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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Liquidia Corporation (LQDA) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Low · Gem Score -19 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 33 · Value -61 · Sentiment 62 (timing only, not weighted)
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Liquidia Corporation
LQDA NASDAQLiquidia Corporation is a biopharmaceutical company focused on developing, manufacturing, and commercializing therapies for rare cardiopulmonary diseases. The company’s current portfolio centers on treatments for pulmonary arterial hypertension and pulmonary hypertension associated with interstitial lung disease, supported by its proprietary PRINT particle-engineering platform, which is designed to create precise drug particles for inhaled and other advanced delivery formats. Liquidia’s work spans product development, manufacturing, and commercialization, giving it a role across the full lifecycle of specialty respiratory medicines. Its marketed and investigational programs are aimed at patients with challenging respiratory and vascular conditions, positioning the company within the rare-disease and specialty pharmaceutical markets. Liquidia Corporation is headquartered in Morrisville, North Carolina.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Jun 30, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 1.44
Total Equity: $195.11M
Shares: 96,280,965
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $284.18M
EBITDA: $170.27M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $284.18M
Revenue: $450.91M
Revenue: $450.91M
Revenue: $450.91M
Total Equity: $195.11M
Tax Rate: 7.9%
Equity: $195.11M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $284.18M
Current Liabilities: $189.30M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $195.11M
Shares: 96,280,965
Shares: 96,280,965
CapEx: -$17.01M
Shares: 96,280,965
Stock Price: $68.39
Net Income: $138.61M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 11, 2026 10:54am (26d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $12.9M | $15.9M | $17.5M | $14.0M | $158.3M |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.0M | $2.9M | $2.9M | $5.9M | — |
| Gross Profit | $9.8M | $13.1M | $14.6M | $8.1M | — |
| Operating Expenses | $43.6M | $51.8M | $88.0M | $129.4M | — |
| Operating Income | -$33.8M | -$38.8M | -$73.4M | -$121.3M | -$51.4M |
| Net Income | -$34.6M | -$41.0M | -$78.5M | -$130.4M | -$68.9M |
| EBITDA | -$28.2M | -$35.1M | -$71.2M | -$119.1M | -$49.8M |
| EPS | $-0.39 | $-0.46 | $-0.88 | $-1.66 | $-0.80 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.39 | $-0.46 | $-0.88 | $-1.66 | $-0.80 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 11, 2026 10:54am (26d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $57.5M | $93.3M | $83.7M | $176.5M | $190.7M |
| Total Current Assets | $61.3M | $99.8M | $89.9M | $185.1M | $273.4M |
| Total Assets | $93.7M | $129.2M | $118.3M | $230.3M | $327.9M |
| Current Liabilities | $7.3M | $8.8M | $18.6M | $41.8M | $135.8M |
| Long-Term Debt | $10.8M | $20.1M | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $28.5M | $38.8M | $71.0M | $153.0M | $283.2M |
| Total Equity | $65.3M | $90.4M | $47.3M | $77.3M | $44.7M |
| Retained Earnings | -$309.6M | -$350.6M | -$429.1M | -$559.5M | -$626.3M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 11, 2026 10:54am (26d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$34.0M | -$28.6M | -$41.6M | -$93.4M | -$35.7M |
| Capital Expenditure | $-107,220 | $-592,000 | -$1.3M | -$4.9M | -$4.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$34.1M | -$29.2M | -$42.9M | -$98.4M | -$40.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $57,329 | $9.3M | $21.7M | $52.6M | $53.9M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$7.8M | $35.8M | -$9.6M | $92.8M | $17.7M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 11, 2026 10:54am (26d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +24.0% | +9.7% | -20.0% | +1,031.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +33.0% | +11.7% | -44.4% | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -14.7% | -89.3% | -65.3% | +57.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -18.6% | -91.4% | -66.1% | +47.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -24.6% | -102.7% | -67.3% | +58.1% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-17 17:17The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The quarterly trajectory is the entire story and it's stunning: revenue went $4.4M → $3.1M → $2.9M → $8.8M → $54.3M → $92.0M → $132.9M → $171.7M across eight quarters. That's not "decelerating" as the revenue confidence signal claims — sequential growth is +69%, +45%, +29%. Deceleration in percentage terms, sure, but absolute quarterly adds are $37.8M → $40.9M → $38.8M, essentially linear. Net income flipped from -$41.6M to +$74.7M in four quarters, a 43.5% net margin in the most recent print. This is a genuine commercial inflection, not a story stock — YUTREPIA is selling. TTM revenue is roughly $451M annualized on the Q2 run-rate (~$687M), which reframes the multiples entirely: EV/revenue of 12.4x on TTM becomes ~8x on run-rate, and the 47.5x P/E collapses toward ~20x forward if margins hold. The synthesis's "Q4 2025 revenue $158M" framing is stale; the real number now is a Q2 2026 quarterly print of $171.7M.
