Business Description
Lam Research Corporation is a prominent supplier of equipment vital for semiconductor processing, encompassing its design, production, sales, repair, and ongoing maintenance. These sophisticated systems are fundamental for the creation of integrated circuits. The company's extensive product catalog features a variety of deposition technologies. For tungsten metallization, they provide ALTUS systems that deposit conformal films. SABRE products excel in electrochemical deposition, crucial for copper interconnect transitions and enabling copper damascene manufacturing. SOLA utilizes ultraviolet thermal processing for film treatments, while VECTOR delivers plasma-enhanced chemical vapor deposition (CVD) and atomic layer deposition (ALD) solutions. Furthermore, SPEED addresses gapfill applications with its high-density plasma CVD products, and Striker is engineered for single-wafer atomic layer deposition of dielectric films. Beyond deposition, Lam Research offers a comprehensive suite of etching tools. Flex is designed for dielectric etch applications, Kiyo handles conductor etch processes, Syndion specializes in through-silicon via etching, and Versys metal products are used for metal etch processes. The company's offerings also extend to specialized solutions like Coronus, which enhances die yield through bevel cleaning. For various wafer cleaning requirements, Lam Research supplies multiple product lines, including Da Vinci, DV-Prime, EOS, and SP series. Additionally, Metryx mass metrology systems provide precise, in-line mass measurement capabilities for semiconductor wafer manufacturing. Lam Research serves the global semiconductor industry, distributing its technologies and services across the United States, China, Europe, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and other international markets. Established in 1980, the company maintains its corporate headquarters in Fremont, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 23, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:00am (4d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.17
Total Equity: $9.86B
Shares: 1,290,142,000
Total Debt: $4.47B
Cash: $6.39B
EBITDA: $6.34B
Total Debt: $4.47B
Cash: $6.39B
Revenue: $18.44B
Revenue: $18.44B
Revenue: $18.44B
Total Equity: $9.86B
Tax Rate: 10.1%
Equity: $9.86B
Total Debt: $4.47B
Cash: $6.39B
Current Liabilities: $6.57B
Long-Term Debt: $3.72B
Total Debt: $4.47B
Total Equity: $9.86B
Shares: 1,290,142,000
Shares: 1,290,142,000
CapEx: -$759.19M
Shares: 1,290,142,000
Stock Price: $409.54
Net Income: $5.36B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Lam grew revenue from 14.63B in 2021 to 18.44B in 2025 while expanding gross margin from 46.5% to 48.7% and operating margin from 30.6% to 32.0%, with net income reaching 5.36B and FCF 5.41B in 2025. The 2024 revenue dip to 14.91B (a WFE cyclical downturn) was absorbed without margin collapse - GM actually rose to 47.3% - signaling real pricing power and cost discipline through the cycle. Earnings quality is pristine: OCF/NI 1.02x, accruals -0.2% of assets, Beneish M -2.34, Altman Z 30.88. The balance sheet carries 6.39B liquid cash and 1.92B net cash against a self-funding FCF engine. Capital allocation is shareholder-friendly: diluted shares declined from 1.45B to 1.29B (-2.9% CAGR), SBC is a modest 1.9% of revenue, and buybacks ran 10x SBC, meaning per-share value is being concentrated rather than eroded. Insider selling (50 sales, ~69M, no buys) is meaningful in size but appears to be routine 10b5-1 / compensation-driven liquidation by one named insider (Brandt) on a single day - typical for a mature large-cap and not a directional red flag.
None surfaced.
None surfaced.
