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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Moody's Corporation (MCO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -4 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 83 · Value -75 · Sentiment -19 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Moody's Corporation
MCO NYSEMoody's Corporation is a global provider of financial intelligence and analytical tools serving participants across the capital markets and financial services industry. The company operates through two main business segments: Moody’s Investors Service, which offers credit ratings and related research on corporations, financial institutions, structured finance products, and public sector entities, and Moody’s Analytics, which delivers data, models, software solutions, and professional services that support risk management, credit analysis, regulatory compliance, and economic research. Its products are used by banks, asset managers, insurers, governments, and corporations to assess credit risk, structure transactions, and inform investment and lending decisions. Moody’s Corporation is headquartered in New York, New York, and plays a significant role in global fixed-income markets by providing standardized opinions on creditworthiness and sophisticated analytical platforms that help institutions interpret complex financial and macroeconomic information.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 13.67
Total Equity: $4.21B
Shares: 179,882,955
Total Debt: $6.99B
Cash: $2.38B
EBITDA: $4.06B
Total Debt: $6.99B
Cash: $2.38B
Revenue: $7.72B
Revenue: $7.72B
Revenue: $7.72B
Total Equity: $4.21B
Tax Rate: 21.3%
Equity: $4.21B
Total Debt: $6.99B
Cash: $2.38B
Current Liabilities: $2.98B
Long-Term Debt: $6.99B
Total Debt: $6.99B
Total Equity: $4.21B
Shares: 179,882,955
Shares: 179,882,955
CapEx: -$326.00M
Shares: 179,882,955
Stock Price: $478.87
Net Income: $2.46B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:41am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.2B | $5.5B | — | $7.1B | $7.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.6B | $1.6B | — | $1.9B | $2.0B |
| Gross Profit | $4.6B | $3.9B | — | $5.1B | $5.7B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.6B | $2.2B | $2.3B |
| Operating Income | $2.8B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $3.0B | $3.5B |
| Net Income | $2.2B | $1.4B | — | $2.1B | $2.5B |
| EBITDA | $3.2B | $2.4B | — | $3.6B | $4.1B |
| EPS | $11.88 | $7.47 | $8.77 | $11.32 | $13.73 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $11.78 | $7.44 | $8.73 | $11.26 | $13.67 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:21am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.3B | $5.3B | $5.2B |
| Total Assets | $14.7B | $14.3B | $14.6B | $15.5B | $15.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $3.6B | $3.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $7.4B | $7.4B | $7.0B | $6.7B | $7.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $11.8B | $11.7B | $11.1B | $11.8B | $11.6B |
| Total Equity | $2.9B | $2.7B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $4.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $12.8B | $13.6B | $14.7B | $16.1B | $17.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:41am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.0B | $1.5B | $2.2B | $2.8B | $2.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$139.0M | -$283.0M | -$271.0M | -$317.0M | -$326.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.9B | $1.2B | $1.9B | $2.5B | $2.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.2B | -$97.0M | -$3.0M | -$221.0M | -$227.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $1.7B | $988.0M | $0 | $496.0M | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$750.0M | -$983.0M | -$490.0M | -$1.3B | -$1.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$786.0M | -$42.0M | $361.0M | $278.0M | -$24.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:41am (12d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -12.1% | — | — | +8.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -15.8% | — | — | +11.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | -29.8% | +11.4% | +33.9% | +16.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -37.9% | — | — | +19.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | -25.2% | — | — | +14.0% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:21am (12d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-15 | $1.03 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $1.03 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-21 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-15 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-16 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-25 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-22 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-16 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-16 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-22 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-22 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-17 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-18 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-23 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-22 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-18 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-19 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-24 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-22 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-19 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-11MIS monetizes a regulatory artifact — an NRSRO opinion embedded in Basel risk weights, investment mandates and bond indentures — priced off issuance volume, not analyst hours; AI compresses the hours while the fee schedule holds.
Moody's Analytics research, commentary and economic content is exactly what LLMs deflate: customers who paid five figures per seat for synthesized credit views can get 80%-adequate answers internally, pressuring CreditView-type ARR and seat counts.
Whether MA retains pricing and net expansion as generative substitutes mature — observable in MA recurring-revenue retention, ARR growth split between Decision Solutions/KYC data and Research & Insights, and any shift to consumption/API pricing.
