For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Netflix Inc. (NFLX) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-14): Designation Watch · Gem Score -12 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 73 · Value -69 · Sentiment -42 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $24.76 vs $80.43 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Netflix Inc.
NFLX NASDAQNetflix Inc. is a global entertainment company focused on subscription-based streaming services. It offers television series, films, documentaries, live programming, and games across a wide range of genres and languages, making it a major destination for on-demand viewing. The company distributes content through internet-connected devices such as smart TVs, smartphones, tablets, set-top boxes, and computers, giving members flexible access to entertainment wherever they watch. Netflix Inc. also develops and licenses original programming alongside acquired content, supporting a broad content library that serves consumers in numerous markets worldwide. Headquartered in Los Gatos, California, Netflix Inc. plays a significant role in the digital media landscape as a leading provider of streaming entertainment services.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.53
Total Equity: $26.62B
Shares: 4,343,863,000
Total Debt: $14.46B
Cash: $9.03B
EBITDA: $13.66B
Total Debt: $14.46B
Cash: $9.03B
Revenue: $45.18B
Revenue: $45.18B
Revenue: $45.18B
Total Equity: $26.62B
Tax Rate: 13.7%
Equity: $26.62B
Total Debt: $14.46B
Cash: $9.03B
Current Liabilities: $10.98B
Long-Term Debt: $13.46B
Total Debt: $14.46B
Total Equity: $26.62B
Shares: 4,343,863,000
Shares: 4,343,863,000
CapEx: -$688.22M
Shares: 4,343,863,000
Stock Price: $80.44
Net Income: $10.98B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 3:09pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $29.7B | $31.6B | $33.7B | $39.0B | $45.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $17.3B | $19.2B | $19.7B | $21.0B | $23.3B |
| Gross Profit | $12.4B | $12.4B | $14.0B | $18.0B | $21.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $6.2B | $6.8B | $7.1B | $7.5B | $8.6B |
| Operating Income | $6.2B | $5.6B | $7.0B | $10.4B | $13.3B |
| Net Income | $5.1B | $4.5B | $5.4B | $8.7B | $11.0B |
| EBITDA | $6.4B | $6.0B | $7.3B | $10.7B | $13.7B |
| EPS | $1.23 | $1.08 | $1.30 | $2.09 | $2.58 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.20 | $1.06 | $1.28 | $2.05 | $2.53 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:23pm (45d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $6.0B | $5.1B | $7.1B | $7.8B | $9.0B |
| Total Current Assets | $8.1B | $9.3B | $9.9B | $13.1B | $13.0B |
| Total Assets | $44.6B | $48.6B | $48.7B | $53.6B | $55.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $8.5B | $7.9B | $8.9B | $10.8B | $11.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $14.7B | $14.4B | $14.1B | $13.8B | $13.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $28.7B | $27.8B | $28.1B | $28.9B | $29.0B |
| Total Equity | $15.8B | $20.8B | $20.6B | $24.7B | $26.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $12.7B | $17.2B | $22.6B | $31.3B | $42.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 3:09pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $392.6M | $2.0B | $7.3B | $7.4B | $10.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$524.6M | -$407.7M | -$348.6M | -$439.5M | -$688.2M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$132.0M | $1.6B | $6.9B | $6.9B | $9.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$788.3M | -$757.4M | $0 | $0 | -$17.2M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$500.0M | -$700.0M | $0 | $1.4B | -$1.8B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$600.0M | $0 | -$6.0B | -$6.3B | -$9.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$2.2B | -$884.5M | $1.9B | $688.8M | $1.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 3:09pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +6.5% | +6.7% | +15.6% | +15.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +0.7% | +12.5% | +28.2% | +22.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | -9.1% | +23.5% | +49.8% | +27.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -12.2% | +20.4% | +61.1% | +26.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -6.8% | +22.5% | +47.0% | +27.1% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-06 19:21A +1σ run of quarters pays -53%; a −1σ run costs 66%. Ratio -0.8:1 (μ 14.8%, σ 3.3% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.7 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($80.43) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +21% | 32.5% | $42.64 | -47% |
| Base — stabilizes | +14% | 28.2% | $30.80 | -62% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +7% | 24.0% | $21.80 | -73% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +13% | 27.7% | $29.59 | -63% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +18% | 31.0% | $37.49 | -53% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +11% | 27.3% | $27.70 | -66% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-24 15:20The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Starting from the raw tape: Netflix is printing $12.56B in Q2'26 revenue, up 13.4% YoY from $11.08B, with TTM revenue around $48.4B and TTM net income near $13.65B. That's a ~28% net margin on the trailing year and operating margin of 29.5% on FY25 — this is no longer a media company financially, it's an asset-light global distribution platform with 21% FCF margin ($9.46B on $45.2B). Earnings CAGR of 42.5% over four years is real, but the base effect is enormous: 2021 net income was $5.12B against a partially COVID-inflated cost structure. The Q1'26 net margin of 43.1% is almost certainly a one-time item (tax benefit or content amortization change) — normalized quarterly margins are running 22-28%, and the sequential deceleration from 15.9% YoY revenue growth is visible if you squint at the $12.05B→$12.25B→$12.56B ramp (roughly 2-3% sequential, ~12% annualized). The synthesis model calling this "decelerating" is directionally correct.
