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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated (JLL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated
JLL NYSEJones Lang LaSalle Incorporated is a global real estate services and investment management company. Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated provides a broad range of commercial property solutions, including leasing advisory, tenant representation, property and asset management, capital markets services, valuation, project management, workplace strategy, and facilities management. The company also serves investors, occupiers, developers, and lenders through technology-enabled real estate services and investment management capabilities. Its business is organized around commercial real estate and related services across office, industrial, retail, multifamily, hotel, and specialized property sectors. With operations in many countries, Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated plays a significant role in helping clients buy, build, occupy, manage, and invest in real estate across global markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Jun 30, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 20.92
Total Equity: $7.60B
Shares: 47,692,000
Total Debt: $1.64B
Cash: $458.20M
EBITDA: $1.50B
Total Debt: $1.64B
Cash: $458.20M
Revenue: $27.43B
Revenue: $27.43B
Revenue: $27.43B
Total Equity: $7.60B
Tax Rate: 19.3%
Equity: $7.60B
Total Debt: $1.64B
Cash: $458.20M
Current Liabilities: $6.95B
Long-Term Debt: $251.30M
Total Debt: $1.64B
Total Equity: $7.60B
Shares: 47,692,000
Shares: 47,692,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 47,692,000
Stock Price: $362.36
Net Income: $997.80M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 11:05am (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $19.4B | $20.9B | $20.8B | $23.4B | $26.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $18.3B | $20.0B | $20.2B | $22.6B | $25.0B |
| Operating Income | $1.0B | $868.1M | $576.5M | $868.1M | $1.1B |
| Net Income | $961.6M | $654.5M | $225.4M | $546.8M | $792.1M |
| EBITDA | $1.3B | $1.1B | $814.9M | $1.1B | $1.4B |
| EPS | $18.89 | $13.51 | $4.73 | $11.51 | $16.73 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $18.47 | $13.27 | $4.67 | $11.30 | $16.40 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 11:05am (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $593.7M | $519.3M | $410.0M | $416.3M | $599.1M |
| Total Current Assets | $6.4B | $6.6B | $6.9B | $7.5B | $8.2B |
| Total Assets | $15.5B | $15.6B | $16.1B | $16.8B | $17.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $6.5B | $5.9B | $6.4B | $7.1B | $7.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $956.4M | $1.8B | $1.4B | $864.2M | $800.2M |
| Total Liabilities | $9.1B | $9.4B | $9.7B | $9.9B | $10.2B |
| Total Equity | $6.4B | $6.1B | $6.4B | $6.9B | $7.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $4.9B | $5.6B | $5.8B | $6.3B | $7.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 11:05am (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $972.4M | $199.9M | $575.8M | $785.3M | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$416.8M | -$5.7M | -$13.6M | -$60.9M | -$7.7M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $0 | $400.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$343.3M | -$601.2M | -$61.6M | -$80.7M | -$211.5M |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.8M | -$95.6M | -$82.6M | -$10.7M | $246.2M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 11:05am (31d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.7% | -0.5% | +12.9% | +11.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -16.8% | -33.6% | +50.6% | +26.5% |
| Net Income Growth | -31.9% | -65.6% | +142.6% | +44.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -13.1% | -25.7% | +37.9% | +20.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 11:05am (31d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019-11-14 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2019-05-16 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2018-11-15 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2018-05-17 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2017-11-15 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2017-05-11 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2016-11-10 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2016-05-11 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2015-11-10 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2015-05-13 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2014-11-12 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2014-09-25 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2014-06-25 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2014-05-13 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2013-12-26 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2013-11-13 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2013-05-14 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2012-11-13 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2012-05-11 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2011-11-10 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The single most misleading number in this file is the 61.8% earnings CAGR. It is a recovery metric, not a growth metric. JLL's net income went from $961.6M in 2021 to $225.4M in 2023 to $792.1M in 2025 — a V-shape around a cyclical trough, not a compounding trend. Earnings are still 17.6% below the 2021 peak. The 12.3% revenue CAGR is similarly a two-year recovery number (2023-to-2025), not a five-year structural rate; the true 2021-to-2025 revenue CAGR is 7.7%. The momentum model is measuring the bounce, not the trajectory, and the valuation synthesis is building a $460 fair value on top of that bounce.
Strip out the December 2025 quarter — $7.61B revenue, $401.7M net income, 5.3% margin, almost certainly inflated by year-end transaction closings and possibly one-time items — and the "normal" JLL margin across the other three TTM quarters is 2.5% to 3.4%, averaging roughly 3.0%. At that margin, TTM earnings are closer to $820M than the $998M the TTM window implies, pushing the effective P/E from 17.3x to roughly 20.3x. The pre-flight model's "22x P/E on 3% net margins" is actually the more honest framing than the canonical 17.3x, which is flattered by the seasonal outlier. A labor-intensive global services firm at 20x normalized earnings and 12.2x EV/EBITDA is not cheap; it is the price the market pays when it believes the cycle has turned. The question is whether that belief is justified at $362, which is 8% below the 52-week high of $393.84 and roughly 40% above the 52-week low.
