For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for ITT Inc. (ITT) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
ITT Inc.
ITT NYSEITT Inc. is a diversified industrial manufacturer of highly engineered critical components and customized technology solutions for transportation, industrial, and energy markets. The company operates through three segments: Motion Technologies, Industrial Process, and Connect & Control Technologies. Its portfolio includes brake pads, shock absorbers, damping systems, industrial pumps, valves, fluid handling equipment, connectors, switches, actuators, and monitoring and control solutions. These products serve applications where reliability, performance, and durability are essential, including vehicles, industrial processing systems, energy infrastructure, and other demanding operating environments. ITT Inc. also supports customers with aftermarket parts, service, and maintenance-related solutions that help extend equipment life and improve operational continuity. Headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut, ITT Inc. plays a significant role in supplying mission-critical technologies to global original equipment manufacturers and industrial end users.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Jul 4, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 4.94
Total Equity: $4.81B
Shares: 85,333,333
Total Debt: $3.73B
Cash: $590.80M
EBITDA: $900.10M
Total Debt: $3.73B
Cash: $590.80M
Revenue: $4.74B
Revenue: $4.74B
Revenue: $4.74B
Total Equity: $4.81B
Tax Rate: 29.7%
Equity: $4.81B
Total Debt: $3.73B
Cash: $590.80M
Current Liabilities: $2.25B
Long-Term Debt: $2.87B
Total Debt: $3.73B
Total Equity: $4.81B
Shares: 85,333,333
Shares: 85,333,333
CapEx: -$123.30M
Shares: 85,333,333
Stock Price: $204.33
Net Income: $421.50M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 3:53pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.8B | $3.0B | $3.3B | $3.6B | $3.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.5B |
| Gross Profit | $899.5M | $922.3M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $395.2M | $454.3M | $579.1M | $571.3M | $707.9M |
| Operating Income | $504.3M | $468.0M | $528.2M | $676.0M | $684.5M |
| Net Income | $316.3M | $367.0M | $410.5M | $518.3M | $488.0M |
| EBITDA | $617.4M | $575.4M | $637.4M | $813.3M | $827.7M |
| EPS | $3.68 | $4.40 | $4.99 | $6.34 | $6.15 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.66 | $4.38 | $4.96 | $6.30 | $6.11 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 3:53pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $647.5M | $561.2M | $489.2M | $439.3M | $1.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $3.4B |
| Total Assets | $3.6B | $3.8B | $3.9B | $4.7B | $6.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $928.3M | $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | $9.9M | $7.7M | $5.7M | $232.6M | $521.5M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $2.2B |
| Total Equity | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $4.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 3:53pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$8.4M | $277.7M | $538.0M | $562.6M | $668.8M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$88.4M | -$103.9M | -$107.6M | -$123.9M | -$121.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$96.8M | $173.8M | $430.4M | $438.7M | $547.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$146.9M | -$79.3M | -$864.8M | -$6.8M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$2.4M | -$2.1M | -$2.2M | $226.5M | $287.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$75.8M | -$87.9M | -$95.8M | -$104.7M | -$111.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$116.5M | -$245.3M | -$60.0M | -$104.5M | -$521.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$212.3M | -$86.4M | -$72.0M | -$49.9M | $1.3B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 3:53pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +8.1% | +9.9% | +10.6% | +8.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +2.5% | +20.1% | +12.6% | +11.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -7.2% | +12.9% | +28.0% | +1.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +16.0% | +11.9% | +26.3% | -5.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -6.8% | +10.8% | +27.6% | +1.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 3:52pm (31d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-08 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-06 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-02 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-06 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-29 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-03 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-03 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-07 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-31 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-08 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-08 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-30 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-01 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-16 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-08 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-10 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-10 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The number that should stop every model in its tracks is the 2026 quarterly margin collapse, and I don't think any of the prior outputs grapples with it seriously enough. Net margin went from 12.5% in Q4 2025 to 6.4% in Q1 2026 to 5.8% in Q2 2026, while revenue jumped from $1.05B to $1.21B to $1.47B in the same span. That 40% two-quarter revenue step-up is almost certainly a closed acquisition, and the margin halving is the cost of absorbing it. The TTM ROIC of 6.0% versus the 2025 annual ROIC of 16.5% — a 64% gap that the anomaly list flags at 8/10 confidence — is the single most important data point in this file, and it tells you the business you are valuing is not the business that generated the 2024-2025 earnings stream. The valuation synthesis anchors fair value at $127.70, which implicitly assumes the pre-acquisition margin profile persists. If the 5.8% net margin is the new steady state on a ~$5.4B revenue run-rate, annualized net income is roughly $340M, and $18.36B of market cap is 54x that. Even if you normalize to a 9% blended margin (giving the acquired business a break for integration costs), you get ~$486M of earnings, and $204 is still 37x. The synthesis calls this "overvalued" and I agree, but I think its $128 anchor is slightly too punitive because it doesn't credit the genuine net-cash position ($1.74B cash against $783M debt) or the 12.8% FCF CAGR that is real, not modeled. A fairer range is $135-150, which still implies a 27-34% downside from $204.
