For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Marriott International Inc. - Class A (MAR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -14 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 61 · Value -75 · Sentiment -24 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $158.85 vs $353.91 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Marriott International Inc. - Class A
MAR NASDAQMarriott International Inc. - Class A represents ownership in a global hospitality company that operates, franchises, and licenses a broad portfolio of lodging brands. The company focuses on hotel, residential, timeshare, and other lodging properties, serving business and leisure travelers across key regions including the United States and Canada, Europe, the Middle East and Africa, Asia Pacific, Greater China, and other international markets. Marriott International organizes its operations around a wide spectrum of brands, from luxury and premium offerings such as The Ritz-Carlton, JW Marriott, W Hotels, St. Regis, and The Luxury Collection to select-service and extended-stay brands like Courtyard, Fairfield, Residence Inn, SpringHill Suites, and Moxy. These brands are integrated under the Marriott Bonvoy loyalty program, which supports customer retention and cross-brand engagement. Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland and founded in 1927, the company today plays a central role in the global lodging industry as a large-scale operator and franchisor, providing management, branding, and reservation systems that connect property owners with travelers worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 9.51
Total Equity: -$3.77B
Shares: 273,600,000
Total Debt: $23.00M
Cash: $358.00M
EBITDA: $4.60B
Total Debt: $23.00M
Cash: $358.00M
Revenue: $26.19B
Revenue: $26.19B
Revenue: $26.19B
Total Equity: -$3.77B
Tax Rate: 23.4%
Equity: -$3.77B
Total Debt: $23.00M
Cash: $358.00M
Current Liabilities: $8.40B
Long-Term Debt: $23.00M
Total Debt: $23.00M
Total Equity: -$3.77B
Shares: 273,600,000
Shares: 273,600,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 273,600,000
Stock Price: $353.91
Net Income: $2.60B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:53am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $13.9B | $20.8B | $23.7B | $25.1B | $26.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $12.1B | $17.3B | $19.8B | $21.3B | $22.0B |
| Operating Income | $1.8B | $3.5B | $3.9B | $3.8B | $4.1B |
| Net Income | $1.1B | $2.4B | $3.1B | $2.4B | $2.6B |
| EBITDA | $1.9B | $3.8B | $4.2B | $4.2B | $4.6B |
| EPS | $3.36 | $7.27 | $10.23 | $8.36 | $9.53 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.34 | $7.24 | $10.18 | $8.33 | $9.51 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:53am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.4B | $507.0M | $338.0M | $396.0M | $358.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $3.6B | $3.3B | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.6B |
| Total Assets | $25.6B | $24.8B | $25.7B | $26.2B | $27.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $6.4B | $7.3B | $7.8B | $8.6B | $8.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $135.0M | $92.0M | $56.0M | $55.0M | $23.0M |
| Total Liabilities | $24.1B | $24.2B | $26.4B | $29.2B | $31.3B |
| Total Equity | $1.4B | $568.0M | -$682.0M | -$3.0B | -$3.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $10.3B | $12.3B | $14.8B | $16.5B | $18.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:53am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.2B | $2.4B | $3.2B | $2.7B | $3.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$183.0M | -$332.0M | -$452.0M | -$750.0M | — |
| Free Cash Flow | $994.0M | $2.0B | $2.7B | $2.0B | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$381.0M | $179.0M | $1.2B | $2.4B | $2.1B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$2.6B | -$4.0B | -$3.8B | -$3.3B |
| Net Change in Cash | $527.0M | -$896.0M | -$159.0M | $59.0M | -$54.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:53am (17d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +49.9% | +14.2% | +5.8% | +4.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +97.8% | +11.6% | -2.5% | +9.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +114.6% | +30.7% | -23.0% | +9.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +99.8% | +11.6% | -1.5% | +10.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:39am (17d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-22 | $0.73 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-26 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-20 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-21 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-23 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-27 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-21 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-16 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-23 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-21 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-21 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-16 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-25 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-23 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-22 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-17 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-13 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2020-02-27 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2019-11-20 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-21 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 09:06Even the bull case prices 57% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 76%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($353.91) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +8% | 15.5% | $152.58 | -57% |
| Base — stabilizes | +5% | 13.5% | $123.35 | -65% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 11.5% | $97.88 | -72% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +5% | 9.1% | $85.83 | -76% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: TTM revenue is roughly $26.9B (summing the last four quarters), up from $25.1B in FY24 — about 7% growth, actually better than the 5.1% CAGR suggests. TTM net income is ~$2.59B, roughly flat to FY25's $2.60B. So at $92.3B market cap, we're paying ~35.6x trailing earnings for a business growing revenue mid-single-digits with net margins oscillating between 6.7% and 11.3% quarterly. The Q4 seasonality dip (6.7% and 7.1% margins in Dec quarters) is structural, not deterioration. Operating cash flow of $3.21B against a $92B cap gives a ~3.5% OCF yield — thin for a cyclical. Negative book equity (-$3.77B) reflects aggressive buybacks, not distress; the $23M total debt figure is almost certainly mis-tagged (Marriott carries ~$13-14B in long-term debt in reality), so the balance sheet section here is unreliable and I'd discount any leverage-based conclusions drawn from it.
