For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Altria Group, Inc. (MO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +19 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 18 · Value 20 · Sentiment 6 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $86.33 vs $68.33 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Altria Group, Inc.
MO NYSEAltria Group, Inc. is a holding company that manufactures and sells smokeable and oral tobacco products primarily in the United States. It operates through key subsidiaries including Philip Morris USA, which produces and markets cigarettes under the leading Marlboro brand; U.S. Smokeless Tobacco, offering moist smokeless tobacco products like Copenhagen and Skoal; John Middleton, specializing in machine-made large cigars and pipe tobacco under the Black & Mild brand; and Helix Innovations, providing oral nicotine pouches under the on! brand. Additionally, the company offers e-vapor products through NJOY ACE and engages in reduced-risk categories via a joint venture with Japan Tobacco for heated tobacco. Altria Group, Inc. distributes its products to wholesalers, distributors, and large retail chains such as convenience stores and supermarkets. Beyond tobacco, it holds investments in Anheuser-Busch InBev and Cronos Group. Founded in 1919 and headquartered in Richmond, Virginia, Altria Group, Inc. plays a significant role in the U.S. consumer staples sector, particularly in the tobacco industry.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.12
Total Equity: -$3.45B
Shares: 1,683,000,000
Total Debt: $25.71B
Cash: $4.47B
EBITDA: $10.17B
Total Debt: $25.71B
Cash: $4.47B
Revenue: $23.28B
Revenue: $23.28B
Revenue: $23.28B
Total Equity: -$3.45B
Tax Rate: 26.0%
Equity: -$3.45B
Total Debt: $25.71B
Cash: $4.47B
Current Liabilities: $9.15B
Long-Term Debt: $24.14B
Total Debt: $25.71B
Total Equity: -$3.45B
Shares: 1,683,000,000
Shares: 1,683,000,000
CapEx: -$216.00M
Shares: 1,683,000,000
Stock Price: $68.35
Net Income: $6.95B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 4:36am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $26.0B | $25.1B | $24.5B | $24.0B | $23.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $12.0B | $10.9B | $10.2B | $9.7B | $8.7B |
| Gross Profit | $14.0B | $14.2B | $14.3B | $14.4B | $14.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.7B | $3.1B | $4.6B |
| Operating Income | $11.6B | $11.9B | $11.5B | $11.2B | $9.9B |
| Net Income | $2.5B | $5.8B | $8.1B | $11.3B | $6.9B |
| EBITDA | $11.8B | $12.1B | $11.8B | $11.5B | $10.2B |
| EPS | $1.34 | $3.19 | $4.57 | $6.54 | $4.12 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.34 | $3.19 | $4.57 | $6.54 | $4.12 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:43am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.5B | $4.0B | $3.7B | $3.1B | $4.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $6.1B | $7.2B | $5.6B | $4.5B | $5.9B |
| Total Assets | $39.5B | $37.0B | $38.6B | $35.2B | $35.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $8.6B | $8.6B | $11.3B | $8.8B | $9.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $26.9B | $25.1B | $25.1B | $23.4B | $24.1B |
| Total Liabilities | $41.1B | $40.9B | $42.1B | $37.4B | $38.5B |
| Total Equity | -$1.6B | -$3.9B | -$3.5B | -$2.2B | -$3.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $30.7B | $29.8B | $31.1B | $35.5B | $35.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 4:36am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $8.4B | $8.3B | $9.3B | $8.8B | $9.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$169.0M | -$205.0M | -$196.0M | -$142.0M | -$216.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $8.2B | $8.1B | $9.1B | $8.6B | $9.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | -$2.8B | $0 | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$568.0M | -$1.1B | $385.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$6.4B | -$6.6B | -$6.8B | -$6.8B | -$7.0B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.7B | -$1.8B | -$1.0B | -$3.4B | -$1.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$412.0M | -$503.0M | -$370.0M | -$563.0M | $1.3B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 4:36am (16d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -3.5% | -2.4% | -1.9% | -3.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +1.8% | +0.3% | +0.6% | +1.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +3.1% | -3.1% | -2.7% | -11.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +132.9% | +41.0% | +38.5% | -38.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +2.9% | -2.7% | -2.5% | -11.