The e2e synthesis pegs composite fair value at $124 and signal-adjusted FV at $140, implying roughly -66% downside from $409. Even granting that the DCF anchor ($60) likely understates a fortress semicap franchise with structural WFE growth, the anchored-PE method at $254 still sits ~38% below today's price. Quality is elite (Fortress), which lifts deserved value, but quality does not by itself make the stock cheap - and you are paying ~3x the conservative composite for it. What is priced in: continued AI/advanced-node WFE expansion, share gains in etch/deposition for gate-all-around and HBM/3D NAND, sustained mid-30s operating margins, and minimal cyclicality. That is a lot to assume for an equipment maker whose history includes painful down-cycles. Calling deserved value ~$300-340 generously (anchored-PE plus a quality premium for net cash and per-share compounding), the price still sits 20-35% above a defensible number. This is not deep overvaluation - the business is real - but there is no margin of safety, and the bear's geopolitical/cyclical risks are not discounted at all.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward WFE guidance from Lam, AMAT, TSMC, Samsung capex commentary
- China revenue % and trajectory under current export controls
- Sustainability of mid-30s operating margin through a potential memory air-pocket
- Buyback pace and any large one-off service/CSBG revenue mix shifts
The non-fundamental pressure on LRCX is overwhelmingly to the upside. The active narrative is platform-monopoly inside the dominant tape story of the cycle - AI infrastructure capex - and Lam just fed that story raw meat with a 24% revenue beat and a raised WFE outlook. News flow in the last 72 hours is uniformly bullish (UBS and Cantor lifting targets, +114% YTD framing, 'far from finished' headlines), and analyst revisions are running hot: 8 prints this month at an average $420 target, with consensus already chasing price. The macro tape is neutral with VIX in the mid-16s, so there is no risk-off headwind to fight the story. Beta 1.87 in a calm tape is a tailwind, not a liability. The only sentiment crack is a structural one: consensus target ($342) still sits 17% BELOW spot, meaning the sell side is behind the narrative, not against it - that is fuel for further upgrades, not a warning. Cyclical/China bear angles exist but are dormant in the current news cycle; nobody is pricing them today. Net: this is a name riding the single most powerful narrative in the market with momentum, news, and revisions all leaning the same way.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any hyperscaler capex guide cut or AI demand wobble - would crack the narrative fast given the multiple
- Pace of analyst target hikes catching up to spot (watch if revisions stall above $425)
- New China/export-control headlines that would reactivate the dormant bear case
- VIX move above 22 or a sharp risk-off day - high-beta AI names get hit first
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:03am (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $14.6B | $17.2B | $17.4B | $14.9B | $18.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $7.8B | $9.4B | $9.7B | $7.9B | $9.5B |
| Gross Profit | $6.8B | $7.9B | $7.8B | $7.1B | $9.0B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.1B |
| Operating Income | $4.5B | $5.4B | $5.2B | $4.3B | $5.9B |
| Net Income | $3.9B | $4.6B | $4.5B | $3.8B | $5.4B |
| EBITDA | $4.9B | $5.7B | $5.6B | $4.9B | $6.3B |
| EPS | $2.72 | $3.29 | $3.33 | $2.91 | $4.17 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:00am (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.4B | $3.5B | $5.3B | $5.8B | $6.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $11.7B | $12.3B | $13.2B | $12.9B | $14.5B |
| Total Assets | $15.9B | $17.2B | $18.8B | $18.7B | $21.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.5B | $4.6B | $4.2B | $4.3B | $6.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $5.0B | $5.0B | $5.0B | $4.5B | $3.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $9.9B | $10.9B | $10.6B | $10.2B | $11.5B |
| Total Equity | $6.0B | $6.3B | $8.2B | $8.5B | $9.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $14.7B | $18.5B | $22.0B | $24.8B | $29.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 3:04am (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.6B | $3.1B | $5.2B | $4.7B | $6.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$349.1M | -$546.0M | -$501.6M | -$396.7M | -$759.2M |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.2B | $2.6B | $4.7B | $4.3B | $5.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $349.1M | $0 | -$120.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.7B | -$3.9B | -$2.0B | -$2.8B | -$3.4B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$498.3M | -$897.2M | $1.8B | $263.4M | $556.9M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:00am (4d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$30.7B $28.3B – $32.1B
