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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Ollie's Bargain Outlet Holdings Inc. (OLLI) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -1 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 77 · Value -65 · Sentiment 41 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Ollie's Bargain Outlet Holdings Inc.
OLLI NASDAQOllie's Bargain Outlet Holdings Inc. is a retailer specializing in closeout merchandise, excess inventory, and salvage goods across the United States. The company sources overstocks, discontinued items, package changes, cancelled orders, buybacks from retailers, and products from major manufacturers to offer customers deep discounts on a wide variety of everyday essentials. Its product assortment includes housewares, bed and bath items, food, floor coverings, health and beauty aids, books and stationery, toys, electronics, hardware, candy, clothing, sporting goods, pet supplies, lawn, and garden products. Ollie's Bargain Outlet Holdings Inc. creates a unique treasure hunt shopping experience with its ever-changing inventory and branding like Ollie's Army loyalty program, Good Stuff Cheap, Real Brands Real Cheap!, and Sarasota Breeze. It operates in the competitive discount retail sector, focusing on value-driven consumers seeking branded products at bargain prices. Founded in 1982 and headquartered in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the company maintains a robust store network emphasizing rapid inventory turnover and opportunistic purchasing.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.89
Total Equity: $1.89B
Shares: 61,773,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $259.68M
EBITDA: $352.87M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $259.68M
Revenue: $2.65B
Revenue: $2.65B
Revenue: $2.65B
Total Equity: $1.89B
Tax Rate: 24.0%
Equity: $1.89B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $259.68M
Current Liabilities: $400.45M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $1.89B
Shares: 61,773,000
Shares: 61,773,000
CapEx: -$101.88M
Shares: 61,773,000
Stock Price: $74.75
Net Income: $240.60M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:31pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| Gross Profit | $681.2M | $656.1M | $832.4M | $914.5M | $1.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $476.7M | $525.2M | $604.6M | $664.9M | $775.3M |
| Operating Income | $204.6M | $130.9M | $227.8M | $249.5M | $297.7M |
| Net Income | $157.5M | $102.8M | $181.4M | $199.8M | $240.6M |
| EBITDA | $229.5M | $159.6M | $262.7M | $293.5M | $352.9M |
| EPS | $2.44 | $1.64 | $2.94 | $3.26 | $3.92 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.43 | $1.64 | $2.92 | $3.23 | $3.89 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:03pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $247.0M | $210.6M | $266.3M | $205.1M | $259.7M |
| Total Current Assets | $726.8M | $754.3M | $871.4M | $993.8M | $964.1M |
| Total Assets | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $3.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $263.3M | $259.3M | $315.6M | $304.3M | $400.4M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $684.5M | $682.0M | $786.4M | $865.8M | $1.1B |
| Total Equity | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $883.7M | $986.5M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:31pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $45.0M | $114.3M | $254.5M | $227.5M | $296.5M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$35.0M | -$51.7M | -$124.4M | -$120.6M | -$101.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | $10.0M | $62.7M | $130.1M | $106.9M | $194.7M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$220.0M | -$41.8M | -$52.5M | -$53.0M | -$73.8M |
| Net Change in Cash | — | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:31pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.2% | +15.1% | +8.0% | +16.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -3.7% | +26.9% | +9.9% | +17.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | -36.0% | +74.0% | +9.5% | +19.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -34.7% | +76.5% | +10.1% | +20.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -30.4% | +64.6% | +11.7% | +20.2% |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterlies first: Q1 FY26 (May '26) printed $658.9M rev vs $576.8M year-ago — that's +14.2% YoY, decent but a step down from the +16.8% clip Q4 delivered ($779.3M vs $667.1M). Net margin of 8.6% in Q1 is up from 8.2% a year ago, so unit economics are holding. Trailing four quarters sum to ~$2.73B rev and ~$249M NI (9.1% margin), consistent with the FY26 annual print. Full-year revenue grew 16.8% ($2.27B→$2.65B) and NI grew 20.4% — genuinely accelerating for a mature retailer, not decelerating. The "decelerating quarterly trend" signal looks like noise from seasonal Q4 vs Q1 comparisons; on YoY basis growth is steady mid-teens. FCF of $195M on a $4.44B market cap is a 4.4% FCF yield, and ROIC of 13.9% with zero debt and $260M cash is genuinely high-quality.