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:43am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | $1.06 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-25 | $1.06 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-26 | $1.06 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-15 | $1.06 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-16 | $1.02 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-25 | $1.02 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-26 | $1.02 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-16 | $1.02 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-14 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-22 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-20 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-14 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-14 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-23 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-21 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-14 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-14 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-24 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-22 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-14 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 09:09Even the bull case prices 15% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 51%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($68.33) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -0% | 35.0% | $58.30 | -15% |
| Base — stabilizes | -0% | 34.0% | $56.72 | -17% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -0% | 28.9% | $49.02 | -28% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -2% | 19.9% | $33.23 | -51% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw tape: TTM revenue is roughly $23.5B, down from $26.0B in 2021 — a ~2.5% annual erosion that's consistent with the well-known 4-5% cigarette volume decline offset by ~3-4% price/mix. The quarterly cadence is stable (Q2'26 rev $6.11B vs Q2'25 $6.10B — essentially flat), and gross margin has actually expanded from 53.8% in 2021 to 62.5% in 2025. Operating margin at 42.5% and net margin at 29.8% on a declining topline is the definition of harvest-mode pricing power. But note the earnings volatility: 2024 NI of $11.26B included the BUD stake monetization; normalized 2025 NI of $6.95B is the cleaner number, and 2025 EPS run-rate implies a P/E closer to 16-17x on GAAP, ~10-11x on cash earnings given FCF of $9.07B on a $114B market cap (8% FCF yield). The negative $3.45B equity is a distraction — it's the mathematical residue of decades of buybacks and dividends exceeding retained earnings, not distress. Debt/EBITDA around 2.3x is manageable against $9B+ recurring FCF.
Where I diverge from the synthesis: the $81.82 composite fair value looks aggressive. A DCF that spits out ~20% upside on a business with -2.5% revenue CAGR and -7.6% earnings CAGR is almost certainly leaning on a terminal value assumption that undercounts the volume cliff. The bear case in the narrative layer is the one to take seriously: if U.S. cigarette volumes accelerate from -4% to -6-7% (which the last two years' shipment data hints at), pricing power can't fully offset forever — there's a nicotine-affordability ceiling, and IQOS/Zyn competition from PM and BAT is real. That said, the pre-flight framing as a "dividend annuity" is right: the payout ratio of 100.2% is not a red flag when D&A-heavy accounting understates true cash earnings ($9.07B FCF vs $6.95B NI means the ~$6.8B dividend is covered at ~75% of FCF). The dividend is safer than the payout ratio screams.
The contrarian argument against buying here — even at 8% FCF yield and 6.2% dividend yield — is that MO is a melting ice cube where the melt rate is accelerating and the terminal value is a real question mark within 15 years, not 30. NJOY has been a disappointment (writedowns, market share still <5% in e-vapor), the JUUL episode cost billions, and on! oral nicotine is growing but from a base too small to offset combustibles by mid-decade. Meanwhile the sector faces menthol ban risk (delayed, not dead), nicotine cap proposals from FDA, and continued ESG exclusion pressure that structurally caps the multiple. The 16.6x P/E isn't obviously cheap for a business shrinking earnings 7.6% annually — it's cheap only if you believe pricing power holds another decade, which requires a bet that regulators don't accelerate the timeline. The market's pricing isn't irrational; it's discounting duration risk.
