For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for PG&E Corporation (PCG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -40 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -82 · Value -5 · Sentiment 5 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $22.53 vs $17.60 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
PG&E Corporation
PCG NYSEPG&E Corporation is an energy holding company based in San Francisco, California, whose primary business is regulated electric and natural gas utility operations in Northern and Central California. Its main subsidiary, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, delivers electricity and natural gas to residential, commercial, industrial, and agricultural customers across a broad service territory covering the majority of the region’s counties. The company’s activities span electricity generation, high-voltage transmission, and local distribution, as well as the sale and delivery of natural gas through an extensive pipeline and distribution network. PG&E Corporation plays a central role in California’s utility sector, supporting household energy needs, commercial activity, and critical infrastructure. The company operates under a regulated framework, with rates and major investments overseen by state authorities, positioning it as a core infrastructure provider within the state’s energy and utilities market.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.18
Total Equity: $32.54B
Shares: 2,290,677,966
Total Debt: $61.34B
Cash: $713.00M
EBITDA: $10.19B
Total Debt: $61.34B
Cash: $713.00M
Revenue: $24.94B
Revenue: $24.94B
Revenue: $24.94B
Total Equity: $32.54B
Tax Rate: -11.6%
Equity: $32.54B
Total Debt: $61.34B
Cash: $713.00M
Current Liabilities: $16.30B
Long-Term Debt: $57.75B
Total Debt: $61.34B
Total Equity: $32.54B
Shares: 2,290,677,966
Shares: 2,290,677,966
CapEx: -$11.79B
Shares: 2,290,677,966
Stock Price: $17.60
Net Income: $2.70B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 28, 2026 12:27am (26d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $20.6B | $21.7B | $24.4B | $24.4B | $24.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $14.6B | $14.7B | $16.1B | $15.3B | $15.1B |
| Gross Profit | $6.1B | $7.0B | $8.3B | $9.2B | $9.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.9B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.6B | $5.0B |
| Operating Income | $2.1B | $2.7B | $4.0B | $4.6B | $4.8B |
| Net Income | -$88.0M | $1.8B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.7B |
| EBITDA | $6.0B | $7.1B | $8.6B | $9.6B | $10.2B |
| EPS | $-0.05 | $0.91 | $1.09 | $1.16 | $1.18 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.05 | $0.84 | $1.05 | $1.15 | $1.18 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 25, 2026 3:02am (29d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $291.0M | $734.0M | $635.0M | $940.0M | $713.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $11.1B | $12.8B | $14.4B | $17.2B | $15.8B |
| Total Assets | $103.3B | $118.6B | $125.7B | $133.7B | $141.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $17.4B | $15.8B | $17.3B | $16.3B | $16.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | $39.0B | $49.0B | $52.0B | $54.0B | $57.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $82.1B | $95.6B | $100.4B | $103.3B | $108.8B |
| Total Equity | $21.0B | $22.8B | $25.0B | $30.1B | $32.5B |
| Retained Earnings | -$9.3B | -$7.5B | -$5.3B | -$3.0B | -$650.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 28, 2026 12:27am (26d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.3B | $3.7B | $4.7B | $8.0B | $8.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$7.7B | -$9.6B | -$9.7B | -$10.4B | -$11.8B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$5.4B | -$5.9B | -$5.0B | -$2.3B | -$3.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$87.0M | -$6.0B | -$3.1B | -$800.0M | -$3.9B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$320.0M | $640.0M | -$15.0M | $281.0M | -$241.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 28, 2026 12:27am (26d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +5.0% | +12.7% | 0.0% | +2.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +15.7% | +18.4% | +10.2% | +7.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +25.3% | +49.2% | +13.8% | +6.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +2,161.4% | +24.4% | +11.3% | +7.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +17.8% | +21.5% | +11.9% | +5.