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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Illinois Tool Works Inc. (ITW) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -2 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 76 · Value -65 · Sentiment 8 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $145.41 vs $294.52 at analysis
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Illinois Tool Works Inc.
ITW NYSEIllinois Tool Works Inc. is a diversified industrial manufacturing company that develops specialized equipment, consumables, and related service solutions for a wide range of end markets. The company operates through seven segments: Automotive OEM, Food Equipment, Test and Measurement and Electronics, Welding, Polymers and Fluids, Construction Products, and Specialty Products. Its offerings span components and fasteners for vehicles, commercial kitchen equipment, testing and inspection systems, welding equipment and consumables, industrial adhesives and fluids, construction fastening systems, and packaging, coding, and appliance components. Illinois Tool Works Inc. serves industrial, commercial, and institutional customers globally, providing highly engineered, application-specific products that are integrated into customers’ production processes and infrastructure. Founded in 1912 and headquartered in Glenview, Illinois, the company plays a significant role in the industrials sector by supplying essential tools, systems, and consumables that support manufacturing efficiency, maintenance, and operations across multiple industries worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 10.49
Total Equity: $3.23B
Shares: 292,300,000
Total Debt: $8.97B
Cash: $851.00M
EBITDA: $4.53B
Total Debt: $8.97B
Cash: $851.00M
Revenue: $16.04B
Revenue: $16.04B
Revenue: $16.04B
Total Equity: $3.23B
Tax Rate: 22.7%
Equity: $3.23B
Total Debt: $8.97B
Cash: $851.00M
Current Liabilities: $5.13B
Long-Term Debt: $6.68B
Total Debt: $8.97B
Total Equity: $3.23B
Shares: 292,300,000
Shares: 292,300,000
CapEx: -$419.00M
Shares: 292,300,000
Stock Price: $294.52
Net Income: $3.07B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:06am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $14.5B | $15.9B | $16.1B | $15.9B | $16.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | $8.1B | $7.9B | $7.6B | $7.6B |
| Gross Profit | — | $7.8B | $8.2B | $8.3B | $8.5B |
| Operating Expenses | — | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.0B | $4.3B |
| Operating Income | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.3B | $4.2B |
| Net Income | $2.7B | $3.0B | $3.0B | $3.5B | $3.1B |
| EBITDA | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.3B | $4.6B | $4.5B |
| EPS | $8.55 | $9.80 | $9.77 | $11.75 | $10.52 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $8.51 | $9.77 | $9.74 | $11.71 | $10.49 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:43am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.5B | $708.0M | $1.1B | $948.0M | $851.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $6.4B | $6.3B | $6.2B | $5.9B | $6.2B |
| Total Assets | $16.1B | $15.4B | $15.5B | $15.1B | $16.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.5B | $4.5B | $4.7B | $4.3B | $5.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $6.9B | $6.2B | $6.3B | $6.3B | $6.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $12.5B | $12.3B | $12.5B | $11.8B | $12.9B |
| Total Equity | $3.6B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $3.3B | $3.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $24.3B | $25.8B | $27.1B | $28.9B | $30.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:06am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.6B | $2.3B | $3.5B | $3.3B | $3.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$296.0M | -$412.0M | -$455.0M | -$437.0M | -$419.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.3B | $1.9B | $3.1B | $2.8B | $2.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$731.0M | -$2.0M | $0 | -$115.0M | -$119.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $210.0M | $1.4B | $973.0M | $1.9B | $508.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.5B | -$1.5B | -$1.6B | -$1.7B | -$1.8B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.0B | -$1.8B | -$1.5B | -$1.5B | -$1.5B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.0B | -$819.0M | $357.0M | -$117.0M | -$97.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:06am (17d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +10.2% | +1.1% | -1.3% | +0.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | +4.7% | +1.6% | +2.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +9.0% | +6.6% | +5.5% | -1.1% |
| Net Income Growth | +12.6% | -2.5% | +18.0% | -12.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +8.3% | +6.3% | +5.6% | -0.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:43am (17d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-30 | $1.61 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-31 | $1.61 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-31 | $1.61 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-30 | $1.61 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-30 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-31 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-31 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-30 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-28 | $1.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-27 | $1.40 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-28 | $1.40 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-28 | $1.40 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-29 | $1.31 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-30 | $1.31 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-29 | $1.31 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-29 | $1.31 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-29 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-30 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-30 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-29 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 09:00Even the bull case prices 58% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 64%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($294.52) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +4% | 22.3% | $125.00 | -58% |
| Base — stabilizes | +3% | 19.4% | $105.57 | -64% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +1% | 16.5% | $87.67 | -70% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +2% | 20.0% | $106.85 | -64% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-11The Test and Measurement and Electronics segment sells inspection, test and electronics-assembly consumables into semiconductor and electronics manufacturing, while Welding consumables and Construction Products sell into power, pipe and structure work - all three are direct beneficiaries of AI-driven datacenter and grid buildout as a demand stream, not as a technology.
