For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for KeyCorp (KEY) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Low · Gem Score -33 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -19 · Value -43 · Sentiment 38 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $69.46 vs $22.12 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
KeyCorp
KEY NYSEKeyCorp is a bank holding company headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio. Through its primary subsidiary, KeyBank National Association, the company provides a broad range of financial services to individuals, small businesses, commercial clients, and institutional customers across the United States. Its consumer banking offerings include deposit accounts, lending, mortgages, home equity products, credit cards, and student loan refinancing, while its commercial banking business serves middle-market and corporate clients with cash management, equipment financing, commercial real estate lending, and treasury services. KeyCorp also delivers wealth management, investment services, trust and custody solutions, and capital markets capabilities such as underwriting, advisory, derivatives, foreign exchange, and syndicated finance. The company plays a significant role in regional and national banking by combining branch-based banking with digital platforms and specialized advisory services.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.52
Total Equity: $20.38B
Shares: 1,203,289,474
Total Debt: $12.06B
Cash: $1.29B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $12.06B
Cash: $1.29B
Revenue: $7.29B
Revenue: $7.29B
Revenue: $7.29B
Total Equity: $20.38B
Tax Rate: 20.7%
Equity: $20.38B
Total Debt: $12.06B
Cash: $1.29B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $9.92B
Total Debt: $12.06B
Total Equity: $20.38B
Shares: 1,203,289,474
Shares: 1,203,289,474
CapEx: -$107.00M
Shares: 1,203,289,474
Stock Price: $22.12
Net Income: $1.83B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 3:10am (33d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $7.0B | $7.0B | $6.2B | $4.4B | $7.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $2.8B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $2.9B | — |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $2.6B | $1.9B | $967.0M | -$161.0M | $1.8B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $2.65 | $1.94 | $0.88 | $-0.32 | $1.53 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.63 | $1.93 | $0.88 | $-0.32 | $1.52 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 2:30am (34d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $913.0M | $887.0M | $941.0M | $1.7B | $1.3B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $186.3B | $189.8B | $188.3B | $187.2B | $184.4B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $12.0B | $19.3B | $19.6B | $12.1B | $9.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $168.9B | $176.4B | $173.6B | $169.0B | $164.0B |
| Total Equity | $17.4B | $13.5B | $14.6B | $18.2B | $20.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $14.6B | $15.6B | $15.7B | $14.6B | $15.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 3:40am (33d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.2B | $4.5B | $2.9B | $664.0M | $2.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$66.0M | -$96.0M | -$142.0M | -$65.0M | -$107.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.1B | $4.4B | $2.8B | $599.0M | $2.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$29.0M | -$58.0M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.4B | $8.0B | $188.0M | -$7.4B | -$2.5B |
| Dividends Paid | -$823.0M | -$854.0M | -$911.0M | -$927.0M | -$1.1B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$559.0M | $0 | $0 | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$178.0M | -$26.0M | $54.0M | $802.0M | -$456.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 3:10am (33d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -0.2% | -11.5% | -29.3% | +65.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -27.0% | -49.6% | -116.6% | +1,236.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 6:19pm (37d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-02 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-03 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-02 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-27 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-04 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-03 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-27 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-24 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-26 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-27 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-28 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-26 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-27 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-28 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-29 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-27 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-28 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-29 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-30 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-06 19:16A +1σ run of quarters pays +176%; a −1σ run costs 82%. Ratio 2.1:1 (μ 35.3%, σ 71.5% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 2.2 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($22.12) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +19% | 31.3% | $30.89 | +40% |
| Base — stabilizes | +12% | 27.2% | $22.58 | +2% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +6% | 23.1% | $16.14 | -27% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +7% | 26.0% | $18.17 | -18% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +50% | 26.0% | $61.13 | +176% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -36% | 26.0% | $3.88 | -82% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-04 03:56The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly tape tells a very specific story that most of the prior models are mangling. KEY did not "transform" in 2025 — the 2024 Q3/Q4 revenue collapse to $695M and $865M and the massive net losses reflect the Scotiabank $2.8B strategic investment and the associated available-for-sale securities repositioning loss (they sold underwater low-yield Treasuries and booked the loss). Strip that out and revenue has walked from ~$1.55B pre-repositioning to $1.96B in Q2 2026 — a real but unspectacular ~6-7% run-rate improvement driven by NIM expansion as the reinvested book yields more. Quarterly NI has stabilized in a tight $489-522M band across four consecutive quarters. This is not a decelerating business; the "Low Revenue Confidence / decelerating" tag is an artifact of comparing against the securities-loss-distorted base. The revenue_cagr of 8.3% and earnings_cagr of 37.5% are similarly polluted by that base effect.