|
$36.0B $35.9B – $36.0B
|
$38.9B $36.8B – $41.9B
|
$44.9B $42.5B – $48.5B
|
| EBITDA |
$10.2B $9.4B – $10.7B
|
$12.0B $11.9B – $12.0B
|
$12.9B $12.2B – $13.9B
|
$14.9B $14.1B – $16.1B
|
| Net Income |
$9.9B $9.6B – $11.1B
|
$10.9B $9.8B – $13.8B
|
$13.9B $12.9B – $15.3B
|
$17.1B $15.9B – $18.8B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:03am (4d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +17.8% | +1.2% | -14.5% | +23.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +15.7% | -1.2% | -9.3% | +27.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +20.1% | -3.8% | -17.6% | +38.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +17.8% | -2.0% | -15.1% | +40.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +16.9% | -1.3% | -13.0% | +29.3% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:03am (4d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 300.00 | $355.71 | $106,713 |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 1,393.00 | $357.24 | $497,635 |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 1,100.00 | $357.98 | $393,778 |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 3,828.00 | $359.08 | $1.4M |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 1,906.00 | $360.15 | $686,446 |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 819.00 | $361.21 | $295,831 |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 2,708.00 | $362.40 | $981,379 |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 2,345.00 | $363.33 | $852,009 |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 2,300.00 | $364.41 | $838,143 |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 1,200.00 | $365.16 | $438,192 |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 5,803.00 | $367.01 | $2.1M |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 4,030.00 | $368.03 | $1.5M |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 4,198.00 | $369.16 | $1.5M |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 5,037.00 | $370.27 | $1.9M |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 8,233.00 | $371.17 | $3.1M |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 7,700.00 | $372.23 | $2.9M |
| 2026-06-12 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 1,600.00 | $373.09 | $596,944 |
| 2026-06-11 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 974.00 | $337.56 | $328,783 |
| 2026-06-11 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 1,083.00 | $338.62 | $366,725 |
| 2026-06-11 | BRANDT ERIC | S-Sale | 1,895.00 | $339.75 | $643,826 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 6:04pm (7d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-17 | $0.26 | 2026-05-20 | 2026-06-17 | 2026-07-08 |
| 2026-03-04 | $0.26 | 2026-02-04 | 2026-03-04 | 2026-04-08 |
| 2025-12-03 | $0.26 | 2025-11-05 | 2025-12-03 | 2026-01-07 |
| 2025-09-24 | $0.26 | 2025-08-26 | 2025-09-24 | 2025-10-15 |
| 2025-06-18 | $0.23 | 2025-05-21 | 2025-06-18 | 2025-07-09 |
| 2025-03-05 | $0.23 | 2025-02-06 | 2025-03-05 | 2025-04-09 |
| 2024-12-11 | $0.23 | 2024-11-07 | 2024-12-11 | 2025-01-08 |
| 2024-09-17 | $2.30 | 2024-08-29 | 2024-09-17 | 2024-10-01 |
| 2024-06-18 | $2.00 | 2024-05-16 | 2024-06-18 | 2024-07-10 |
| 2024-03-12 | $2.00 | 2024-02-07 | 2024-03-13 | 2024-04-03 |
| 2023-12-12 | $2.00 | 2023-11-09 | 2023-12-13 | 2024-01-03 |
| 2023-09-12 | $2.00 | 2023-08-24 | 2023-09-13 | 2023-10-04 |
| 2023-06-13 | $1.73 | 2023-05-11 | 2023-06-14 | 2023-07-05 |
| 2023-03-14 | $1.73 | 2023-02-09 | 2023-03-15 | 2023-04-05 |
| 2022-12-13 | $1.73 | 2022-11-10 | 2022-12-14 | 2023-01-04 |
| 2022-09-13 | $1.73 | 2022-08-25 | 2022-09-14 | 2022-10-05 |
| 2022-06-14 | $1.50 | 2022-05-11 | 2022-06-15 | 2022-07-06 |
| 2022-03-15 | $1.50 | 2022-02-10 | 2022-03-16 | 2022-04-06 |
| 2021-12-14 | $1.50 | 2021-11-11 | 2021-12-15 | 2022-01-05 |
| 2021-09-27 | $1.50 | 2021-08-26 | 2021-09-28 | 2021-10-13 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw quarterly trajectory is genuinely impressive: revenue stepped from $3.87B (Jun-24) to $5.84B (Mar-26), a 51% climb in seven quarters, with net margin expanding from 26.4% to 31.2%. TTM revenue is roughly $21.7B and TTM net income ~$6.7B, putting trailing EPS near $5.20-$5.30 on ~1.27B shares. At $409.54 that's a P/E closer to ~77, not the 15.2x the pre-flight model claims (it appears to have used a wrong EPS or share count — a serious error that should make us discount that module's conclusions). EV/EBITDA of 64 and P/S of 6.8 are not cyclical-trough multiples; they're priced as if 31% margins and 24% YoY growth persist indefinitely. The synthesis verdict's $124 fair value is directionally right that the stock is rich, but a $139 target implying -66% downside is almost certainly too punitive for a business doing $5.4B FCF with 43% ROIC and net cash on the balance sheet.