ITW's 80/20 pricing power on thousands of low-ticket, high-margin niche SKUs partly rests on customer inattention to small-dollar spend; AI procurement agents that automate spec matching, substitute discovery and cross-distributor price comparison attack exactly that inattention rent, and industry net margins are already down 2.1pp.
Whether AI-assisted procurement and generative part-consolidation erode ITW's price/mix contribution faster than AI-driven electronics and infrastructure capex lifts volume. Watch the price/mix line versus organic volume by segment, especially Polymers and Fluids and Construction Products.
Brand and part numbers written into customer engineering drawings, automotive OEM platform qualifications, welding-procedure and food-safety certifications, global plant footprint, and distributor shelf position - none of which cheap software reproduces.
AI Lens thesis
ITW is an ABNB-pattern name: the scarce assets are plants, approvals and installed equipment, and the monetized unit is a physical consumable or component consumed per unit of industrial activity, so intelligence getting cheaper does not substitute the product. AI arrives through three narrow channels - as customer demand (electronics test, welding into datacenter and power construction, semiconductor assembly materials), as an internal SG&A and engineering-productivity lever layered onto an already-harvested 80/20 program running 26 percent operating margins, and as a procurement-side threat to the price/mix rent embedded in thousands of small niche SKUs. Direction is mildly positive because the demand channel is real and the substitution channel is nearly absent; magnitude is small enough that AI should not be the deciding variable in the thesis.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Instron materials-test and Miller welding systems sit on decades of instrumented process data at the customer's machine; a connected-equipment and quality-assurance subscription attached to installed hardware would convert a hardware franchise into recurring software revenue, and almost nothing in the current numbers assumes it.
Downside The decentralized 84-division structure that makes 80/20 work is the wrong shape for enterprise AI - fragmented data, no shared systems - so ITW may capture materially less internal AI cost benefit than centralized industrial peers, meaning consensus efficiency gains show up at competitors instead.
Outcome range spread 36
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a story of stagnation dressed up as quality. Revenue has been rangebound at $15.9-16.1B for four straight years (2022-2025), with 2025 essentially flat vs. 2022 in nominal terms — meaning meaningful real revenue contraction. The quarterly cadence is worse than the headline: Q1 2026 at $4.02B is below Q4 2025 ($4.09B) and below Q2 2024 ($4.03B). Net income actually *fell* from $3.49B in 2024 to $3.07B in 2025 — a 12% decline — and Q3 2024's $1.16B (29.2% margin) is clearly a one-time gain distorting comps. Strip that out and margins are running steadily at 18-20%, which is genuinely good but not expanding. FCF at $2.71B against an $83.9B market cap is a 3.2% FCF yield. This is a no-growth, high-quality cash machine — nothing more.
The synthesis verdict of $131 fair value vs. $294 price is directionally correct but the magnitude feels aggressive. A 55% haircut implies ITW should trade at roughly 15x earnings and ~11-12x EV/EBITDA — that's deep-cyclical multiples for a business earning 28.7% ROIC with best-in-class 80/20 operational discipline. Comparable quality industrials (RBC, Roper, Fastenal) trade 25-35x. A more defensible fair value is probably 20-22x normalized $11 EPS = $220-240, still implying 20-25% downside but not the 55% the DCF spits out. The narrative model's framing — "45% fundamentals, 55% story" — is more honest than the point estimate. The mature_earner classification is correct; the pre-flight "platform monopoly" framing is a stretch — ITW is a diversified industrial with pricing power, not a platform, and conflating the two is exactly the narrative inflation the bear case warns about.