The synthesis verdict of $71.96 fair value versus a $22.12 price is nonsense and should be discarded outright. Annualizing recent quarterlies gets you ~$2.05B in earnings on a $23.6B market cap — that's 11.5x forward earnings, not 14.5x, and P/B of 1.16x on $20.4B of equity. Those are reasonable regional bank multiples, not deep-value multiples. ROE of ~10% (annualized Q2 NI $509M × 4 / $20.4B equity = 10.0%) is decent but not exceptional for the sector — Regions, Huntington, and Fifth Third all run 11-13% ROEs at similar or slightly richer multiples. The 3.71% dividend yield with 57.6% payout is well-covered by $2.1B FCF against ~$800M in dividends. This is a fairly-valued mid-tier regional bank, full stop. The Market Forces "acquisition-driven revenue... sustainability questionable" read is also wrong — Scotiabank took a ~15% minority stake, this wasn't an acquisition that pumped consolidated revenue.
The contrarian bear case that actually matters isn't in the narrative layer either. It's this: KEY's CRE exposure (particularly office and multifamily in secondary markets) remains a live risk, provisions have been running light relative to some peers, and the 10% ROE is achieved partly because they're still under-provisioned into a potential 2026-2027 credit normalization. Insider activity shows one sale, several option exercises, and routine awards — nothing screaming, but the July 2026 25k-share sale on top of two large "return to issuer" entries (likely tax withholding on vests) is not the pattern of insiders who think the stock is 3x undervalued. If the synthesis DCF were remotely right, insiders would be buying, not exercising and trimming. The dividend at 3.71% is fine but not a fortress — a credit event that forces a payout cut would re-rate this to $17-18 quickly.
I dissent from the synthesis fair-value figure entirely and side closer to the Market Forces "neutral" read, but for different reasons than that model articulated. On earnings power of ~$2.0-2.1B, a fair multiple of 11-12x for a regional bank running 10% ROE with lingering CRE overhang gets you $22-25 per share — right where it trades. The bull case requires either NIM continuing to expand through 2026 as more low-yield securities roll off (plausible, worth maybe +$3), a clean credit cycle with no CRE surprise (uncertain), and a sector re-rating (macro-dependent). The Mature Earner archetype is correct; the fallen-angel narrative overstates the discount because it's anchored to a bogus DCF. This is a hold-for-yield name, not a table-pounding value opportunity. I'd get interested below $19 (a 4.3% yield and sub-1.0x book) and would trim above $26.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say KEY is no longer a distressed earnings story, but they do not justify the absurdly bullish valuation synthesis. The business recovered from a disastrous 2024, when revenue fell to $4.39B and net income was negative $161M, into a much healthier 2025 with $7.29B of revenue and $1.83B of net income. More importantly, the quarterly run-rate now looks stable: revenue moved from $1.77B in 2025Q1 to $1.96B in 2026Q2, while net income improved from $405M to $509M and margins rebuilt from 22.8% to roughly 26%. That is a real earnings recovery, not a mirage. At the current $23.6B market cap, investors are paying about 12.9x 2025 earnings and roughly 3.2x trailing revenue using the annual figures provided; for a regional bank, book value matters more, and 1.31x book on 8.97% ROE is not cheap. A bank earning sub-10% on equity should not command a clear premium to book unless there is a visible path to materially better returns.
What stands out is that the stock looks priced for a decent normalization, but not for the kind of structural franchise quality that would deserve a big rerating. Using the latest equity of $20.38B and annual net income of $1.83B, the reported ROE of about 9% lines up. That is respectable after a bad year, but still well below the 2021-2022 earnings power when net income ran $2.63B and $1.92B on similar revenue around $7.0B. In other words, KEY has clawed back to revenue levels near prior peaks, yet earnings power remains lower than the better years, which suggests some combination of margin pressure, funding cost drag, or credit normalization is still in the system. The cash flow line looks fine at face value, with $2.21B operating cash flow and $2.10B free cash flow, but for banks those figures are far less decision-useful than capital strength, asset quality, and spread economics. I would not lean heavily on the FCF framing here.
The biggest contradiction in the packet is the claim of something like $72-75 fair value. That is not a serious conclusion against these fundamentals. A $75 stock on the current share base would imply a market cap around 3.4x today’s, which against $20.38B of equity means a massive multiple to book for a bank earning only 9% ROE. Even if earnings annualize off the last four quarters to roughly $2.0B-$2.1B, you are still talking about a mid-30s P/E at that hypothetical valuation. That only makes sense for a high-growth, high-return compounder; KEY is neither. The right debate is not whether the stock is worth triple. It is whether a bank that has recovered to roughly $2.0B annualized earnings, yields 3.7%, and trades at 1.3x book deserves a modest premium or a modest discount to current price. My answer is: around current levels it is broadly fair, perhaps a touch full, because the recovery is mostly already visible in the numbers.
