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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Lemaitre Vascular Inc. (LMAT) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -5 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 73 · Value -69 · Sentiment -39 (timing only, not weighted)
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Lemaitre Vascular Inc.
LMAT NASDAQLeMaitre Vascular Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets specialized medical devices and implants designed for vascular surgery and the treatment of peripheral vascular disease. The company offers a comprehensive portfolio of products across six key categories: aortic, arteriovenous access, cardiac, carotid, lower extremity, and neuro applications. Its product lines include allografts—cryopreserved human tissue grafts used in vascular reconstruction—embolectomy catheters for removing blood clots from arteries, thrombectomy catheters for venous thrombi removal, and various synthetic and biologic grafts and patches. LeMaitre also provides human tissue cryopreservation services. The company distributes its products globally through direct sales to hospitals in over 25 countries and through distributors in more than 70 countries across North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific. Founded in 1986 and headquartered in Burlington, Massachusetts, LeMaitre serves vascular surgeons performing both open surgical procedures and minimally invasive interventions, with the majority of its revenue generated from the United States market.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.52
Total Equity: $393.52M
Shares: 22,929,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $28.24M
EBITDA: $78.33M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $28.24M
Revenue: $249.60M
Revenue: $249.60M
Revenue: $249.60M
Total Equity: $393.52M
Tax Rate: 23.2%
Equity: $393.52M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $28.24M
Current Liabilities: $36.32M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $393.52M
Shares: 22,929,000
Shares: 22,929,000
CapEx: -$6.78M
Shares: 22,929,000
Stock Price: $82.38
Net Income: $57.73M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 1:09pm (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $154.4M | $161.7M | $193.5M | $219.9M | $249.6M |
| Cost of Revenue | $53.0M | $56.8M | $66.4M | $69.0M | $71.1M |
| Gross Profit | $101.4M | $104.9M | $127.0M | $150.9M | $178.5M |
| Operating Expenses | $65.0M | $78.1M | $90.3M | $98.6M | $110.6M |
| Operating Income | $36.4M | $26.8M | $36.7M | $52.3M | $67.9M |
| Net Income | $26.9M | $20.6M | $30.1M | $44.0M | $57.7M |
| EBITDA | $47.5M | $36.3M | $46.2M | $61.9M | $78.3M |
| EPS | $1.27 | $0.94 | $1.36 | $1.96 | $2.55 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.25 | $0.93 | $1.34 | $1.93 | $2.52 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 1:00pm (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $13.9M | $19.1M | $24.3M | $25.6M | $28.2M |
| Total Current Assets | $139.9M | $161.7M | $194.6M | $402.2M | $468.2M |
| Total Assets | $292.8M | $310.5M | $346.8M | $551.8M | $615.7M |
| Current Liabilities | $21.8M | $25.3M | $29.9M | $30.6M | $36.3M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $38.7M | $42.3M | $48.9M | $214.5M | $222.2M |
| Total Equity | $254.2M | $268.2M | $297.9M | $337.3M | $393.5M |
| Retained Earnings | $88.1M | $97.8M | $115.4M | $145.1M | $184.7M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 1:09pm (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $35.1M | $25.4M | $36.8M | $44.1M | $81.3M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$4.9M | -$3.2M | -$7.3M | -$7.0M | -$6.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | $30.2M | $22.1M | $29.5M | $37.2M | $74.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $-899,000 | $0 | -$1.9M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | $0 | $0 | $169.3M | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | -$9.3M | -$11.0M | -$12.4M | -$14.4M | -$18.1M |
| Stock Buybacks | $-802,000 | $-642,000 | $-853,000 | -$1.7M | -$1.8M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$12.9M | $5.3M | $5.1M | $1.3M | $2.6M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 1:09pm (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.7% | +19.7% | +13.6% | +13.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +3.5% | +21.1% | +18.8% | +18.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | -26.3% | +36.8% | +42.3% | +30.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -23.3% | +45.9% | +46.3% | +31.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -23.7% | +27.5% | +34.0% | +26.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 1:01pm (8d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-20 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-21 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-12 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-20 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-21 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-15 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-13 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-21 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-15 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-15 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-13 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-15 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-16 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-16 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-08 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-16 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-24 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-16 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-07 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-18 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-15AI compresses the non-manufacturing overhead of a small-cap device firm — regulatory submissions, EU MDR/CE dossier maintenance, clinical literature work, complaint handling and multi-language sales support — where LeMaitre carries unusually high fixed cost per dollar of revenue given ~$250M sales across dozens of SKUs and geographies.
