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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Newmont Corporation (NEM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -8 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 32 · Value -41 · Sentiment 33 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $122.48 vs $95.76 at analysis
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Newmont Corporation
NEM NYSENewmont Corporation is a leading gold mining company headquartered in Denver, Colorado, and founded in 1921. It specializes in the exploration, development, and production of gold, along with byproducts such as copper, silver, lead, and zinc. The company manages a global portfolio of mines and joint ventures across key regions including the Americas (such as the United States, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Suriname, and the Dominican Republic), Africa (notably Ghana), Australia, and Papua New Guinea. Newmont Corporation operates tier-one assets focused on sustainable mining practices, emphasizing long-life reserves and efficient extraction methods to deliver gold and associated metals to markets worldwide. Its operations play a vital role in the precious metals sector, supplying essential materials for jewelry, investment products, technology, and industrial applications. With a diverse geographical footprint, Newmont Corporation maintains a strong position in the gold mining industry, contributing to global commodity supply chains through its integrated production capabilities.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.39
Total Equity: $34.04B
Shares: 1,108,000,000
Total Debt: $5.12B
Cash: $7.65B
EBITDA: $13.48B
Total Debt: $5.12B
Cash: $7.65B
Revenue: $22.67B
Revenue: $22.67B
Revenue: $22.67B
Total Equity: $34.04B
Tax Rate: 40.5%
Equity: $34.04B
Total Debt: $5.12B
Cash: $7.65B
Current Liabilities: $5.71B
Long-Term Debt: $5.12B
Total Debt: $5.12B
Total Equity: $34.04B
Shares: 1,108,000,000
Shares: 1,108,000,000
CapEx: -$3.04B
Shares: 1,108,000,000
Stock Price: $95.76
Net Income: $7.09B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:09pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $12.2B | $11.9B | $11.8B | $18.7B | $22.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $5.4B | $6.5B | $6.7B | $9.0B | $8.1B |
| Gross Profit | $6.8B | $5.4B | $5.1B | $9.7B | $14.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $5.5B | $5.2B | $6.8B | $5.2B | $3.6B |
| Operating Income | $1.3B | $203.0M | -$1.7B | $4.5B | $11.0B |
| Net Income | $1.2B | -$429.0M | -$2.5B | $3.3B | $7.1B |
| EBITDA | $3.6B | $2.4B | $408.0M | $7.1B | $13.5B |
| EPS | $1.46 | $-0.54 | $-2.97 | $2.92 | $6.41 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.46 | $-0.54 | $-2.97 | $2.92 | $6.39 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:52pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $5.0B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $3.6B | $7.6B |
| Total Current Assets | $7.7B | $6.5B | $7.5B | $12.3B | $13.1B |
| Total Assets | $40.6B | $38.5B | $55.5B | $56.3B | $57.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.7B | $2.9B | $6.0B | $7.5B | $5.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $5.6B | $5.6B | $7.0B | $7.6B | $5.1B |
| Total Liabilities | $18.7B | $18.9B | $26.3B | $26.2B | $23.1B |
| Total Equity | $21.9B | $19.5B | $29.2B | $30.1B | $34.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $3.1B | $916.0M | -$3.0B | -$1.3B | $3.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:09pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.3B | $3.2B | $2.8B | $6.4B | $10.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.7B | -$2.1B | -$2.7B | -$3.4B | -$3.0B |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.6B | $1.1B | $97.0M | $3.0B | $7.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$328.0M | -$15.0M | $668.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.4B | -$89.0M | $0 | -$384.0M | -$3.4B |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.8B | -$1.7B | -$1.4B | -$1.1B | -$1.1B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$525.0M | $0 | $0 | -$1.2B | -$2.3B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$555.0M | -$2.1B | $156.0M | $550.0M | $4.0B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:09pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -2.5% | -0.9% | +58.2% | +21.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -19.7% | -6.1% | +90.1% | +50.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -83.9% | -937.4% | +366.3% | +142.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -136.8% | -481.4% | +234.2% | +111.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | -33.3% | -82.9% | +1,640.9% | +89.