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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for PagerDuty Inc. (PD) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -9 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 0 · Value -16 · Sentiment -16 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
PagerDuty Inc.
PD NYSEPagerDuty Inc. is a digital operations management platform that focuses on real-time incident response and management solutions. It facilitates the coordination of incident response teams, allowing organizations to mitigate disruptions and ensure reliable digital services. The platform is primarily used in industries such as information technology, telecommunications, and any domain requiring high uptime and service reliability. PagerDuty's solutions enable businesses to automatically orchestrate tasks and alerts, analyze incident impacts, and streamline communication among team members. By integrating with various IT service management and monitoring tools, PagerDuty plays a crucial role in maintaining operational efficiency, reducing downtime, and optimizing service delivery. As businesses increasingly rely on digital infrastructure, PagerDuty is pivotal in ensuring that incidents are resolved efficiently, thereby supporting continuous business operations and customer satisfaction.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.87
Total Equity: $270.67M
Shares: 92,995,000
Total Debt: $420.61M
Cash: $237.40M
EBITDA: $18.96M
Total Debt: $420.61M
Cash: $237.40M
Revenue: $492.55M
Revenue: $492.55M
Revenue: $492.55M
Total Equity: $270.67M
Tax Rate: -756.5%
Equity: $270.67M
Total Debt: $420.61M
Cash: $237.40M
Current Liabilities: $303.89M
Long-Term Debt: $420.61M
Total Debt: $420.61M
Total Equity: $270.67M
Shares: 92,995,000
Shares: 92,995,000
CapEx: -$2.94M
Shares: 92,995,000
Stock Price: $11.90
Net Income: $173.37M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:07am (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $281.4M | $370.8M | $430.7M | $467.5M | $492.5M |
| Cost of Revenue | $48.4M | $70.4M | $77.8M | $79.7M | $74.1M |
| Gross Profit | $233.0M | $300.4M | $352.9M | $387.8M | $418.4M |
| Operating Expenses | $334.7M | $429.7M | $449.1M | $447.6M | $412.6M |
| Operating Income | -$101.7M | -$129.4M | -$96.2M | -$59.8M | $5.8M |
| Net Income | -$107.5M | -$128.4M | -$75.2M | -$42.7M | $173.4M |
| EBITDA | -$93.4M | -$111.9M | -$76.1M | -$39.2M | $19.0M |
| EPS | $-1.27 | $-1.45 | $-0.89 | $-0.59 | $1.91 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-1.27 | $-1.45 | $-0.89 | $-0.59 | $1.87 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:43am (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $349.8M | $274.0M | $363.0M | $346.5M | $237.4M |
| Total Current Assets | $645.1M | $600.3M | $703.2M | $711.7M | $612.2M |
| Total Assets | $806.4M | $817.9M | $925.3M | $927.3M | $990.5M |
| Current Liabilities | $227.0M | $271.1M | $281.7M | $369.2M | $303.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | $300.1M | $296.5M | $489.5M | $484.5M | $420.6M |
| Total Liabilities | $539.5M | $575.8M | $746.4M | $779.2M | $719.9M |
| Total Equity | $267.0M | $242.1M | $178.9M | $148.0M | $270.7M |
| Retained Earnings | -$348.8M | -$477.2M | -$552.4M | -$595.2M | -$421.8M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:07am (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$6.0M | $17.0M | $72.0M | $117.9M | $114.9M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$3.5M | -$4.6M | -$2.2M | -$2.8M | -$2.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$9.5M | $12.3M | $69.8M | $115.1M | $111.9M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $-160,000 | -$66.3M | -$24.1M | $0 | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | -$50.0M | -$100.1M | -$134.9M |
| Net Change in Cash | $10.6M | -$75.8M | $92.6M | -$18.3M | -$109.8M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:07am (8d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +31.8% | +16.2% | +8.5% | +5.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +28.9% | +17.5% | +9.9% | +7.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -27.2% | +25.6% | +37.9% | +109.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -19.5% | +41.5% | +43.2% | +505.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | -19.9% | +32.0% | +48.5% | +148.4% |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-15Autonomous remediation agents still need a governed place to be dispatched, escalated, audited and rolled back — PagerDuty's escalation graph, on-call schedules and Rundeck-style automation runbooks are a natural control plane for machine responders, monetizable per action rather than per seat.
Revenue is anchored to the count of paid human responders and to noise-reduction value; AI that triages, correlates and auto-resolves shrinks both the responder roster and the willingness to pay for alert grouping, while Datadog/hyperscaler on-call modules bundle the same function against telemetry PagerDuty does not hold.