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 25, 2026 3:02am (29d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-30 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-31 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-31 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-30 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-30 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-31 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-31 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-30 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-28 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-28 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2017-09-28 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2017-06-28 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2017-03-29 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2016-12-28 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2016-09-28 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2016-06-28 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2016-03-29 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2015-12-29 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2015-09-28 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 10:42| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($17.60) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +9% | 15.8% | $29.35 | +67% |
| Base — stabilizes | +6% | 13.8% | $23.42 | +33% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 11.7% | $18.31 | +4% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +0% | 13.5% | $18.88 | +7% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a coherent but unexciting story: revenue crawling at 1% CAGR ($20.6B in 2021 to $24.9B in 2025), earnings compounding at 9.5% as operating margin expanded from 10.4% to 19.5%, and ROE stuck at 8.3% — still 200+ bps below the 10-10.5% allowed return California authorizes. That margin expansion is the whole earnings story, and it's largely mechanical: rate-base recovery post-bankruptcy plus cost discipline. What jumps out as genuinely concerning is not on the P&L — it's the cash flow and balance sheet. Operating cash flow of $8.72B against capex of $11.79B produces -$3.07B free cash flow, funded by incremental debt on an already staggering $61.3B debt load (1.88x D/E, current ratio 0.97). This is a company that must access capital markets continuously and cannot afford a credit event, a wildfire verdict, or a rate case setback.
On the prior models: the classification as "mature_earner" is wrong in spirit — this is a leveraged, capital-starved rebuild story, not a steady compounder — and the Pre-Flight tag of "recovery-story-regulated-utility" is more honest. The Synthesis "Reasonable Premium" verdict and the Market Forces "Headwinds/avoid" verdict flatly contradict each other, and the file doesn't resolve the tension. I side more with Market Forces on directionality but disagree with "avoid" as a blanket call. The Synthesis note that the market prices in "no growth optionality" is half-right: at 14.9x earnings and 1.24x book, PCG trades at ~20% discount to peer utilities (XEL, WEC, DUK at 18-21x), which is exactly the wildfire/California-regulatory penalty — not a mispricing. The Narrative layer's "anchored, moderate intensity" read is the most intellectually honest of the bunch: the discount is real risk premium, not sentiment overhang waiting to unwind.
The contrarian case cuts both ways and neither side is being pressed hard enough. Bull contrarian: if PG&E closes the ROE gap to allowed 10.5% over 3-4 years, earnings power rises ~25% from here, and at a re-rated 17x multiple you get to ~$22-24 — a 25-35% return plus a token 0.28% dividend. That requires (a) no major wildfire event triggering inverse condemnation liability, (b) constructive GRC outcomes in 2026-27, and (c) capex funded without punishing equity issuance. Bear contrarian, which I find more compelling given the numbers: the -$3.07B FCF is structural, not cyclical — California's electrification mandate requires $60B+ of capex through 2030, meaning perpetual external financing at rates that have doubled since 2021. Interest expense is silently eating the margin expansion story. The two insider sales in July 2026 (159,500 shares combined) are small but directionally unhelpful, and no offsetting buys appear.
Data gaps matter here: NI is missing for four of the last eight quarters, which makes trajectory reads noisy, and the 2026-dated insider transactions look like a data-tagging issue worth flagging. FCF CAGR is blank because it's been negative throughout — that's not a calculation failure, it's a business-model feature the models are glossing over. I dissent from the Synthesis "Reasonable Premium" framing: at $17.60 with 1.24x book, PCG isn't at a premium to anything meaningful — it's at a discount that accurately reflects the tail risk. But I also dissent from Market Forces' "avoid" — a regulated monopoly at 15x earnings with a clear (if slow) path to closing a 200bp ROE gap is not an avoid, it's a position-sized carry trade with binary downside. Fair value under a no-catastrophe scenario is $20-22; under a bad-fire-season scenario, $12-13. Expected value maybe $18, so you're paid roughly nothing to own the tail risk today. I'd want either a 15%+ margin of safety (sub-$15) or evidence of the ROE actually inflecting toward 10% before committing capital.