The contrarian pushback: ROIC of 28.7% is extraordinary and durable — ITW has delivered this for a decade+ through the 80/20 methodology, and the market rightly pays up for capital efficiency this rare. Debt/equity of 2.78x looks scary but reflects aggressive buybacks shrinking equity, not balance sheet stress — $3.13B OCF against $8.97B debt is 2.9x coverage, fine. The 2.19% dividend with 58% payout is sustainable and growing. If you believe reshoring/electrification/infrastructure spending is real and multi-year, ITW's automotive OEM, welding, and test/measurement segments are direct beneficiaries — and none of that shows up in trailing numbers yet. That's the bull case worth taking seriously, not the "hidden champion" hyperbole. Also worth noting: the data shows a Q1 2026 print, which is either forward-looking or mislabeled — I'd want to verify before anchoring hard on it.
Where I land: I agree with the synthesis direction (overvalued) but dissent on magnitude. The disconnect between -0.2% revenue CAGR, -6.3% FCF CAGR, and a 28x P/E is not defensible — you're paying growth-stock multiples for a business that hasn't grown the top line in four years and whose FCF is shrinking. Even granting premium quality, 28x forward on flat earnings requires either (a) margin expansion beyond 20% which has stalled, or (b) a cyclical inflection that isn't visible in the data. Neither is impossible, but neither is priced with any margin of safety. Fair value in the $220-240 range (18-20% downside) is more credible than $131. This isn't a short — quality compounders can stay expensive for years and the dividend + buyback provides floor support — but it's not a place to add capital at $294. Wait for either a cyclical drawdown to $230-240 or evidence of genuine revenue re-acceleration (2+ consecutive quarters of 4%+ YoY growth). The bear risk is asymmetric: if industrial capex softens in 2026, multiple compression to 22x on down earnings gets you to $200 fast.
GPT Reading
At $294.5, ITW is being valued like a premium compounder while the actual income statement looks like a no-growth, margin-optimized industrial. Revenue was $16.04B in 2025 versus $16.11B in 2023 and $15.93B in 2022; that is basically flat for four years. Even the quarterly run-rate says the same thing: the last four quarters sum to about $16.22B, only modestly above the prior four quarters near $15.77B, and the most recent quarter grew just 4.7% y/y to $4.02B from $3.84B. Meanwhile net income is not cleanly compounding either. 2025 NI of $3.07B was down sharply from 2024’s $3.49B, and the latest quarter’s $768M was only up 9.7% y/y off a soft base. This is a very good business, but the data do not support a 28x earnings multiple, 5.4x sales, and 20.7x EV/EBITDA for a company whose medium-term growth is essentially zero.
What does support a premium is operating quality. Gross margin of 52.9%, operating margin of 26.3%, and net margin of 19.1% are exceptional for an industrial. ROIC at 28.7% is legitimately elite, and free cash flow of $2.71B on $3.07B of net income is solid conversion. The balance sheet, however, is less pristine than the quality narrative implies: $8.97B of debt against just $851M of cash and only $3.23B of equity means the optical 95% ROE is mostly leverage and buybacks crushing book value, not some magical earnings engine. Price/book of 26.7x is a uselessly high number in that context, but it does underscore that investors are paying for franchise quality rather than balance-sheet substance. If I normalize this as a mature industrial that can maybe grow EPS mid-single digits through mix, pricing, and repurchases, fair value is nowhere near $295.
The key contradiction in the bull case is that ITW has already delivered the margin excellence people usually hope for. Operating income was $4.22B in 2025 on $16.04B of sales, basically peak-quality economics already. There is little evidence left of a large self-help runway from here. In fact, 2025 operating income of $4.22B was slightly below 2024’s $4.26B despite higher revenue, and free cash flow has a negative multiyear CAGR. That matters because when a company is priced at 28x earnings without real top-line growth, the multiple itself is doing the heavy lifting. A 22x multiple on $10-11 of sustainable EPS would already be generous for this profile and gets you something like $220-$240, not $295. To justify the current price, I would want to see either sustained organic growth in the high single digits or another leg up in margins; the raw numbers show neither.
