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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Netflix, Inc. (NFLX) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +14 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 81 · Value -40 · Sentiment -51 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $25.38 vs $72.95 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Netflix, Inc.
NFLX NASDAQNetflix, Inc. is a leading entertainment services company specializing in on-demand streaming of TV series, movies, and games through subscription plans. Subscribers in over 190 countries access unlimited content across a variety of genres and languages on internet-connected devices, including televisions, digital video players, set-top boxes, mobile phones, and tablets. Members enjoy flexible viewing options, such as play, pause, and resume anytime, anywhere, with the ability to adjust plans as needed. The company offers diverse subscription tiers tailored to different markets and features, distributing content via its app and partnerships with cable, satellite, and telecom operators for seamless integration on their devices. Netflix, Inc. acquires, licenses, and produces original content, including exclusive series and films, catering to global audiences seeking personalized entertainment experiences. Founded in 1997 and headquartered in Los Gatos, California, it plays a pivotal role in the digital streaming sector, transforming how consumers engage with leisure and video content worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.53
Total Equity: $26.62B
Shares: 4,343,863,000
Total Debt: $14.46B
Cash: $9.03B
EBITDA: $13.66B
Total Debt: $14.46B
Cash: $9.03B
Revenue: $45.18B
Revenue: $45.18B
Revenue: $45.18B
Total Equity: $26.62B
Tax Rate: 13.7%
Equity: $26.62B
Total Debt: $14.46B
Cash: $9.03B
Current Liabilities: $10.98B
Long-Term Debt: $13.46B
Total Debt: $14.46B
Total Equity: $26.62B
Shares: 4,343,863,000
Shares: 4,343,863,000
CapEx: -$688.22M
Shares: 4,343,863,000
Stock Price: $72.78
Net Income: $10.98B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:40pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $29.7B | $31.6B | $33.7B | $39.0B | $45.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $17.3B | $19.2B | $19.7B | $21.0B | $23.3B |
| Gross Profit | $12.4B | $12.4B | $14.0B | $18.0B | $21.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $6.2B | $6.8B | $7.1B | $7.5B | $8.6B |
| Operating Income | $6.2B | $5.6B | $7.0B | $10.4B | $13.3B |
| Net Income | $5.1B | $4.5B | $5.4B | $8.7B | $11.0B |
| EBITDA | $6.4B | $6.0B | $7.3B | $10.7B | $13.7B |
| EPS | $11.55 | $10.10 | $12.25 | $20.28 | $2.58 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $11.24 | $9.95 | $12.03 | $19.83 | $2.53 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:23pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $6.0B | $5.1B | $7.1B | $7.8B | $9.0B |
| Total Current Assets | $8.1B | $9.3B | $9.9B | $13.1B | $13.0B |
| Total Assets | $44.6B | $48.6B | $48.7B | $53.6B | $55.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $8.5B | $7.9B | $8.9B | $10.8B | $11.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $14.7B | $14.4B | $14.1B | $13.8B | $13.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $28.7B | $27.8B | $28.1B | $28.9B | $29.0B |
| Total Equity | $15.8B | $20.8B | $20.6B | $24.7B | $26.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $12.7B | $17.2B | $22.6B | $31.3B | $42.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:40pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $392.6M | $2.0B | $7.3B | $7.4B | $10.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$524.6M | -$407.7M | -$348.6M | -$439.5M | -$688.2M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$132.0M | $1.6B | $6.9B | $6.9B | $9.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$788.3M | -$757.4M | $0 | $0 | -$17.2M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$500.0M | -$700.0M | $0 | $1.4B | -$1.8B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$600.0M | $0 | -$6.0B | -$6.3B | -$9.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$2.2B | -$884.5M | $1.9B | $688.8M | $1.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:40pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +6.5% | +6.7% | +15.6% | +15.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +0.7% | +12.5% | +28.2% | +22.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | -9.1% | +23.5% | +49.8% | +27.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -12.2% | +20.4% | +61.1% | +26.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -6.8% | +22.5% | +47.0% | +27.1% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 20:16Even the bull case prices 29% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 58%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($72.95) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +27% | 32.5% | $51.98 | -29% |