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 23, 2026 7:41pm (30d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-27 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-03 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-26 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-04 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-27 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-04 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-27 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-05 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-04 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-04 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-29 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-06 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-31 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-08 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-07 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-07 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-01 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-09 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-08 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-08 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-20 23:35| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($95.76) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +60% | 35.0% | $542.93 | +467% |
| Base — stabilizes | +40% | 33.4% | $310.98 | +225% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +20% | 28.4% | $151.79 | +59% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +15% | 27.4% | $126.57 | +32% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: Newmont's revenue trajectory is genuinely striking — $4.40B in Q2'24 climbing monotonically to $7.31B in Q1'26, a 66% jump in seven quarters. Net margin expanded from 19.4% to 44.6% over the same window. Full-year 2025 delivered $22.67B revenue, $10.96B operating income, and $7.30B FCF against a $100.9B market cap — that's a 7.2% FCF yield with net cash of $2.5B on the balance sheet. ROIC of 20.7% for a gold miner is extraordinary and almost certainly not sustainable through-cycle. The Q1'26 44.6% net margin (net income exceeding operating income run-rate implied by prior quarters) smells like asset sale gains or a one-time reserve reversal, not clean operating performance — worth flagging before extrapolating.
Now the contrarian read the models are underweighting: this is peak-cycle earnings on a peak-cycle gold price. Gold at ~$2,300-2,400/oz (and spiking higher in 2025-26) is doing all the heavy lifting. Compare 2023 (op income -$1.70B, net loss $2.49B) to 2025 (op $10.96B, NI $7.09B) — same company, same mines, roughly same production. The delta is almost entirely realized price per ounce. A 14.99x P/E on peak earnings is not "cheap"; it's a normal multiple on a number that could halve if gold retraces to $1,800. Normalize NI to a mid-cycle $3.5-4B (halfway between 2024's $3.35B and 2025's $7.09B) and you get a ~26-28x P/E — expensive, not undervalued. The synthesis verdict of $119 fair value implicitly assumes current gold prices hold; the market's 15x isn't mispricing, it's discounting the cyclicality the DCF ignores.
The prior models contradict themselves and I side with the skeptical read. Pre-flight correctly identifies the "leveraged play on sustained high gold prices" framing, and the Narrative layer correctly notes fundamentals are doing 85% of the work with the discount reflecting "commodity cyclicality risk" — but then the Valuation Synthesis stamps "undervalued" with a signal-adjusted $119 target, which is exactly the mistake of treating commodity-cycle earnings as recurring. The mature_earner archetype at 0.7 confidence is also questionable — miners aren't compounders, they're price-takers on a depleting asset base. Insider activity is quietly telling: three sales in May-July 2026 versus zero opportunistic buys, on top of routine award grants. Not a scream, but no insider is treating $95 as a gift either. "Lagging sector peers" in the secondary signals is another tell — if NEM can't outperform GDX with these tailwinds, what happens when they reverse?
Where the data is thin: we have no per-ounce production cost (AISC) disclosure here, no reserve life, no hedge book, and no breakdown between organic growth and Newcrest acquisition contribution — the 38.5% revenue CAGR is inflated by an M&A step-function, not organic reacceleration. The 767% FCF CAGR is mathematically meaningless off a tiny base. Also stale: the "Q1 2026" data is future-dated relative to real-world present, so either this is a simulation or the timestamps are off — either way, treat the Q1'26 44.6% margin with extra suspicion until you see the actual print quality. I dissent from the synthesis's undervalued call. My read: at $95.76 the market is fairly pricing peak-cycle economics with appropriate cyclicality discount. Fair value on normalized $4B NI and a 16x mid-cycle multiple is closer to $57-65; fair value if you believe gold sustains $2,300+ is $95-105. The $119 signal-adjusted target requires both sustained gold AND multiple expansion, which is asking too much. Own it for the dividend and gold-hedge role, not for re-rating upside.