The strongest argument against my view is that ITW has earned a structural premium for a long time because it behaves unlike a typical cyclical industrial. Even with flat revenue, it has held gross margin above 52%, operating margin above 26%, and quarterly net margins mostly in the 18-20% range, with only one obvious outlier quarter at 29.2%. That consistency through a sluggish macro backdrop is exactly what premium-multiple investors pay for. A 2.2% dividend yield and 58% payout ratio also make it attractive as a quality shareholder-return vehicle, and if end markets improve even modestly, the company could convert small revenue gains into disproportionate EPS growth because the base margins are so high. In other words, if you believe ITW is less a cyclical machinery name and more a durable cash compounder with pricing power, 28x is expensive but not absurd. I weigh that less heavily because the recent data show resilience, not acceleration, and resilience alone usually does not justify nearly 6x revenue.
What would change my mind is simple: I need to see growth broad enough to prove the current multiple is buying more than stability. If the next few quarters push annualized revenue clearly above $16.8B while maintaining operating margin at or above 26% and free cash flow above $3.0B, then I would accept that ITW can grow into a premium valuation. Likewise, if net debt starts coming down materially without hurting buybacks or dividend growth, the quality case gets stronger. On the other hand, if quarterly revenue slips back below $4.0B or net margins settle closer to 18% than 20%, the stock should de-rate hard because there is no valuation cushion.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a superbly run industrial that has stopped growing. Annual revenue has essentially flatlined—$15.93B in 2022, $16.11B in 2023, $15.90B in 2024, $16.04B in 2025—for a revenue CAGR of −0.2%. Recent quarterly run-rate sits in a tight $3.84–4.09B band with no inflection. Net income of $3.07B in 2025 is below the $3.49B of 2024 (the prior year flattered by a $1.16B quarter that pushed margins to an unsustainable 29.2%), and earnings CAGR over the measured window is a meager 1.8% while FCF CAGR is −6.3%. What the market is paying for is not top-line expansion; it is the margin machine. Gross margin holds at 52.9%, operating margin 26.3%, net margin 19.1%, with free cash flow of $2.71B on only $419M of capex. That is elite conversion. But a 28× P/E, 20.7× EV/EBITDA, and 5.4× sales on zero organic growth is a quality premium stretched into pure multiple expansion. The $83.9B enterprise is being valued as if the 80/20 playbook can manufacture earnings growth the revenue line refuses to deliver.
Balance-sheet optics reinforce the mature-earner read rather than a compounder story. Equity has been compressed to $3.23B against $8.97B of debt, producing a cosmetic ROE of 95% and a 2.78× debt-to-equity ratio; ROIC of 28.7% is the cleaner signal and it is genuinely strong, but it is being earned on a capital base that management has deliberately shrunk via returns of capital, not on reinvestment at high incremental returns. Dividend yield of 2.2% at a 58% payout is sustainable given FCF, yet it is not a growth reinvestment story. The valuation synthesis fair value near $131–139 is harsh—implying mid-teens earnings multiples that ignore durability of the margin structure—but the direction is correct: at $294.52 the stock embeds a narrative premium that fundamentals alone cannot support. Roughly half the price is story about structural moats in automotive OEM, food equipment, and welding; the cash-flow math does not get you there.
The strongest counter-argument is that ITW has earned the right to a scarcity multiple. Operating margins in the mid-20s through a soft industrial cycle, steady quarterly revenue with “good revenue confidence,” FCF quality flagged as good, and performance above sector benchmarks all argue that the 80/20 operating system really does decouple earnings from volume. Diversification across seven segments and mission-critical switching costs can justify trading through the cycle at 22–25× rather than a deep-value industrial multiple. A bull can also note that net margins have stabilized in the 18–20% range even as the one-time 2024 spike rolled off, and that modest volume recovery plus pricing could restore low-single-digit earnings growth without heroic assumptions. I weigh this less heavily because the market is already paying ~28× for that resilience; the margin of safety is gone. Paying 28× for 0–2% growth and mid-single-digit FCF yield leaves no room for a normal industrial downturn or for multiple compression if the “compounder” label is questioned.