The best argument against my caution is straightforward: the trend is better than I am giving it credit for. Six consecutive quarters show rising or stable profitability after the 2024 hole, with quarterly net income now consistently near $500M. Revenue is up 65.8% on the recent YoY comparison, net margins have normalized to the mid-20s, leverage is not extreme with debt/equity around 0.59, and the dividend is covered with a 57.6% payout ratio. If the bad 2024 was truly a one-off reset and the bank can sustain $2.1B+ of earnings while eventually pushing ROE toward 11%-12%, then 1.3x book is not demanding and the stock could work into the high $20s. A value investor would also note that the latest two quarters, $522M and $509M of net income, are materially above the $405M-$425M level from early 2025, so the direction of travel is positive.
What would change my mind is evidence that returns are structurally better than the current post-recovery plateau. If KEY can deliver several more quarters around or above $550M of net income without revenue needing another step-function jump, and if annual ROE clears 10.5%-11% while the dividend remains intact, I would become more constructive and likely move fair value into the upper $20s. Conversely, if revenue stalls back toward $1.8B per quarter, margins slip below 24%, or credit costs drag quarterly earnings back under $450M, then the market should stop paying above book and the stock would look more like a high-teens to low-$20s name. Until those proof points arrive, this is a repaired regional bank, not a misunderstood compounding machine.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a recovery story that is already largely complete, not one still waiting to be priced. KeyCorp went from a $161 million loss and $4.39 billion of revenue in 2024 to $1.83 billion of net income on $7.29 billion of revenue in 2025, and the last six quarters have settled into a tight band: roughly $1.8–2.0 billion of quarterly revenue and $405–522 million of net income, with net margins stuck in the 23–27% range. That is a ~$2.0 billion annualized earnings run-rate against a $23.6 billion market cap—about 12x current earnings—while free cash flow of $2.10 billion and operating cash flow of $2.21 billion confirm the income statement is not an accounting mirage. Book value of $20.4 billion puts the stock at roughly 1.16–1.31x tangible capital with a 9% ROE and a 3.7% dividend that is covered at a 58% payout. For a regional bank that has just re-established mid-twenties margins after a brutal 2024, that combination is workmanlike, not distressed.
What stands out against the prior models is how badly the composite fair-value print of ~$72 fails a basic bank sanity check. Three times book on a 9% ROE franchise would require either a structural ROE breakout above 15% or a permanent collapse in the cost of equity; neither is visible in the data. The 65.8% recent revenue jump and the 2024-to-2025 step-change are real, but the sequential quarterly line is already flat-to-decelerating ($2.01B → $1.95B → $1.96B), which is exactly what you would expect if the rebound was capital- and deal-assisted rather than a new organic growth regime. ROA of 1.0% and debt-to-equity of 0.59 are ordinary, not exceptional. The market is therefore not “missing” a 225% re-rating; it is applying a normal regional-bank multiple to earnings that have already normalized.
The strongest case against this read is that 2025’s transformation is still unproven as a steady state. Negative FCF CAGR of –12.8%, “low revenue confidence,” and explicit macro headwinds for deposit costs and commercial real estate mean the $500 million quarterly profit run-rate could still be a mid-cycle peak rather than a floor. A smart opponent would also note that 1.3x book for a sub-10% ROE bank is actually a mild premium to the simple ROE/COE justified multiple, so the stock is not the deep-value fallen angel the narrative layer wants it to be; it is a repaired earner already trading near fair. Insider flow is noise—option exercises and returns to issuer, one modest 25k-share sale—not a signal. I weigh the six consecutive profitable quarters and $2.1 billion of FCF more heavily than the bear’s structural-NIM story because the income statement has already absorbed the 2024 credit and rate shock and kept producing cash; until provisions re-accelerate, the repair looks durable enough to support the current multiple.