GPT Reading
At $95.76, Newmont is not expensive on trailing earnings, but the trailing earnings are exactly the problem: they look peak-ish. The business has clearly transformed from the ugly 2023 loss year into a cash machine, with revenue up from $18.68B in 2024 to $22.67B in 2025 and net income more than doubling from $3.35B to $7.09B. The most recent five quarters are even stronger, with quarterly revenue climbing from $4.40B in June 2024 to $7.31B in March 2026, while net margins exploded from ~19%-20% to 38%-45%. That is not the profile of a “mature earner” in a steady state; it is the profile of a miner catching a very favorable price deck and likely benefiting from post-acquisition scale and cost absorption. The market cap is $100.9B against 2025 free cash flow of $7.3B, so the equity is trading around 13.8x trailing FCF and roughly 15x trailing earnings. For a normal industrial that might be fair. For a gold miner earning 31.3% net margins and 48.4% operating margins in what looks like an unusually strong commodity environment, I think that multiple already capitalizes a lot of good news.
What stands out most is how extreme the margin expansion has been relative to the company’s own history. Newmont did $11.8B-$12.2B of revenue in 2021-2023 and managed net income of $1.17B, then -$429M, then -$2.49B. Now, just two years later, it earns $7.09B on $22.67B of sales with ROE and ROIC both around 21%. That kind of swing can happen in mining, but it should make an investor less willing to annualize current profitability. Even the “cheap” EV/EBITDA of 7.3x is being measured off a year with $10.96B of operating income and gross margin of 64.3%, levels that are far above what this company showed through the preceding cycle. The balance sheet is excellent — $7.65B cash against $5.12B debt, current ratio 2.29, debt/equity 0.15 — so I am not worried about financial risk. I am worried that investors are paying a premium multiple on book value, 3.1x, for a business whose returns are highly hostage to gold staying elevated. For a miner, fortress balance sheets are necessary; they are not by themselves a reason to pay up.
The strongest pushback is straightforward and real: if gold has structurally repriced upward rather than merely spiked, then Newmont is still not fully valued. On that view, the company is now a larger, better portfolio after integration, 2025 FCF of $7.3B is sustainable or improvable, and net cash plus a tiny 15.6% payout ratio leave substantial room for higher shareholder returns. Quarterly data support that bull case: revenue grew 21.3% YoY in the latest read, earnings 111.6%, and the latest quarter’s $3.26B of net income on $7.31B revenue implies enormous operating leverage. If one simply annualizes the latest quarter, the stock is nowhere near 15x earnings. I take that evidence seriously; it is the best reason the “undervalued” model output could be right.
But I weigh it differently because mining earnings should be normalized, not extrapolated from the hottest quarter. The annual revenue base almost doubled from 2023 to 2025, while profit margins went from deeply negative to elite, which suggests a mix of acquisition effects, price tailwinds, and possibly one-time favorable items rather than a settled earnings run-rate. The dividend yield of just 1.1% also tells me management is not distributing cash as if this level of profitability is permanently bankable. Insider activity is not a smoking gun, but the only open-market type prints shown are small sales, not buys, which is what you often see when management knows the stock is being valued on very favorable conditions. I do not think the shares are dramatically overvalued because the balance sheet is strong and the company is genuinely producing huge cash flow; I do think the current price is discounting a “high gold, high margin” world more heavily than a cyclical asset should command.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2025-2026 economics are durable through a full year rather than a burst. If Newmont can hold quarterly revenue above $6.5B while keeping net margins above 30% and convert that into another $7B+ of annual FCF without balance sheet strain, then $95.76 would look reasonable and perhaps cheap. I would also get more constructive if the next annual report shows similar profitability with capex still around $3B rather than rising sharply, or if management materially raises the dividend/buyback from the current low payout, signaling confidence in through-cycle cash generation. Conversely, if margins slide back toward the 20%-25% range seen in mid-2024 even with healthy revenue, then the stock should not trade near 15x trailing earnings and I would see fair value closer to the low-$80s.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a company that has undergone a step-change in scale and profitability rather than a simple cyclical bounce. Annual revenue jumped from $11.8B in 2023 to $18.7B in 2024 and $22.7B in 2025, while net income swung from a $2.5B loss to $3.35B and then $7.09B. The most recent quarter (March 2026) is even more striking: $7.31B revenue and $3.26B net income at a 44.6% net margin, implying a run-rate that would put the stock on roughly 7–8x trailing earnings if sustained. Free cash flow of $7.3B against a $101B market cap delivers a 7.2% FCF yield, supported by a net-cash balance sheet ($7.65B cash versus $5.12B debt) and a debt-to-equity ratio of just 0.15. Operating margin of 48% and ROIC of 21% are exceptional for a bulk miner and show that the Newcrest integration has delivered real operating leverage, not just volume. At 15x earnings, 7.3x EV/EBITDA and 4.7x sales, the market is pricing Newmont as if these economics are temporary rather than the new baseline of a 6 Moz producer with fortress liquidity.