I would reverse to neutral or constructive only on clear evidence of a re-acceleration: sustained quarterly revenue growth above 4–5% year-over-year for two consecutive halves, operating margin holding above 27% while volume recovers, or FCF climbing back through $3B with the current capital intensity. A material debt paydown that normalizes the equity base without starving the dividend would also reduce financial-risk overhang. Absent those, the stock remains a high-quality franchise priced for perfection.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
ITW shows the hallmarks of a high-quality mature earner. Gross margin has climbed from 48.9% (2022) to 52.9% (2025) and operating margin from 23.8% to 26.3%, indicating real operating leverage and pricing power on a roughly flat revenue base of about $16B. Net income of $3.07B in 2025 converts cleanly to $2.71B of FCF (OCF/NI 0.98x, accruals just 0.5% of assets), and the mechanical integrity checks - Beneish M at -2.44 and Altman Z at 8.44 - are firmly in the safe zone. Capital allocation is disciplined: diluted shares fell from 316.4M to 292.3M (about -2% CAGR), SBC is a trivial 0.4% of revenue, and buybacks run 23x SBC, so per-share value is being concentrated. The only friction is balance-sheet posture: net debt of about $8.1B against $851M cash, and short-term debt of $2.29B exceeds liquid cash - a refinancing touchpoint, not a solvency issue given $2.7B annual FCF and Z of 8.44. Overall this reads as a durable, well-run industrial compounder rather than a growth story.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Cause of 2025 net income decline from $3.49B to $3.07B despite stable margins - one-time charges, tax, or organic softening?
- Composition and maturity schedule of the $2.29B short-term debt and refinancing plans
- Segment-level organic growth vs. price/mix to confirm margin gains are structural (80/20) not transitory
- Insider transaction pattern and any large 10b5-1 program details
- Pension, environmental, or contingent liabilities not visible in the summary metrics
The composite fair value sits at $138.65 and the signal-adjusted at $131.47, implying roughly -55% downside from $294.52. Even the most generous input, an anchored-PE of $192.12, still says the stock is ~35% rich. DCF ($125.67) and EPV floor ($111.14) corroborate that the cash-flow math does not support the tape. I discount the raw -55% headline because ITW is a genuine compounder (Fortress, quality 76) with clean earnings and steady buybacks, which deserves a premium multiple - but a premium is not a blank check.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- 2026 organic revenue guidance and whether management sees end-market inflection
- segment-level margin trajectory - is the high-20s target sustainable or peaking
- buyback pace vs FCF - is the EPS engine still self-funding
- any one-time items flattering 2024-2025 operating margin
ITW sits in an oddly calm pocket of the tape. The regime is modestly risk-on (score +47, VIX 15.5, index near highs), and with beta at 1.01 the macro backdrop is a mild tailwind rather than a torque. The active narrative is a 'platform-monopoly' story with strong intensity but only moderate durability and low cult - meaning the market believes ITW is a structurally advantaged multi-segment compounder, but this is not a mania name that trades on story alone. That combination gives the stock a steady bid without a euphoric one. On the other side, 10y at 4.65% and a market PE of 26 create a persistent quiet drag on any name where the multiple is doing the heavy lifting, and the narrative itself concedes that price sits well above steady-state fundamentals - so any crack in the 'indispensable industrial' framing would land hard. Momentum is positive but shallow (roughly flat CAGR with low volatility), consistent with a name being held rather than chased. Net: the non-fundamental forces are close to offsetting, with a slight tailwind bias from regime and narrative durability, checked by rate/valuation sensitivity.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any analyst downgrade or target cut that reframes ITW as a legacy cyclical rather than a platform compounder
- Sector rotation out of quality industrials into higher-beta cyclicals or AI names, which would leave ITW as a source of funds
- Move in 10y yields above 4.75-5.0%, which historically compresses premium industrial multiples
- PMI/ISM trajectory - a rollover would test the durability of the narrative premium
ITW is an ABNB-pattern name: the scarce assets are plants, approvals and installed equipment, and the monetized unit is a physical consumable or component consumed per unit of industrial activity, so intelligence getting cheaper does not substitute the product. AI arrives through three narrow channels - as customer demand (electronics test, welding into datacenter and power construction, semiconductor assembly materials), as an internal SG&A and engineering-productivity lever layered onto an already-harvested 80/20 program running 26 percent operating margins, and as a procurement-side threat to the price/mix rent embedded in thousands of small niche SKUs. Direction is mildly positive because the demand channel is real and the substitution channel is nearly absent; magnitude is small enough that AI should not be the deciding variable in the thesis.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- consumables vs equipment revenue mix
- organic volume by segment
- aftermarket attach rates
- capacity utilization by segment
- electronics assembly consumables demand
- welding consumables into power projects
- global industrial production trend
- vehicle build rates and content per vehicle
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 11, 2026, ITW was $294.52. We expect it to be $270.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $210.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 11, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.