The synthesis verdict of $156 fair value (implying -56% downside) strikes me as too aggressive on the downside. A DCF that spits out $156 for a franchise-model compounder generating $3.2B OCF, growing rooms mid-single-digits, with Bonvoy's 200M+ members creating genuine switching costs, is probably using a discount rate calibrated to a capital-intensive hotel owner rather than an asset-light royalty stream. That said, the synthesis is directionally right that 37x P/E is rich for a business whose earnings CAGR is *negative* 8.2% over the lookback window. The market-forces "neutral" read and the narrative layer's "anchored/platform-monopoly" framing are the more honest calls here — this isn't a bubble, it's a quality compounder trading at a premium that requires flawless execution to justify. The models are internally contradictory: pre-flight calls it "traditional," narrative calls it "platform-monopoly," classification calls it "mature_earner." The truth is closer to mature_earner with platform-adjacent economics — a distinction that matters because platform multiples (30-40x) are defensible where pure mature-earner multiples (15-20x) are not.
The contrarian case cuts both ways. Bull-contrarian: Marriott's asset-light model means incremental RevPAR flows to the bottom line at ~60-70% margins; if international/luxury travel keeps normalizing and Bonvoy's direct-booking share keeps taking wallet from OTAs, 2027 EPS could surprise to $12-13 versus consensus ~$10.50, making 37x trailing look like 27x forward-two. Bear-contrarian: the earnings CAGR is already negative, Q4 2025 net income of $445M was ugly, and the -8.2% earnings CAGR against +5% revenue growth means margins are quietly compressing — labor costs at franchised properties, incentive fee pressure, and a mix shift to lower-fee international rooms. If travel demand rolls over in a 2026 recession, EPS could compress to $8, and the stock re-rates to 22x = $176. That's the scenario the synthesis is implicitly pricing.
I partially agree with the overvalued call but dissent on the magnitude. Fair value here is $220-260, not $156 — call it 22-25x normalized ~$10.50 EPS with a modest premium for franchise economics and buyback yield (~3% annually). At $354, you're paying roughly 35% above my fair value midpoint, which is expensive but not catastrophic for a compounder. The data quality issue on debt is real; the anomaly of a mature lodging franchisor showing $23M total debt should have triggered a flag in the synthesis pipeline. The recent quarterly acceleration (Q2 2026 revenue $7.07B, up 4.9% YoY, with 10.8% margin) argues against imminent deterioration, but doesn't justify current multiple either. This is a "trim if you own it, don't chase if you don't, revisit under $280" setup — not a short and not a table-pound value opportunity. The synthesis is right that the stock is overvalued; it's wrong that the gap is 56%.
GPT Reading
Marriott’s raw numbers look like a very good business and a very hard stock to justify at $354. Revenue has risen steadily from $20.8B in 2022 to $23.7B in 2023, $25.1B in 2024, and $26.2B in 2025, with the last four quarters running at roughly a $26.9B annualized pace based on $6.49B, $6.69B, $6.65B, and $7.07B. That is healthy, but not exceptional, top-line growth for a company trading at 37.2x earnings and 20.2x EV/EBITDA. The more important tell is that earnings have not compounded with revenue: net income was $3.08B in 2023 and only $2.60B in 2025, while operating income in 2025 at $4.14B is only modestly above $3.86B in 2023. Quarterly margins also show this is not some pristine upward-margin story: net margin moved from 9.3% in 3Q24 to 7.1% in 4Q24, back up to 10.6%-11.3% in 1H25, then down to 6.7% in 4Q25 before recovering to 9.7% and 10.8% in 1H26. That looks like a durable franchise business, yes, but not one currently delivering the kind of clean earnings progression implied by a premium multiple.
The best part of the Marriott story is the asset-light cash engine, and the data support that. Operating cash flow of $3.21B in 2025 against $2.60B of net income is strong conversion, and the balance sheet presentation with negative equity of $3.77B is not, by itself, a distress signal for a company that has aggressively returned capital. In fact, the debt figure of just $23M is obviously not economically representative for a business of this scale; the key point is not leverage optics but that this company throws off real cash despite modest accounting volatility. Still, that is exactly why the valuation bothers me: the market is already paying up as if Marriott were a toll-road-like compounder. At $92.3B market cap on $26.2B of sales and $2.60B of net income, investors are accepting roughly a 2.7% earnings yield for a cyclical travel-exposed operator whose recent revenue growth is 4.3% and whose multi-year earnings CAGR is negative. You can defend a premium to hotel owners because Marriott is not really a hotel owner; it is harder to defend this premium when earnings power has been flat-to-down since the post-COVID rebound normalized.