The NRSRO designation plus a multi-decade proprietary default and ratings-transition history, and Orbis entity/ownership data covering hundreds of millions of private firms — none of which cheap code creates.
AI Lens thesis
AI reaches Moody's on two separate paths that must not be blended: on the ratings path it is almost purely a cost story — the need for a third-party opinion that regulators, trustees and mandates accept is a legal and coordination fact, not an information-processing task, so agentic credit analysis does not remove the requirement to buy a rating, while AI shrinks the analytical labor behind each rating and raises MIS margin; on the analytics path AI is genuinely two-sided — it commoditizes narrative research and generic risk modeling while simultaneously raising the value of authoritative, machine-readable, permissioned reference data (entity resolution, ownership, KYC screening, default histories) that AI agents must ground on, positioning Moody's as a paid data layer inside others' workflows rather than a UI vendor. Net: cost falls, the ratings revenue unit survives, and the contested ground is whether the analytics mix rotates fast enough from seats-and-reports toward data-and-API before deflation hits.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Moody's default/transition database and Orbis are among the few credit datasets with no synthetic substitute — licensing them as grounding data to model providers and agent builders creates a new high-margin unit priced per query rather than per seat.
Downside MIS revenue is issuance-linked, and if AI accelerates private-credit and bilateral direct lending — where borrowers often skip a public rating — cheap intelligence quietly erodes the rated-issuance funnel even as pricing per rating holds.
Outcome range spread 46 · unresolved
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: MCO is generating $7.72B annual revenue with $2.46B net income (31.9% net margin), FCF of $2.58B, and trending toward ~$8.2-8.4B run-rate based on the Q1 2026 print of $2.08B (up 8.3% YoY vs the $1.92B in Q1 2025). Operating margin expanded from 42% (2024) to 44.9% (2025). ROE of 58% and ROIC of 31% are franchise-quality numbers — this is genuinely one of the best businesses in the S&P 500. Debt/equity of 1.66 looks aggressive optically but $2.9B in OCF makes $6.99B of debt trivially serviceable. So on quality, the story is real.
But the multiple is doing enormous work. At $478.87, we're at 33.6x trailing earnings, 21.5x EV/EBITDA, and 11.3x sales for a business growing revenue 8.9% YoY with earnings growing ~19% (helped by a soft Q4 2024 comp of $395M NI — margin compression that quarter to 23.6% is a real anomaly worth flagging; strip that and earnings growth normalizes to low-double-digits). The synthesis verdict of $220 fair value implies a ~13-14x earnings multiple, which is too punitive for a duopoly compounding at 8-10% with 30%+ ROIC — that DCF is likely using too conservative a terminal or discount rate. Fair value for MCO has historically hovered 25-28x, which puts a reasonable anchor at $340-380, not $220 and not $479.
Where I partially dissent from the synthesis: the "-54.2% overvalued" claim is directionally right but magnitudinally overstated. The market-forces "cyclical peak earnings" framing is more useful — 2025 debt issuance has been strong, and Ratings revenue is inherently cyclical. If issuance normalizes down 15-20% in a recession, MCO earnings could compress to ~$11-12/share vs the ~$14 trailing, and a 25x multiple on trough earnings gets you to $275-300. That's the real downside case, not $220. The narrative layer's observation that $258 of the $479 is pure "duopoly durability premium" is fair but misses that this premium has been persistent for 15+ years — the market isn't wrong to pay for it, it's just wrong to pay this much for it right now with issuance at cyclical highs.
The contrarian argument nobody is making loudly enough: private credit is eating public debt issuance share, and private credit doesn't need Moody's ratings the same way. That's a slow-motion structural headwind distinct from the SEC/NRSRO regulatory threat the bear narrative focuses on. Combined with the deceleration flag in revenue confidence (Q4 2025 rev of $1.89B was actually below Q3 2025's $2.01B, and Q1 2026's $2.08B is only modest sequential progress) and insider activity showing net selling on the small transactions, the trajectory doesn't support the growth acceleration embedded in a 35x multiple. Also worth flagging: the 2023 annual data is missing (rev/gross/NI blank), which makes multi-year CAGR calculations unreliable — the models leaning on this should be discounted accordingly.
