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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Kimberly-Clark Corporation (KMB) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Low · Gem Score -29 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 27 · Value -66 · Sentiment -48 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $89.52 vs $109.31 at analysis
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Kimberly-Clark Corporation
KMB NASDAQKimberly-Clark Corporation is a global consumer goods company specializing in essential personal care and tissue products for everyday use. Headquartered in Dallas, Texas, it focuses on categories such as baby and child care, adult incontinence, feminine care, family care, and professional hygiene solutions. The company manufactures items made primarily from natural and synthetic fibers, leveraging nonwoven and absorbency technologies to produce disposable diapers, training and youth pants, baby wipes, feminine and incontinence care products, as well as facial and bathroom tissue, paper towels, napkins, wipes, soaps, and sanitizers. Kimberly-Clark markets its products under widely recognized brands including Huggies, Kleenex, Scott, Cottonelle, Kotex, Depend, Poise, Andrex, Pull-Ups, GoodNites, Viva, and WypAll, serving consumers, healthcare providers, and businesses across more than 175 countries. Distribution spans supermarkets, mass merchandisers, drugstores, warehouse clubs, department stores, professional distributors, and e-commerce channels, positioning Kimberly-Clark as a key player in global hygiene and tissue markets. Founded in 1872, the company today operates with a strong presence in both consumer and professional segments worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.07
Total Equity: $1.63B
Shares: 333,200,000
Total Debt: $694.00M
Cash: $688.00M
EBITDA: $3.16B
Total Debt: $694.00M
Cash: $688.00M
Revenue: $16.45B
Revenue: $16.45B
Revenue: $16.45B
Total Equity: $1.63B
Tax Rate: 22.6%
Equity: $1.63B
Total Debt: $694.00M
Cash: $688.00M
Current Liabilities: $7.13B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $694.00M
Total Equity: $1.63B
Shares: 333,200,000
Shares: 333,200,000
CapEx: -$1.14B
Shares: 333,200,000
Stock Price: $109.31
Net Income: $2.02B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 5:49am (44d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $19.4B | $20.2B | $20.4B | $20.1B | $16.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $13.5B | $14.0B | $13.4B | $12.9B | $10.5B |
| Gross Profit | $6.0B | $6.2B | $7.0B | $7.2B | $5.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.4B | $3.5B | $4.7B | $4.0B | $3.6B |
| Operating Income | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.3B | $3.2B | $2.4B |
| Net Income | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $2.0B |
| EBITDA | $3.3B | $3.4B | $3.1B | $4.0B | $3.2B |
| EPS | $5.38 | $5.73 | $5.22 | $7.58 | $6.09 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.35 | $5.72 | $5.21 | $7.55 | $6.07 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 5:30am (44d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $270.0M | $427.0M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $688.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $5.6B | $5.7B | $5.7B | $5.6B | $5.3B |
| Total Assets | $17.8B | $18.0B | $17.3B | $16.5B | $17.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $6.7B | $7.3B | $6.9B | $7.0B | $7.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $17.1B | $17.3B | $16.3B | $15.6B | $15.5B |
| Total Equity | $737.0M | $700.0M | $1.1B | $975.0M | $1.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $7.9B | $8.2B | $8.4B | $9.3B | $9.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 5:49am (44d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.7B | $2.7B | $3.5B | $3.2B | $2.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.0B | -$876.0M | -$766.0M | -$721.0M | -$1.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.8B | $2.5B | $1.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$46.0M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $336.0M | -$312.0M | -$112.0M | -$554.0M | -$550.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.5B | -$1.6B | -$1.6B | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$400.0M | -$100.0M | -$225.0M | -$1.0B | -$141.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$33.0M | $157.0M | $666.0M | -$72.0M | -$320.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 5:49am (44d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +3.8% | +1.3% | -1.8% | -18.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +3.9% | +13.1% | +2.1% | -17.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | +4.7% | -12.6% | +36.9% | -26.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +6.6% | -8.8% | +44.3% | -20.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +3.2% | -9.8% | +28.9% | -20.9% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:06am (49d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-04 | $1.28 | — | — | — |
| 2026-06-05 | $1.28 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-06 | $1.28 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-05 | $1.26 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-05 | $1.26 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-06 | $1.26 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-07 | $1.26 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-06 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-06 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-07 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-07 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-07 | $1.18 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-07 | $1.18 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-08 | $1.18 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-09 | $1.18 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-08 | $1.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-08 | $1.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-09 | $1.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-03 | $1.16 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-09 | $1.14 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-24 05:56The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly tape tells a cleaner story than the models let on, but not a bullish one. Strip out Q4 2024's $6.53B (which is clearly the pre-divestiture consolidated print — the personal-care international carve-out to Suzano closed in 2025) and KMB's post-divestiture quarterly run-rate is remarkably steady: $4.05B, $4.16B, $4.15B, $4.08B, $4.16B, $4.19B. That's a ~$16.6B annualized business growing low single digits sequentially — not a "collapsing" franchise. The revenue_cagr of -10.3% and YoY -18% are optical artifacts of the divestiture, and the momentum module is essentially broken here. The synthesis and thesis-eval models both partially fall for it: the "revenue decline may not be finished" bear (72 weight) is likely double-counting a one-time perimeter change.