Where I part company with the synthesis: the "fair value $69" composite feels mechanically anchored to trailing multiples for a "mature earner" archetype that this classification engine slapped on too confidently. A business compounding revenue at 12% CAGR with 20%+ earnings growth, zero leverage, 14% ROIC, and a store count going from ~530 toward a plausible 700+ is not a mature earner — it's a mid-cycle compounder. The thesis engine's -9 score leans heavily on the "saturation masquerading as whitespace" bear, which is the right question but wrong answer for now: Ollie's is still opening 50-75 stores/yr with new-store productivity holding. That's testable and hasn't broken yet. The narrative layer's assessment that price is only 7% above DCF anchor with durable fundamentals is closer to the truth than the synthesis's fair-value verdict.
The contrarian case deserves airtime though. First, gross margin at 40.5% is near cycle-high; post-pandemic closeout availability has been unusually rich as consumer brands over-ordered and dumped inventory. As supply chains normalize (2026-2027), closeout supply tightens and GM likely compresses 100-200bps. Second, Big Lots's bankruptcy is a double-edged sword — Ollie's is picking up leases cheap now (real tailwind), but it also signals discount retail can hit a wall fast when the treasure-hunt narrative fades. Third, insider activity is quietly bearish-tilted: I see sales and F-InKind (tax withholding on vest) but zero open-market buys in the last 10 transactions. Not damning, but not a vote of confidence at $75 either. Fourth, at 19x P/E and 11.9x EV/EBITDA, this is not the bargain it was at $55 in mid-2024; the easy money has been made.
Committing: I dissent mildly from the synthesis fair-value call and lean undervalued-to-fairly-valued. If I capitalize FY26 NI of $241M growing 12-15% for five years then fading to 6%, discount at 9%, terminal 3%, I get intrinsic value in the $78-88 range — above spot, not below. The synthesis's $69 anchor implies either faster margin compression or slower unit growth than the data supports. That said, I won't pound the table at $75 because (a) gross margin mean-reversion is a real 2-3 year risk worth 10-15% of value, (b) the stock has already re-rated off its lows so the fat pitch is gone, and (c) the "it depends" here is on same-store-sales — measured by quarterly comps disclosed on the print. If comps stay +2-4% and unit growth holds 10%, this is a $85-90 stock in 18 months. If comps go negative while GM compresses, $60 is on the table. Starter position justified; full position waits for either a pullback to $65 or confirmation on the next two comp prints.
GPT Reading
What stands out first is that the business is simply working again, and the numbers are better than the stock’s “mature discount retailer” framing suggests. Fiscal 2026 revenue reached $2.65 billion, up 16.7% from $2.27 billion, while net income rose 20.4% to $240.6 million. That is not low-grade defensive plodding; it is a retailer putting up double-digit top-line growth with incremental margin expansion. Gross margin improved to 40.5% from roughly 40.3%, operating margin to 11.2% from 11.0%, and net margin to 9.1% from 8.8%. The quarterly cadence also looks healthy rather than fluky: the latest quarter did $658.9 million of revenue versus $576.8 million a year earlier, with net income up from $47.6 million to $56.4 million. A debt-free balance sheet with $259.7 million of cash, $296.5 million of operating cash flow, and $194.7 million of free cash flow gives this growth real quality. At $74.75, the stock is on about 19.2x earnings and roughly 22.8x free cash flow, which feels closer to a market multiple than a premium growth multiple.
The deeper story in the data is that Ollie’s has regained both growth and profitability after the 2023 reset. Revenue went from $1.83 billion in 2023 to $2.10 billion in 2024, $2.27 billion in 2025, and now $2.65 billion in 2026; net income climbed from $102.8 million in 2023 to $181.4 million, then $199.8 million, then $240.6 million. That 2022-to-2023 earnings dip now looks cyclical rather than structural. If this were a genuinely saturating or competitively impaired format, I would expect to see either gross margin erosion or weaker cash conversion as growth resumed. Instead, gross profit grew to $1.07 billion, operating income to $297.7 million, and ROIC sits near 13.9% with no leverage. For a store-based retailer, those are strong economics. The market seems to be treating Ollie’s as if the current run-rate is too good to last, yet the available evidence says the model remains highly productive.