The acceleration is visible quarter by quarter: revenue climbed steadily from $4.4B in mid-2024 to $7.3B, with net margins expanding from the high teens into the mid-30s and then above 40%. That pattern, combined with high revenue confidence and adequate FCF quality, argues against the idea that 2025 was a pure gold-price fluke. The low 15.6% payout ratio and 1.1% yield leave substantial room for buybacks or dividend growth while still funding the $3B capex load. Insider activity is noise—small routine sales offset by awards—and does not contradict the cash-flow story. In short, the quantitative models that flag undervaluation (composite near $99, signal-adjusted $119) are directionally correct; the market is applying a heavy commodity-cyclicality discount to what is now a high-ROIC, net-cash cash machine.
The strongest counter-argument is that these margins and the $7B FCF figure are gold-price artifacts that will mean-revert hard. Gold miners historically print peak earnings at the top of the metal cycle; a sustained drop back toward $2,000/oz would crush the 48% operating margin and could easily halve FCF. The 2023 collapse (operating loss of $1.7B on similar production scale) remains a live reminder that Newmont’s earnings power is not structural in the way a software company’s is. Sector intelligence flags the stock as lagging peers, macro headwinds are explicitly noted, and the valuation methods themselves disagree—exactly the mixed signal one expects when the market correctly embeds a large probability of gold-price mean reversion. Capex intensity and reserve replacement risk in a depleting asset base further justify a discount to the DCF. I weigh this less heavily than the bulls because the current net-cash position and sub-15% payout give Newmont more downside buffer than in prior cycles, and because unit economics have improved post-integration; still, the commodity beta is real and cannot be wished away.
A decisive break in the gold price below $2,100 sustained for two quarters, or a sequential revenue decline back below $5.5B with margins compressing under 25%, would flip the thesis to fairly valued or worse. Conversely, another two quarters of $6.5B-plus revenue and FCF conversion above 30% would force a re-rating toward the $120 signal-adjusted level.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Claude — Second Response · overvalued changed direction
VERDICT: Modestly overvalued at $95.76; fair value $75-90 on blended-cycle earnings with credit for the fortress balance sheet, still not the $119 undervalued call
Grok's argument that Newcrest integration created structural margin lift — not just price capture — is the strongest challenge to my position, and I want to give it fair weight. The claim is testable: if unit economics genuinely improved post-integration, operating margins should hold even at lower gold prices. But I can't verify that from what we have — no AISC disclosure, no per-mine breakdown, no separation of Newcrest synergies from realized-price effects. Grok is asserting a structural story that the data provided doesn't actually prove; the same revenue-and-margin curve is equally consistent with "peak gold + M&A step-function" as with "durable operating leverage." Extraordinary claims require the AISC data neither of us has.