Where I part company with the synthesis is the fair-value anchor. A $31.67 composite FV against $80.44 price implies a 60% haircut, which almost certainly comes from a DCF penalizing terminal growth too aggressively or a comps model using legacy-media multiples. Netflix at $331B market cap, ~$5.4B net debt, on $13.65B TTM earnings trades at ~24x forward earnings if you assume 15% NTM earnings growth — that is *not* egregious for a business compounding FCF at 17% with 41% ROE and no meaningful capex drag ($688M on $45B rev). The market-forces model's 10-12% normalized growth call is the right pivot point: if Netflix decelerates to 10% revenue growth with 30% operating margins holding, you get roughly $16-18B in operating income by 2027, which at a 20-22x multiple lands you in the $340-400B enterprise value zone — i.e., roughly where it trades. So "overvalued by 58%" overstates it; "fairly valued to modestly rich" is closer.
The contrarian case against my own read: content spend is the ticking clock nobody is modeling honestly. Netflix's operating leverage since 2022 came from *holding* content spend near $17B while revenue grew from $31.6B to $45B. That's a structural bet that global content amortization is now scalable — but sports rights (NFL, WWE, boxing), live programming, and gaming R&D are all inflating cash content commitments in ways that lag the P&L by 2-3 years. Debt sits at $14.46B against $9.03B cash — leverage is modest but not zero, and current ratio of 1.19 is thin for a business with $32B in content obligations off-balance-sheet. Insider activity is a nothingburger — 9,248 shares sold against routine RSU awards is noise, not signal. The narrative-economics layer nails the risk: this is priced as platform monopoly (7.7x sales, 25x EV/EBITDA), not as media. If ad-tier ARPU disappoints in even one quarter or password-sharing tailwind fully laps by mid-2026, the multiple compresses fast.
Net: the synthesis verdict of $31-34 FV is too punitive and likely rests on a bad terminal growth assumption or peer set that includes Warner/Paramount. But the pre-flight and market-forces models are directionally right — this is priced for continued execution with zero room for a soft quarter. My fair value lands at $62-70, roughly 15-22% below current, reflecting a 20-22x multiple on normalized 2026 earnings of ~$15B with 10-12% growth. That's not "sell everything" — it's "trim, don't chase, and wait for the deceleration print that the market hasn't priced." The Q1'26 43% margin spike is a red flag for revenue-quality watchers: something one-time flowed through, and the Street may be extrapolating it. I dissent from the synthesis on magnitude but agree on direction.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not a broken business but a business whose economics have become dramatically better, faster than many old “media” heuristics allow. Revenue has climbed from $29.7B in 2021 to $45.2B in 2025, a 52% increase, but net income has more than doubled from $5.1B to $11.0B and operating income has risen from $6.2B to $13.3B. That is the story: Netflix is no longer just scaling subscribers, it is scaling monetization and margin. Annual operating margin moved from 20.8% in 2021 to 29.5% in 2025, and the latest quarterly run-rate is even stronger: the last four quarters produced about $48.4B of revenue and $13.7B of net income, a 28% net margin. Even with some quarter-to-quarter lumpiness — notably the 43.1% net margin in 1Q26 looks unusually high relative to adjacent periods — the broader trend is unmistakable. This is a business converting moderate top-line growth into outsized earnings growth.
The cash profile reinforces that this is a real earnings story, not accounting theater. In 2025, operating cash flow was $10.15B and free cash flow was $9.46B, with capex only $688M. Against $14.46B of debt and $9.03B of cash, net debt is modest for a company with this level of cash generation. ROIC of 35.9% and ROE of 41.3% are elite, even if part of the ROE strength comes from a capital-light model and accumulated buyback-style economics rather than tangible asset intensity. The balance sheet is not pristine in a zero-debt sense, but it no longer needs to be: annual FCF covers net debt quickly. That matters because the market is paying for durability of earnings power, and on the raw numbers Netflix has earned some premium. A business doing roughly $13B+ of operating profit on a sub-$50B revenue base is not a conventional studio; it is behaving more like a global digital platform with content as its acquisition and retention engine.