Whether AIOps/Automation consumption revenue scales faster than responder-seat erosion. Observable in ARR-per-customer, the >$100k customer count, and any disclosed shift away from per-user pricing.
Ultra-reliable multi-channel notification delivery at scale, the accumulated escalation-policy and integration graph across hundreds of tools, and the auditable record that a named human was notified within SLA.
AI Lens thesis
PagerDuty's underlying job — accountable human response to service disruption — is durable, but its economics rest on two AI-vulnerable layers: a seat-priced roster of on-call engineers and an event-correlation layer whose intelligence was once hard and is becoming a commodity LLM function. The decisive structural fact is data position: PagerDuty sees alerts, acknowledgements and human actions, while root-cause telemetry, traces and logs sit in Datadog, Splunk and cloud-native stacks — so the most capable AI SRE is likelier to be built by the observability owner, which can then bundle on-call and demote PagerDuty toward a paging gateway. Against that, AI-native rivals (incident.io, Rootly) show entrant cost has collapsed, and PagerDuty is already growing ~7pp below industry. The offsetting path is real but narrow: become the governance and execution layer that both humans and agents route through, priced on automation actions, using cheap AI to convert its 85% gross margin and newly positive FCF into durable operating leverage.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside If agentic remediation proliferates, someone must hold the permissions, approvals and audit trail for what machines are allowed to change in production — a governance role with regulatory pull that is worth more per account than paging seats.
Downside Seat erosion can arrive as silent renewal downgrades rather than churn: retained logos, flat or falling ARR per customer, and a business that looks stable on retention metrics while the pricing unit quietly deflates.
Outcome range spread 47 · unresolved
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:29The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly trajectory first: revenue went $115.9M → $118.9M → $121.4M → $119.8M → $123.4M → $124.5M → $124.8M → $121.0M. That's not a growth story — that's a plateau around $122M with the most recent print actually *down* sequentially ($124.8M → $121.0M, -3%). YoY on the latest quarter is $121.0M vs $119.8M = +1.0%. The 5.4% "recent YoY" figure the momentum module cites is generous; the *most* recent comparison is barely positive. The annual $492.5M vs $467.5M = 5.3% growth is decelerating from the 8.5% prior year and 16.1% before that. This is a company approaching stall speed, not a mature earner cruising.
The reported net income of $173.4M for FY26 is almost entirely the $161.6M Q3 print — obviously a tax valuation allowance release or similar one-time item (Q1, Q2, Q4 net income sums to ~$11M, implying a run-rate GAAP earnings profile of roughly $45-50M, not $173M). The 6.4 P/E is a mirage; strip the one-timer and you're at ~20x on GAAP, which is reasonable but not the screaming bargain the ratio suggests. However — and this matters — FCF of $111.9M is real and cash-based, giving a ~12x P/FCF on $920M market cap, or ~8.4% FCF yield. Net debt is only ~$183M ($420M debt minus $237M cash), so EV/FCF is ~10x. That's genuinely cheap for 85% gross margin software, *if* the FCF is durable.
The models split cleanly: synthesis says fair value at $12.68, market-forces screams "melting ice cube" with 30-50% downside, narrative layer says "priced as software that works." I think market-forces is overwrought — a company generating $112M FCF on $492M revenue with 85% gross margins and 2x current ratio is not a melting ice cube in any near-term sense. But I also think synthesis is too clean. The contrarian case that matters isn't "structural decline" — it's that PagerDuty has hit TAM saturation in core incident management, that Datadog/ServiceNow are commoditizing the layer, and that the FCF is being harvested from a shrinking-relevance product while SBC (implied by those 600K+ share awards) dilutes shareholders. Insider activity here is *all* awards and in-kind tax withholding — no open-market buying. That's not a signal; that's just comp. But it does mean run-rate dilution is material on a $920M cap.
Where I land: this is not "Market Headwinds" catastrophe and it's not "starter position undervalued." The synthesis's $12.68 fair value looks about right on current fundamentals, and at $11.90 you're paying roughly fair with a slight discount. The problem is optionality is asymmetric to the *downside*: if growth stalls to 0-2% (which the Q1 print suggests is plausible), the multiple compresses and you're looking at $8-9. If growth reaccelerates to 8-10% via AIOps or platform expansion, you get $16-18. The Q1 revenue sequential decline is the most important datapoint in the file and none of the prior models weighted it appropriately — "decelerating quarterly trend" in the secondary signals is the only acknowledgment, and it's buried. I partially agree with synthesis (fairly valued) but dissent on the implicit optimism: the burden of proof is on reacceleration, and Q1 provided evidence against. I'd want to see two consecutive quarters of sequential revenue growth resuming before committing capital. At $9-10 this becomes interesting; at $11.90 it's a hold-if-you-own, don't-initiate.