| Base — stabilizes | +18% | 28.2% | $35.61 | -51% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +9% | 24.0% | $23.82 | -67% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +13% | 27.7% | $30.45 | -58% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw tape: Netflix is compounding revenue at ~16% (2021's $29.7B to 2025's $45.2B, on track for ~$50B+ in 2026 given the $12.56B June quarter run-rate), operating margins have expanded from 18.6% in 2022 to 29.5% in 2025, and FCF hit $9.46B on $688M capex — this is an asset-light content machine now, not the cash-incinerating growth story of 2019. ROIC of 35.9% and ROE of 41.3% are elite. Net debt is negligible ($5.4B net) against $10B+ annual OCF. The Q1 2026 43.1% net margin looks like a one-off (tax or FX gain — should be normalized), but even the "clean" quarters run 22-28%. Earnings CAGR of 42.5% far outpacing revenue CAGR of 15.8% is the entire story: this is operating leverage kicking in on a fixed content cost base.
Now the models. The synthesis DCF of $25.51 versus a $72.78 price — implying 65% overvaluation — is, frankly, not credible and I'll dissent from it. Work the math: $9.46B FCF on a $306B market cap is a 3.1% FCF yield growing 15%+; a fair-value of $25.51 would imply the market cap should be ~$107B, or ~11x FCF for a business compounding earnings at 25-40% with 36% ROIC. That's a distressed multiple applied to a category leader. The DCF is almost certainly using a terminal growth assumption punitive to Netflix's demonstrated pricing power (they've raised prices repeatedly without churn spikes) and ignoring ad-tier ramp. The narrative layer's honest admission that "186% premium is almost entirely narrative" is itself the tell — when your DCF says a high-quality compounder is worth a third of its market price, question the DCF, not the market. The Pre-Flight framing of Netflix as "traditional/mature earner" is directionally right but understates the operating leverage still in the model.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously isn't the DCF number — it's the deceleration and the setup. Quarterly revenue growth is decelerating (Q2'26 $12.56B vs Q1'26 $12.25B is only 2.5% sequential, and YoY comps are getting harder as the password-sharing tailwind laps). Content amortization is a real cost the FCF number partially obscures — Netflix spends ~$17B/year on content, and the gap between cash content spend and P&L amortization has narrowed, meaning future FCF growth won't outpace earnings growth like it did 2022-2024. Ad-tier ARPU is still meaningfully below premium subscribers, so mix shift is a margin headwind that management has papered over with price hikes on remaining tiers — a lever that has finite pulls. Competition from YouTube (the real threat, not Disney+) continues to eat engagement share. Insider activity is pure award-grants, informationally void. At 28.8x earnings and 22.8x EV/EBITDA, the stock is priced for continued execution — any subscriber miss or content flop cycle would compress the multiple to 22-24x fast, implying $55-60.
My read: the stock is fairly valued to modestly rich, not egregiously overvalued. On 2026E earnings of ~$13-14B (applying 25% growth to 2025's $10.98B, conservative given trajectory), a $306B cap is 22-24x forward — reasonable for a 15% revenue grower with 30% operating margins, dominant category position, and optionality on ads/gaming/live. Fair value range $65-80; current $72.78 is inside that band. I dissent hard from the $25.51 synthesis (that's a model calibration failure, not a valuation) and partially agree with the "overvalued" direction only in the sense that upside from here requires execution — the easy money from the crackdown narrative has been made. This is a hold-quality name at a hold-quality price; I wouldn't chase it here, but calling it 65% overvalued is unserious.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers look better than the “mature earner” label suggests, but the stock still looks priced for more than the fundamentals justify. Revenue has gone from $29.7B in 2021 to $45.2B in 2025, and the quarterly run-rate has kept accelerating: $9.82B in 2024’s September quarter to $12.56B by June 2026 is not a sleepy media asset. Just as important, profitability has scaled even faster. Operating income nearly doubled from $6.95B in 2023 to $13.33B in 2025, while net income rose from $5.41B to $10.98B. That is real operating leverage, not accounting noise. Annual operating margin reached 29.5% in 2025 and net margin 24.3%, versus 20.6% and 16.0% respectively in 2023. Free cash flow at $9.46B on $10.15B of operating cash flow is elite conversion for a business once dismissed as cash-burning. Balance sheet risk is also modest: $14.46B debt against $9.03B cash and nearly $11B of annual earnings is very manageable.