I also think the valuation synthesis is a little too anchored to “fairly valued” because it underweights balance-sheet strength and the asymmetry of a zero-debt retailer in a volatile consumer environment. EV/revenue of 1.58x and EV/EBITDA of 11.9x are not demanding for a business growing revenue 12.3% CAGR and earnings 15.2% CAGR over the measured period, especially when it throws off nearly $200 million of annual free cash flow after over $100 million of capex. Equity of $1.89 billion against a $4.44 billion market cap means the market is not paying an absurd franchise premium either. If Ollie’s can merely hold around 9% net margins on a revenue base that is still compounding low double digits, today’s price looks more like a reasonable entry than a full one. My bias is that fair value is above the current quote, closer to the mid-to-high $80s, because this is a cleaner, more profitable retailer than the stock screen implies.
The best case against that view is straightforward: this may be near peak conditions for the closeout model, and the stock is not cheap enough if growth normalizes hard. Quarterly revenue is lumpy, seasonality is meaningful, and one good year can flatter the multiple. The latest annual free cash flow of $194.7 million implies only about a 4.4% FCF yield on market cap, which is not a screaming bargain for a brick-and-mortar retailer exposed to discretionary traffic, inventory availability, and execution on expansion. The 2022-to-2023 operating income collapse from $204.6 million to $130.9 million is proof the model is not immune to shocks. If sourcing tailwinds fade, if store productivity starts slipping as the footprint expands, or if margin drifts back toward the 2024 area, then 19x earnings can quickly become a rich multiple for a retailer with mid-single-digit true normalized EPS growth. The insider tape is not helpful either; it is mostly administrative, but there is no obvious signal of aggressive insider buying at these levels.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2026 was a local high rather than a base for continued compounding. Specifically, if the next two quarters show revenue growth falling to low single digits while net margin slips below 8%, I would assume unit economics are compressing and move toward the low $60s on fair value. Likewise, if annual free cash flow drops materially below $150 million despite continued store growth capex, the quality argument weakens. On the other hand, if Ollie’s can sustain revenue above $2.9 billion on annualized net margins around 9% and keep free cash flow near or above $225 million, then the market will have to pay more than 19x earnings for a debt-free retailer compounding this way.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a retailer that has quietly rebuilt itself into a clean compounding machine. Revenue climbed from $1.75B in fiscal 2022 to $2.65B in fiscal 2026, a 12.3% CAGR, while net income recovered from the 2023 air-pocket of $102.8M to $240.6M—earnings CAGR of 15.2%. The latest annual print shows gross margin locked at 40.5%, operating margin 11.2%, and net margin 9.1%, all improved versus the mid-cycle trough. Free cash flow of $194.7M after $102M of growth capex, zero debt, and $260M of cash leave the balance sheet fortress-like. Recent quarterly run-rates reinforce the trajectory: the May 2026 quarter delivered $659M revenue (+14% YoY) and $56M net income; the January quarter before it posted $779M and an 11% net margin. At 19.2× trailing earnings, 11.9× EV/EBITDA and a 4.4% FCF yield, the market is simply paying a normal multiple for mid-teens growth and pristine capital structure—no distress, no heroic premium.
What stands out is how little of the prior-cycle excess remains. The 2023 earnings collapse is fully repaired, ROIC sits at 13.9%, and FCF conversion is healthy even while the company is still opening stores aggressively. The rule-based “mature earner” label fits the cash-flow profile, yet the 16–20% recent top- and bottom-line growth rates are still those of a company with runway, not a fully saturated box. Insider activity is noise—option exercises and tax withholds—not distribution. The story the numbers tell is therefore straightforward: a high-teens grower with fortress finances trading at a mid-teens-to-low-twenties earnings multiple. That is fair value with a mild tilt toward expensive only because the deceleration flag on quarterly revenue and the saturation debate keep the multiple from expanding.
The strongest counter-argument is that 19× understates the quality. A debt-free 15% earnings compounder with 22% FCF CAGR, 200-plus store whitespace, and a counter-cyclical closeout model that historically thrives when vendors dump inventory should clear 22–25× without difficulty. Bulls will correctly note that the 47% drawdown from the 52-week high has already purged the froth, that unit economics remain intact at 9%+ net margins, and that the valuation synthesis’s $69–70 fair-value anchor is only 7% below the current print—well inside normal model error. They will also point out that ROE of 12.7% on an under-levered equity base understates true economic returns once the store base matures. I weigh those points seriously, yet the combination of already-elevated store density concerns, the thesis engine’s –9 score, and the fact that every incremental dollar of growth now requires heavier capex keeps me from calling the stock cheap. The premium to the composite DCF is small, but it is a premium paid for execution that has little margin for error.