Nothing in AI directly threatens the revenue unit; the real risk is that AI-assisted procurement analytics and GPO benchmarking make LeMaitre's per-unit price premium on catheters, patches and grafts more visible and harder to hold, since price/mix has been a core driver of the 65.7%→71.5% gross margin climb.
Whether the pricing engine keeps working: watch reported average selling price growth and gross margin per quarter. AI matters to this name only through hospital purchasing sophistication, not through product substitution.
AI Lens thesis
The need — repairing and clearing diseased vessels in an aging population — is physical and growing, and the solution is a sterile implant or catheter in a surgeon's hand with FDA/CE clearance and product liability attached, none of which cheap software reproduces. AI reaches LeMaitre in three thin channels: (1) internal cost — regulatory writing, quality systems, tissue-processing documentation, and a direct sales force of specialist reps who can be made more productive per territory; (2) demand — AI-read CT/ultrasound and screening algorithms plausibly increase diagnosed PAD, carotid and aortic disease, which widens the procedure funnel LeMaitre sells into; (3) competition — AI lowers the cost of design and simulation but not of clinical evidence, cryopreserved tissue supply chains, sterile manufacturing, or 25 years of surgeon relationships in a market too small to attract a well-funded AI-native entrant. Net: mildly favorable, structurally minor. The company's margin expansion is a pricing-and-scale story, not an AI story, and should not be credited to AI.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside AI-assisted imaging screening expanding diagnosed carotid and aortic disease volumes is a free volume tailwind LeMaitre captures without spending anything — device demand rises with detection rates it does not have to fund.
Downside LeMaitre's growth depends heavily on acquiring small niche device lines; if AI-inflated software valuations and cheaper product development spawn more bidders or make targets believe they can go direct, the roll-up arithmetic that underpins mid-teens growth gets more expensive.
Outcome range spread 25
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:35The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: LMAT has printed eight consecutive quarters of expansion, with revenue climbing from $55.8M (Q2'24) to $66.6M (Q1'26) — that's ~19% YoY on the most recent print, actually accelerating from the 13.5% "recent YoY" the momentum module cites. Net margin has structurally re-rated from ~20% to ~24%, with a Q3'25 spike to 28.4% (likely one-off). Annual op margin went from 16.6% (2022) to 27.2% (2025) — that's a 1,060bp expansion on a 55% revenue base expansion. FCF of $74.5M on $249.6M revenue = 29.8% FCF margin, with essentially zero debt and $28M cash. This is a pristine balance sheet compounding at ~14% top-line with expanding profitability. The "decelerating quarterly trend" flag looks wrong to me — Q1'26 at $66.6M is a sequential high and up 11.2% from Q1'25's $59.9M ex-seasonality.
Where I disagree with the synthesis: a $45.79 composite fair value (implying -44% downside) reads as a DCF crank job using conservative reversion assumptions on a company that just demonstrated the opposite. At $82.38, EV/FCF is roughly 25x on TTM FCF that grew 59% CAGR. P/E of 32.7x on a business compounding earnings at 30%+ with 15% ROE, zero leverage, and 72% gross margins isn't cheap but it isn't egregious either — it's roughly a PEG of 1.0-1.1 if you believe even half the earnings trajectory persists. The Market Forces module calling this "harvest mode" with "deteriorating strategic positioning" contradicts the actual numbers: harvest-mode companies don't post 19% YoY revenue with 400bp of margin expansion. That signal appears to be pattern-matching on "open surgery" keywords rather than reading the P&L. The Narrative module's framing is more honest — the price embeds continued execution, and the question is durability, not whether the current run is real.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: margin expansion from 20% to 24% net over two years in a medtech niche is unusual and mean-reverting risk is real. If the Q3'25 28.4% margin was a mix/pricing anomaly (Q4'25 already came back to 24.2%, Q1'26 to 23.6%), the "structural" gain may be more like 300bp, not 400bp. Allograft supply is a real moat but also a real constraint — you can't scale donor tissue infinitely, which caps volume growth even as pricing holds. Insider data is unusable (all showing 0-1 share awards on 2026-06-04, clearly a data artifact, not the "unusual selling" the secondary signal claims — another module I'd discount). The stock is down from $118 to $82 (-30%), and that de-rating has already happened; buyers here aren't paying peak multiples. At the 2024 low-water valuation the P/E was arguably richer relative to then-current growth.
