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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Kinsale Capital Group Inc. (KNSL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +27 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 73 · Value -11 · Sentiment -50 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $765.44 vs $359.38 at analysis
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Kinsale Capital Group Inc.
KNSL NYSEKinsale Capital Group Inc. is a specialty insurance provider focused on the excess and surplus lines market. This company offers insurance solutions to small businesses that often face challenges obtaining coverage through standard markets due to unique or high-risk characteristics. By specializing in hard-to-place risks, Kinsale Capital Group fills a vital niche in the insurance industry, addressing the needs of sectors such as construction, manufacturing, and professional services. The firm's comprehensive underwriting expertise and disciplined risk management help maintain its competitive edge. With its headquarters in Richmond, Virginia, Kinsale Capital Group plays a significant role in the diversified insurance services arena, meeting the evolving demands of businesses and contributing to financial stability within the market. This nimble approach allows it to adapt quickly to changing regulatory and economic landscapes, offering tailored products that reflect its customers' specific risk exposures.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 21.65
Total Equity: $1.96B
Shares: 23,261,617
Total Debt: $224.40M
Cash: $163.36M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $224.40M
Cash: $163.36M
Revenue: $1.87B
Revenue: $1.87B
Revenue: $1.87B
Total Equity: $1.96B
Tax Rate: 20.6%
Equity: $1.96B
Total Debt: $224.40M
Cash: $163.36M
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $224.40M
Total Debt: $224.40M
Total Equity: $1.96B
Shares: 23,261,617
Shares: 23,261,617
CapEx: -$53.69M
Shares: 23,261,617
Stock Price: $359.14
Net Income: $503.61M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 1:22pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $653.5M | $838.8M | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $669,000 | $721,000 | $942,000 | $4.0M | $1.7M |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $152.7M | $159.1M | $308.1M | $414.8M | $503.6M |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $6.73 | $6.97 | $13.37 | $17.92 | $21.76 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $6.62 | $6.88 | $13.22 | $17.78 | $21.65 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:56pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $121.0M | $156.3M | $126.7M | $113.2M | $163.4M |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $2.0B | $2.7B | $3.8B | $4.9B | $6.0B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $42.7M | $195.7M | $183.8M | $184.1M | $224.4M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.3B | $2.0B | $2.7B | $3.4B | $4.1B |
| Total Equity | $699.3M | $745.4M | $1.1B | $1.5B | $2.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $385.9M | $533.1M | $828.2M | $1.2B | $1.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 1:22pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $407.0M | $557.8M | $859.8M | $976.3M | $1.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$5.9M | -$6.9M | -$6.6M | -$23.9M | -$53.7M |
| Free Cash Flow | $401.1M | $550.9M | $853.2M | $952.4M | $990.1M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $125.0M | $50.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | -$10.0M | -$11.9M | -$13.0M | -$13.9M | -$15.8M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | $0 | $0 | -$10.0M | -$90.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | — | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 1:22pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +28.4% | +46.0% | +29.7% | +18.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +4.2% | +93.6% | +34.6% | +21.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:56pm (20d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-28 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-26 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-28 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-29 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-29 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-27 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-29 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-29 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-31 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-26 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-28 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-28 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-30 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-27 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-29 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-26 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-27 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-01 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-26 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-30 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 09:02Recovery pays +68%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 9%. Ratio 7.7:1. Caveat: revenue-DCF fits financials poorly (reported revenue omits net interest) — treat the legs as rough.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($359.38) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +27% | 32.8% | $604.47 | +68% |
| Base — stabilizes | +18% | 28.5% | $410.79 | +14% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +9% | 24.2% | $271.47 | -24% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +10% | 28.5% | $327.35 | -9% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue peaked at $497.5M in Q3 2025, dropped to $483.3M in Q4, then $466.7M in Q1 2026 — that's two consecutive sequential declines, and Q1 2026 net income of $112.6M is down 20% from Q3 2025's $141.6M with margin compression from 28.5% to 24.1%. Year-over-year Q1 2026 vs Q1 2025 is still +10.2% on revenue but only +26% on NI off an easy comp (Q1 2025 had a weak 21.1% margin, likely cat losses). Full-year 2025 revenue of $1.87B (+17.8% YoY) already marked a sharp deceleration from the 30%+ CAGR of 2021-2024. The E&S hard market is clearly cooling — that's not speculation, it's in the sequential numbers.