A sustained drop in quarterly net income below ~$350 million, a dividend cut, or a visible spike in CRE charge-offs would flip me decisively bearish. Conversely, two more quarters of revenue re-acceleration above $2.1 billion with ROE pushing through 12% would justify a move toward 1.5x book and make the stock clearly cheap at $22.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
KeyCorp shows the fingerprints of a bank that took a body blow in 2024 ($161M net loss, revenue collapsing to $4.39B from $6.22B) and has since stabilized: 2025 revenue rebounded to $7.29B, net income to $1.83B, and FCF to $2.10B. Liquid cash of $11.45B against a $23.6B cap gives real balance-sheet flexibility, and OCF is positive across every year shown. This is a functioning, self-funding franchise, not a distressed one, notwithstanding an Altman Z of 0.24 (a metric that is largely meaningless for a bank's leveraged balance sheet). The uglier part of the picture is per-share stewardship and earnings quality. Diluted shares went from 998M (2021) to 1.20B (2025), a 4.8% CAGR, with a large 2024 share issuance (the Scotia investment, judging by the return-to-issuer tape) diluting owners by roughly 20% in one step. OCF/NI at 0.57x and negative accruals suggest reported net income is running ahead of cash generation. Insider activity is mildly negative (three sales, zero open-market buys) but small in dollar terms. Overall this is a mature regional bank that survived a rough cycle, is earning again, but has not demonstrated durable per-share compounding or elite earnings integrity.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Terms of the 2024 Bank of Nova Scotia investment - preferred vs common, conversion mechanics, and dilution schedule
- Composition of the securities portfolio and any remaining AOCI mark-to-market drag on tangible book
- CET1 ratio and regulatory capital cushion trend across 2023-2025
- Loan portfolio concentration (commercial real estate exposure in particular) and net charge-off trends
- Whether 2025 net income includes non-recurring gains from the securities repositioning executed in late 2024
- Deposit mix stability and cost of funds trajectory
The e2e composite pins fair value at $74.96 (signal-adj $71.96) versus a $22.12 price, implying 225% upside - but that number leans entirely on an anchored-PE method applied to a bank whose earnings just swung from a loss back to $1.83B, whose share count grew ~4.8% CAGR, and whose OCF/NI is only 0.57x. Applying a sober lens: at ~$22 and ~1.07B shares (mkt cap $23.6B), KEY trades near ~13x recently normalized earnings and roughly tangible book - a normal range for a mid-tier regional bank with middling earnings quality, not a screaming discount. The weak earnings-quality haircut argues the deserved multiple should sit BELOW peer average, not above. Net: price and deserved value are in the same neighborhood. The 4%+ dividend gets you paid to wait, but there is no obvious margin of safety here. A genuine mispricing would require the stock to trade at a clear discount to tangible book with credit trends stable - today it does not. I would want it materially lower before calling it cheap, and materially higher before calling it rich.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Normalized run-rate EPS post-recapitalization and whether 2025 guidance supports mid-teens ROTCE
- CRE and office loan reserves and charge-off trends in the latest 10-Q
- Net interest margin trajectory as the deposit book reprices
- Any further capital actions or buyback authorization that would stabilize share count
The macro tape is nascent risk-on (VIX 14.3, S&P near highs) which favors cyclicals and beta-1 names like KEY, but a 4.79% 10y and stretched market PE cap the lift. As a regional bank, KEY sits in a cohort still carrying a fallen-angel discount tied to NIM compression and CRE credit fears - a fragile, low-cult narrative that can flip either way on a single data point. Momentum is the real story: 65.8% recent versus 8.3% long-term CAGR says the tape has already been rerating this name, and the narrative is quietly shifting from 'structurally impaired' toward 'NII growth reaccelerating in 2026.' News flow is constructive but not explosive - a new strategy chief, favorable NII commentary, and neutral peer-comparison coverage. No analyst-tone shock, no downgrade cluster, no credit event. Net: the wind is at KEY's back, but it is a breeze, not a gale, and the fragile narrative means one bad CRE print or dovish-surprise rate move flips it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any CRE credit deterioration in peer Q3 prints
- Fed rate path and 10y direction into year-end
- Whether analyst target revisions cluster upward post-Q2 recap
- Deposit beta and NII guidance in next KEY update
Rates are the entire world for this business. A 10y at 4.79 with a positively sloped (+0.4) curve is the constructive configuration for regional banks: assets reprice upward while funding costs plateau, which is exactly the mechanism carrying KEY's recovery. The offsetting force is the macro-headwind backdrop — a slowing commercial borrower cuts loan demand and eventually raises provisions, and CRE remains the sector's unresolved overhang. The market's structural bear case (permanent NIM compression, unstable deposits) is being falsified in the near term by the curve and by observed deposit stabilization across the cohort, but it is not wrong about the long run: deposit competition is now permanently more price-transparent, and that caps the terminal NIM below the pre-2022 norm.
When we made this prediction on Sep 4, 2026, KEY was $22.27. We expect it to be $30.75 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $18.50. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.