I agree with the synthesis direction (overvalued) but dissent on magnitude. Fair value is $340-380, not $220. At $479 you're paying ~13-15% premium to a generous fair value, not 117%. This is not a short — the franchise quality, buyback pace, and Analytics segment growth (mid-teens, recurring) all support the premium — but it's also not a place to add. Wait for either (a) a credit cycle scare that takes it into the $370s, or (b) an Analytics revenue acceleration print that justifies the current multiple. The prior models are collectively too bearish on fair value and not bearish enough on cyclical risk to the ratings segment specifically.
GPT Reading
Moody’s is a superb business, but the numbers here still argue the stock is priced for near-flawless execution. The operating profile is elite: 2025 revenue reached $7.72B, up 8.9% from $7.09B in 2024, while operating income rose to $3.46B from $2.98B, lifting operating margin to 44.9%. Net income climbed to $2.46B, a 19% increase from $2.06B, and the latest quarter was even stronger on the surface: 2026 Q1 revenue of $2.08B was up about 8.3% year over year and net income of $661M was up 5.8%, with a still-exceptional 31.8% net margin. Free cash flow of $2.58B on $7.72B of revenue is a 33% FCF margin. ROIC at 30.9% and ROA at 15.5% reinforce that this is not a mediocre financial-data vendor; it is a compounding franchise with real pricing power. If I were judging only business quality, this would screen near the top of large-cap financials.
The problem is that the valuation already more than captures that quality. At $478.87, Moody’s trades around 35x earnings, 11.2x sales, and 21.6x EV/EBITDA. Against 2025 FCF of $2.58B, the equity is at roughly a 3.1% FCF yield, and even that is on a year when margins were close to peak. For an issuer-exposed business with cyclical sensitivity embedded in ratings activity, that is rich. The balance sheet is fine but not pristine enough to explain the premium on its own: $6.99B of debt versus $2.38B of cash leaves roughly $4.6B net debt, and the apparent 58% ROE is heavily flattered by a small $4.21B equity base rather than some magical capital-light alchemy. The more relevant metric is that investors are paying more than 11 times revenue for a company growing high single digits, not 20%-plus. That can work for software with a long runway; it is harder to justify for a mature oligopoly already earning nearly 45% operating margins.
What stands out in the quarterly series is not deterioration, but normalization after a very favorable run. Revenue moved from $1.67B in 2024 Q4 to $1.92B, $1.90B, $2.01B, $1.89B, then $2.08B; that is healthy, but not the kind of acceleration that supports a dramatic rerating from “excellent compounder” to “pay any price.” Net margins mostly sit around 30%-32%, except for the softer 23.6% in 2024 Q4, suggesting the current earnings power is durable but also already mature. This is exactly the kind of business where small disappointments in issuance volumes or analytics growth do not break the franchise, but they can compress the multiple materially. If you assume even a still-premium 27x-30x earnings on 2025 EPS power, fair value lands materially below today’s price. On simple market-cap math, $82.8B against $2.46B of net income gets you the same answer: the market is capitalizing a best-in-class franchise as though cyclicality and regulation barely matter.
The strongest pushback is obvious and respectable: Moody’s probably deserves a persistent premium because the franchise is unusually durable. Gross margin of 74.4%, operating margin near 45%, current ratio of 1.74, and consistently strong cash conversion support the view that this is closer to a tollbooth than a normal financial company. Annual revenue has also rebounded decisively from $5.47B in 2022 to $7.72B in 2025, and quarterly revenue has now printed above $2.0B. If the market believes this reflects a structurally stronger mix, with analytics carrying more recurring and less cyclical economics than the old ratings-only story, then 35x earnings is not insane. The latest quarter also weakens the pure “cyclical peak” bear case, because revenue and income both advanced off already-strong comps rather than rolling over. I weigh those points less heavily because the valuation leaves little room for mere excellence; it requires continued high-single-digit or better growth plus sustained peak margins, and that combination tends to be vulnerable in mature franchises.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of respectable growth, but evidence that Moody’s can compound through the cycle fast enough to earn into this multiple. If revenue growth re-accelerates from about 9% to the low teens for several quarters while maintaining 44%-plus operating margin and pushing annual FCF materially above $3.0B, then today’s price would look more defensible. Likewise, if 2026 can pace toward roughly $8.4B-$8.6B of revenue and $2.8B+ of net income without balance-sheet strain, I would revisit the bear view. Absent that, I think this remains a great company with a stock price that already discounts most of the good news.