That said, the margin story is genuinely worrying and the models under-weight it. Q2 2026 net margin dropped to 8.2% from 16% the prior quarter and from a 12–14% recent band; NI fell to $345M from $665M on flat revenue. Gross margin at 36% is fine, but operating margin at 14.3% is not "sector leader" territory for a post-divestiture pure-play that was supposed to be higher-quality mix. FCF of $1.64B on $16.45B revenue is a 10% FCF margin — decent, but at $36.3B market cap that's a ~4.5% FCF yield against a 4.67% dividend yield, meaning the dividend is being funded roughly dollar-for-dollar by FCF with nothing left for buybacks or debt paydown. The pb_ratio of 22x and roe of 124% flag the same thing: equity has been hollowed out ($1.63B on $16.5B revenue), and the balance sheet is thinner than a defensive compounder should carry. Current ratio 0.75 is tight.
Where I'd push back on the prior models: the synthesis fair value of $91 and the narrative model's DCF anchor of ~$91 are suspiciously coincident and both likely lean on trailing metrics that blend pre- and post-divestiture periods. If you take the clean run-rate — $16.6B revenue, assume operating margin normalizes back to 15–16% (call it $2.55B op income), tax at 23%, ~$1.96B normalized NI — that's ~$5.90 EPS on 332M shares. At an 18x staples multiple you get $106, at 17x you get $100, at 20x (peer PG trades richer) you get $118. So $109 isn't egregious; it's within a reasonable band assuming Q2 2026's margin compression was transitory (input costs, restructuring charges). If Q2 is the new normal, fair value is closer to $80. The contrarian bull case the models miss: post-divestiture KMB is a higher-return, lower-capex business, and the reported ROIC of 111% (nonsense as printed, but directionally reflecting the equity shrinkage) means incremental capital is highly productive. A leveraged recap or accelerated buyback with the divestiture proceeds could re-rate the equity meaningfully.
The insider tape is unhelpful — small option exercises with in-kind tax withholdings and two modest May sales; no conviction signal either way. What matters is the next 2–3 prints: does operating margin recover to 15%+ or was Q2 2026's 8.2% net margin the reveal that private-label pressure in tissue/towel is finally biting? I lean toward the synthesis "fully priced" call but with less conviction than the -16 thesis score implies — the bear case is partly built on divestiture-distorted growth math. Fair value $95–105 depending on margin normalization; current $109 sits at the top of that band with a 4.7% yield acting as a floor. Not a short, not a buy. Wait for Q3 to see if margins mean-revert, and demand a $95 handle for a starter position given the balance sheet is levered enough that a rate shock or further volume erosion has real downside.
