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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Nike, Inc. - Class B (NKE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-06): Designation Low · Gem Score -38 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -3 · Value -61 · Sentiment -49 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $28.19 vs $41.32 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Nike, Inc. - Class B
NKE NYSENike, Inc. Class B is a consumer discretionary company focused on the design, development, marketing, and sale of athletic footwear, apparel, accessories, equipment, and related services. The company serves a broad global customer base through performance and lifestyle products that support sports, fitness, and everyday wear. Its business is centered on footwear, with additional offerings spanning apparel and accessories across categories such as running, basketball, football, training, and casual sportswear. Nike also operates through brand and regional segments that help it address major markets across North America, Europe, the Middle East and Africa, Greater China, and Asia Pacific and Latin America. Based in Beaverton, Oregon, Nike, Inc. Class B is a widely recognized name in the global sportswear market and plays a major role in shaping athletic and lifestyle apparel trends.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.10
Total Equity: $14.87B
Shares: 1,481,000,000
Total Debt: $7.94B
Cash: $7.56B
EBITDA: $4.54B
Total Debt: $7.94B
Cash: $7.56B
Revenue: $46.40B
Revenue: $46.40B
Revenue: $46.40B
Total Equity: $14.87B
Tax Rate: 20.3%
Equity: $14.87B
Total Debt: $7.94B
Cash: $7.56B
Current Liabilities: $12.55B
Long-Term Debt: $5.94B
Total Debt: $7.94B
Total Equity: $14.87B
Shares: 1,481,000,000
Shares: 1,481,000,000
CapEx: -$684.00M
Shares: 1,481,000,000
Stock Price: $40.99
Net Income: $3.11B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:12pm (29d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $46.7B | $51.2B | $51.4B | $46.3B | $46.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $25.2B | $28.9B | $28.5B | $26.5B | $26.5B |
| Gross Profit | $21.5B | $22.3B | $22.9B | $19.8B | $19.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $14.8B | $16.4B | $16.6B | $16.1B | $16.1B |
| Operating Income | $6.7B | $5.9B | $6.3B | $3.7B | $3.8B |
| Net Income | $6.0B | $5.1B | $5.7B | $3.2B | $3.1B |
| EBITDA | — | $6.6B | $7.1B | $4.5B | $4.5B |
| EPS | $3.83 | $3.27 | $3.76 | $2.17 | $2.10 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.75 | $3.23 | $3.73 | $2.16 | $2.10 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:37pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $8.6B | $7.4B | $9.9B | $7.5B | $7.6B |
| Total Current Assets | $28.2B | $25.2B | $25.4B | $23.4B | $24.6B |
| Total Assets | $40.3B | $37.5B | $38.1B | $36.6B | $38.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $10.7B | $9.3B | $10.6B | $10.6B | $12.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $8.9B | $8.9B | $7.9B | $8.0B | $5.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $25.0B | $23.5B | $23.7B | $23.4B | $23.5B |
| Total Equity | $15.3B | $14.0B | $14.4B | $13.2B | $14.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $3.5B | $1.4B | $965.0M | -$727.0M | -$155.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:12pm (29d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $5.2B | $5.8B | $7.4B | $3.7B | $2.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$758.0M | -$969.0M | -$812.0M | -$430.0M | -$684.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.4B | $4.9B | $6.6B | $3.3B | $2.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | -$500.0M | $0 | -$1.0B | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$4.0B | -$5.5B | -$4.3B | -$3.0B | -$146.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.3B | -$1.1B | $2.4B | -$2.4B | $99.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:12pm (29d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +9.6% | +0.3% | -9.8% | +0.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +3.8% | +2.7% | -13.5% | +0.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -11.4% | +6.7% | -41.3% | +2.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -16.1% | +12.4% | -43.5% | -3.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | +7.4% | -37.0% | +1.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:38pm (25d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-02 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-02 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-03 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-03 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-01 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-01 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-01 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-02 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-03 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-02 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-02 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-03 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-04 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-03 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-27 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-02 02:11A +1σ run of quarters pays -54%; a −1σ run costs 68%. Ratio -0.8:1 (μ -2.1%, σ 5.6% , 16 pairs).