Grok Reading
Moody's prints the kind of economics that justify a permanent premium: 74% gross margins, 45% operating margins, 32% net margins, and $2.58B of free cash flow on $7.72B of 2025 revenue. Annual revenue stepped from $7.09B to $7.72B (+8.9%), with net income lifting from $2.06B to $2.46B (+19.5%), and the last four reported quarters have locked net margins in a tight 30.5–32.5% band after the soft 23.6% print in late 2024. ROE at 58% and ROIC at 31% confirm the ratings-plus-analytics franchise still converts incremental issuance and software attach into cash with almost no capital intensity (capex only $326M). The balance sheet is levered—$7.0B debt against $2.4B cash and $4.2B equity—but operating cash flow of $2.9B covers the structure comfortably. That is the raw story: a mature earner at cyclical-peak profitability, not a broken franchise.
The price, however, does not match the growth tape. At $478.87 the stock clears 35× earnings, 11× sales, and 21.5× EV/EBITDA while free-cash-flow yield sits near 3.1%. Recent revenue growth is high-single-digit and the secondary signals explicitly flag decelerating quarterly revenue plus macro headwinds; that combination does not support a mid-30s multiple for a business whose volume is still tied to debt issuance cycles. The prior valuation work that anchors fair value near $220 is too punitive on terminal growth, but even granting a quality multiple of 26–28× 2025 earnings lands closer to $370–400—still a meaningful gap below the current quote. The market is paying full freight for the narrative that Analytics will keep compounding in the teens and that the duopoly never loses pricing power; the numbers on hand show solid but not explosive expansion.
The strongest case against an overvalued call is simply the durability of the cash engine and the scarcity of comparable assets. A smart opponent would note that FCF has compounded at 17%, margins have re-expanded cleanly, and the platform-monopoly framing has survived every prior regulatory scare; they would also argue that 35× is the clearing price investors have repeatedly paid for SPGI/MCO when issuance recovers, so mean-reversion arguments have been expensive for years. Insider activity is noise (mostly awards and small sales), not a red flag, and the current ratio of 1.74 plus fortress FCF quality reduce balance-sheet risk. I weigh those points as reasons the stock can stay expensive longer than a pure DCF implies, not as reasons $479 is the right entry; quality and scarcity explain a premium, they do not erase a 20–30% valuation overhang when growth is already decelerating.
What flips the verdict is concrete re-acceleration: two consecutive quarters of revenue growth back above 12–13% with Analytics mix visibly rising, or a clear multi-year issuance supercycle that lifts 2026–27 consensus earnings enough to pull the forward multiple under 28× while FCF holds above $2.7B. A sustained regulatory attack that impairs NRSRO economics, or Analytics growth rolling over into mid-single digits, would push me from “expensive compounder” to outright avoid.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Moody's is a mature, high-margin compounder: revenue $7.72B (2025) up from $6.22B (2021) despite the 2022 debt-issuance air pocket, gross margin 74.4%, operating margin 44.9%, and net income $2.46B. FCF of $2.58B on $7.72B revenue is a 33% FCF margin - the signature of a toll-booth franchise (ratings plus analytics) with minimal reinvestment needs. Earnings quality is clean: OCF/NI 1.13x, accruals -1.8% of assets, Beneish M -2.49, Altman Z 7.23 (safe zone). Nothing in the mechanicals suggests the reported numbers are engineered. Capital return is disciplined - diluted share count fell from 187.9M to 179.9M (-1.1% CAGR), buybacks are 5.2x SBC, and SBC is only ~3% of revenue. Per-share value is being concentrated, not siphoned. The one blemish is net debt of ~$4.55B (cash $2.45B), but at $2.58B annual FCF that is roughly 1.8x FCF - trivial for a business with this margin structure and cash conversion. Insider tape is neutral-benign: only $2.2M in sales over 12 months, mostly small option-exercise-linked dispositions by the CEO and a few directors, no meaningful open-market buys but also no signal of stress or heavy distribution.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment mix between MIS (ratings) and MA (analytics) - MA subscription growth is key to durability of the 2025 rebound.