The prior models' treatment of insider activity is a small but telling error. The "significant insider buying" secondary signal rests on a single 5,019-share purchase on August 31, 2026 — roughly $1 million at the current price — and eight "A-Award" entries that are equity compensation grants, not open-market purchases. No one at ITT is writing a check that signals conviction at $204. The classification as "mature_earner" at 0.77 confidence is also stale; a company that just bolted on 40% of its revenue base in two quarters is in a transition state, not a mature steady state, and the growth profile the models are underwriting (8-10% organic) no longer describes the P&L. The pre-flight's "energy-transition beneficiary" framing is directionally reasonable for the Industrial Process and Connect & Control segments, but it is a narrative overlay on a company whose most recent two quarters show a 5.8% net margin, which is closer to a commodity industrial than a premium technology-adjacent franchise.
Where I partially disagree with the synthesis is on the M&A premium. The narrative layer correctly identifies that roughly $7.5B of the $18.4B market cap is speculative deal-flow premium, and I agree that premium is fragile and binary. But I think the models underweight the probability that the 2026 acquisition itself is the catalyst — ITT just demonstrated it can execute a bolt-on that adds $500M+ of revenue. If management continues to buy at 8-10x EBITDA (the top bull case in the thesis evaluation), the revenue base compounds faster than the 9.5% CAGR the momentum module calculates, and the multiple compresses organically. That is a real, if modest, bull case that the $128 DCF anchor doesn't capture. The contrarian argument, though, is sharper: at 41x TTM earnings with a 0.72% dividend yield and a 29% payout ratio, there is no cash return to shareholders that justifies the multiple. You are paying for growth that is acquisition-dependent and for a margin profile that just broke. The 3.3-4.1x PEG the thesis evaluation flags is the right frame, and for industrials, PEGs above 2.5 have historically mean-reverted within two to three years.
The data is also thinner than it appears. We have exactly two quarters of post-acquisition results, no segment-level breakdown for 2026, no disclosure of the acquired entity's standalone margins, and no guidance. The "high revenue confidence" and "accelerating" trend labels in the secondary signals are mechanically correct but analytically misleading — a one-time revenue step-up is not an accelerating organic trend. The 2025 annual income statement (revenue $3.94B, NI $488M, FCF $547.5M) is the last clean data point, and it is already nine months old. Until we see Q3 2026 and a full-year 2026 print with segment detail, the margin trajectory is a two-data-point line, which is not a trend.
GPT Reading
Grok Reading
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
ITT has grown revenue from $2.77B in 2021 to $3.94B in 2025, a roughly 9 percent CAGR with no down year. Gross margin recovered from a 2022 dip of 30.9 percent to 35.4 percent in 2025, the highest in the series, while operating margin sits at 17.4 percent after peaking at 18.6 percent in 2024. Free cash flow has been the standout: from negative $96.8M in 2021 (a one-time capex year) to $547.5M in 2025, roughly 14 percent of revenue and accelerating. The balance sheet carries $960M of net cash, the company is self-funding, and the Altman Z score of 7 places it firmly in the safe zone. Earnings quality is clean: accruals are just 0.9 percent of assets, OCF-to-net-income is 0.9x, and the Beneish M-score of -2.62 shows no manipulation signal. Share count has fallen from 86.5M to 79.9M over four years, with buybacks running nearly 9x stock-based compensation, so per-share value is being concentrated. The one meaningful insider transaction in the tape is a $1.0M open-market purchase by Luca Savi in August 2026, with zero insider sells; the remaining entries are routine 935-share equity awards at zero cost.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Customer and end-market concentration in the 10-K (aerospace, oil-and-gas, water) to gauge how cyclical the revenue base truly is
- Whether the 2025 operating-margin decline is driven by one-time items or a structural cost increase (SG&A, inventory write-downs)
- Convertible or hybrid debt terms that could introduce future dilution beyond the current buyback program
- Segment-level margin trends to confirm the gross-margin expansion is broad-based rather than concentrated in one product line
- Capex trajectory: the 2021 negative FCF year suggests a capex cycle; confirm whether 2025 FCF of $547.5M is sustainable or flattered by a capex lull
The e2e composite fair value is $127.70 (signal-adjusted $128.40) against a price of $204.33, a 60 percent premium. The most generous method, the DCF at $151.58, still leaves the stock 35 percent above intrinsic. The anchored-PE method lands at $148.82, another 27 percent below price. The EPV floor of $58.80 is a liquidation reference and not the operative number, but it underscores that the downside cushion at $204 is thin relative to the asset base. Earnings quality is good (score 1), so no haircut is warranted, and the business itself is solid (quality 81) with four years of revenue growth, expanding margins, and accelerating FCF. None of that, however, justifies a 35-to-60 percent premium over the numbers the cash flows actually support.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest quarterly guidance on organic growth rate and margin trajectory - is the DCF growth assumption of low-single-digits still valid or has management guided to mid-single-digits?
- Any disclosed or rumored strategic interest (Parker, Emerson, PE) - a signed LOI or board-level discussion would change the deserved-value math materially
- Segment-level revenue and margin detail for braking systems, fluid handling, and defense connectors to confirm the conglomerate is not hiding a weak unit
- Buyback authorization remaining and pace - at current price the buyback is destroying value if the stock is truly over $150
- Net debt and free cash flow conversion in the most recent 10-Q to confirm the DCF cash-flow assumptions hold
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.