The contradictions among the prior models matter. The classification calls this a "mature_earner," which understates the cyclicality — Lam's revenue swung from $17.4B (FY23) to $14.9B (FY24) to $18.4B (FY25), a textbook capex-equipment cycle, not a mature compounder. The narrative layer correctly identifies this as a platform with a real moat (Lam + AMAT + TEL effectively control deposition/etch), but the "anchored" label is questionable when the stock trades at 76x TTM earnings against a 3% five-year revenue CAGR. Market-forces calling it a "trade not an investment" is the most honest read in the file. The pre-flight P/E math being off by 5x is disqualifying for that module's conclusions.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: WFE spending is structurally higher than the historical $80-90B baseline because (1) HBM/advanced packaging adds a permanent etch/deposition intensity layer, (2) GAA transistors at 2nm require ~30% more deposition steps than FinFET, and (3) China indigenization is *additive* equipment demand even as US-customer China revenue gets capped. The recent margin expansion to 31% is not just cycle — it's mix shift toward higher-value advanced nodes. If FY27 revenue reaches $24B at 30% net margin, that's $7.2B NI and ~$5.65 EPS, putting forward P/E at ~72. Still expensive, but not the 3.7x premium-to-DCF the narrative layer cites. The DCF anchoring at $124 likely uses a too-low terminal growth and ignores the structural step-up in WFE intensity.
That said, the warning signs are loud. Insider selling on 2026-06-12 is concentrated (ten sales same day, ~17.9K shares total) — small in dollar terms but the cluster timing at all-time highs is meaningful tape-reading. Quarterly revenue confidence flagged as "decelerating" tracks: sequential growth went $5.17B → $5.32B → $5.34B → $5.84B, so the last quarter reaccelerated but two quarters were essentially flat, suggesting the cycle peak could be near. Revenue CAGR of 2.9% over five years is the honest long-run number; pay 76x earnings for a 3% top-line compounder only if you fully believe the supercycle reframing. I disagree with synthesis ($139 target implies a -66% crash that requires either a cyclical collapse or multiple compression more severe than 2022's). I disagree with pre-flight (broken P/E math). I agree with market-forces: this is a trade riding real momentum, not an investment at this price. Fair value on a normalized mid-cycle basis — say $20B revenue at 28% net margin = $5.6B NI, 25x = $140B EV, or ~$110/share — but on a cycle-peak basis at 30x forward $6/EPS you can justify $180. The current $410 requires either supercycle permanence or 35x sustained multiple on peak earnings. Neither is impossible; both are demanding. Initiate at $250-280 (32% pullback), trim above $450.
GPT Critique
In reviewing Lam Research Corporation's financial data, I note a significant revenue and net income growth trajectory over the past two years, with quarterly revenue climbing from $3.87 billion in June 2024 to $5.84 billion in March 2026. This represents a 51% increase, emphasizing a robust upward trend supported by expanding net margins from 26.4% to 31.2%. This growth is not just cyclical; it appears to be driven by structural shifts in semiconductor demand, likely due to developments in AI and advanced packaging technologies. However, the high P/E ratio of 76, as opposed to the reported 15.2x, suggests the stock is trading at a premium that assumes continued high growth rates, which may not be sustainable long-term.
I agree with Opus on the overvaluation of Lam Research at its current price of $409.54. The TTM P/E of 76 and EV/EBITDA of 64 are indicators that the market is pricing Lam as if its peak margins and growth will persist indefinitely. This aligns with Opus's observation that these are not multiples typical of a cyclical trough. However, I diverge from Opus's suggested fair value range of $140-180, seeing it as overly conservative given the company's strong cash flow generation and ROIC of 43%. While I concur with Opus that a $139 target is too harsh, I would argue for a slightly higher fair value, considering Lam's strategic positioning in the semiconductor capital equipment space and its potential to benefit from sustained WFE demand.
Opus's critique of the pre-flight model relying on incorrect P/E calculations is valid, and I also find the model's classification of Lam as a "mature_earner" misleading. Lam's revenue swings, indicative of a cyclical-capex-equipment company, are not accurately captured by such a label. I concur with Opus that the narrative layer’s description of Lam as having a platform with a real moat is more accurate, given its critical role in deposition and etch technologies. Moreover, I agree with Opus's skepticism regarding the pre-flight model's missteps, particularly the erroneous P/E figure, which undermines its conclusions.
A careful skeptic might argue that despite the insider selling and potential cyclical peak, the structural changes in the semiconductor industry, such as the shift to more complex chip architectures, could justify the premium valuation. However, they would also caution that geopolitical tensions and potential oversupply could disrupt Lam's growth trajectory. This perspective would highlight the need to balance optimism about AI-driven demand with awareness of inherent industry cyclicality and external risks.