My read: the synthesis verdict of $45-53 fair value is too harsh and appears to over-weight reversion assumptions while under-weighting the demonstrated eight-quarter operating leverage story. But at $82 with a 32x P/E, this isn't a table-pounding buy either — you're paying for continued execution in a business where the law of large numbers eventually bites (though $250M revenue in a fragmented vascular market is nowhere near that ceiling). Fair value in my framework is closer to $70-85: 25-28x forward earnings of ~$3.00-3.20/share, which implies the stock is roughly fairly valued to modestly rich, not 35% overvalued. The bigger risk than valuation is a single soft quarter puncturing the compounder narrative — with the stock already off 30% from highs, the market is watching. I'd wait for either a pullback to the low $70s or a Q2'26 print confirming the acceleration before adding; existing holders should sit tight. The synthesis and Market Forces modules are meaningfully too bearish given what the actual quarterly cadence shows.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not a broken story but a very small medtech franchise executing at a level that usually commands a premium. Revenue has gone from $154.4M in 2021 to $249.6M in 2025, a 13%-plus CAGR, while operating income nearly doubled from $36.4M to $67.9M despite 2022 being a reset year. The more recent cadence is even better: quarterly sales rose from $55.8M in 2024-06 to $66.6M in 2026-03, and the latest quarter was up 11.2% year over year from $59.9M. Net income growth has outpaced sales, from $44.0M in 2024 to $57.7M in 2025, and the last four quarters sum to roughly $62.5M of earnings, implying the current price is closer to 30x run-rate earnings than the headline 32.7x trailing figure. For a debt-free company with 71.5% gross margin, 27.2% operating margin, 23.1% net margin, and $74.5M of free cash flow on $249.6M of sales, that multiple is rich but not absurd. This is not a speculative device story; it is already producing roughly 30% FCF conversion on sales and an FCF yield around 4% on the current market cap.
The key fact the “overvalued” models can miss is that the margin structure appears to have genuinely stepped up rather than merely spiked. Annual operating margin has expanded from 19.0% in 2023 to 23.8% in 2024 to 27.2% in 2025, and quarterly net margins have mostly stayed in the low-20s or better, even touching 28.4% in 2025-09. That matters because valuation based on older normalized margins will understate earnings power. The balance sheet also gives this business a quality premium: no debt, $28.2M cash, current ratio near 13x, and ROIC of 14.3% without leverage. In small-cap medtech, a niche leader that self-funds growth and converts earnings into cash this cleanly often deserves to trade well above the market. At $82.38, investors are paying about 7.6x sales and 23.4x EV/EBITDA; those are full multiples, but for a company compounding revenue low-teens while earnings compound much faster, I think they are within a reasonable band rather than clearly bubble-like.
My read is therefore more constructive than the synthesis that pegs fair value in the low-$50s. That conclusion feels too anchored to generic mature-industrial math and not enough to the actual trajectory here. If LeMaitre can sustain even 10-12% sales growth and hold operating margin around 27-28%, earnings power can keep compounding into the low-to-mid teens without financial engineering. On a forward earnings base that could plausibly exceed $65M within a year, a 28-32x multiple gets you roughly the current price to low-$90s before giving any credit for further mix improvement or tuck-in optionality. I do not see obvious evidence in the raw numbers of a business rolling over; if anything, 2026-03 showed re-acceleration versus the late-2024 base.
The best bear case is straightforward: this is still a $250M-revenue company in a slow-changing medtech niche, and the stock already discounts an awful lot of excellence. Sequentially, revenue has not climbed in a straight line — $64.2M in 2025-06 fell to $61.0M in 2025-09 before recovering, and 2026-03 at $66.6M is only modestly above 2025-06. If growth slips from low teens to high single digits while margins simply plateau, 30x earnings and 7.6x sales can compress quickly into the 20s P/E and 5-6x sales, which would indeed imply a price much closer to $60 than $80. The latest insider blotter is not helpful, though the data shown look more like awards than informative open-market transactions. And because this is already at 4.8x book and pays only a 1.15% dividend, there is not much valuation support if the “premium compounder” label gets revoked.
