or pricing normalize. Book value is only $888 million, so the 5.2x price/book tells you the market is capitalizing intangibles around execution and cycle position, not hard assets. And the insider sales on 2026-06-12, while not dispositive, are the kind of data bears will point to if they think management knows the cycle is peaking.
What would change my mind is not a mild slowdown, but evidence that the margin structure is already unwinding. If the next couple of quarters fall back toward the 8%-9% net margin range on flat-to-down revenue, then the “new normal” thesis is wrong and the stock should trade more like a conventional contractor, probably below $280. Likewise, if TTM free cash flow badly lags the new earnings level, I would worry the earnings quality is weaker than it appears. But if revenue stays above $1.0 billion per quarter and net margins remain at or above 10%, the market will eventually have to accept that IES has structurally re-rated its earnings power, and a stock in the low $300s will look too cheap.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The most striking feature of IES Holdings is not the revenue growth, but the violent expansion of operating leverage. While revenue has compounded at a respectable 20.2% CAGR, net income has exploded at a 51.7% CAGR, driven by a net margin that has nearly doubled from 7.7% in FY2024 to 11.3% in FY2025. The quarterly data confirms this is not a one-time accounting artifact; the most recent quarter (June 2026) posted a 12.4% net margin on $1.24B in revenue, representing a sequential acceleration from the 11.3% margin in March 2026. This trajectory suggests the company is successfully capturing pricing power in the data center and electrical infrastructure space, converting top-line growth into bottom-line cash at an accelerating rate. The balance sheet supports this aggressive posture: with zero total debt and $127.2M in cash against a $12.95B market cap, the company is funding its expansion entirely through internal cash generation ($218.8M FCF in FY2025), which is a rare and powerful combination for a construction firm.
The valuation metrics present a contradiction that the prior models failed to resolve. The "Valuation Synthesis" cites a P/E of 21x, yet the canonical metrics list a TTM P/E of 14.15x. This discrepancy is critical. If we use the canonical TTM P/E of 14.15x, the stock is trading at a significant discount to its own historical growth rate, not a premium. The "Market Forces" model flags "Unusual Selling Activity" based on insider transactions, but a closer look reveals that the "sales" in June 2026 were modest (approx. 37,500 shares total) compared to the "A-Award" grants in July 2026. More importantly, the "Market Forces" model claims a "61% drawdown from peak," which is not supported by the provided price data ($316.92) or the valuation metrics. If the stock were down 61% from a peak, the P/E would likely be much lower or the market cap significantly smaller relative to the earnings power. The data suggests the stock is actually trading at a reasonable multiple for a company with 50%+ earnings growth and zero debt. The "fair_value" verdict of $271.54 appears to be anchored to a conservative DCF that likely underestimates the durability of the current margin expansion.
The strongest case against this bullish read is the cyclical nature of the construction industry and the potential for margin compression. The "Bear story" correctly identifies that IES is exposed to residential and commercial construction, which are macro-sensitive. If the data center buildout slows or if labor costs spike, the 12.4% net margin could revert to the 7-8% range seen in 2024. Furthermore, the "Market Forces" model notes "Macro Headwinds," which could pressure the 22.7% recent revenue YoY growth. The insider selling, while small in absolute terms, is a signal that insiders may be taking profits at these levels. However, I weigh this differently because the zero-debt balance sheet provides a massive cushion against downturns, and the FCF quality is "Good," indicating that the earnings are backed by real cash, not just accruals. The "steady-compounder" narrative is supported by the consistent quarterly revenue growth and the accelerating margins, which suggest that the company is not just riding a cyclical wave but is structurally improving its cost base and pricing power.