The balance sheet is genuinely unimpeachable — $889.9M total debt against $599.1M cash, net debt of roughly $291M, D/E of 0.22, current ratio of 1.13. ROIC of 11.7% and ROE of 13.5% are respectable for a services firm. The four consecutive 2,000-share insider sales in mid-August 2026 (roughly $2.9M aggregate at current prices) are a textbook 10b5-1 drip, not a signal; the model's "neutral" call is correct. What the data file does not give me is segment-level revenue, forward guidance, FCF, or capex — the free cash flow line is blank, the capex line is blank, and the "decelerating" revenue confidence flag is asserted without explanation. I am being asked to underwrite a $460 DCF anchor without seeing the growth assumptions or the discount rate, and the synthesis model itself concedes that its constituent methods disagree. That is not a foundation for a 27% upside call.
The contrarian case is not that office is dead — it is that even in the bull scenario, the math is already done. If JLL recovers to its 2021 peak earnings of $961.6M and the market pays a generous 20x, that is a $19.2B market cap, or roughly $390 per share. The stock is at $362. The "CRE transaction recovery" narrative that the pre-flight and market-narrative models identify as the core thesis is, in other words, largely priced in at current levels. To justify $460, JLL needs to exceed 2021 earnings by 25%+ while maintaining a 20x multiple, which requires either margin expansion to 5%+ (unprecedented in the five-year data) or revenue growth well above the current 11% pace into a market where office leasing volumes are still structurally depressed. The "40%+ recurring revenue" bull point is real but it is a mix-shift story, not a growth story; recurring fees grow with the asset base, not with transaction volume, and the asset base is not expanding at 11%. I am not calling this a value trap — the balance sheet and revenue trajectory are solid — but the synthesis verdict of "undervalued" with a $460 anchor is a bull case dressed as a base case, and the 27% upside is the number you get if the cycle turns on schedule and margins hold, not the number you get if they don't.
GPT Reading
Grok Reading
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
JLL's revenue trajectory tells a clear cyclical story: $20.91B in 2022, a dip to $20.55B in 2023, then a strong climb to $27.43B by 2026, a 33.5 percent recovery from the trough. Net income followed the same arc, collapsing from $1.14B to $169.6M in 2023 before rebuilding to $997.8M. Free cash flow, the most important number here, is at an all-time high of $1.36B in 2026, more than double the 2022 level of $679M. The business is self-funding and does not need external capital to survive or grow. Operating margin has recovered from the 3.0 percent 2023 trough to 4.7 percent, but remains below the 5.5 percent 2022 peak, suggesting the cost structure or revenue mix has not fully normalized. Earnings quality is clean: OCF/NI of 1.31x, negative accruals of -0.5 percent of assets, and an Altman Z of 3.48 in the safe zone. There are no mechanical red flags in the Beneish or accrual screens.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- 10-K segment breakdown: what share of revenue is transaction-based (most cyclical) versus recurring fee-based (leasing, property management, consulting), and how has that mix shifted since 2023
- Convertible or hybrid debt terms embedded in the $1.39B short-term obligations: maturity schedule, covenants, and any embedded equity conversion features
- Customer concentration: top-10 client revenue share and any single-client dependency that could amplify a CRE downturn
- Whether the 0 percent SBC figure reflects a genuine absence of stock comp or a reclassification; confirm in the proxy statement
- Ulbrich's 10b5-1 plan details: are the August 2026 sales pre-scheduled or discretionary, and what is his remaining insider stake
- Operating expense trajectory: is the 4.7 percent margin gap to 2022 driven by higher headcount, technology spend, or a structurally lower-margin revenue mix
The e2e composite fair value lands at $450.97 (signal-adjusted $460.44) against a price of $362.36, implying roughly 24-27% upside. Earnings quality is high (score 3), so no haircut is warranted; the deserved value is not being eroded by low-quality accruals or dilution. However, the composite is propped up by an anchored-PE output of $776.30, which is a runaway method for a cyclical services name and should be heavily discounted. Stripping that out, a more conservative fair-value range is $400-430, still 10-18% above the current price. The EPV floor of $125.63 is a distressed liquidation number and not a meaningful anchor for a going concern printing record free cash flow.
The market narrative is cyclical-late-stage: the bull case rests on 40%+ recurring revenue from property management and facilities, plus diversification into industrial and data centers. The bear case argues hybrid work is a permanent 20-30% reduction in office square footage and that transaction-based fees will never fully recover. Both have merit. The quality lens confirms a solid (score 25) business that bottomed hard in 2023 and is now generating record FCF with a shrinking share count, but margins have not yet returned to pre-downturn levels. That recovery trajectory is partially priced in at $362.
Net: the stock is modestly cheap. The gap is real and the earnings quality supports it, but it is not a 50%+ dislocation. You are paying a reasonable price for a business that is recovering from a genuine cyclical trough, with a structural office headwind that caps the ceiling. The margin of safety is present but not deep enough to call it a high-conviction value entry.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest 10-Q segment revenue split: what percentage of total revenue is now recurring (property management, facilities) vs transaction-based (brokerage, advisory)? A shift above 45% would raise deserved value.
- Management guidance on office transaction volume recovery trajectory in the next two quarters - is the trough confirmed or still rolling?
- Share buyback authorization remaining and execution pace in the next two quarters - a meaningful reduction in share count would lift EPS and narrow the gap.
- Data-center and industrial segment growth rates in the latest earnings call - are these genuinely scaling or still a small percentage of total revenue?
- Any one-time charges or restructuring costs in the TTM window that are depressing the earnings base used in the PE methods.
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.