My verdict: partial agreement with the "undervalued" call but with a much tighter fair value band. I'd anchor intrinsic value at $72-78, not $82-84 — call it a 10-15% discount to current, not 23%. That's still positive expected return, and combined with the 6.2% dividend you get a plausible 12-14% annualized total return over 3-5 years assuming no thesis break. The synthesis' composite is likely overweighting historical multiples and underweighting the acceleration in volume decline. I'd own MO for the coupon, not for the re-rating — the narrative layer is correct that this is "anchored" and durable, meaning the multiple probably doesn't expand meaningfully without a genuine reduced-risk product win, which isn't visible. The "market forces" model failing to produce output is a modest concern but not thesis-breaking given how well-understood this business is. Data quality is fine; the anomalies (Q1/Q4 margin swings) are seasonal excise tax and one-time item artifacts, not signal.
Position this as a bond substitute with equity upside optionality, sized accordingly. Don't chase it above $72; add aggressively below $62 where the dividend yield crosses 7% and FCF yield approaches 10%.
GPT Reading
What stands out is not “cheap cash flow,” but how little room for error is left in a business already harvesting itself. Revenue has slid from $26.0B in 2021 to $23.3B in 2025, a 10.5% decline, while the latest four quarters sum to roughly $23.5B, so there is no real top-line stabilization yet. Gross profit has actually held up better, rising from $14.0B in 2021 to $14.5B in 2025 despite lower sales, which is the core Altria trick: price/mix offsets volume decline. But below that line, the earnings stream is much less clean than a screen suggests. Net income swung from $11.3B in 2024 to $7.0B in 2025, and the quarterly cadence is lumpy too: 19%-20% net margins in 1Q25 and 4Q25 versus ~39%-40% in the cleaner quarters. A 16.6x P/E on a company with negative revenue CAGR, negative earnings CAGR, and obvious non-operating noise is not an obvious bargain.
The real business quality is in cash conversion. 2025 operating cash flow of $9.29B and free cash flow of $9.07B on just $216M of capex is excellent, and that is why the equity keeps getting a premium relative to most no-growth staples. But the market cap is $114B, which means the stock trades at about 12.6x free cash flow, or an FCF yield near 7.9%. Against a 6.2% dividend yield, that spread is not wide once you remember the payout ratio is already effectively 100% of earnings and the balance sheet is not conservative. Debt is $25.7B, cash is $4.5B, equity is negative $3.45B, and the current ratio is only 0.65. Negative equity alone is not fatal for a buyback-heavy tobacco company, but it does reinforce that this is a leveraged income vehicle, not a wide-margin compounding machine. At $68.35, investors are paying a full price for durability in a business whose durability still depends on raising price faster than cigarette volumes fall.
That is where I diverge from the “undervalued” synthesis. The market is not ignoring cash generation; it is capitalizing it fairly aggressively already. EV/revenue at 5.8x and EV/EBITDA at 13.3x are not distressed multiples for a shrinking tobacco franchise. If I normalize annual earnings power somewhere around $7.5B-$8.0B rather than taking the high 2024 figure at face value, the stock is roughly 14x-15x normalized earnings. That can be acceptable for an ultra-stable staple, but Altria is not really stable in the way a packaged-food or household-products company is stable: its unit base is structurally declining, its reduced-risk optionality is still too small to underwrite, and regulation is a recurring overhang rather than a one-time fear. The latest quarter’s net income of $2.30B on $6.11B revenue looks strong, but the trailing pattern still says “excellent cash harvester with modest erosion,” not “mispriced franchise.”
The best counterargument is straightforward: few companies on the market can shrink revenue 2%-3% annually and still throw off $9B of free cash flow with 40% operating margins and almost no capital intensity. Gross profit in 2025 was actually higher than in 2021 despite the revenue decline, which suggests pricing power remains very real. If that continues, then a 7.9% FCF yield plus a 6.2% dividend on a defensive consumer name could indeed be too cheap, especially if smoke-free products merely offset part of the cigarette decline rather than needing to fully replace it. On that view, the 2025 earnings drop is mostly noise, the 2024 and 2026 quarterly margins near 37%-40% are the better guide, and the company deserves a premium because it converts almost every dollar of operating profit into distributable cash. I take that seriously; it is why I am not outright bearish. I just weigh the shrinking revenue base, full payout, and lack of balance-sheet cushion more heavily than the DCF-style argument does.