Where Grok's argument does move me: the net-cash balance sheet and 15.6% payout ratio are more defensive than I initially credited. In prior cycles Newmont carried real leverage into gold downdrafts, which amplified the equity drawdown. This time a 40% gold retracement doesn't threaten solvency or the dividend — it just compresses earnings. That deserves a smaller cyclicality discount than I applied, and it narrows the gap between my $57-65 normalized fair value and spot. GPT arrives at $80-90 via essentially the same logic and I think that's closer to right than my initial $60-70. I'll widen my range upward.
What did not move me: Grok's "run-rate 7-8x earnings if sustained" is exactly the extrapolation error I flagged initially — annualizing the hottest quarter of a commodity cycle. And the synthesis's $119 target still requires gold to hold AND multiple expansion, which remains asking too much. GPT and I converge on the core point: this is peak-cycle economics being partially — not fully — capitalized by a market that correctly senses cyclicality. Fair value on a blended normalized/current-gold scenario is $75-90, making $95.76 modestly rich rather than egregiously so. I'm revising my range up but holding the direction.
GPT — Second Response · fairly valued changed direction
VERDICT: Roughly fairly valued to slightly overvalued at $95.76; reasonable range $90-$100 today, with upside only if $6B-$7B FCF proves durable through a full cycle
Claude moved me more than Grok did, but not enough to fully change sides. The most useful pushback was not “gold is cyclical” in the abstract—I already leaned on that—but his specific normalization framework: if you haircut 2025 net income to roughly $3.5B-$4B, the stock stops looking cheap very quickly. He also usefully flagged how odd the Q1’26 44.6% net margin looks relative to the prior quarterly operating-income cadence; I agree that quarter is too noisy to annualize cleanly. Where I still part ways is on the degree of compression embedded in his $57-$65 fair value. That assumes both a sharp earnings reversion and a market unwilling to pay more than a mid-teens multiple for a net-cash, tier-one-scale miner with visibly improved asset quality and integration benefits. The balance sheet, scale step-up, and cash-generation profile argue against treating this as simply “same company, different gold price.”
Grok’s strongest point is that the business may have had a genuine structural reset from the portfolio combination, not merely a spot-price windfall. I underweighted that in my first pass. But his “new baseline” framing still leans too heavily on the latest quarter and on valuation multiples measured off unusually fat margins. A 7.2% trailing FCF yield is not obviously a bargain for a miner unless one believes most of that FCF is durable, and the historical swing from losses in 2023 to elite profitability in 2025 still argues for caution. So I’m revising only at the margin: from “slightly overvalued” to roughly fairly valued/slightly rich. I am less confident in an $80-$90 anchor after considering the post-integration quality improvement, but I’m still not willing to underwrite a bullish rerating without evidence that $6B-$7B annual FCF survives beyond the hottest part of the gold tape.
Grok — Second Response · fairly valued changed direction
VERDICT: Fairly valued at $95; peak-cycle margins warrant the discount, normalized support $75-95
The peak-cycle normalization case from both colleagues is the specific argument that forces a revision. Claude’s math—that a mid-cycle $3.5-4B NI implies 26-28x on the current price—and GPT’s observation that 7.3x EV/EBITDA and 13.8x FCF are being applied to what look like top-of-cycle margins ($10.96B op. income, 48% margins, 44% net) correctly re-weight the commodity beta I had acknowledged but under-weighted. The 2023-to-2025 swing is almost pure realized gold price, not structural cost or volume alchemy; without AISC, reserve life, or clean one-time adjustments, treating $7.3B FCF and the Q1’26 print as the new baseline was too aggressive. Insider sales and the still-low 15.6% payout further signal that management itself is not banking permanence.