I would flip to undervalued on a clean print of 70-plus new stores with flat-to-up four-wall margins and comps re-accelerating above 4%, or on any sustained trade below $65. I would flip to outright overvalued if next two quarters show sequential margin compression below 8% net or if management guides store openings below 50 while inventory turns slow.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Ollie's is a mature, cash-generative specialty discounter running a durable playbook. Revenue has scaled from $1.75B (2022) to $2.65B (2026), a ~11% CAGR, with gross margin expanding from 38.9% to 40.5% and operating margin holding above 10% (11.2% in 2026). Net income grew from $157.5M to $240.6M and FCF from $10M to $194.7M, evidencing real operating leverage rather than accounting flatter. OCF/NI of 1.03x, accruals of -0.2% of assets, Beneish M at -2.04, and Altman Z at 4.72 all corroborate that reported earnings are backed by cash. The balance sheet carries $259.7M net cash with no debt overhang, so the company self-funds new store growth and buybacks. Diluted share count fell from 64.9M to 61.8M (-1.2% CAGR), SBC is a modest 0.5% of revenue, and buybacks run 7x SBC - per-share value is being concentrated. Insider activity is quiet: one small CEO sale of $319K against routine option exercises and tax withholdings, nothing directionally alarming. The only soft spot in the trajectory is the 2023 margin dip (OpM 7.2%, GM 35.9%), which has since fully reversed - a reminder the model is not immune to merchandising cycles, but management demonstrably navigated back.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Store unit economics and new-store payback period in the 10-K
- Closeout inventory sourcing concentration and any dependence on specific liquidation channels
- Lease obligations and true economic leverage once operating leases are capitalized
- Whether the 2023 margin dip was inventory-mark related or a structural cost issue
- Capital allocation policy on buybacks vs. store growth going forward
At $74.35 versus a composite fair value of $69.10 and signal-adjusted $69.64, OLLI trades roughly 7% above deserved value. The DCF ($68.01) and EPV floor ($43.91) both sit below the tape; only the anchored-PE ($96.45) argues upside, and that method is essentially extrapolating a premium multiple on a mature discounter facing saturation - I discount it heavily. Earnings quality is high, which supports rather than expands the deserved price. The business quality is Strong (77), which justifies pricing near fair value but does not create a margin of safety. The market is paying for the 200+ store runway and clean compounding story; that expectation is already in the print. To underwrite meaningful upside from $74 you need the anchored-PE outcome (mid-90s) to be right, which requires unit growth AND margin expansion AND multiple persistence - a stack of goods, not a discount. The EPV of $44 is a reminder that if closeout sourcing normalizes or new-store productivity fades, downside is real.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- New-store productivity and comp trend in the next print - key to defending the growth premium
- Gross margin trajectory as vendor closeout supply normalizes post-pandemic
- Any guidance shift on unit growth runway or SG&A leverage
- Buyback pace and remaining authorization - supports per-share compounding
The macro tape is mildly constructive (regime score +22, VIX 16, S&P barely off highs) and OLLI's 0.47 beta means it barely feels the crosswinds anyway. What actually presses on this name is its narrative status: a moderate-intensity, durable steady-compounder story in discount retail — exactly the archetype money hides in when investors get twitchy about rates (10y 4.68%) and a 26.9x market PE. The treasure-hunt/closeout story is well-worn but intact, and there is no active narrative crack pulling the multiple down. Momentum is strong-positive (12.3% CAGR, low revenue vol), which reinforces the compounder tag and keeps trend-followers engaged. There is no euphoric cult premium (cult: low) and only a 7.1% narrative premium over DCF, so the stock is not fighting a stretched story either. Net: no dominant force, but multiple small tailwinds (defensive sector bid, low beta in an uncertain tape, durable narrative, positive momentum) with no visible headwind narrative in the flow. That skews the pressure gently upward rather than balanced.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Same-store-sales prints or comp guidance that would confirm/crack the saturation bear case
- Any shift in analyst tone from 'steady compounder' to 'maturing concept' — the biggest narrative risk
- VIX regime change or a risk-off break that would test whether the defensive bid actually shows up
- Competitive closeout-sourcing headlines (Dollar Tree, Big Lots dynamics) that could erode the moat narrative
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 5, 2026, OLLI was $77.10. We expect it to be $70.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $59.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.