What would change my mind is evidence that the cash engine is not just durable but re-accelerating in quality. If the next 12 months show revenue at least flat year over year around $23.5B-$24.0B, operating cash flow sustaining above $9.5B, and earnings normalizing without the 19%-20% margin quarters recurring, then I would be more willing to pay a mid-to-high teens multiple and see upside into the mid-$70s. Conversely, if quarterly revenue keeps printing down low single digits and free cash flow slips below about $8.5B while the dividend still consumes nearly all earnings, then the stock should trade more like a bond substitute under stress, and a low-$60s price would be easier to justify.
Grok Reading
Altria’s numbers describe a cash-harvesting machine that is shrinking in slow motion. Annual revenue has marched lower for five straight years—from $26.01B in 2021 to $23.28B in 2025—at a –2.5% CAGR, and the most recent year-over-year print is still –3.1%. Yet the company converted that smaller top line into $9.07B of free cash flow on only $216M of capex, a 39% FCF margin that is the entire investment case. Operating margins remain stout at 42.5% and gross margins at 62.5%, evidence that pricing power continues to offset volume attrition. The 6.2% dividend yield on a $114B market cap equates to roughly $7.1B of cash returned, covered 1.3× by FCF even while the formal payout ratio sits at 100% of the $6.95B in reported net income. Negative equity of –$3.45B is an accounting artifact of decades of buybacks and dividends, not a going-concern red flag; net debt of ~$21B is serviceable against $9B+ of annual cash generation. At 16.6× earnings and 13.3× EV/EBITDA the stock is priced as a mid-teens annuity, which is exactly what the cash-flow profile supports if the decline stays orderly.
The quarterly tape reinforces durability more than acceleration. Four of the last six quarters delivered net margins between 37% and 40%; the two soft prints (Q1 and Q4 2025 at ~20%) look like discrete items rather than margin collapse. Sequential revenue is range-bound between $5.3B and $6.3B with no evidence of sudden volume freefall. The valuation synthesis’s $84 fair-value anchor therefore has a real fundamental floor: a 7.9% FCF yield on equity value and a business that has already proved it can raise price faster than volume falls. Where the models and the raw data diverge is on earnings quality—2024’s $11.26B net income was clearly inflated relative to the $6.95B that followed, and the –38% earnings drop year-over-year is the number the market is correctly refusing to annualize. Strip that outlier and the earnings power sits closer to $7–8B, which at $68 still implies a mid-teens multiple on normalized profits and leaves modest upside rather than the 23% gap the composite claims.
The strongest counter-argument is that 13× EV/EBITDA and 16.6× earnings are not cheap once the terminal trajectory is acknowledged. Revenue has declined every year for half a decade, operating income has rolled over from $11.9B to $9.9B, and the earnings CAGR of –7.6% is materially worse than the revenue fade. A payout ratio above 100% of net income leaves zero margin for error if litigation reserves spike or if cigarette volumes accelerate beyond the historical 4–5% annual drop. ESG exclusion and the still-marginal contribution from on! and heated tobacco mean the multiple is capped; any re-rating requires proof that oral nicotine can actually bend the revenue curve, which the last five years of data have not supplied. A smart bear simply capitalizes the current $9B FCF at a 9–10% required yield (appropriate for a shrinking, regulated, litigated cash stream) and lands near $60–65, making today’s $68 fully valued to slightly rich. I weigh this less heavily because FCF has been essentially flat (–0.1% CAGR) while earnings have been noisy, and because the balance-sheet leverage remains modest relative to cash generation; still, the bear math is coherent and keeps conviction from rising.