That said, the models are correctly nervous about the wrong things. The synthesis anchors on patent litigation with UTHR — that's the binary, and it's real, but the market has clearly voted: at $6.12B with $190M cash, no debt, and a company now generating ~$75M/quarter in net income, the market is pricing post-litigation clarity, not existential risk. The thesis evaluator's -7 score and "bull mass 77.4 vs bear mass 84.5" feels like it's still fighting the 2024 tape. The bear case that "Tyvaso DPI neutralizes YUTREPIA differentiation" is being empirically refuted every quarter by the revenue curve — patients are switching or being added. What the models under-weight: this is now a profitable company with $75M quarterly earnings and zero debt, throwing off cash. The "-$40M FCF" citation is a 2025 annual number that's already obsolete.
The contrarian pushback worth taking seriously: (1) The Q2 2026 margin of 43.5% is suspiciously high for a specialty pharma in launch mode with active litigation legal spend — is there a one-time tax benefit, milestone payment, or inventory build inflating this? Without segment detail I can't rule out that the earnings quality is weaker than headline. (2) Insider selling on 2026-07-13 was concentrated (multiple insiders, ~65k shares) right after what would have been a blowout Q2 print — that's the pattern of insiders using strength to exit, not accumulate. (3) The PRINT platform "optionality" is still zero-revenue outside YUTREPIA; this is functionally a one-drug company at a $6.1B cap. (4) PAH is a finite market (~$3B US); at $687M run-rate Liquidia is already capturing 20%+ share against entrenched Tyvaso DPI — the incremental growth ceiling is closer than the revenue_cagr of 451% would suggest. Peak sales of $800M-$1.2B is plausible; $2B+ requires new indications that don't yet have Phase 3 data.
GPT Reading
Liquidia is no longer a pre-revenue biotech story in the numbers; it is a commercial launch story that went from essentially nothing to a real business in four quarters. TTM revenue through 2026-06-30 is $450.9M, built from quarterly sales of $54.3M, $92.0M, $132.9M, and $171.7M. That is not a one-quarter spike; it is a clean staircase, with sequential growth of roughly 69%, 44%, and 29%. Even more striking, profitability flipped hard alongside the launch: net income moved from a $3.5M loss in 2025-09 to $14.6M, then $52.9M, then $74.7M, for a TTM net margin of 30.7% and operating margin of 37.4%. For a small biotech, that kind of operating leverage says the product economics are very strong once scale arrives. The balance sheet also matters here: $190.7M of cash, no debt, and a current ratio of 2.3 mean this is not being financed on fumes.
The problem is that the stock is priced as if this early commercial trajectory extends a long way without interruption. At $68.39, the company is worth $6.12B, or 13.6x TTM sales on my math and 47.5x TTM earnings. Those are not impossible multiples for a rare-disease asset with steep ramp, but they are aggressive when the entire investment case is concentrated in one abrupt inflection year. Until very recently this business was doing $10M-20M of annual revenue and losing $70M-$130M a year. Even after the step-up, the latest annual cash flow statement still shows operating cash flow of -$35.7M and free cash flow of -$40.0M for 2025, which is stale relative to the TTM P&L but reminds you how new this profitability is. The market is capitalizing four quarters of breakout execution at over $6B before we have seen what normalized demand, payer behavior, competitive response, or litigation finality look like over a full cycle. That is a lot of faith for a company whose book equity is only $44.7M and whose P/B of 33.7 is basically telling you the valuation has almost no balance-sheet anchor.