What would change my mind is not a one-quarter wiggle but evidence that the operating step-up was temporary. If revenue growth falls below 8% year over year for two consecutive quarters while net margin drifts back toward 18-20%, I would stop treating the current valuation as defendable and would likely move to clearly overvalued. Conversely, if the company prints another couple of quarters around $67-70M in revenue with net income staying above $15M per quarter, the market will have further proof that the higher margin base is durable, and $82 will look fair to slightly cheap rather than expensive.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a high-quality niche compounder that has already delivered the hard part. Revenue climbed from $154.4M in 2021 to $249.6M in 2025 (13.6% CAGR), while net income more than doubled from $26.9M to $57.7M and free cash flow reached $74.5M against only $6.8M of capex. Operating margin expanded from the low-20s to 27.2% and net margin hit 23.1%, with gross margin locked near 71.5%. The balance sheet is pristine—zero debt, $28.2M cash, current ratio nearly 13—and ROIC of 14.3% shows the capital is earning its keep. Recent quarters remain solid: the March 2026 print of $66.6M revenue and 23.6% net margin sits comfortably above the year-earlier $59.9M / 18.4%. This is not a story of aspirational margins; the company is already running at elite medical-device profitability and converting almost every incremental dollar into cash.
What the quantitative models miss is how badly their own DCF anchors contradict the reported economics. The narrative layer admits the DCF is built on ~8% EBIT margins while the company just printed 27% operating margin and $67.9M of operating income. That single assumption alone collapses the $45–53 “fair value” range; a business throwing off $74.5M of FCF with no leverage and mid-teens top-line growth is simply not worth 12–14× free cash flow. At $82.38 the stock trades at roughly 25× trailing FCF and 33× earnings—rich, but nowhere near the 35% overvaluation the composite claims once realistic margins are restored. The 30% drawdown from the $118 high has already excised a good portion of the prior exuberance.
The bear case that still carries weight is deceleration plus strategic risk. Quarterly revenue growth has cooled into the low double-digits, the secondary signals flag a decelerating trend, and the open-surgery vascular franchise sits on the wrong side of the long-term shift toward endovascular techniques. Hospital GPO pressure and a $250M revenue base limit the runway for another 400 bp of margin expansion; the 38.5% earnings CAGR of the last several years is mathematically unlikely to repeat. At 7.6× sales and 23× EV/EBITDA the market is still paying for continued mid-teens growth and stable-to-rising margins—exactly the scenario that fails if unit growth slows further or pricing power erodes. Insider filings are noise (mostly 1-share awards), so they neither confirm nor refute the thesis.
I still land modestly negative on valuation because 33× earnings leaves little room for the very deceleration the data already hint at, and the niche TAM does not justify compounder multiples forever. A fair range nearer $68–73 (roughly 22–24× trailing earnings or ~20× FCF) better matches a high-teens ROIC business whose growth is rolling over from 14% toward low double-digits. The quality premium is real; the current price simply overpays for its persistence.
What would flip me is evidence that growth is re-accelerating rather than fading—specifically two consecutive quarters of ≥15% revenue growth with operating margin holding above 26%, or a clear international/allograft mix shift that lifts the forward revenue CAGR back above 14% while FCF stays above $80M. Conversely, a print showing revenue growth below 8% or gross margin compression below 68% would confirm the overvaluation and push fair value into the low $60s.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
LeMaitre has compounded revenue from 154M in 2021 to 250M in 2025 (roughly 13% CAGR) while gross margin expanded from 65.7% to 71.5% and operating margin from 23.6% to 27.2%. Net income more than doubled from 27M to 58M, and FCF stepped up decisively to 74.5M in 2025 (OCF/NI 1.23x, accruals -2% of assets) - cash generation is real, not accrual-driven. Altman Z of 7.12 and Beneish M of -2.61 corroborate a clean earnings profile. Balance sheet holds 28M net cash with no debt drag; the business fully self-funds growth. Dilution is modest: diluted share count crept from 21.5M to 22.9M (about 1.7% CAGR) with SBC at 3.1% of revenue and buybacks recovering only 21% of SBC - so per-share value is not being destroyed, but capital is not being aggressively returned either. Insider activity shows 5 sells for 6.3M and zero open-market buys in the last 12 months, flagged as unusual, though at a mature-earner with rising stock this is common and not per se a governance red flag.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Customer/product concentration in vascular portfolio and geographic mix from 10-K
- M&A contribution vs organic growth within the 13% revenue CAGR