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($41.32) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -1% | 9.2% | $21.69 | -48% |
| Base — stabilizes | -2% | 8.0% | $18.47 | -55% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -3% | 6.8% | $15.47 | -63% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +3% | 6.7% | $19.04 | -54% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -8% | 6.7% | $13.21 | -68% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Independent read first: Nike's trajectory is uglier than the headline P/E suggests but better than the DCF verdict implies. FY26 revenue of $46.4B is essentially flat vs FY25's $46.31B but down 9.7% from FY24's $51.36B, and operating income collapsed from $6.31B (FY24) to $3.80B (FY26) — that's operating margin compression from 12.3% to 8.2%. Yet the quarterly cadence shows a real inflection: Q4 FY26 (May 2026) printed 9.7% net margin and $1.07B NI, vs 1.9% and $211M in the year-ago quarter. That's a 5x earnings jump on flat revenue, which is exactly what an inventory-cleanup-then-margin-recovery story looks like. FCF at $2.18B on $62.5B market cap is a 3.5% yield, supplemented by a 4% dividend — the balance sheet ($7.56B cash vs $7.94B debt, near-net-zero leverage) can carry the dividend indefinitely even at trough earnings.
Where I disagree with the synthesis: the $28.07 signal-adjusted fair value is mechanically extrapolating the -5% revenue CAGR and -26% earnings CAGR forward, which double-counts the trough. If FY26 Q4's 9.7% margin annualizes even partially — say Nike does $47B at 10% net margin — that's $4.7B NI, or ~$3.15 EPS, putting the stock at ~13x normalized. That's not overvalued for a brand with 43% gross margins, 20% ROE, and 20% ROIC (those returns-on-capital numbers, by the way, are inconsistent with the "permanently impaired" thesis the pre-flight flagged — impaired brands don't earn 20% ROIC). The synthesis and momentum layer are anchored to the wrong reference frame: trailing 3-year CAGRs on a company mid-reset are noise, not signal. The narrative layer's "fallen angel / anchored" framing is closer to right, but its 47% story premium calculation inherits the same flawed DCF anchor.
The contrarian case against my pushback: Q4 FY26 margin recovery could be one-time — clearance-driven gross margin relief, favorable comps, or FX. Revenue is still not growing (0.2% YoY most recent), and the structural bear case (On, HOKA, Gen Z taste shift toward lifestyle/luxury, China weakness) is real and not cyclical. Adidas trades around 1.5x sales; Nike at 1.3x is not obviously cheap versus a peer that's executing better on the turnaround. If normalized margin is actually 7-8% not 10%, EPS is $2.20-$2.50 and fair value is $35-40, right where the stock sits. The dividend yield of 4% also signals the market doesn't believe in the growth reacceleration — that's a value-trap yield, not a bargain yield, if operating income doesn't recover. Data gaps: no segment breakdown (China vs NA vs EMEA), no gross margin trajectory by quarter, no inventory metric — all three matter enormously for judging whether Q4 was a real inflection or a clearance blip.
GPT Reading
Nike at roughly $41 is not obviously cheap just because the chart is broken. The core fact pattern is that revenue has gone nowhere for two years while profit has been cut almost in half from the 2024 peak. FY2026 revenue was $46.40B versus $46.31B in FY2025, but both sit well below FY2024’s $51.36B. Gross profit is down from $22.89B in 2024 to $19.91B in 2026, and operating income has fallen from $6.31B to $3.80B. That is not a temporary optical issue from one bad quarter; it is a sustained erosion in both volume and margin. Net income of $3.11B implies a 6.7% margin, versus 11.1% in 2024 and 13.0% in 2022. When a brand business loses 430 bps of net margin in two years without growing the top line, you should assume the moat is under pressure until proven otherwise.
What stands out to me is that the current multiple already assumes a meaningful earnings recovery while the raw earnings cadence is still weak. The trailing quarterly run-rate shows some stabilization in revenue, but not enough to justify much optimism: the last four quarters sum to about $46.4B, and quarterly sales ranged from $10.97B to $12.43B, basically flat to slightly down from prior-year levels. Meanwhile profitability remains inconsistent: quarterly net margins over the last five quarters were 1.9%, 6.2%, 6.4%, 4.6%, and 9.7%. That latest 9.7% quarter is better, but still only back to the 2024 range, and it came on lower revenue. Against that, the stock trades at 19.5x earnings, 13.4x EV/EBITDA, and 1.3x sales. For a dominant global brand, those are not outrageous multiples; for a business with a -5% revenue CAGR, -26% earnings CAGR, and -43% FCF CAGR, they are not a bargain either. On $2.18B of free cash flow, the equity is at roughly a 3.5% FCF yield, which is thin for a company still trying to prove its reset is real.