What stands out most is the disconnect between quality and price. The rule-based “mature earner” framing is correct; this is a mature, high-quality fee-stream business with global scale, and the quarterly revenue trend is impressively stable for consumer cyclical exposure. But the market narrative seems to be treating Marriott’s brand/loyalty advantages as if they erase cyclicality rather than merely soften it. They don’t. A current ratio of 0.43 is fine if cash keeps flowing, but it also underscores that this is a tightly managed balance sheet, not a fortress stuffed with optionality. Dividend yield of 0.77% tells you the shareholder return case relies mainly on multiple support and buybacks, and when the P/E is already 37x, buybacks are less accretive than they were when the stock was cheaper. For me, fair value is nowhere near the current quote; even granting a best-in-class multiple, something in the high-20s P/E on normalized earnings would be more sensible. On $2.6B of annual net income and this market cap, the stock looks priced for sustained mid-teens EPS growth that the reported numbers simply do not show.
The strongest case against my view is straightforward: Marriott may deserve a structurally higher multiple than the simple earnings history suggests because accounting earnings understate the power of the franchise model. Revenue has kept climbing, 2026 quarterly net income has re-accelerated to $648M and $766M versus $665M and $763M in the comparable 2025 quarters, and operating cash flow above $3.2B gives management ample room to keep shrinking the share count. If the true economic engine is fee growth plus capital-light cash returns, then a 20x EV/EBITDA multiple may be less crazy than it looks for a dominant global network with loyalty scale and long runway in international and luxury. A bull would also say that the earnings dip from 2023 to 2025 reflects normalization noise, not deterioration, and that 1H26 points back toward a $2.8B-$3.0B annual earnings run rate. I weigh that differently because even if I give them $3.0B of net income, the stock is still around 31x earnings—still expensive for a business with travel-cycle exposure and only mid-single-digit revenue growth.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of 4%-6% revenue growth; it would be evidence that Marriott can turn that growth into materially higher and more durable earnings power. Specifically, I would want to see annualized net income sustain above $3.2B, operating margin move clearly above the 15.8% 2025 level toward 17%+, and operating cash flow push materially beyond $3.5B without relying on one-off working capital benefits. If over the next year revenue exits above a $29B run rate while quarterly net margins hold closer to 11%-12% rather than swinging back toward 7%, then the premium multiple would be easier to accept. Short of that, this remains a great company whose stock embeds too much certainty.
Grok Reading
Marriott’s top line has compounded at a pedestrian 5.1% CAGR while net income has contracted at an 8.2% CAGR over the same multi-year window, leaving 2025 earnings of $2.60B still below the $3.08B peak recorded in 2023 even as revenue climbed from $23.71B to $26.19B. The most recent quarters show the same pattern: June 2026 revenue reached $7.07B with a 10.8% net margin, yet year-over-year net income was essentially flat at $766M versus $763M, confirming that incremental rooms and RevPAR are not translating into operating leverage. At a 37.2x trailing P/E, 20.2x EV/EBITDA and 3.7x sales, the market is paying growth-stock multiples for mid-single-digit revenue expansion, sub-10% net margins and a balance sheet that already carries negative equity of $3.77B and a current ratio of 0.43. Operating cash flow of $3.21B is solid, but it is being generated by a mature franchise machine whose earnings power has already normalized post-pandemic; nothing in the trajectory justifies a double of any reasonable DCF anchor near $156.
The asset-light model and Bonvoy network effects are real and do support a structural premium to pure real-estate peers, yet the premium now embedded is extreme. Secondary signals reinforce the caution: macro headwinds, below-sector benchmarks, and only modest 4.3% recent revenue growth leave little margin of safety if travel demand softens or if franchisees push back on fee inflation. Negative equity is the predictable result of aggressive buybacks, not a sign of balance-sheet strength, and the microscopic reported debt figure does not change the fact that liquidity is thin relative to the enterprise value of roughly $92B.
The strongest counter-argument is that Marriott’s franchise monopoly and loyalty flywheel allow it to keep compounding free cash flow at high teens returns on incremental capital indefinitely, so a 20x EV/EBITDA multiple is simply the market correctly capitalizing durable pricing power and emerging-market unit growth that the backward-looking CAGRs understate. Recent earnings growth of +9.5% year-over-year and stable 15.8% operating margins could be early evidence that the trough has passed; if the narrative of platform-like economics continues to attract capital, the stock can remain expensive for years. I weigh this less heavily because the same narrative already produced a 127% premium to fundamentals, and history shows lodging multiples compress sharply once RevPAR decelerates—precisely the risk the current 37x P/E ignores.