What stands out most to me is that the numbers are good enough to reject the lazy bear case that this is just promotional biotech vapor, but not good enough to justify paying any price. The quarter that matters most is 2026-06: $171.7M of revenue and $74.7M of earnings annualize to nearly $687M and $299M respectively if sustained, which would make today’s valuation look far less crazy. But that is exactly the trap: investors are already capitalizing something close to that run rate, and probably more, despite clear evidence that the current economics may still reflect a launch window rather than a settled franchise. The TTM revenue base of $450.9M versus market cap of $6.12B only works if the business is still in the first innings and can compound materially from here. If growth slows toward a more normal specialty-pharma curve, 12x-14x sales is too rich.
The best argument against my caution is straightforward and powerful: the market may simply be right that the income statement has structurally changed. If a company goes from $8.8M of revenue in the June 2025 quarter to $171.7M one year later, and from a -470% margin to +43.5%, traditional backward-looking valuation discipline will chronically understate fair value. On this view, the high P/S is a mirage created by a denominator that has not caught up, the high P/E is temporary because earnings are still ramping, and the negative historical cash flow is irrelevant because it belongs to a pre-scale phase that is now over. The no-debt balance sheet and strong cash reserve reduce financing risk, and the fact that profitability appeared so quickly after commercialization suggests a much better asset than skeptics expected. I take that seriously. If the latest quarter is even close to repeatable, this is not a 2024-style speculative biotech anymore.
Still, I weigh the valuation risk more heavily because the stock leaves little room for ordinary stumbles, and the insider tape does not help. The recent disclosures show a cluster of sales in July and another in September; the sizes are not huge relative to the company, but they are directionally inconsistent with a “still obviously cheap” setup. More importantly, I would need to see whether 2026-09 can hold revenue above roughly $175M and keep net margin north of 30% without a one-time benefit. If revenue falls back toward $140M-$150M or margins compress sharply, the market will suddenly be paying 15x-plus a lower run-rate revenue stream and the equity could de-rate hard. Conversely, if the next two quarters show revenue sustaining above $160M-$180M with cumulative operating cash flow turning decisively positive, then I would concede that the current premium is earned and likely too low for a de-risked rare-disease compounder.
Grok Reading
The quarterly print sequence is the entire story and it is unambiguous: Liquidia went from $8.8M revenue and a –$42M loss in the June 2025 quarter to $171.7M revenue and $74.7M of net income one year later, with sequential steps of $54M → $92M → $133M → $172M and net margins climbing straight through to 40–43%. Trailing-twelve-month revenue through mid-2026 is roughly $451M and TTM net income about $139M, which means the $6.12B market cap and $68.39 price are already capitalizing a business that has crossed into real profitability at a ~14× sales / ~44× earnings multiple. Cash was $191M with zero debt at year-end 2025, so the balance sheet no longer looks like a going-concern problem. That revenue ramp is not a modeling artifact; it is the commercial launch of YUTREPIA doing exactly what a successful rare-disease inhaled therapy is supposed to do in its first full year.
What the models under-weight is the shape of the curve and the single-asset concentration. Sequential growth has already decelerated from +69% to +44% to +29% even while absolute dollars keep rising, and the “Low Revenue Confidence / decelerating” flag is correctly placed. At a $6B enterprise value the market is still embedding a multi-year path to roughly $1B-plus of sustained PAH franchise revenue plus PRINT platform optionality. That only works if United Therapeutics loses or settles the patent fight on terms that leave YUTREPIA unencumbered; the prior synthesis itself notes the stock is pricing roughly 75–80% odds of a favorable legal outcome. A clean loss is existential for a company whose entire operating history before mid-2025 was sub-$20M of largely non-recurring or low-margin revenue. Insider activity reinforces the caution: a cluster of open-market sales in July and September 2026, including multi-tens-of-thousands-share blocks, is not the signature of executives who think the current multiple still embeds free upside.
The strongest counter-argument is simply the P&L itself. A company that just printed 43% net margins on $172M of quarterly sales, with no leverage and a clean current ratio above 2, is no longer a pre-revenue science project; calling it “pre-profit growth” is already stale. If the patent cloud lifts and sequential growth stabilizes even in the mid-teens, the run-rate implies $700M-plus of annual revenue inside twelve months and mid-30% margins would produce $250M+ of earnings—making today’s 44× TTM look closer to 20–25× forward and justifying a premium multiple for a rare-disease franchise. Tyvaso DPI competition is real but has not stopped the ramp so far, and the PRINT particle platform still carries latent pipeline value the market is not fully paying for. A bull can therefore argue that $68 already discounts a realistic probability-weighted legal outcome and that the commercial data are doing the heavy lifting.