What stands out, though, is that the market cap is disconnected from the scale of current earnings power unless you assume this margin expansion and double-digit revenue growth persist for a long time. At $306.6B, investors are paying about 7.0x sales, 22.8x EV/EBITDA, and 28.8x trailing earnings for a company that already earns a 24% net margin. Those are not crazy multiples for a high-quality compounder, but they are full for a business of this size in a brutally competitive category. If I annualize the last four quarters of revenue, I get roughly $47.7B; annualizing the last four quarters of net income gets about $13.7B, implying a forward-ish earnings multiple in the low-20s. That is less stretched than the rule-based valuation suggests, and the model’s $25 fair value looks absurdly punitive given the demonstrated earnings base. But even a low-20s multiple only works cleanly if Netflix can keep adding monetization layers without margin backsliding. The quarter-to-quarter margin pattern still reminds you this is a content business: 43.1% net margin in March 2026 followed by 27.1% in June is a huge swing. This is a great business, but not one I want to treat like software.
The central story I see is that Netflix has won enough of streaming to become a cash machine, and the market knows it. The problem for fresh buyers is not business quality; it is that the easy re-rating has happened. Revenue growth of 15.9% and earnings growth of 26.1% are excellent, but they sit on top of a much larger base now. With 2025 revenue already at $45.18B and gross margin just under 48.5%, future upside depends less on “will they survive?” and more on “how much more can they monetize each member without materially increasing content spend?” That can still work, but at 11.9x book and 7.0x sales, you are paying for sustained execution in advertising, pricing, and global mix improvement. I do not see obvious distress, but I also do not see a margin of safety at $72.78. My read is that the stock is closer to fairly valued-to-mildly overvalued than dramatically overvalued; a reasonable fair range is around $60-$68, which bakes in continued growth but not perpetual premium expansion.
The best counterargument is straightforward: the market is paying up because Netflix has earned it. ROE of 41.3%, ROIC of 35.9%, and FCF of $9.46B are exceptional, especially in media. Revenue has compounded at 15.8%, earnings at 42.5%, and recent quarters show no sign of a collapse after the password-sharing push. If the June 2026 quarter’s $12.56B revenue is the new level and ad monetization is still early, then today’s valuation could prove conservative rather than rich. A bull would also say the March 2026 margin spike to 43.1% is evidence of latent earnings power, not an anomaly, and that even if reported margins swing by release slate, the annualized trajectory is unmistakably upward. I respect that case; it is why I am not joining the valuation engine’s extreme bearishness. But I weigh it differently because this is no longer a turnaround or under-earning asset. The stock already capitalizes years of quality execution, and in consumer entertainment, premium valuations rarely forgive even a couple quarters of slower net adds, weaker ad ARPU, or heavier content amortization.