GPT Reading
What stands out to me is that PG&E is no longer a turnaround on the income statement, but it is absolutely still a financing story on the cash flow statement. Annual revenue has essentially flattened around a very narrow band — $24.43B in 2023, $24.42B in 2024, $24.94B in 2025 — so the equity case is not top-line growth. The improvement has come from monetizing the regulated asset base more effectively: gross profit rose from $6.06B in 2021 to $9.87B in 2025, operating income from $2.14B to $4.85B, and net income from a loss in 2021 to $2.70B in 2025. That is real progress. But the quality of that progress is constrained by the capital intensity underneath it: $8.72B of operating cash flow sounds healthy until you set it against $11.79B of capex and see the resulting -$3.07B free cash flow. For a utility, negative FCF by itself is not damning; for PG&E, with $61.34B of debt, just $713M of cash, and a sub-1 current ratio, it means the business is still structurally dependent on accommodating regulators and open capital markets. The quarterlies reinforce the same picture: revenue is steady around $5.9B to $6.0B, while Q1 net income slipped from $735M to $634M year over year, so even the earnings march is not perfectly linear.
Opus argues the “raw numbers tell a coherent but unexciting story,” and I agree with that core framing. He is also right that margin expansion, not demand growth, has driven the equity narrative; a move from roughly 10% operating margin in 2021 to 19.5% in 2025 is too large to ignore. I also agree with his attack on the “mature_earner” label. A company with 1% revenue CAGR, 9.5% earnings CAGR, 1.88x debt/equity, negative free cash flow, and de minimis 0.28% yield is not a classic utility compounder. Where I disagree is his emphasis that the stock is principally a “wildfire-adjusted risk premium” problem rather than a return-on-capital problem. The 8.3% ROE is not just 200 bps below the allowed return; it is evidence that shareholders are funding an enormous asset base and taking extraordinary tail risk without yet earning utility-like returns. That is not merely a market discount issue. It is a business economics issue, and until ROE is sustainably closer to 10%, I think the stock deserves to trade below higher-quality regulated peers regardless of wildfire sentiment.
I also part company with Opus on valuation range. He lands at fair value around $18-19 and says “not a buy above $15.” I’m more negative. At $17.60, investors are paying about 14.9x earnings, 1.24x book, and nearly 9.75x EV/EBITDA for a utility with low-single-digit revenue growth, modest 8.3% ROE, no meaningful dividend support, and structurally negative free cash flow. That multiple set is not egregious in isolation, but it is too full for this risk profile. Opus’s bull case of $20-22 under a no-catastrophe scenario assumes the market will reward progress before it fully shows up in economics; I would not underwrite that. The annual net margin of 10.8% and operating margin near 19.5% already reflect much of the post-bankruptcy clean-up, yet shareholders still have a weak cash conversion story and high balance-sheet leverage. If this were trading at 11-12x earnings or near book value, I’d be more open to the “carry trade with binary downside” framing. At nearly 15x, I think you are already paying for a substantial amount of normalcy that PG&E has not yet earned.
