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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for KBR Inc. (KBR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-13): Designation Watch · Cairn score +28 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 23 · Value 32 · Sentiment -52 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $55.11 vs $37.11 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
KBR Inc.
KBR NYSEKBR Inc. is an engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) company that specializes in delivering a wide array of services to the energy, technology, and government sectors. Known principally for its role in project management and engineering solutions, the company provides expertise in designing infrastructure and advanced technological systems. KBR supports both commercial and state entities through differentiated technology solutions, which encompass everything from energy and chemicals to aerospace and defense systems. Its significant contribution to the construction and maintenance of energy facilities includes oil and gas projects, highlighting its impact on global energy infrastructure. Additionally, KBR’s work with government entities showcases its capabilities in high-stakes environments, delivering mission-critical solutions in areas such as space exploration and defense. With a foundation dating back to 1901, KBR Inc. has grown into a pivotal player in its industries, recognized for its ability to adapt to emerging technologies and complex project demands, significantly influencing industries reliant on robust engineering solutions.
Earnings Schedule
Checked daily · calendar updated Aug 13| Print date | EPS est. | EPS actual | Revenue est. | Revenue actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 28, 2026 | $0.87 | $0.89 +2.3% | — | — |
| May 5, 2026 | $0.91 | $0.96 +5.5% | — | — |
| Feb 26, 2026 | $0.95 | $0.99 +4.2% | — | — |
Green = beat the estimate, red = missed. An earnings print is the fastest way a thesis changes — our designations should be re-read after each one.
Recent SEC Filings
| Filed | Form | Document |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 6, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jul 30, 2026 | 10-Q | View |
| Jul 30, 2026 | 8-K | View |
| Jul 17, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jul 17, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jul 17, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jul 10, 2026 | 8-K | View |
| May 21, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 21, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 18, 2026 | 8-K | View |
| May 15, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 15, 2026 | 4 | View |
Filings link to the SEC’s EDGAR system. Annual/quarterly reports (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F) carry the full story; 8-K/6-K current reports are the fastest signal that something material happened.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.21
Total Equity: $1.51B
Shares: 129,000,000
Total Debt: $2.60B
Cash: $500.00M
EBITDA: $947.00M
Total Debt: $2.60B
Cash: $500.00M
Revenue: $7.79B
Revenue: $7.79B
Revenue: $7.79B
Total Equity: $1.51B
Tax Rate: 25.4%
Equity: $1.51B
Total Debt: $2.60B
Cash: $500.00M
Current Liabilities: $1.69B
Long-Term Debt: $2.55B
Total Debt: $2.60B
Total Equity: $1.51B
Shares: 129,000,000
Shares: 129,000,000
CapEx: -$42.00M
Shares: 129,000,000
Stock Price: $37.11
Net Income: $415.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:17pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $7.3B | $6.6B | $7.0B | $7.7B | $7.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $6.5B | $5.7B | $6.0B | $6.6B | $6.6B |
| Gross Profit | $806.0M | $828.0M | $977.0M | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $575.0M | $485.0M | $529.0M | $440.0M | $372.0M |
| Operating Income | $231.0M | $343.0M | $448.0M | $659.0M | $778.0M |
| Net Income | $18.0M | $190.0M | -$265.0M | $375.0M | $415.0M |
| EBITDA | $377.0M | $480.0M | $589.0M | $815.0M | $947.0M |
| EPS | $0.13 | $1.36 | $-1.96 | $2.79 | $3.21 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.12 | $1.26 | $-1.96 | $2.79 | $3.21 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 4:50pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $370.0M | $389.0M | $304.0M | $342.0M | $500.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.2B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.1B |
| Total Assets | $6.2B | $5.6B | $5.6B | $6.7B | $6.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.9B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $2.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $4.5B | $3.9B | $4.2B | $5.2B | $5.1B |
| Total Equity | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:17pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $278.0M | $396.0M | $331.0M | $462.0M | — |
| Capital Expenditure | -$30.0M | -$71.0M | -$80.0M | -$52.0M | -$42.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $248.0M | $325.0M | $251.0M | $410.0M | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$399.0M | -$73.0M | $0 | -$738.0M | -$14.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$44.0M | -$16.0M | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$61.0M | -$66.0M | -$72.0M | -$79.0M | -$84.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$82.0M | -$203.0M | -$138.0M | -$218.0M | -$329.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$66.0M | $19.0M | -$85.0M | $46.0M | $155.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:17pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -10.6% | +6.0% | +10.8% | +1.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +2.7% | +18.0% | +12.5% | +4.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +48.5% | +30.6% | +47.1% | +18.1% |