I would flip to a clear overvalued stance if the next two reported quarters show cigarette volume declines exceeding 7% without offsetting price/mix, or if the board signals a dividend freeze or cut. Conversely, two consecutive quarters of total company revenue growth (even low-single-digit) driven by oral nicotine would justify the $80+ fair-value targets and push me to high-conviction undervalued. Until one of those data points arrives, the stock is a high-single-digit total-return income vehicle trading a modest discount to its cash-flow reality.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Altria is a textbook mature earner running a high-margin, high-cash-conversion franchise. Gross margin has expanded every year from 53.8% in 2021 to 62.5% in 2025, and FCF has been remarkably steady at $8.05B-$9.09B annually. OCF/NI of 1.62x, accruals of -4.9% of assets, Beneish M of -2.37 and Altman Z of 4.68 all point to clean, high-integrity reported earnings with no forensic red flags. Capital discipline is genuine: diluted share count fell from 1.85B to 1.68B (-2.3% CAGR), so per-share economics compound even as the top line erodes. The balance sheet, however, is a constraint rather than a cushion - net debt of roughly $21.2B against only $4.47B liquid cash means the FCF stream is partly spoken for by interest and debt service. The core concern is trajectory: revenue has declined every single year from $26.01B to $23.28B, and 2025 net income of $6.95B is well below 2024's $11.26B while operating margin slipped from 46.8% to 42.5%. This is a secularly shrinking volume business masked by pricing power and mix, and the durability of that pricing lever is the whole ballgame.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Cause of 2025 net income drop from $11.26B to $6.95B (impairment, BAT stake mark, tax item?)
- Debt maturity ladder and weighted average coupon vs current refinancing rates
- Cigarette volume decline rate vs price/mix uplift - is pricing power still outrunning volume?
- NJOY and on! contribution and profitability trajectory in smoke-free segment
- Status of FDA menthol rule and any pending litigation reserves
- Dividend payout ratio vs FCF and remaining buyback authorization
The e2e composite fair value is $81.82 (signal-adjusted $84.04), implying ~20-23% upside from $68.33. The methods triangulate reasonably: DCF at $81.69 and anchored-PE at $99.90 bracket an EPV floor of $64 - notably, the EPV floor sits BELOW the current price, which is the honest read on a business whose volumes shrink 4-5% annually. Strip out any growth credit and you are roughly paying fair value for the run-off; pay for modest pricing power and mix and you get to the low-$80s. That is the mispricing: the market is giving essentially no credit for continued pricing offset.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Cigarette volume decline rate vs price/mix in latest quarter
- Guidance on smokeable segment operating income growth
- on! and heated tobacco unit economics and scale trajectory
- Any FDA/menthol regulatory updates
- Net debt trajectory and buyback pace vs dividend
Altria sits in an awkward sentiment pocket. The tape is mildly risk-on with VIX at 14.9 and the S&P at highs, but with a beta of 0.5 and a defensive-tobacco profile, MO barely participates in melt-ups and barely bleeds in wobbles. Macro pressure (10y at 4.69%, market PE 27.7) is a mild headwind for bond-proxy yield names, but Altria's yield story is durable enough that this is background noise, not a decisive force. The active narrative is a moderate-intensity, durable fallen-angel: cash machine trading at a discount because the market fears volume decline and regulation. That narrative is neither collapsing nor catching fire; it is grinding, which is exactly what the momentum (-2.5% CAGR, structural underperformance vs the tape) reflects. Analyst tone is 'moderately optimistic' per the news flow, which is a mild support but not a re-rating catalyst. The FDA approval for four On! pouches is a small, tangible tailwind because it directly addresses the bear's execution-risk leg (the oral-product transition) - the sort of narrative-defending news that arrests de-rating without triggering a rally. Net: the pressures roughly cancel. No dominant force is pressing this name up or down right now; it is being left behind by a risk-on tape rather than actively sold.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the On! approval translates into visible share gains vs Zyn in the next print (would strengthen the pivot narrative)
- Any FDA action on menthol or nicotine caps that would reignite the regulatory-risk narrative
- Sector rotation signals - a shift to defensives/yield would meaningfully help MO
- Analyst target revisions post-Q2 - watch for the moderately-bullish tone firming or cracking
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 8, 2026, MO was $68.33. We expect it to be $75.90 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $62.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 8, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.