- Nature of the 5 insider sells (10b5-1 plans vs discretionary) and any Form 4 context
- Sustainability of 71.5% gross margin - pricing vs mix vs FX
- SBC grant structure and dilution trajectory going forward
The composite fair value of $45.79 and signal-adjusted FV of $53.40 both sit well below the $82.38 price, implying roughly 35% downside on the base synthesis. The DCF alone at $56.97 is the most generous input and still leaves a ~30% gap; the EPV floor of $23.43 shows how little of today's price is supported by current earning power without heavy growth credit. The gap is real, not a rounding error. That said, LMAT is a genuinely strong business (quality 73) with clean earnings (quality 3), so the deserved value deserves a premium to the composite - call it something in the high $50s to mid $60s once you credit durable double-digit growth, expanding margins, and a debt-free balance sheet. Even on that generous read, $82 is a full price. The market is paying for 8+ years of mid-teens growth and 40%+ EBIT margins in a slow-growth device niche - a bar the bull case can clear but that leaves zero room for a stumble. This is a fine business at a rich price, not a mispricing to exploit.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward organic growth guidance vs the mid-teens embedded in price
- Gross and EBIT margin trajectory - is 40%+ EBIT actually in reach or capped nearer 30%
- M&A cadence and pricing - tuck-ins are core to the growth algorithm
- Any GPO/hospital pricing pressure showing up in ASPs
The macro backdrop is mildly constructive - VIX at 14.3, S&P near highs, risk-on regime - but LMAT's 0.52 beta means the tailwind lands soft. What actually dominates this tape is stock-specific: the Aug 5 Q2 revenue miss and weak Q3 guide punctured a moderate-intensity steady-compounder narrative that was priced for sustained mid-teens growth and 40%+ margins. Post-print coverage (analyst Q&A recap, value comparisons vs GEHC) reads as investors interrogating whether the premium narrative still holds, not defending it. Narrative durability is only moderate and cult coefficient is low, so there is no fanbase to absorb the disappointment - the story is carried by execution, and execution just slipped. Analyst tone is turning from cheerleading to scrutiny, which for a name trading well above DCF is a slow de-rating force rather than a crash catalyst. Net: modest persistent headwind, not a rout.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether sell-side price targets are cut in the weeks following the Q2 miss
- Q3 pre-announcement or channel checks on Artegraft trajectory
- Any sector rotation into defensive med-device names that would revive the compounder bid
- VIX break above 20 which would expose the premium multiple faster
The need — repairing and clearing diseased vessels in an aging population — is physical and growing, and the solution is a sterile implant or catheter in a surgeon's hand with FDA/CE clearance and product liability attached, none of which cheap software reproduces. AI reaches LeMaitre in three thin channels: (1) internal cost — regulatory writing, quality systems, tissue-processing documentation, and a direct sales force of specialist reps who can be made more productive per territory; (2) demand — AI-read CT/ultrasound and screening algorithms plausibly increase diagnosed PAD, carotid and aortic disease, which widens the procedure funnel LeMaitre sells into; (3) competition — AI lowers the cost of design and simulation but not of clinical evidence, cryopreserved tissue supply chains, sterile manufacturing, or 25 years of surgeon relationships in a market too small to attract a well-funded AI-native entrant. Net: mildly favorable, structurally minor. The company's margin expansion is a pricing-and-scale story, not an AI story, and should not be credited to AI.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- PAD/carotid procedure volume trends
- aging-demographic surgical caseloads
- dialysis access population growth
- unit volume vs price contribution
- procedure-driven reorder rates
- mix shift toward lower-ASP items
- open vs endovascular mix shifts
- new PAD drug therapy data
The world is aging and vascular disease burden compounds with it; that demand is procedural, non-discretionary once symptomatic, and delivered through surgeons who value tool familiarity — a durable moat for a direct-sales niche supplier. The offsetting force is buyer consolidation: hospital systems and GPOs are professionalizing procurement precisely against low-visibility, high-margin disposables, and LMAT's growth formula leans on annual price increases. Higher-for-longer rates (10y 4.63) tighten hospital budgets and raise the bar for M&A math, while the sector's contraction phase is concentrated in capital equipment rather than implants and consumables — so LMAT is on the right side of the sector's split. Net: a business whose demand is close to weather-proof, whose pricing lever is finite, and whose realistic long-run trajectory is low-double-digit revenue with mid-teens earnings, not a mid-20s compounder.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for LMAT — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.