| Net Income Growth | +955.6% | -239.5% | +241.5% | +10.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +27.3% | +22.7% | +38.4% | +16.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:18pm (9d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-13 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-15 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-15 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-13 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-13 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-16 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-17 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-14 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-14 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-14 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-14 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-14 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-14 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-14 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-14 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-14 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-14 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:05pm (9d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-15 | Dominguez Joseph | A-Award | 34.00 | $35.98 | $1,223 |
| 2026-07-15 | Dugle Lynn A | A-Award | 51.00 | $35.98 | $1,835 |
| 2026-07-15 | Vigeveno Huibert Hans | A-Award | 34.00 | $35.98 | $1,223 |
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw trajectory is less flattering than the synthesis suggests. Quarterly revenue peaked at $2.11B in Q4 2024 and has stepped down four consecutive quarters to $1.92B — a ~9% top-line contraction while the "growth" narrative rests on annual FY26 revenue ($7.79B) barely edging FY25 ($7.71B), just 1% YoY. The revenue_cagr of 5.8% is flattered by the 2021 base and disguises the fact that KBR is currently *decelerating*, not accelerating. Net margins are noisy in a tight 3.6–6.0% band with no clear expansion trend — Q1 FY26 5.3% is worse than Q3 FY25's 6.0%. Annual operating margin did step from 5.8% (FY23) to 10.0% (FY26), which is real, but a chunk of that reflects the 2023 impairment/goodwill hit ($265M loss) rolling off the base rather than durable operational leverage.
The balance sheet deserves more attention than any prior model gave it. $2.60B debt against $1.51B equity (D/E 1.72) and only $500M cash on a company generating ~$415M in net income is meaningful leverage for an EPC/services hybrid with lumpy cash conversion. The Market Forces model's cash-quality flag is the single most important signal in this file and the Synthesis verdict essentially ignores it — you cannot call a stock "undervalued by 45%" via DCF when operating and free cash flow lines are literally blank in the data. The $42M capex is trivially low, which is either a services-mix story (plausible) or a sign of underinvestment. Insider buying in May 2026 (~30K shares across four separate P-purchases) is a genuinely bullish tell — these aren't option exercises, they're open-market buys at prices presumably near current levels, and insider *purchases* at KBR have historically been rare.
The prior models contradict each other in ways worth naming. Synthesis says "$53.80 fair value, growth is free"; Market Forces says EPS forecasts are 30-40% too optimistic; Thesis Evaluation lands at -1 (dead neutral); Narrative calls the discount fundamentally-justified, not a mispricing. That's not a coherent stack — it's three models disagreeing, and the Synthesis number is the outlier. The 11.6x P/E and 7.3x EV/EBITDA are cheap versus Jacobs (~20x) and Fluor (~18x), but KBR's ROE of 27% is inflated by leverage (ROA is only 6.3%, ROIC 16%) and its government services book, while sticky, is not growing fast enough to justify a re-rating absent a specific catalyst. A contrarian would argue: if this were truly a government-services compounder trading at EPC multiples, revenue would be *accelerating*, not printing four straight down quarters. The most likely explanation for the discount is that the market has correctly identified a business whose Sustainment Solutions government growth is being offset by Mission Technology / legacy energy softness, netting to ~1% organic growth.
I dissent partially from the synthesis $53.80 fair value — that number requires believing in both margin durability and a growth re-acceleration, neither of which the trailing four quarters support. But I also dissent from calling this a value trap: the insider buying cluster, the 11.6x P/E floor, the 1.8% dividend yield with a 20% payout ratio (huge room to grow), and the government services mix shift are real. Fair value on trailing FY26 EPS of ~$3.10 at a defensible 14-15x (mid-way between EPC and government services multiples) is $43-47, not $54. At $37 you're getting maybe 15-25% upside plus a dividend, not 45%. The thesis pivots entirely on the next two quarters: if Q2/Q3 FY26 revenue re-accelerates above $2.0B and margins hold 6%+, the re-rating case is live; if the sequential decline continues and FCF quality remains opaque, this drifts to $32-34. The right posture is a starter position sized for asymmetry, not a full-conviction long, and definitely not the table-pounder the Synthesis 45% upside implies.