That said, the current price still looks rich. At a $331B market cap, investors are paying about 7.3x trailing sales, roughly 30x earnings, and 25.4x EV/EBITDA for a company whose recent revenue growth is 15.9% and whose likely normalized revenue growth should slow from the recent password-sharing and pricing tailwinds. If I annualize the first half of 2026, revenue is tracking around $49.6B-$50.0B, so the stock is still around 6.6x forward sales. That multiple can work for a business compounding 20%+ with obvious runway, but Netflix is increasingly a margin-expansion story rather than a broad-based high-growth story. The latest quarterly revenues rose from $10.54B to $12.25B to $12.56B over five quarters; that is still good growth, but the slope is already flattening. The market is effectively assuming that ad monetization, pricing power, and content efficiency keep offsetting eventual saturation. I think that is plausible, but too fully reflected. This is not a disaster waiting to happen; it is a very good company priced as if its best phase of profit expansion can persist for years with little interruption.
The strongest counterargument is straightforward: maybe the market is right to pay up because Netflix has structurally escaped the low-return media trap. A skeptic of my caution would point to 2023-2025 revenue growth accelerating from $33.7B to $39.0B to $45.2B while operating margins simultaneously expanded from 20.6% to 26.7% to 29.5%. That combination is unusual and powerful. If 2026 can deliver something like $50B of revenue and $14B+ of net income, then today’s multiple compresses quickly into the low-20s on earnings for a business with global scale, a proven subscription product, and growing ad optionality. They would also argue that comparing Netflix to legacy entertainment is the wrong frame: legacy players have weaker engagement, less pricing power, and worse international economics. I weigh that differently because the easy wins appear increasingly harvested. Once margins are near 30% and revenue is near $50B, each additional turn of valuation depends on either a new growth leg or an implausibly smooth continuation of current execution.
What changes my mind is concrete. If the next few quarters show revenue sustaining 14-16% growth while net margins hold above 28% without another one-off spike like 1Q26, then the premium deserves more respect and I would move closer to fair value in the low-to-mid $90s. Likewise, evidence that ad-tier monetization is adding revenue rather than simply shifting mix would matter a lot. On the other hand, if revenue growth drops toward 10-12% while margins stop expanding, then a 30x earnings multiple is too high and the stock deserves a reset toward the mid-$60s. For now, I see an excellent business, but not a mispriced one: quality is real, upside is less so.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a business that has completed its conversion from growth story to cash engine. Annual revenue climbed from $29.70B in 2021 to $45.18B in 2025 while net income more than doubled to $10.98B; operating margin expanded to 29.5 percent and free cash flow reached $9.46B on only $688M of capex. The last four reported quarters show sequential revenue still advancing—$11.08B, $11.51B, $12.05B, $12.25B, $12.56B—with net margins oscillating between 20 and 43 percent, the spike in Q1 2026 almost certainly reflecting a non-recurring tax or content timing item rather than a new run-rate. Returns on capital are elite (ROE 41 percent, ROIC 36 percent), the balance sheet is unlevered enough (debt-to-equity 0.54, net debt under $5.5B), and FCF conversion is clean. That is the fundamental reality: Netflix is a high-quality mature earner generating mid-teens top-line growth and mid-twenties bottom-line growth after a multi-year margin catch-up.
Where the quantitative models and the tape diverge is valuation. At $80.44 the stock trades at 32x trailing earnings, 7.7x sales and 25x EV/EBITDA while the composite fair-value work lands near $34. Even granting that those models embed conservative terminal growth, a 138 percent premium to DCF is not explained by the 15.8 percent revenue CAGR or the 16.9 percent FCF CAGR once the one-time password and pricing tailwinds are normalized. Recent revenue growth is already flagged as decelerating; the 42.5 percent earnings CAGR is largely margin expansion that cannot repeat at the same rate. Paying a software-like multiple for a content business whose incremental dollar still requires rising content spend and faces bundled competition is the stretch the price is asking investors to accept.
The strongest counter-argument is that quality and momentum still justify a premium. A 26 percent year-over-year earnings lift in the latest comparable period, ROIC above 35 percent, and $9-plus billion of annual FCF give the company real scarcity value inside Communication Services. If ad-tier monetization and further international ARPU gains keep revenue growing 14–16 percent while margins stabilize near 25 percent, a mid-20s earnings multiple would not be outrageous and the current 32x would merely be expensive rather than broken. Insider activity is neutral rather than distributional, and the platform-monopoly narrative continues to attract institutional flows that can sustain the multiple longer than pure DCF discipline would allow. Those points have merit; they simply require the growth deceleration already visible in the quarterly trend to reverse, which the data do not yet show.