What would change my mind is specific and near-term. I would get more constructive if Netflix can sustain revenue above $13B a quarter while keeping net margins consistently above 25% without a meaningful rise in leverage; that would support a materially higher earnings base than the market currently discounts. I would also want to see free cash flow move sustainably above $11B annually, which would validate that the current profit profile is not just timing-driven. On the other side, if quarterly revenue growth drops into high single digits while margins slip back toward 20%-22%, the premium multiple should compress fast and my fair value would move below $60. For now, the business is excellent, but the stock already reflects that excellence.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a business that has completed its transition from cash-burning content spender into a high-return cash compounder. Annual revenue climbed from $33.7B in 2023 to $39.0B in 2024 to $45.2B in 2025, a clean 15–16% clip that has persisted into the first half of 2026 ($12.25B then $12.56B). More striking is the operating leverage: operating income nearly doubled from $6.95B to $13.33B over two years while net margin expanded to 24.3% and ROIC reached 36%. Free cash flow of $9.46B on only $688M of capex shows the model now throws off almost pure cash; FCF conversion sits near 86% of net income. Trailing P/E of 28.8× and EV/EBITDA of 22.8× are elevated in absolute terms, yet they sit on top of 42% earnings CAGR and mid-teens top-line growth with fortress returns on capital. The valuation engine’s $25–26 fair-value print is simply broken—it capitalizes a $9.5B FCF stream at roughly 11× and ignores both the growth still visible in the quarterly run-rate and the 41% ROE. At $73 the market is paying roughly 32× that FCF; that is a premium, not a fantasy multiple for a business of this quality.
Quarterly margins have been noisy—Q1 2026 net margin spiked to 43% before settling back to 27% in Q2—so the trailing earnings power is best read as roughly $3.2–3.4B per quarter, or about $13B annualized, which still supports a mid-20s forward P/E if growth holds. Debt of $14.5B against $9B cash and $9.5B FCF is trivial; the balance sheet is not a constraint. Insider activity is pure award noise, and the secondary signals correctly flag decelerating sequential revenue momentum and macro headwinds, but they do not yet show an actual break in the 15% growth regime.
The strongest contrary case is straightforward: a 3.1% FCF yield leaves almost no margin of safety if growth settles into the high-single-digits that a mature, penetrated streaming market should eventually deliver. Password-sharing monetization and the ad-tier ramp are largely in the rear-view; competition from Amazon, Disney and Apple remains well-capitalized; and content spend, while now leveraged, can still spike. A skeptic would also note that the 186% premium the narrative layer assigns above the (flawed) DCF is real even if the absolute DCF level is wrong—investors are paying for the “global entertainment monopoly” story, and stories can deflate faster than cash flows. I weigh this less heavily because the observed economics—15% growth, 29% operating margins, 36% ROIC, near-perfect FCF conversion—have already validated a large part of that story; the premium is expensive, not unearned.
I would flip to decisively undervalued if the next two prints show revenue re-accelerating above 18% with ad-tier contribution expanding margins past 30%, or if the multiple compressed toward 22× earnings while FCF stayed above $9B. I would flip to clearly overvalued if quarterly revenue growth falls below 10% year-on-year or if operating margin compresses back under 25% on rising content or traffic-acquisition costs.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The trajectory is exceptional: revenue compounded from $29.7B (2021) to $45.2B (2025), gross margin expanded from 41.6% to 48.5%, operating margin nearly doubled from 20.9% to 29.5%, and net income more than doubled from $5.12B to $10.98B. Free cash flow inflected from negative $132M in 2021 to $9.46B in 2025, marking the definitive shift from cash-consuming content investor to self-funding cash machine. Altman Z of 9.06 confirms deep balance-sheet safety, and OCF/NI at 0.73x with accruals at 3.2% of assets show clean earnings integrity for a content-heavy model where amortized content assets naturally depress OCF/NI. Liquidity is adequate rather than fortress: $9.06B cash against net debt of $5.40B means the balance sheet is no longer a cushion, but $9.46B annual FCF makes debt service a non-issue. SBC is tiny at 0.8% of revenue and buybacks run 1124% of SBC, indicating genuine per-share value protection - which makes the module's flagged 75.7% diluted share CAGR (jumping from 439.3M to 4.34B in one year) almost certainly a stock-split artifact rather than real dilution; the underlying share count trend from 455M (2021) to 439M (2024) is mildly accretive. Insider activity is neutral: routine awards and option exercises, modest sales ($36M over 12 months) with no open-market buys - unremarkable for a mega-cap. The business shows clear operating leverage, pricing power (ad tier, password-sharing crackdown monetization), and a durable content-plus-scale moat evidenced in the margin expansion itself.