What would change my mind is a significant deceleration in revenue growth or a sharp drop in net margins. If the next two quarters show revenue growth slowing below 15% or net margins falling below 10%, it would suggest that the current margin expansion is a temporary blip rather than a structural shift. Additionally, if the company takes on significant debt to fund acquisitions, it would change the risk profile from a "cash-rich consolidator" to a "leveraged acquirer," which would warrant a lower valuation multiple. The "Valuation Synthesis" model's caution about "methods disagreeing" is valid, but the underlying data of zero debt, high FCF, and accelerating margins points to a company that is undervalued relative to its growth and quality metrics. The market is likely underestimating the durability of the data center tailwind and the company's ability to maintain its margin expansion.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The trajectory is exceptional: revenue nearly doubled from $2.03B (2022) to $3.99B (2026), gross margin expanded from 15.4% to 26.3%, and operating margin went from 3% to 12.4%. Net income rose from $43.6M to $452M and FCF from negative $43.6M to $228.4M. Diluted shares fell slightly (20.9M to 20.2M) with buybacks running 357% of SBC and SBC only 0.4% of revenue - genuine per-share value concentration, not dilution theater. Balance sheet is a fortress: $387.9M net cash, Altman Z of 10.95, accruals just 1.3% of assets, Beneish M of -2.05. OCF/NI at 0.77x is the one soft spot - net income is outrunning cash somewhat, likely working-capital absorption from rapid growth typical in E&C, but FCF is still strongly positive and rising in absolute terms. The blemish is insider activity: 94 sells totaling $439.6M against zero buys, dominated by Gendell/Tontine, a large concentrated holder trimming. This is distribution rather than an operational red flag, but the scale is notable and the pattern is described as deviating from historical norms.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Segment/end-market concentration - how much revenue and margin comes from data-center-adjacent electrical work vs residential
- Working capital drivers behind the OCF/NI gap - contract assets, retention receivables
- Backlog trend and mix to test whether the 26.3% gross margin is sustainable
- Nature of Gendell/Tontine sales - 10b5-1 plan, remaining stake, and voting/control implications
- Acquisition contribution to growth vs organic - rollup risk in reported margins
- Customer concentration in the largest end markets
The e2e synthesis lands at a composite FV of $232.70 and a signal-adjusted FV of $271.54, both below the $316.92 print, implying about -14% to -27% downside on the central methods. The DCF ($102) and EPV floor ($59) look punitive and probably underweight the current margin ramp, so I set them aside as downside anchors rather than deserved value. The anchored-PE of $667 is a runaway output - it capitalizes peak-cycle earnings on a stretched multiple and should be discounted heavily; a fair value 2x the price on a cyclical contractor is not credible.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Backlog composition and data-center concentration in latest 10-Q
- Segment margins - are commercial/industrial margins sustainable or peak-cycle
- Residential segment volumes vs housing starts
- Cash use - buybacks vs continued M&A pace and multiples paid
- Any commentary on 2026 margin normalization
The macro tape is turning against exactly this profile. IESC is a beta-1.78 industrial cyclical with construction and residential exposure, sitting in a nascent risk-off regime with VIX at the 75th percentile and the 10y at 5%. High-beta cyclicals get marked down disproportionately in these tapes, and IESC's late-August 53% single-day drop with no clean catalyst signals fragile positioning and jumpy holders - exactly the tape behavior of a name where the narrative is wobbling. The July 31% earnings surge plus split-driven melt-up left a crowded, momentum-heavy shareholder base that a risk-off tape tends to shake out first. On the narrative side, the story is a moderate-intensity, low-cult steady-compounder wrapped in a crowded AI-data-center trade. That trade is the marginal buyer of this name, and when data-center sentiment cools (as it periodically does within any risk-off episode), IESC has no cult premium or defensive characteristics to cushion the de-rating. Analyst tone and news flow are quiet - no fresh upgrades or narrative reinforcement to lean against the tape. Net: moderate headwind, not a collapse, because the underlying compounder story is intact and durable at moderate intensity.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- What actually caused the August 24 drop - guidance cut, insider sale, or purely technical
- Whether data-center capex sentiment holds through the next hyperscaler capex updates
- VIX trend and whether risk-off deepens beyond the nascent 1-day read
- Any analyst target revisions post the August drop - silence would itself be bearish
The world is re-electrifying: AI compute demand is converting into power distribution, switchgear, and low-voltage field labor — a physical bottleneck that cannot be offshored or automated away, and where IES self-performs. That is a genuine multi-year capex wave, not a narrative. Against it, financing conditions are tight (10y at 5%), which suppresses the rate-sensitive half of the portfolio: single-family housing and speculative commercial. So the world is simultaneously handing IES its best-ever demand in one segment and its weakest in another. The net has been decisively positive because data-center scopes are larger, better-priced, and longer-dated than the residential work they offset. The durable question is not whether electrical services demand exists — it does — but whether the current pricing power survives when capacity catches up and the category's boom-phase margins normalize.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for IESC — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.