The balance sheet is fine and prevents this from being a disaster story. Debt of $7.94B is nearly offset by $7.56B of cash, the current ratio is 1.96, and the dividend yield near 4% gives investors some paid patience. But that strength mainly limits downside from financial distress; it does not create upside by itself. The interesting contradiction in the models is that some framing treats Nike like a classic fallen angel that should be bought on trough earnings. I think that overstates how “trough” these earnings are. FY2026 operating income of $3.80B was actually slightly above FY2025’s $3.70B, so the business may already be showing its new normal rather than a one-off air pocket. If normalized earnings power is closer to $3-4B net income than the $5.7-6.0B delivered in 2022-2024, then 19.5x is full, not cheap. My base case is that fair value sits in the mid-$30s, where the market would be paying for brand durability without prepaying for a full margin snapback.
The best counterargument is straightforward: Nike still produces nearly $20B of gross profit on $46B of sales, earned $1.07B in the most recent quarter, and continues to generate positive free cash flow despite a difficult reset. A bull can also point out that gross margin remains a healthy 42.9%, ROIC near 19.9% and ROE above 20% are still elite for a challenged consumer company, and the near-flat revenue in FY2026 after a big drop in FY2025 could mark the bottom. If sales even recover to $49-50B and net margin returns to 9-10%, earnings power quickly moves back toward $4.5-5.0B, making today’s valuation look undemanding. I weigh that less heavily because there is no evidence of that recovery yet in the annual numbers, and competition-driven brand slippage rarely announces itself cleanly before becoming persistent in the P&L.
What would change my mind is specific proof that Nike can rebuild profits without relying on hope. I would turn more constructive if the next few quarters show revenue growing at least 3-5% year over year while operating margin climbs back above 10%, which would imply annual operating income moving toward $4.8-5.0B. Sustained free cash flow above $3.5B would also matter, because that would push the FCF yield into a range that actually compensates for execution risk. On the other hand, if revenue remains stuck around $46B and net income stays near $3.0B, the stock should not hold a market cap above $60B for long.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a brand that lost altitude fast and has stopped falling, not one still in freefall. Annual revenue collapsed from the $51.3B peak in FY2024 to $46.3B in FY2025 and then stabilized at $46.4B in FY2026—effectively zero growth (+0.2% YoY) after a roughly 10% structural step-down. Net income was cut nearly in half from the $5.7B FY2024 level to $3.11B, and free cash flow of $2.18B (from $2.87B operating cash flow after only $684M of capex) now yields just 3.5% on the $62.5B equity value. That is the damage. What the quarterly tape shows, however, is that the earnings trough may already be behind: the May 2026 quarter delivered $1.07B of net income on $10.97B of revenue for a 9.7% net margin, the best print in eight quarters and a sharp rebound from the 4.6% and 1.9% lows of the prior year. Gross margin has held at 42.9%, ROIC remains a robust 19.9%, and the balance sheet is fortress-like—$7.56B cash against $7.94B debt, current ratio 1.96, net leverage essentially zero. At 19.5x trailing earnings, 13.4x EV/EBITDA, 1.31x sales, and a 4.0% dividend yield, the market is no longer paying a growth multiple; it is paying a mature-consumer multiple on depressed earnings for a company still generating high-teens returns on capital.
The story the data tell is inventory and channel reset, not brand death. Operating margin compressed from the mid-teens historically to 8.2% because Nike overbuilt wholesale, lost pricing power temporarily, and spent through the DTC transition while specialized competitors (On, HOKA) took share in performance running. Revenue CAGR of –5% and earnings CAGR of –26% over the measured window capture that reset; they do not prove permanence. The latest quarter’s margin re-expansion to nearly 10% net is hard evidence that mix, promotions, and cost actions are beginning to bite. With the stock already cut in half from the prior $80 region to $41, the “permanently impaired” narrative is largely in the price. A 4% cash yield backed by an investment-grade balance sheet and $2.2B of FCF gives downside support that pure DCF models ignoring brand durability and capital-return capacity tend to underweight.
The strongest case against this read is the valuation synthesis itself: a composite fair value near $29 and the explicit claim that $41 embeds a 47% narrative premium the cash flows do not support. Skeptics will correctly note that FCF has cratered (–43% CAGR), revenue confidence is flagged low and decelerating, and Nike has not yet demonstrated it can re-accelerate top-line growth against fresher lifestyle and performance brands. If the May quarter’s 9.7% margin proves a one-quarter inventory-release artifact rather than the start of a multi-year climb back toward 11–12% net margins, then 19.5x earnings and 13x EBITDA on a no-growth $46B revenue base is too expensive, and mean-reversion toward slower-growth apparel peers (low-teens P/E, sub-10x EBITDA) would imply material further downside. The –5% revenue CAGR and sector headwinds are real; hoping for mid-single-digit growth and margin recovery is still a hope until two or three more clean quarters confirm it.