GPT Reading
At $109, Kimberly-Clark looks expensive for what the actual numbers now show: a smaller, lower-earning business than the headline “defensive staples compounder” story implies. The cleanest way to see it is to stop averaging across the old and new perimeter and look at current run-rate economics. The last four quarters sum to roughly $16.6B of revenue and $1.96B of net income, which is basically flat-to-down sales with earnings that are no better than 2022 and still below the 2024 peak of $2.55B. Yet the stock trades at about 18x earnings, 2.2x sales, and 11.5x EV/EBITDA. For a business with organic upside likely in the low single digits, that multiple only works if margins are durably improving or if the revenue reset was a one-time portfolio clean-up that leaves a better franchise behind. I do not think the reported data prove that yet.
What stands out most is that the quality of the 2025 “improvement” is less impressive than it first appears. Annual revenue fell from $20.06B in 2024 to $16.45B in 2025, an almost 18% decline, while operating income fell from $3.21B to $2.35B, down 27%. Net income dropped from $2.55B to $2.02B, down 21%. So this was not a story of shedding low-margin sales and cleanly protecting profit dollars; profit shrank materially too. Gross margin did improve over a multiyear horizon, reaching 36.0% in 2025 versus 30.8% in 2022, but operating margin in 2025 was only 14.3%, still not evidence of a structurally stronger earnings machine after the shrink. Quarterly data also do not show a business clearly reaccelerating: revenue has sat in a very tight $4.05B-$4.19B range for six straight quarters, while net margin swung from 14%-16% in early periods down to 8.2% in the latest quarter. A true “mature earner” deserves a premium when the earnings stream is visibly steady; here, the sales base is steady, but the profit stream is not.
The balance sheet and cash flow are better than the skeptics might admit, but they are not strong enough to justify paying up. Net debt is basically nil with $694M debt against $688M cash, which removes a major risk. Operating cash flow of $2.78B and free cash flow of $1.64B are solid in absolute terms, and they support the 4.7% dividend yield. But on a $36.3B market cap, that free cash flow is only about a 4.5% yield before asking for any growth at all. For a no-growth-to-low-growth staples company facing retailer pressure, private label competition, and a current ratio below 0.75, that is not a bargain. The extreme P/B of 22x and ROE above 120% are not signs of economic magic; they mostly tell you the equity base is very small at $1.63B, so the accounting optics flatter returns. I would much rather underwrite KMB on earnings and FCF, and on those measures the stock looks more like a bond substitute priced for safety than an undervalued operating asset.
The best argument against this bearish read is straightforward: the market may be correctly looking through a portfolio change and valuing the remaining business on resilience, not size. If the 2024 annual revenue figure includes a business later divested while the recent quarterly run rate reflects the new base, then the apparent collapse from $20B to $16.5B overstates deterioration. On that view, the important numbers are the stable recent quarters around $4.1B of revenue, annualized operating cash flow near $2.8B, near-zero net debt, and a dividend that appears covered. A bull would also point out that gross margin has expanded by roughly 500 bps since 2021, that annual net income in 2025 still exceeded 2023 despite lower revenue, and that staples investors routinely pay 17x-20x for durability. I weigh those points less heavily because the latest quarter’s 8.2% net margin is exactly the kind of slippage that breaks the “just pay up for stability” thesis. If the post-reset business were truly superior, I would expect more visible consistency in quarterly profitability than we have.
What would change my mind is evidence that the new KMB can hold sales around $16.5B-$16.8B while restoring earnings power above the current run rate. Specifically, I would want to see at least two consecutive quarters with revenue above $4.2B and net margin back in the 12%-14% range, or annual operating income tracking back toward $2.6B-$2.8B without another leg down in volumes. Stronger free cash flow matters too: if FCF can move from $1.64B toward $2.0B while capex normalizes and the dividend remains comfortably covered, then $109 would look more defensible. Absent that, I think investors are paying a premium multiple for a franchise that has shrunk, has not fully proven its new earnings floor, and offers limited upside beyond income.