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Confirm the 439M-to-4.34B diluted share jump is a stock split (10-for-1?) and not real dilution
- Content-asset amortization schedule and cash-content-spend vs P&L amortization gap
- Ad-tier subscriber count and ARPU disclosure in latest 10-K/shareholder letter
- Debt maturity ladder against the $5.4B net debt position
- Subscriber growth by region and any signs of saturation in mature markets (UCAN)
- Segment or geographic revenue concentration risk
The e2e composite FV of $25.78 and EPV floor of $18.19 imply -65% downside, which fails a basic sanity check against a business generating $9.46B in FCF, 29.5% operating margins, and $306B of market cap. A $25 fair value on NFLX would imply the market cap should be near $105B - roughly 11x FCF for a global platform compounding revenue and margins. That is not a credible deserved value; the DCF/EPV inputs are almost certainly mis-specified (likely a share-count artifact flagged in the quality lens, or stale FCF). I am heavily discounting the mechanical FV. Anchoring instead on the underlying economics: a business with expanding margins, pricing power (ad tier, paid sharing), and $9.46B+ FCF deserves a premium multiple. At $306B cap, NFLX trades around 32x FCF - full, but defensible for a category-defining platform with durable growth. The price embeds continued subscriber and ARPU expansion plus ad-tier scaling; that is the base case, not a heroic one, but leaves little margin of safety. Bear risks (saturation, content cost inflation, ad-tier cannibalization) are real but not acutely priced in. Verdict: fairly valued. A strong business the market already understands - no obvious gap to exploit either way.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Actual diluted share count and buyback pace (the 75% dilution CAGR flag looks like a split/data artifact)
- FCF run-rate sustainability - how much reflects content amortization timing vs true cash economics
- Ad-tier ARPU and take-rate disclosure in filings/transcripts
- Guidance on 2025-2026 operating margin trajectory
The macro tape is actively hostile: VIX at 20.7 (top 3% of the year), S&P off 3.9% from highs, 10y at 4.61%, and market PE stretched at 26.2. With a 1.52 beta, NFLX is exactly the kind of name this tape marks down first - a large-cap growth story trading on narrative premium, not cash flows. In a stress regime, high-multiple communication-services growth is where flows exit. The narrative itself is fraying at the edges. Recent headlines are notably off-tone for a 'platform monopoly' story: 'Days of Rapid Growth Are Over,' 'Won't Double by 2031,' Q2 revenue miss, and a competitor comparison (ROKU) framing Netflix as the pricier, less-diversified option. The bull thesis is still intact and durable, but the incremental news flow is chipping at the growth-forever framing that supports the premium multiple. Big content spend headlines ($500M Walking Dead, $200M Women's World Cup) read as cost pressure to a nervous tape rather than moat-building. Offsetting slightly: the narrative archetype remains 'platform monopoly / durable,' momentum score is strong_positive, and there is no acute analyst downgrade cycle visible. So this is a persistent press, not a collapse - a real crosswind amplified by beta and multiple, not a narrative break.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether analyst target revisions turn net-negative after the Q2 revenue miss commentary
- VIX cooling back under 18 - would materially reduce the beta-driven drag
- Subscriber growth print in the next quarter - a soft number would convert narrative slippage into a real crack
- Whether the 'growth is over' framing spreads to sell-side notes or stays in commentary
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. No usable fair-value anchor — composite, DCF and anchored-PE are all absent from valuation-synthesis. Typical for pre-profit / narrative-platform names where those methods don't apply.