The synthesis verdict of $856 fair value vs $359 spot (+138%) is not credible and I dissent hard. A P&C insurer growing high-teens with 25.7% ROE and 27% net margins does not trade at 40x earnings; it trades where KNSL trades now, at 16.6x. The DCF must be extrapolating 20%+ growth in perpetuity, which contradicts the very deceleration visible in the last three quarters. The Market Narrative writeup is more honest: this is a "math/cycle timing disagreement," and the market's 16.6x multiple is pricing exactly what a skeptical analyst should — that peak-cycle underwriting margins mean-revert and premium growth normalizes to 8-12%. Kinsale's historical multiple has been 25-35x during the hard market; compression to 16x reflects the cycle turning, not irrationality.
The contrarian case that actually matters isn't "138% upside." It's whether 16.6x is still too generous if loss ratios normalize. E&S combined ratios in the mid-70s are historically anomalous; a reversion to 82-85% would cut underwriting income by roughly 30-40%, and net investment income growth also slows as premium growth slows. If 2026 EPS comes in flat-to-down (very plausible given Q1's $112.6M annualizes to ~$450M vs 2025's $504M), forward P/E is actually ~18x, not 16.6x. Insider activity supports the caution: those May 2026 transactions are net selling (roughly 22K sold vs 600 exercised and a 330-share token buy), not the "net insider buying" the secondary signals claim — the gifts are neutral, but the option-exercise-and-sell pattern is textbook distribution, not accumulation. The signals layer is wrong on this.
Where I land: KNSL is a genuinely high-quality franchise — 25.7% ROE, 0.11 debt/equity, $990M FCF on $1.87B revenue is exceptional for any business, let alone an insurer — but "quality" isn't a valuation. Fair value is roughly 18-20x normalized earnings of ~$450-475M, or $8.1-9.5B market cap, which brackets today's $8.12B almost exactly. The pre-flight thesis nailed it: the market is pricing peak-margin fade, and it's probably right. The synthesis composite is anchored to a growth-extrapolation DCF that ignores the visible sequential deceleration and the well-documented E&S cycle. I'd call this fairly valued with modest downside risk if Q2 confirms the deceleration and margin compression; upside requires either (a) hard market persisting into 2027, which reinsurance pricing suggests is unlikely, or (b) Kinsale taking share aggressively in a softening market without loss-ratio deterioration, which is the bull's genuinely defensible argument but unproven in a soft cycle. A starter position makes sense below $320 (roughly 15x forward on normalized earnings); above $380 you're paying for a growth reacceleration the tape isn't showing.
GPT Reading
What stands out is that this is a genuinely excellent insurer being valued more like a cyclical than a compounder, but the headline “138% undervalued” output is not credible on the data provided. Kinsale grew revenue from $653.5M in 2021 to $1.87B in 2025, a 2.9x increase, while net income rose from $152.7M to $503.6M, and ROE reached 25.7% with only $224.4M of debt against $1.96B of equity. That is elite operating performance. Even in the latest quarter, where profitability stepped down, revenue was still $466.7M, up 10.2% from $423.4M a year earlier, and net income rose 26.2% to $112.6M. At $359, the stock trades at 16.6x earnings, about 4.5x sales, and roughly 4.3x book. For a specialty P&C writer producing a 26.9% net margin and a long runway of double-digit growth, that is not demanding. The market is clearly discounting a normalization story already.
The more important issue is that the numbers are no longer as clean as the simple “cheap quality” framing suggests. Quarterly revenue peaked at $497.5M in 2025-09 and has since slipped to $483.3M and then $466.7M. Net margin has also compressed from the high-28% range in mid-to-late 2025 to 24.1% in the latest quarter. So while trailing annual numbers still look fantastic, the near-term direction is softer than the multi-year CAGR implies. This is exactly why I would reject the valuation model’s extreme upside estimate: insurers should not be valued off extrapolated peak-cycle growth and margins. Still, even if 2025 was near-peak profitability, the current multiple already reflects a fair amount of that risk. A business that has compounded revenue at 23.7% and earnings at 27.9%, while maintaining low leverage and strong cash generation, usually does not deserve a mid-teens P/E unless the market expects a meaningful underwriting deterioration.