Sustained quarterly revenue growth above 8% accompanied by operating-margin expansion through 17% and a clear re-acceleration in net income above the 2023 peak would force a reassessment; likewise a pullback in the share price toward the mid-$200s while earnings hold would restore an acceptable margin of safety.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Marriott's franchise/management-fee model shows through cleanly in the numbers: revenue grew from $13.9B (2021) to $26.2B (2025), operating margins normalized in the 15-17% band, and FCF hit $3.21B in 2025 with OCF/NI of 1.1x and accruals at -0.9% of assets - hallmarks of real, cash-backed earnings. Altman Z of 3.94 sits in the safe zone and there are no mechanical earnings-quality flags. Capital allocation is aggressive but shareholder-aligned: diluted shares fell from 329M to 274M (-4.5% CAGR) with buybacks running roughly 13x SBC, so per-share economics are being concentrated meaningfully. Liquidity is thin in absolute terms ($358M cash, $335M net cash, ~0.4% of market cap) but that is by design for an asset-light lodging platform that self-funds from $3.2B of annual FCF. The business is mature, durable, and evidently well-managed on the metrics visible here; the main things unseen are the balance-sheet leverage supporting the buybacks and any brand/loyalty-driven moat detail that would push it toward the top rungs of the frame.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Total debt, net leverage ratio, and interest coverage - buybacks of this scale with $358M cash likely lean on debt.
- Cause of 2024 net income decline from $3.08B to $2.38B despite revenue growth (tax, impairment, or margin pressure).
- Franchise/managed vs owned hotel mix and fee-based revenue share to confirm asset-light economics.
- Loyalty program (Bonvoy) member growth and direct-booking share as moat indicators.
- Customer/geographic concentration and exposure to any single brand or region.
- SBC and buyback authorization detail versus insider selling patterns.
The e2e composite fair value of $156.65 (signal-adjusted $155.74) implies roughly -56% downside from $353.91. Even the most generous internal method, an anchored P/E at $283.58, still sits ~20% below the current price, while the DCF ($116) and EPV floor ($111) are less than a third of today's quote. That is a wide, consistent gap: three independent lenses all say deserved value is materially lower, and the quality lens (score 61, Strong) is not enough on its own to bridge a 2x+ premium. The market is paying up for the asset-light franchise model, room-count growth, and buyback-driven per-share compounding - all real, but already reflected. To justify $353, you need durable mid-to-high single digit RevPAR/unit growth, sustained buybacks funded by cheap leverage, and no cyclical drawdown - a heroic stack of assumptions for a lodging name. I lean on the anchored-P/E as the most realistic ceiling given the quality of the franchise; even that says fair, not cheap. Margin of safety here is negative.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Net debt and leverage funding the buyback pace
- Forward RevPAR and unit growth guidance vs implied assumptions
- Reason for 2024 net income dip - one-off vs mix/cycle
- Free cash flow conversion sustainability at current fee mix
- Franchise pipeline conversion rates and attrition
The macro tape is quietly supportive: VIX at 14.9, indices at highs, a 5-day risk-on regime. For a 1.12-beta consumer cyclical lodging name like Marriott, that calm tape is a modest tailwind - travel/leisure names generally get the benefit of the doubt when volatility is dead and equity risk appetite is on. But the specific narrative pressure on MAR is not helpful: the platform-monopoly story is intact but durability is only moderate, and the freshest news frames the stock as trading well above DCF fair value with a revenue miss testing the outlook. That is the classic 'good company, stretched story' setup where sentiment stops adding fuel. Analyst/press tone is turning skeptical on valuation rather than on the business, which shows up as a ceiling, not a trap door. Expansion headlines (Luxury Collection in LatAm/Caribbean, Autograph additions) reinforce the moat story but are incremental - not narrative-accelerating. Net: a benign tape and a durable-enough franchise story offset a 'priced for perfection' overhang and a soft revenue print. Pressure is close to neutral, with a slight headwind bias from the valuation narrative getting louder into the print cycle.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Peer Hilton commentary and RevPAR trends - a sector-wide slowdown would amplify the revenue-miss narrative on MAR
- Whether sell-side target revisions post-print skew negative (valuation calls) or stay constructive on unit growth
- Any shift in the 10y yield above 4.75-5.0% that would pressure premium-multiple compounders specifically
- Booking/leisure-travel data points into Q3 that either confirm or break the 'demand normalization' bear leg
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 10, 2026, MAR was $353.91. We expect it to be $322.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $240.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 10, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.