- The 2023 revenue line reads as $0 in the table - confirm actual 2023 revenue (likely a data gap, not a real zero) via the 10-K.
- Debt maturity schedule and weighted average coupon on the ~$7B gross debt stack.
- Customer/geographic concentration and any regulatory actions or litigation reserves in the 10-K.
- Recurring revenue percentage in Moody's Analytics vs transaction-based MIS revenue.
At $477.47 vs a composite fair value of $211 (signal-adjusted $220), MCO screens as materially overvalued on cash-flow math. The DCF pins deserved value at $161 and the EPV floor at $119; only the anchored-PE method at $402 gets within striking distance, and that method essentially capitalizes the current premium multiple back into 'fair value' - it tells you the market is willing to pay this, not that the business earns it. Even generously weighting the anchored PE, deserved value lands in the low-$300s, leaving the current price 30-50% above any reasonable anchor. The Fortress quality grade (83) and pristine earnings quality justify a premium to a generic DCF - but they do not justify paying 2x DCF. The bull case (duopoly quasi-rents, regulated moat, analytics growth) is entirely known and fully in the tape; you are underwriting perpetual mid-teens EPS growth plus multiple maintenance to earn a market return from here. That is the definition of priced-for-perfection on a name where the base rate of surprise is low. Not a short - the compounding is real - but the margin of safety is negative.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward issuance guidance and MIS pricing assumptions in the next print
- MA segment organic growth and ARR retention - key to justifying analytics-driven multiple
- Buyback pace vs SBC to confirm per-share compounding continues
- Any regulatory commentary on NRSRO reform or alternative rating frameworks
The macro tape is modestly risk-on with VIX at 15.5 and the S&P near highs, which is a mild tailwind for a beta 1.33 name like MCO that tends to lever benign conditions. Offsetting that, 10y at 4.65% and a market PE of 26 are ordinary crosswinds for a long-duration compounder whose multiple already prices in perpetual pricing power. Momentum is constructive (strong_positive, improving leverage, healthy cash generation), which keeps the tape friendly rather than punishing. The active narrative is platform-monopoly with moderate intensity and durable shelf life but low cult - meaning the story supports the stock but does not generate fresh buying energy or FOMO. Analytics and ratings are simply seen as an inevitability, not a hot theme, so there is little narrative fuel to push shares higher from here. News flow is mixed-to-slightly-negative for the ratings franchise: SLR flagging deteriorating private-credit recoveries and covenant erosion signals a credit cycle turn that historically pressures issuance volumes, while the easyJet downgrade headline reinforces relevance but not growth. The July pre-print drop on 37x P/E chatter shows the market is already twitchy about the multiple, which is the single most persistent headwind on this specific name.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the private-credit downgrade cycle accelerates into a broader issuance slowdown narrative
- Any SEC or Basel headlines that reawaken the NRSRO regulatory threat angle
- Analyst target revisions after Q2 print and whether the 37x P/E framing sticks in strategist notes
- Rotation out of premium-multiple financial-data names into cheaper cyclicals if the risk-on tape broadens
AI reaches Moody's on two separate paths that must not be blended: on the ratings path it is almost purely a cost story — the need for a third-party opinion that regulators, trustees and mandates accept is a legal and coordination fact, not an information-processing task, so agentic credit analysis does not remove the requirement to buy a rating, while AI shrinks the analytical labor behind each rating and raises MIS margin; on the analytics path AI is genuinely two-sided — it commoditizes narrative research and generic risk modeling while simultaneously raising the value of authoritative, machine-readable, permissioned reference data (entity resolution, ownership, KYC screening, default histories) that AI agents must ground on, positioning Moody's as a paid data layer inside others' workflows rather than a UI vendor. Net: cost falls, the ratings revenue unit survives, and the contested ground is whether the analytics mix rotates fast enough from seats-and-reports toward data-and-API before deflation hits.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- MIS operating margin trajectory
- Headcount per rating action
- Pricing on research renewals
- Orbis coverage and pricing power
- Data licensing to AI providers
- New NRSRO entrants gaining acceptance
- Research & Insights ARR trend
- Seat vs API revenue mix
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 11, 2026, MCO was $487.28. We expect it to be $448.49 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $340.00. This is an early model (v0.3.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 11, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.