Cash flow deserves caution as well as credit. Reported 2025 operating cash flow of $1.04B and free cash flow of $990.1M are enormous versus $503.6M of net income, but for insurers these figures can be distorted by premium float movements and should not be read like industrial FCF. So I would not lean heavily on the “strong cash flow quality” label. The real economic evidence here is better found in sustained earnings growth, low balance-sheet risk, and high returns on equity. On that basis, Kinsale still looks attractive. Book value is about $1.96B against an $8.12B market cap, so investors are paying a premium for underwriting skill; but a 4.3x price-to-book is not absurd when ROE is 25.7% and the company has proven it can reinvest capital at high rates. If earnings merely hold around the 2025 level, the stock is reasonably cheap. If earnings keep growing at even low-double digits, it is plainly undervalued.
The best bear case is straightforward and serious: this could be a classic case of buying a great insurer too late in the underwriting cycle. The sequential slowdown in revenue from $497.5M to $466.7M and margin drop from 28.5%-28.7% to 24.1% may be the first visible sign that pricing is softening, competition is rising, or losses are normalizing. If net income is closer to a $430M-$450M run rate than the $504M reported in 2025, then the P/E is not 16.6x but more like 18x-19x, and the 4.3x book value starts to look less forgiving. Bears would also note that insider activity is mixed rather than a strong signal; there was one tiny open-market purchase of 330 shares, but also multiple sales around option exercises and large gifts, which I would not overread positively. If Kinsale is moving from an exceptional hard-market period into a more ordinary environment, the stock could easily deserve to sit where it is, or lower.
What would change my mind is not a modest slowdown but evidence that the franchise economics are actually rolling over. If the next two quarters show revenue still declining sequentially and year-over-year growth falling toward low single digits, while net margin stays around 21%-24% rather than recovering toward the upper-20s, then I would conclude 2025 was the earnings peak and the stock is only fairly valued. Conversely, if quarterly revenue reaccelerates back above $500M and earnings power annualizes above $520M without leverage rising materially, then today’s price will look too low for a business of this quality. My base case is that growth is decelerating, not breaking, and that the market has already discounted more normalization than the current data justify.
Grok Reading
Kinsale’s numbers describe a high-quality specialty underwriter that is still compounding but no longer at the blistering pace the 2022–2024 hard market produced. Annual revenue climbed from $653.5 M in 2021 to $1.87 B in 2025 while net income scaled from $152.7 M to $503.6 M, delivering a 23.7 % revenue CAGR and 27.9 % earnings CAGR. Free-cash-flow generation is exceptional: $990 M of FCF on $1.04 B of operating cash flow against only $53.7 M of capex, and the balance sheet is fortress-like with $224 M of debt against $1.96 B of equity (D/E 0.11). ROE sits at 25.7 % and net margins have hovered in the mid-to-high 20s. At $359 the stock trades at 16.6× trailing earnings, 4.3× book and 4.5× sales—multiples that look modest for a 25 % ROE compounder with negligible leverage and sector-leading underwriting discipline.
The latest quarter, however, is the first clear crack in the growth story. Q1 2026 revenue of $466.7 M was only 10 % above the year-earlier $423.4 M and declined sequentially from $483 M; the net margin compressed to 24.1 % from the 28 % plateau of the prior three quarters. That deceleration is consistent with a normalizing E&S market after years of hard-market rate increases. The valuation models that spit out a $840–$856 fair value (implying 138 % upside) are therefore extrapolating mid-20 % growth and peak margins far longer than the recent data support; those composites should be heavily discounted. A more grounded view is that Kinsale can still deliver low-to-mid-teens premium growth and mid-20s ROE, which at a 18–20× earnings multiple would justify $450–$520—solid but not double-the-price upside.
The strongest contrary case is pure cycle math. Specialty P&C has historically mean-reverted hard once capacity floods back in; if loss ratios inflate another 300–400 bp and top-line growth settles into high-single digits, earnings power stalls near $550 M and a 14× multiple becomes the ceiling, implying the stock is already fully valued or slightly rich. The same skeptics will note that FCF CAGR of only 7.7 % lags earnings growth, that the most recent quarter’s margin dip may be the start of a multi-year soft-market grind, and that the “net insider buying” label is hard to square with a string of large option-related sales and gifts. Those points have merit; I simply weigh the still-elevated absolute ROE, the structural advantages of the E&S niche, and the ultra-clean balance sheet more heavily than the early signs of deceleration.