I would flip to decisively bearish if the next two quarters show net margins falling back below 6% and revenue declining more than 3% YoY, or if FCF drops under $1.5B while the dividend is held—evidence the reset is structural, not cyclical. I would flip more bullish if FY2027 revenue clears $48B with operating margin back above 11% and FCF above $3B, confirming the brand can re-earn a premium multiple.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The business is clearly in a soft patch. Revenue peaked at $51.36B in FY2024 and has since retraced to $46.40B in FY2026 - essentially flat with FY2022's $46.71B, meaning four years of zero top-line growth. More concerning is the margin compression: operating margin fell from 14.3% in FY2022 to 8.2% in FY2026, and net income roughly halved from $6.05B to $3.11B. Gross margin also slipped from 46% to 42.9%. This is not a company falling apart - it is a franchise going through a genuine profitability reset. Earnings quality remains clean: OCF/NI at 1.08x, accruals at -1% of assets, Beneish M of -2.19, and Altman Z of 3.5 all confirm the reported numbers are real, not manufactured. Capital allocation is disciplined - diluted share count has shrunk from 1.61B to 1.48B (a -2.1% CAGR), and buybacks run 4.66x SBC, so per-share value is being concentrated even as absolute earnings fall. Liquidity is adequate: $7.56B cash against a small net debt position of $379M, and FCF of $2.18B in FY2026 still comfortably self-funds the business, though FCF has also compressed sharply from $6.62B in FY2024. Balance sheet is a constraint, not a cushion, but survival is not remotely in question.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Segment-level detail on where the margin compression is concentrated (DTC vs wholesale, geography, category)
- Inventory levels and days-on-hand vs prior years to assess whether markdowns are the margin driver
- Debt maturity schedule given the net debt position and reduced FCF
- China revenue and margin trajectory specifically
- Any restructuring charges or one-timers depressing FY2025/2026 operating margin
- Commentary on Jordan/running/lifestyle product cycle health
The three valuation methods cluster tightly and tell the same story: DCF at $29.32, EPV floor at $27.87, anchored P/E at $31.57, composite $29.52, signal-adjusted $28.07. Against a $41.32 price, that is roughly a 30-40% overpayment. The methods agreeing this closely is meaningful - this is not one runaway model dragging the average; the deserved-value range is genuinely in the high-$20s to low-$30s given flat revenue for four years and operating margins nearly halved.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- North America and Greater China revenue trajectory in next print
- Gross margin recovery cadence vs guidance
- Inventory days normalization
- DTC mix and full-price sell-through
- Buyback pace vs FCF
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (regime score +47, VIX 15.3), which would normally help a beta-1.12 consumer cyclical. But that tailwind is being neutralized by a stock-specific story problem: NKE is deep in a fallen-angel narrative with strong intensity and moderate durability, and the entire footwear cohort (LULU, DECK, ONON) is being written up as 'plunged' and 'struggling.' Headlines like 'Down 76% From Its High' and 'Suffers a Larger Drop Than the General Market' are the tell - the news flow is framing NKE as a broken compounder, not a risk-on beneficiary. Analyst tone via the story frame is split: bulls lean on brand moat and DTC margin recovery, bears cite Gen Z taste shift and lost pricing power. That divergence, plus the -5% CAGR and -4.4pp deceleration, keeps sentiment leaning negative. The one flicker of tailwind is a mild momentum inflection (recent 0.2% vs -5% long-term) and inclusion in 'comeback candidate' framing - the setup for a narrative flip exists, but hasn't triggered. Net: the tape helps a little, the story hurts more, and this specific name has no active positive catalyst to ride the risk-on regime.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Next earnings print - does inventory normalization and DTC margin show up in the numbers, which could flip the fallen-angel arc
- Any high-profile analyst upgrade or target revision that breaks the negative consensus drift
- Sector rotation signal - if LULU/DECK/ONON catch a bid, NKE likely follows
- China/international commentary - a positive surprise there could reset the growth narrative
- Any Gen Z brand-heat data (search trends, resale premiums) that would rebut the taste-shift bear thesis
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 12, 2026, NKE was $41.32. We expect it to be $35.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $32.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 12, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.