Grok Reading
Kimberly-Clark’s numbers describe a company that deliberately got smaller and has not yet proved the smaller version is more valuable. Annual revenue fell from $20.06B in 2024 to $16.45B in 2025, a roughly 18% cut that the quarterly run-rate has locked in: six of the last seven reported quarters sit in a tight $4.05–$4.19B band, with the anomalous $6.53B print in late 2024 looking like a timing or disposition artifact rather than a growth pulse. On that cleansed base, 2025 delivered $2.02B of net income, $2.78B of operating cash flow and $1.64B of free cash flow after $1.14B of capex. The market is paying $109.31, or about 18× that earnings and roughly 22× that free cash flow, for a franchise whose trailing revenue CAGR is −10.3% and whose free-cash-flow CAGR is −23.2%. Post-cut margins are respectable—gross 36%, operating 14.3%, net 12.3%—but the most recent quarter (June 2026) compressed net margin to 8.2% on $345M of income, a reminder that the earnings power is still lumpy.
The balance sheet explains why classic return ratios look heroic and should be ignored. Equity is only $1.63B against a $36B equity value, so reported ROE of 124% and a 22× price-to-book are arithmetic residues of decades of buybacks and dividends, not evidence of a high-ROIC compounding machine. Net debt is essentially zero ($694M debt versus $688M cash), which is a genuine strength, but the current ratio of 0.75 and a dividend that already absorbs nearly all of the $1.64B free cash flow leave little slack if volumes or mix deteriorate further. At a 4.67% yield the stock is being sold as a bond substitute; the bond only works if free cash flow stops shrinking.
I read the stock as overvalued relative to the cash it can now generate. The quantitative composite pointing to roughly $91–$98 of fair value is directionally right: an 18× multiple and a 2.2× sales multiple are full for a low-single-digit (at best) organic grower in categories where private label and retailer power erode pricing. The “divestiture-cleansed base is stable” bull case is visible in the flat $4.1B quarters, yet stability after a 20% revenue amputation is not the same as a re-rating catalyst, and the June 2026 margin air-pocket shows the earnings bridge is not yet airtight.
The strongest contrary case is straightforward. Consumer-staples peers with brand portfolios like Huggies, Kleenex and Depend routinely clear 16–20× earnings when rates are benign and investors want recession cover; Kimberly-Clark’s EV/EBITDA of 11.5× is not extreme on that peer set, debt is negligible, cash conversion remains high, and adult incontinence is a real demographic tailwind. A smart opponent would also note that gross margin has expanded roughly 500 basis points since 2021 and that the market has already digested the revenue step-down without a collapse in the multiple—evidence the narrative of a defensive dividend compounder is still intact. I weigh those points as reasons the downside may be cushioned near the mid-$90s rather than as reasons the stock is cheap today; paying a defensive premium for negative free-cash-flow growth and unresolved volume pressure is still a rich entry.
I would flip toward fair value or modest undervaluation if the next three quarters show organic sales growth at or above 2% on the new base, free cash flow re-accelerating through $2B, and net margins holding above 12% without one-off help. Sustained volume declines, another leg down in FCF, or a dividend coverage ratio that forces a cut would confirm the overvaluation and push fair value closer to the low $80s.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Kimberly-Clark reads as a classic mature earner: gross margin expanded from 30.8% in 2021 to 36.0% in 2025, operating margin sits in the 13-16% band, and free cash flow has averaged roughly $2B/yr with OCF/NI of 1.51x and negative accruals (-5.7% of assets) - all hallmarks of real earnings. Beneish M of -2.55 and Altman Z of 3.48 corroborate: no mechanical manipulation signals, safe-zone solvency. Capital return discipline is intact: diluted shares actually shrank slightly (-0.4% CAGR), SBC is a modest 0.9% of revenue, and buyback covers SBC 3x over. The concern is the trajectory. Revenue dropped from $20.06B in 2024 to $16.45B in 2025 - an 18% decline that the modules gloss over; whether this reflects divestiture (likely, given the Kenvue-style portfolio reshaping in the sector) or genuine demand loss is decisive for the quality read and needs verification. Net income also fell from $2.55B to $2.02B and FCF from $2.51B to $1.64B. Liquidity is thin for a company this size: $688M cash against $694M short-term debt and net debt position, so the balance sheet is a constraint rather than a cushion. Insider tape is neutral-to-slightly-negative: three small sales ($690K), zero open-market buys, mostly routine option-exercise and tax-withholding activity. Nothing alarming, nothing encouraging. Overall a durable staples franchise with expanding gross margin and clean accounting, but not a fortress - leverage and a sharp revenue step-down keep it out of the top tier.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Whether the 2025 revenue drop from $20.06B to $16.45B reflects a divestiture (e.g., personal protective, tissue segment sale, spin) or organic volume/price decline