GPT Reading
What stands out to me is that KBR is being valued like a no-growth, somewhat messy contractor even though the last two annual periods show a real earnings reset upward. Revenue moved from $6.56B in 2022 to $7.71B in 2025 and $7.79B in 2026, so top-line growth has slowed sharply lately, but profitability improved much faster: operating income rose from $343M in 2022 to $659M in 2025 and $778M in 2026, while net income climbed from $190M to $375M to $415M. On the latest annual numbers, that is a 10.0% operating margin and 5.3% net margin on a business the market still prices at just 0.61x sales, 7.3x EV/EBITDA, and 11.6x earnings. For an industrial services name generating 27.5% ROE and 16.1% ROIC, that multiple is not demanding. The quarterlies reinforce the idea that this is now a steadier earner than the market admits: over the last eight quarters, revenue has sat in a narrow $1.85B-$2.11B range while net margins were mostly 5%-6%, aside from two weaker quarters at 3.6%-3.7%. That looks more like a maturing, better-mixed services business than a collapsing EPC story.
The key issue is whether the flatlining revenue in recent quarters means the earnings improvement has run its course. I do not think so, at least not at $37.11. The most recent quarter posted $1.92B of revenue and $102M of net income, versus $1.85B and $106M in the year-ago quarter; that is only 1% recent revenue growth on the supplied momentum data, but 10.7% earnings growth. The prior four quarters sum to roughly $7.76B of revenue and $401M of net income, essentially in line with the latest annual run rate, so there is no sign of an earnings cliff. Meanwhile, the balance sheet is leveraged but not distressed: $2.60B of debt against $500M of cash is meaningful, yet set against $778M of operating income and a 1.215 current ratio it looks manageable. If this were a deteriorating contractor with unstable margins, I would want a single-digit P/E. But if the business can hold around $400M+ of annual earnings, today’s market cap of $4.68B implies the market is paying a modest price for a company that has already demonstrated margin repair.
The strongest argument against this read is that the market may be correctly focusing on what is missing: cash flow proof and durable growth. We are not given operating cash flow or free cash flow, and the secondary signal explicitly calls cash flow quality weak. In this industry, reported earnings without cash conversion can be a trap because working capital, claims, and contract timing can flatter income statements for years before reversing. The 2023 net loss of -$265M also tells you this is not a pristine compounder; there is embedded project, integration, or other one-off risk in the model. Add debt-to-equity of 1.72x and price-to-book of 3.17x, and the stock is not statistically cheap if the true earnings power is lower than reported. On the operating side, quarterly revenue has actually drifted down from $2.11B in early 2025 to $1.89B-$1.92B lately, so one can argue KBR has already harvested the easy margin gains while organic demand is stalling. If that is the setup, then 11.6x earnings is fair, not cheap.
I weigh those objections seriously, but I still come out constructive because the current price already discounts a lot of imperfection. The stock is not being valued like a high-confidence grower; it is being valued like a business whose 2026 earnings are at risk of retracing. Yet the available data do not show that retracement happening. Instead, they show annual revenue stability around $7.7B-$7.8B, annual net income stepping up from $375M to $415M, and quarter-level profitability mostly holding in the 5%-6% range. Insider buying in May 2026—14,500 shares, 8,375 shares, 4,000 shares, and 3,000 shares across several transactions—also matters more here than token compensation awards, because it suggests informed confidence after the drawdown rather than passive optics. For me, fair value is not the $53-$55 range the model spits out by formula so much as a more conservative low-to-mid $40s based on sustaining roughly $400M of earnings at 13x-14x, which is still only a moderate re-rating for a company with KBR’s current margins and returns.
What would change my mind is straightforward. I would get more bullish if KBR can show two things simultaneously over the next few quarters: revenue returning to at least the $2.0B quarterly level and net income staying above $100M per quarter, which would confirm that margin gains are not just offsetting a shrinking base. I would turn bearish if margins slip back toward the 3.5%-4.0% quarters seen in early and mid-2025, or if whatever cash flow disclosure comes next shows that the $415M of annual net income is not converting into meaningful cash after working capital. At $37, I think the burden of proof is lower for the bull than the bear.
Grok Reading
KBR’s income statement shows a company that has already executed the hard part of a turnaround and is being priced as if none of it happened. Operating income climbed from $448 million in 2023 to $659 million and then $778 million in fiscal 2026 on essentially flat revenue ($7.71 billion to $7.79 billion), pushing operating margin to 10% and net income to $415 million. ROE of 27.5% and ROIC of 16.1% are the returns of a competent capital allocator, not a melting EPC franchise. At $37.11 the stock clears only 11.6x earnings and 7.3x EV/EBITDA with a 0.61x sales multiple—levels that embed perpetual low-single-digit decline. Quarterly run-rate has settled in the $1.89–1.95 billion band after an earlier $2.11 billion print, so top-line growth is negligible (1% recent YoY, 5.8% CAGR), yet net margins have stabilized in the mid-5% range after the noisy 3.6–3.7% quarters. The May 2026 open-market purchases (roughly 30 000 shares across four tickets) are the cleanest signal that insiders see the same disconnect.