On specific claims, I agree with Opus that the prior model’s “Reasonable Premium” language is wrong; there is no meaningful premium here, only a discount that may still be insufficient. I also agree with him that the contradiction between “Reasonable Premium” and “Headwinds/avoid” was unresolved. But I disagree with his statement that “you’re paid roughly nothing to own the tail risk today” only in degree: I think you are actually underpaid. The difference matters. He frames sub-$15 as the required margin of safety; I’d anchor it lower, around $13-15, because the capital structure leaves little room for a financing shock, and the weak current liquidity matters more in a higher-rate world than his narrative lets on. I do agree that the insider sales cited are weak evidence and likely not thesis-changing, and I agree the missing quarterly NI datapoints limit precision. But those data gaps do not rescue the stock; the complete annuals already tell us enough. This is a utility whose reported earnings have improved faster than its investability.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus’s would say we are over-penalizing a regulated utility for negative free cash flow that is normal during heavy grid investment, and underestimating how fast rate-base growth can lift earnings from $2.70B higher if California remains supportive. They would also point out that 1.24x book and a P/E below many peers may already embed much of the liability fear, and that the downside scenarios can look too dramatic if the wildfire fund and hardening spend do their job. That is fair. But until the company demonstrates that its expanding earnings can translate into stronger returns on equity without ever-rising financing dependence, I would rather demand a clear discount than treat $17.60 as fair.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
PG&E is a classic post-bankruptcy regulated utility grinding back to health. Revenue has crept from 20.6B in 2021 to 24.9B in 2025, and profitability has genuinely improved: gross margin expanded from 29.4% to 39.6%, operating margin from 10.4% to 19.4%, and net income turned from a 88M loss to 2.70B. That is real operational progress and reflects rate-base earnings normalizing after the wildfire and restructuring era.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Latest wildfire liability accruals, insurance recoveries, and status of the Wildfire Fund contributions in the 10-K
- Composition of the -3.07B FCF: how much is growth capex vs wildfire mitigation vs maintenance
- Authorized ROE and rate-base growth trajectory approved by CPUC in the most recent GRC
- Terms and cadence of equity issuance program (ATM) driving the 6.8% share growth
- Debt maturity schedule and near-term refinancing needs against the 3.59B short-term debt
- Any securitization proceeds expected that would offset regulatory-asset build-up
The e2e composite pegs fair value at $19.68 against a $17.60 price, implying roughly 12% upside before dividends. That is a real but unremarkable gap for a regulated utility, and it needs to be discounted because the underlying business is Shaky: ~60B net debt, cash-negative operations, and ~6.8%/yr share issuance that steadily dilutes any per-share fair value. Marking the deserved value down for earnings-quality mix and dilution creep pushes my honest anchor closer to $18-19, which makes the current price fair-to-modestly-cheap rather than a bargain.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Next GRC (general rate case) outcome and authorized ROE
- Share issuance pace vs guidance - is dilution slowing or accelerating
- Wildfire fund contribution and AB1054 cap status
- FFO/debt trajectory and any rating agency actions
- Segment cash flow to test whether earnings recovery is translating to real FCF
The macro tape is mildly risk-off (VIX 18.7, S&P off its highs, 10y at 4.69%), but PCG's 0.27 beta and defensive regulated-utility profile mean the market-wide pressure lands very softly here. If anything, a nervous tape tends to rotate money toward regulated cash-flow names like this one, partially muting the headwind. The rates backdrop is a mild negative for a bond-proxy utility, but the curve has normalized and PCG is actively terming out and buying back debt via the announced tender offers, which the market reads as balance-sheet confidence. The narrative is the dominant force and it is genuinely two-sided. The fallen-angel wildfire story still caps enthusiasm, cult coefficient is low, and California regulatory/political risk keeps a permanent discount on the name. But the recent flow is net constructive: a Q2 beat, reaffirmed guidance, a $73B grid investment plan reframing the story toward rate-base growth, and upsized tender offers. Analyst headlines are pivoting from 'wildfire risk' to 'is it fully valued', which is itself a sentiment upgrade. Net: pressures roughly cancel with a very slight positive tilt on the story rehab, offset by lingering tail-risk narrative and mildly hostile rates.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any movement on California wildfire liability reform legislation - the single biggest sentiment unlock
- Whether analysts raise targets after the Q2 beat or stay parked on 'fully valued'
- Execution and financing terms on the $73B capital plan - equity issuance risk would flip sentiment
- Fire-season news flow through late summer; a single ignition event reawakens the tail-risk narrative
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 28, 2026, PCG was $17.60. We expect it to be $19.10 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $15.50. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 28, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.