I would flip to a clear undervalued stance on two concrete triggers: (1) a definitive district-court or appellate win / settlement that removes the injunction risk without a crippling royalty, and (2) two more quarters that hold sequential growth above 15% while net margins stay above 35%, proving the deceleration is just normal launch maturation rather than share loss. Conversely, any adverse Markman ruling, preliminary injunction, or sequential revenue decline would collapse the $6B valuation quickly.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The most glaring contradiction in this dataset is the divergence between the "pre-profit growth" classification and the actual quarterly financials. The rule-based model flags Liquidia as a pre-profit entity, yet the last two quarters show net margins of 39.8% and 43.5%, with net income of $52.9M and $74.7M respectively. This is not a company burning cash to buy growth; it is a company that has already crossed the profitability threshold. The TTM P/E of 47.5x is not a speculative multiple on future earnings, but a trailing multiple on realized earnings that are accelerating. The revenue trajectory is equally violent: from $8.8M in Q2 2025 to $171.7M in Q2 2026, a 19x increase in a single year. This is not a "turnaround bet" in the traditional sense; it is a commercialization inflection that has already happened. The market cap of $6.12B on a TTM revenue base of roughly $491M (sum of last four quarters) implies a P/S of ~12.5x, which is expensive for a biotech, but reasonable for a product with 40%+ net margins and no debt. The balance sheet is clean: $190.7M in cash, zero debt, and a current ratio of 2.31. The "existential patent litigation" narrative cited by the prior models is a real risk, but the financials suggest the market is already pricing in a high probability of success, or that the litigation is not yet a cash-flow event. The insider selling is a red flag, but the volume is trivial (totaling ~65k shares, or ~$4.4M at current prices) against a $6.1B market cap. This is likely routine tax planning or diversification, not a signal of impending doom. The "Low Revenue Confidence" flag due to "decelerating" quarterly trend is misleading; the revenue is accelerating quarter-over-quarter ($54.3M -> $92.0M -> $132.9M -> $171.7M). The deceleration is only visible if you compare the *rate* of growth, but the absolute dollar growth is expanding. The real story is that Liquidia has successfully commercialized YUTREPIA, and the market is now debating whether the peak sales are higher than the current run-rate.
The strongest case against this bullish read is the sheer magnitude of the valuation relative to the company's history and the competitive landscape. A $6.1B market cap for a company that had $14M in revenue just two years ago is a massive bet on sustained dominance in the PAH market. The prior models correctly identify the threat from United Therapeutics and Tyvaso DPI. If Liquidia loses the patent litigation, the $190M cash pile is not enough to survive a prolonged legal battle and commercialization costs, especially if revenue drops off a cliff. The "unanchored" narrative mode is a critical warning: the price is driven by the story, not the cash flows. If the story breaks, the downside is not a 20% correction; it is a 70-80% collapse. The insider selling, while small in absolute terms, is 100% selling with no buying, which is a negative signal in a high-momentum stock. Furthermore, the "Macro Headwinds" and "Below Sector Benchmarks" flags suggest that the broader biotech sector is under pressure, which could amplify any negative news. The 47.5x P/E is high for a company with a single product, even if that product is growing rapidly. If growth slows to 50% YoY, the multiple will compress, and the stock could easily fall to $30-40. The risk is not that the company fails, but that it succeeds at a lower scale than the market expects.
What would change my mind is a definitive legal ruling against Liquidia, which would trigger an immediate re-rating. A second data point would be a quarterly revenue miss or a significant drop in net margin below 30%, which would signal that the commercialization is hitting a ceiling or that costs are rising faster than revenue. A third signal would be a large insider buy, which would validate the management's confidence in the current valuation. Conversely, a large insider sell (over $50M) would be a strong bearish signal. The upcoming FDA decisions on other PRINT platform drugs would also be critical; if they are approved, it validates the platform thesis and justifies the premium. If they are rejected, the single-product risk becomes acute.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Liquidia went from $19.3M revenue and a $151.6M net loss in 2025 to $450.9M revenue, $138.6M net income and $150.7M FCF in the TTM through June 2026 - a genuine commercial inflection (consistent with a Yutrepia-style launch). Operating margin swung from -715% to +37.4%, and the balance sheet holds $284.2M cash against no net debt, with Altman Z of 12.4 confirming no solvency risk. Accruals of -13.1% of assets and OCF/NI of 0.78x show the profit is cash-backed, not fabricated.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Reconcile the reported 0% gross margin against +37.4% operating margin - is COGS being classified into SG&A or is there a one-time item?