- Total debt load and maturity schedule - short-term debt exceeds cash, so refinancing terms matter
- Segment-level organic growth rates ex-FX and ex-divestiture to see if underlying demand is stable
- Any restructuring charges inflating 2024 operating margin or depressing 2025 results
- Pension/OPEB obligations, common for a 150-year-old industrial staples company
- Customer concentration with mass retailers (Walmart, Costco) which pressures pricing
The composite fair value of $98.32 sits ~10% below the $109.31 price, and the signal-adjusted FV of $91.06 implies ~17% downside. The three methods bracket the debate: DCF at $108.33 essentially matches the tape (and likely embeds generous terminal assumptions for a business that just printed an 18% revenue drop), anchored P/E at $98.66 says the multiple is stretched vs history, and the EPV floor at $77.96 says if growth stalls the deserved price is meaningfully lower. Earnings quality is genuinely high, which supports the deserved value, but it does not turn a full price into a cheap one. The Company-Quality lens grades this a Solid, not a fortress, staples name with a leveraged balance sheet and a shaky top line. That argues against paying a premium multiple. The market is treating KMB as a defensive bond-proxy compounder; the price already reflects that view. To justify $109 you need durable low-single-digit revenue growth to resume, margin gains to hold, and no multiple compression - a plausible but hardly heroic set that leaves no margin of safety. Net: this is not overvalued in a dangerous way, but it is not cheap. Fair-to-slightly-rich is the honest read.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the 18% revenue drop reflects a divestiture/restructuring vs organic decline - materially changes DCF terminal assumptions
- Forward organic growth and pricing guidance in the next print
- Net debt trajectory and interest coverage vs the leveraged balance sheet flag
- Private-label share trends in tissue and diapers
KMB sits in an awkward sentiment spot: the tape is mildly risk-on (+32) which is exactly the regime where defensive compounders get faded as capital rotates to higher-beta stories. With a beta of 0.28, KMB neither participates in the rally nor gets crushed by volatility, but the relative-performance drag is real and visible in the -18% recent move against a -10% longer trend. The 'defensive premium' narrative that justified paying above DCF is quietly unwinding as investors question why they should hold a low-growth staple when risk assets are working. Analyst tone around staples has broadly been cautious on margin compression from input costs, freight, and private-label share gains, which reinforces the de-rating pressure. News flow is thin and generic - KMB shows up only in yield/dividend listicles, which is low-quality sentiment support: it attracts income buyers but signals the stock has become a coupon rather than a story. That is a durable but LOW-intensity tailwind (dividend aristocrat bid) fighting a stronger headwind (defensive multiple compression in a risk-on regime with rates at 4.69%). Net: modest but persistent headwind, muted by low beta.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether VIX spikes or regime flips to risk-off - would immediately re-bid defensives including KMB
- Analyst target revisions post next earnings - watch for capitulation cuts that mark a sentiment bottom
- Private-label share data and input-cost commentary that could either validate the bear narrative or break it
- Sector rotation signals - staples relative strength vs SPX as a real-time gauge of the defensive-premium unwind
The world KMB sells into is stable in need and stingy in wallet. Hygiene consumption doesn't cycle, but the consumer's willingness to pay for branded absorbency does, and that is where private label has been taking units. Macro headwinds with a 10y at 4.69 matter less for demand than for the cost of carrying a reshaped, potentially levered balance sheet. Input and freight inflation plus tariff exposure keep the industry's margin curve pointed down, which means KMB's growth story is a self-help story: fewer SKUs, fewer geographies, more productivity. That can hold earnings power flat-to-slightly-up for years, but it cannot manufacture volume growth. The structural question is whether premium mix in adult care and skin health outruns unit decay in baby and tissue — currently close to a draw.
When we made this prediction on Aug 24, 2026, KMB was $110.72. We expect it to be $105.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $88.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 24, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips up 25%
adjusted_pe
flips up 25%