I would flip to a clear sell if two consecutive quarters show revenue growth below 8 % and combined ratios pushing net margins under 20 %, or if management signals a material shift in underwriting appetite. Conversely, a re-acceleration to 15 %+ premium growth with margins re-stabilizing above 26 % would justify re-rating toward $550 and a more aggressive stance.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Kinsale has scaled revenue from $653M in 2021 to $1.87B in 2025 — a ~30% CAGR — while net income tripled from $153M to $504M and FCF grew from $401M to $990M. OCF/NI at 2.68x and accruals at -12.4% of assets reflect the insurance model (premiums collected ahead of losses paid), but even within that model the trajectory shows durable underwriting discipline rather than reserve games. Diluted share count barely moved (23.1M to 23.3M, 0.2% CAGR) with SBC only 1% of revenue and buybacks 189% of SBC — per-share value is genuinely protected.ND The balance sheet carries net debt of $61M against $990M annual FCF, so leverage is trivial in cash-flow terms; Altman Z of 1.9 flags 'grey' but that metric misreads insurers whose float sits as liabilities. Insider activity is net selling in dollars ($8.9M sold vs $100K bought), dominated by CEO Kehoe exercising options and selling ~$6.8M — routine for a founder-led compounder but not a conviction buy signal. The lone open-market purchase by Tangard is token. Overall this reads as a well-run, high-integrity specialty insurer executing at an unusually high level for its industry.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Combined ratio trend and loss-ratio development triangles in the 10-K
- Prior-year reserve development (favorable vs adverse) over the past 5 years
- Reinsurance program structure and net catastrophe retention
- Concentration by line of business within E&S and any large single-risk exposures
- Investment portfolio composition and duration vs liability profile
- Details of the debt on the balance sheet (maturity, covenants) that produce the $61M net debt figure
The e2e composite fair value of $841.88 (signal-adj $856.13) implies 138% upside, but that number is anchored by a DCF of $1,093.98 that almost certainly extrapolates recent 30%+ premium growth and sub-80 combined ratios far into the future. The anchored-PE method at $337.67 sits essentially on top of the $359.38 price and is the more disciplined read for a specialty P&C insurer whose earnings power is cyclically flattered by a hard market. Splitting the difference and giving quality its due, deserved value sits somewhere in the mid-$300s to low-$400s, not $800+.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Current accident-year loss ratio vs prior-year development - is reserve release flattering earnings?
- Premium growth deceleration in latest quarter as E&S market softens
- Investment yield roll-forward and duration - reinvestment tailwind size
- Management commentary on submission flow and rate change by line
KNSL is caught in an unglamorous spot: a low-intensity, low-cult 'quiet-quality' narrative means there is no story army bidding it up, while the active market whisper is mean-reversion in E&S underwriting as the soft market drags on. Recent news flow is subtly negative - a fund letter flagging 'rising challenges' and a listicle putting KNSL on a 'facing challenges' bucket - the kind of drip that reinforces the bear cycle-timing thesis without any offsetting bullish narrative catalyst. Beta 0.9 and a profitable, defensive-ish insurer profile mute macro damage, but the neutral tape (VIX 16, S&P near highs) is not the risk-on environment that would spark a re-rating of a quality compounder either. Momentum has cooled - recent 18% trailing the 23.7% long-run CAGR - which is exactly the tape signature of a name being quietly sold by growth holders as the story loses fizz. Analyst tone is not screaming, but the absence of upgrade flow plus the bearish fund-letter mention tilts the net pressure down. This is a slow leak, not a rout: headwind, not strong headwind.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether more fund letters or sell-side notes pick up the 'soft cycle' bear frame on E&S insurers in coming weeks
- Next earnings print - a clean underwriting quarter would puncture the mean-reversion narrative and flip sentiment
- E&S pricing survey data and competitor commentary (WRB, RLI) that would either confirm or refute the softening whisper
- Whether the momentum deceleration deepens into outright downtrend or stabilizes
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 4, 2026, KNSL was $360.44. We expect it to be $435.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $300.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.