- Product-level revenue concentration (Yutrepia vs Treprostinil Injection) and any remaining Tyvaso litigation/exclusivity risk
- Composition of the $450.9M revenue - recurring script volume vs stocking, and gross-to-net assumptions
- Whether the July 2026 insider cluster sales were 10b5-1 planned or discretionary
- Cash conversion sustainability: working capital build required to sustain $450M+ run-rate
- Any contingent payments, royalties, or milestone obligations tied to the commercial product
The e2e synthesis flags that the recent revenue step-change implies the market is underwriting a blockbuster PAH franchise, which is precisely what the ongoing patent war with United Therapeutics could deny. A $6.1B market cap on a company one year into commercialization, in a crowded PAH market dominated by Tyvaso/Tyvaso DPI and facing generic pressure, is not a value setup - it is a growth/optionality setup already substantially paid for. Earnings quality is high (score 2), so no haircut needed there, but that only means the reported numbers are trustworthy, not that they justify the multiple.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Ysterla quarterly script trends and payer coverage vs Tyvaso DPI
- Status and timeline of the United Therapeutics patent litigation
- Gross margin normalization (the 0% figure flagged by the quality lens needs explanation)
- Cash burn trajectory and any need for a secondary offering at these levels
- Management guidance on peak Ysterla sales and pipeline PRINT programs
The dominant force on LQDA is a live, self-reinforcing turnaround narrative: Ysterla/YUTREPIA got FDA-approved, the Q1 print beat on both lines with $130M in inhaled-therapy sales, and the stock has responded violently to the upside (+2,234% recent vs +451% long-term CAGR). Momentum is in the strong-positive bucket and the last identified catalyst was a +25.6% earnings gap - that is the textbook signature of a narrative being validated in real time, and it dominates the tape for this name. Cult coefficient is only 'low' and durability 'moderate,' so this is not mania, but it is a clear tailwind. The macro backdrop (risk-off, VIX 17.7, S&P off highs, 10y at 5%) is a headwind for unprofitable small-cap biotech in the abstract, but LQDA's beta of 0.54 and its idiosyncratic single-catalyst story mean the tape barely lands here - launch metrics, script data, and payer news drive this stock, not SPX drawdowns. Analyst tone is not explicitly given, but the narrative + price action + earnings beat combination typically pulls targets up on a lag, which is a forward tailwind unless a script-trend crack appears. Net: story pushing up, tape pushing down mildly, story wins for now.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Weekly YUTREPIA/Ysterla script and TRx trends - the single most likely narrative-breaker or extender
- Next earnings print (launch revenue trajectory vs $130M baseline) and any guidance update
- Sell-side target revisions and rating changes following the Q1 beat - lag catch-ups would be a fresh tailwind
- PAH competitive news flow (United Therapeutics Tyvaso, generics) that could dent the market-share thesis
- Any broad small-cap biotech (XBI) rotation - risk-on turn would amplify this name, risk-off deepening would eventually bite
Rare cardiopulmonary disease demand is insensitive to the macro cycle — patients titrate on clinical need, and specialty pharmacy reimbursement is largely commercial/Medicare-covered — so the flagged macro headwinds (10y at 5%, flattish curve) matter to this name mainly through financing cost for a still-cash-burning company, not through demand. The biotech sector is in an expansion phase with industry margins widening, which supports both partnership optionality and the willingness of payers/prescribers to adopt a second inhaled option. The real 'world' variable is the competitive structure of one narrow market: an incumbent with an inhaled dry-powder franchise plus generic nebulized treprostinil. That bounds pricing, not volume. Net: a demand environment that is quietly supportive, a competitive environment that is the actual binding constraint.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for LQDA — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.