I would reverse to a neutral or constructive stance only if the next two quarters re-accelerate revenue growth above 18 percent year-over-year with ad revenue contributing clear incremental margin, or if trailing EPS rises enough to bring the forward multiple below 22x while free-cash-flow yield expands above 4 percent at the current price.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has grown from $29.7B (2021) to $45.2B (2025), a ~11% CAGR, while operating margin expanded from 20.9% to 29.5% and gross margin from 41.6% to 48.5%. Net income more than doubled ($5.12B to $10.98B) and FCF swung from -$132M in 2021 to $9.46B in 2025 - genuine operating leverage on a maturing content model, not accounting-driven. Altman Z at 9.57 sits deep in the safe zone and accruals at 3.2% of assets are benign.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Content amortization vs. cash content spend reconciliation to explain OCF/NI at 0.73x
- Debt maturity schedule and refinancing profile against the $5.4B net debt position
- Subscriber growth vs. ARPU decomposition to test whether margin gains are pricing-led or mix-led
- Ad-tier revenue contribution and trajectory as a diversification signal
- Content spend guidance vs. FCF trajectory - is the FCF sustainable or a temporary underspend
The composite fair value comes in at $31.67 with a signal-adjusted FV of $33.78, implying roughly -58% downside from $80.43. The three methods bracket a tight range - DCF $28.96, EPV floor $18.22, anchored P/E $50.54 - and even the most generous of them (anchored P/E, which explicitly rewards quality) still leaves the stock ~37% above deserved value. That's a consistent story across independent methods, not a single outlier, which raises my confidence that the price embeds heroic assumptions rather than that the models are broken. Netflix is a genuinely strong business (quality 73) with clean earnings, and that justifies a premium multiple - but a strong business does not by itself make the stock cheap, and here the premium has run past what quality alone can defend. What's priced in at $80.43 and 2.4x sales on a $331B cap: continued global sub growth, ad-tier scaling into a real second revenue leg, sustained margin expansion, and no meaningful content-cost re-acceleration. That's the platform-monopoly bull case fully underwritten. Margin of safety is negative - I'd want the price closer to the anchored-P/E line ($50) before the risk/reward tilts, and closer to the composite ($32-34) for a fat pitch.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Ad-tier ARPU and subscriber mix disclosure in next print
- Content cash spend trajectory vs revenue growth (operating leverage sustainability)
- Guidance on operating margin ceiling and any FX-adjusted growth in developed markets
- Any one-time items inflating current FCF that the DCF/EPV may be extrapolating
The tape is nominally risk-on (regime +32, VIX 15) which should help a beta-1.5 name like Netflix, but that tailwind is being overwhelmed by a stock-specific narrative wobble. Recent news flow is dominated by margin-threat framing: YouTube sparking a creator bidding war, sports-rights push, ad-tier cannibalization questions, and headlines noting management is quietly changing what it wants to be judged on - a classic sign that the old story (engagement hours, subscriber moat) is losing potency. The platform-monopoly archetype is still strong but durability is only moderate, and the news cycle is testing exactly that durability. Analyst/investor tone is split: Ackman adding is a cult-signal tailwind, but the repeated 'after its sharp selloff' and 'down 34%' framing tells you the crowd is nursing a wound, not chasing. For a high-beta name that had been a narrative darling, a fading story plus a 4.69% 10y and 25.8x market PE is a real crosswind - rate-sensitive long-duration growth premia get compressed first. Net: mild headwind, not a rout. The story hasn't broken, it's being renegotiated, and the selloff has already absorbed some of it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether next earnings/guidance confirms ad-tier accretion or flags content-cost step-up (would swing the narrative decisively)
- Sports-rights bidding outcomes and creator-deal announcements - concrete margin data points
- Analyst target revisions post-selloff: are cuts finished or continuing
- Whether Ackman disclosure sparks a durable sentiment reset or fades in a week
The world is consolidating fragmented streaming attention into two or three winners. Legacy media's retreat — licensing libraries out, cutting direct-to-consumer losses, bundling defensively — hands Netflix both cheaper content and less competition for engagement, which is why a flat category can host a mid-teens grower. The second force is the migration of TV ad dollars to connected TV; Netflix arrives with the largest premium logged-in audience and almost no legacy ad business to cannibalize, so incremental ad dollars are close to pure margin. Against that, streaming is no longer a land grab: growth now comes from extracting more per household, which ties Netflix to consumer wallets in a macro-headwind environment and makes each price increase a test rather than a formality. Net: the structural setup supports durable double-digit growth with expanding margins for several years, but the era of surprise-to-the-upside unit growth is over, and the arithmetic embedded in the price belongs to a much earlier stage of the S-curve.
When we made this prediction on Aug 25, 2026, NFLX was $82.20. We expect it to be $72.80 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $50.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 25, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.