That said, the $60-70 and $80-90 anchors over-correct. They discount away the net-cash fortress, the post-Newcrest scale to ~6 Moz, the 21% ROIC, and the real operating leverage visible in the sequential climb from $4.4B to $7.3B quarters. Those buffers mean the stock does not need gold at $2,400 forever to support something near today’s price; it needs only a partial hold of the price deck plus continued cost absorption. I therefore move from “undervalued toward $119” to roughly fairly valued at $95, with the cyclicality discount now properly embedded and upside contingent on two more clean high-margin quarters rather than assumed.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The trajectory is dramatic: revenue jumped from $11.81B (2023) to $22.67B (2025) with gross margin recovering from 43.3% to 64.3% and operating margin swinging from -14.4% to 48.4%. Net income went from a $2.49B loss to $7.09B profit, and FCF exploded to $7.30B. Liquidity is strong with $8.24B cash and $3.13B net cash, and the Altman Z of 3.89 plus Beneish M of -2.71 with -7.5% accruals suggest reported numbers are clean and cash-backed (2025 FCF of $7.30B roughly matches net income of $7.09B). The mechanical earnings-quality checks find no red flags. The concern is per-share value creation. Diluted shares grew from 795M in 2022 to 1.15B in 2024 (an 8.5% CAGR), largely reflecting the Newcrest acquisition rather than routine SBC leakage - but shareholders still bear the dilution. Insider activity is mildly negative: seven sales totaling $3.4M against zero open-market buys in the trailing period, though sizes are small and mixed among directors/officers. Underlying it all, Newmont is a price-taker on gold; the 2022-2023 margin collapse shows how quickly the P&L can invert, so the current 48% operating margin is a peak-cycle print, not a durable moat. Net: this is a well-capitalized, well-run gold major printing real cash right now, with clean accounting but structural cyclicality and a diluted share base that offsets some of the operational recovery.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- How much of the diluted share growth was Newcrest deal issuance versus ongoing SBC, and whether buyback capacity is being deployed to offset
- Realized gold price versus all-in sustaining cost trend to gauge how much of 2025 margin is price versus cost discipline
- Reserve life and grade trajectory across the enlarged Newcrest portfolio
- Capex and sustaining capital guidance versus the $7.30B FCF print to test durability
- Any impairment or divestiture charges embedded in 2023's -14.4% operating margin
The e2e composite fair value of $98.97 sits within 3% of the $95.76 price, and the three underlying methods disagree wildly: DCF at $150.55 (assumes today's gold-price-driven cash flows persist), EPV floor at $40.41 (assumes mid-cycle earnings power), and anchored-PE at $54.36. That spread tells you the answer depends almost entirely on where gold sits in its cycle. The signal-adjusted $119.12 leans on the DCF, which I discount because it extrapolates a peak-cycle print - the same assets lost $2.5B in 2023.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Realized gold price and AISC guidance for 2026 - key to whether current FCF is sustainable
- Post-Newcrest per-share reserves and production trajectory
- Capital return policy (buybacks vs dividend) at current gold prices
- Any impairment or asset-sale signals that would reset the earnings base
The macro tape reads stressed (VIX 20.7, S&P -3.9% off highs, 10y at 4.61%) and would ordinarily press hard on equities, but this is NEM: beta 0.48, gold miner, safe-haven proxy. The same fear that punishes high-beta story stocks tends to firm gold and its senior producers, so the regime lands as a modest positive, not a headwind. Momentum confirms it - 38.5% CAGR, +52pp over three years - the tape has been rewarding this cohort. The narrative is quiet (steady-compounder, minimal intensity, low cult) which is actually the point: there is no fragile story to break. Fundamentals are doing ~85% of the pricing work, so NEM is not exposed to a narrative unwind the way a story stock would be. Analyst tone was flagged as bullish around the July 21 pop, and news flow (Metallic Minerals participation, pre-Q2 setup) is benign. Net pressure: gentle push higher from macro fear seeking gold exposure, offset slightly by recent 21% run cooling vs the 38% long-term pace and by higher-real-rates being a structural drag on non-yielding gold.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Q2 earnings tone and whether analysts push targets higher post-print
- Whether VIX stays elevated or the risk-off tape normalizes (fades the safe-haven bid)
- Gold price action vs real yields - a decisive break in either direction flips the read
- Any shift in narrative intensity around gold as a macro hedge
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 1, 2026, NEM was $93.71. We expect it to be $108.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $78.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 1, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.