The valuation work that lands near $54 is directionally right; even a zero-growth capitalization of the current $415 million earnings base clears well above the current quote once a modest services multiple is applied. The market is still anchored to the 2023 $265 million loss and the legacy energy tag, refusing to underwrite the mix shift toward government and defense work that is already visible in the margin expansion. That skepticism is rational only if the earnings are illusory.
The sharpest bear case is exactly that illusion: free-cash-flow figures are absent from the briefing and every quality overlay flags weak conversion. In project businesses, retainage, mobilization timing and percentage-of-completion accounting can manufacture GAAP profits that never become cash; if the “temporary working-capital” defense is wrong, the entire earnings recovery is suspect. Leverage compounds the risk—$2.60 billion of debt against $500 million of cash and $1.51 billion of equity leaves a 1.72 debt-to-equity ratio with little cushion if government receipts slow or a large project goes sideways. Revenue deceleration and the near-zero thesis score (-1) correctly highlight that the market is not being irrationally pessimistic; it is simply refusing to pay for earnings that have not yet proved they convert.
I still come down undervalued because four years of rising operating profit, mid-teens ROIC and clustered insider buying are harder to dismiss than a single missing FCF line at 11.6x earnings. The cash-conversion overhang caps conviction, but it does not justify a 30-plus percent discount to even conservative intrinsic value.
Two clean quarters of FCF conversion above 80% of net income would remove the central objection and raise conviction sharply; a drop back below 4% net margins or quarterly revenue sustainably under $1.8 billion would confirm structural decay and flip the stance to overvalued.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · four lenses
KBR shows a genuine multi-year operational improvement: revenue $7.34B (2021) to $7.79B (2026), gross margin 11% to 14.8%, operating margin 3.1% to 10%, and net income from $18M to $415M. Earnings quality is clean - accruals -5% of assets and OCF/NI at 4.38x indicate reported profits are backed (and exceeded) by cash. Diluted share count fell from 156M (2022) to 129M (2026), a -2.9% CAGR - management is concentrating per-share value, not diluting it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- What drove FCF from +$410M to -$42M in 2026 - working capital, project billings, or one-off cash tax/settlement?
- Debt maturity ladder and covenants on the $2.6B gross debt - refinancing exposure
- Nature of the 2023 net loss (project write-down, goodwill, legal) - is it truly non-recurring?
- Government/defense vs. sustainable-tech segment mix and customer concentration
- Backlog quality and fixed-price vs. cost-reimbursable contract mix - margin durability
The e2e composite FV of $55 and signal-adjusted $54 imply 45% upside, but the anchored-PE input at $73 is doing a lot of the lifting and looks aggressive for a lumpy E&C name with $2.1B net debt. Stripping that out, the DCF ($49.35) and EPV floor ($48.92) cluster tightly in the high-$40s, which is a more defensible deserved value. Against $37.11, that is roughly 30% upside to a conservative anchor, or a ~24% margin of safety - meaningful but not extraordinary.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Government/defense segment margin trend and backlog duration in latest 10-Q
- Energy segment run-off pace and any impairment risk
- FCF conversion vs GAAP earnings over trailing 4 quarters
- Net debt trajectory and covenant headroom
- Guidance updates that would validate or break the DCF assumptions
The market tape is mildly constructive (neutral-plus, VIX 16, S&P near highs), but that risk-on lift barely reaches KBR: beta 0.45 mutes any macro tailwind, and the active narrative on this name is a fragile fallen-angel story with minimal intensity and low cult following. There is no bull thesis buoying the stock; the discount to intrinsic value is being read by the tape as deserved rather than as an opportunity, which is textbook value-trap sentiment. Fresh Q2 coverage explicitly frames the print as 'margin compression' despite a strong backlog and spin-off optionality, and a syndicated 'profitable stocks with warning signs' piece dropped KBR into a negative screen list, both of which reinforce the skepticism rather than crack it. Analyst tone on the tape is cautious, and with the story labeled fragile and durability weak, there is no narrative engine to pull shares out of the malaise. Add rising leverage (D/E 1.31 to 1.72) as a talking point bears will keep citing, and the net non-fundamental pressure leans negative even in a benign market.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether management accelerates or clarifies the spin-off timeline - a firm date would give the stock a narrative to trade on
- Any government/defense contract wins large enough to force analysts to re-segment KBR away from energy EPC peers
- Sell-side target revisions post-Q2 - are cuts stacking or is anyone defending the margin trajectory
- Sector rotation into defense services (a peer like Leidos or SAIC running) that could drag KBR up by association
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.