GPT Reading
What stands out is how little true growth remains in the model. Quarterly revenue has gone from $115.9M in July 2024 to $124.8M in January 2026, then slipped to $121.0M in April 2026. That is not a company compounding into a larger opportunity; it is a company hovering around a $120M quarterly run rate. Annual revenue growth was already down to 5.3% in FY2026, from 8.6% in FY2025 and 16.2% in FY2024. The business does deserve credit for reaching operating profitability — FY2026 operating income was $5.8M versus a $59.8M loss the year before, and gross margin remains elite at 84.9% — but the income statement is being flattered by a one-off. The $173.4M of FY2026 net income is almost entirely explained by the absurd $161.6M quarter in October 2025, where net margin printed 129.7%. On operating earnings and enterprise value, this is not a 6x earnings stock; it is a roughly 2.6x EV/revenue, 67x EV/EBITDA slow-growth software name with modest real profitability.
The cash flow is better than GAAP earnings, but even there I would be careful about calling this a “mature earner” in the comforting sense. FY2026 free cash flow of $111.9M on $492.5M of revenue is strong, about a 22.7% FCF margin, and capex is negligible at just $2.9M. But for software businesses, strong FCF alongside barely positive operating income often means stock comp and working-capital timing are doing a lot of the work. The balance sheet is fine, not pristine: $237.4M of cash against $420.6M of debt leaves net debt around $183M, meaningful for a company with only $270.7M of equity and a sub-$1B market cap. That leverage is manageable given the cash generation, but it removes some of the strategic flexibility that investors often assume small-cap SaaS names possess. At $11.90, the market cap is $0.92B; adding net debt gets you to an EV a bit above $1.1B. Against a business growing mid-single digits and showing flat-to-down recent quarterly revenue, that feels approximately right, not cheap.
The key contradiction I see in the bullish framing is that the business is being described as predictable and quietly compounding, while the actual numbers show a company that has mostly completed its transition from money-losing growth story to cash-generative niche software utility — without evidence yet that adjacent products are reigniting demand. If PagerDuty can only grow revenue from $467.5M to $492.5M in a year while carrying 85% gross margins, then the debate is no longer about whether margins can improve; they probably can. The debate is whether there is enough topline left to matter. A business with these margins should be able to produce attractive earnings at scale, but scale appears to be stalling. That makes the low P/S less of a bargain multiple and more of a fair discount for a product that may be strategically useful but commercially maturing.
The best case against my caution is straightforward: the market may be over-penalizing a real quality asset because the headline GAAP numbers are noisy and the category is unloved. Even with only 5% revenue growth, a $492.5M revenue base throwing off $111.9M of free cash flow is a serious outcome, especially at a $0.92B market cap. If that cash conversion is durable, the stock is trading at roughly 8x trailing FCF, which is inexpensive for a sticky software platform with 84.9% gross margin and newly positive operating income. If the $161.6M quarterly net income was indeed non-recurring, sophisticated investors already know that; they may instead focus on the trajectory from operating losses of $129.4M in FY2023 to positive $5.8M in FY2026. On that view, PagerDuty does not need reacceleration to work as a stock — it only needs to hold low-single-digit growth and keep turning gross profit into cash. I weigh that argument less heavily because the April 2026 quarter already showed revenue down sequentially to $121.0M and net income down to $5.3M, suggesting the margin story may not have much room to outrun a tired top line.
What would change my mind is evidence that the revenue line is not plateauing. I would want to see at least two consecutive quarters back above $125M with year-on-year growth reaccelerating toward 7-9%, not the current ~5% area, while keeping quarterly net income sustainably positive absent unusual items. Alternatively, if management can show FY2027 free cash flow holding around or above $100M while reducing net debt materially, then I could accept PagerDuty as a genuine cash-compounder and move my fair value into the mid-teens. On the downside, if quarterly revenue slips below $120M again or operating margins fall back negative, the stock should trade more like a no-growth point-solution software asset, which would make even $11.90 look full.
Grok Reading
PagerDuty at $11.90 is a cash-flow story wearing a growth company’s clothes, and the numbers make that plain. Annual revenue climbed from $281M to $493M over five years, but the slope has flattened hard: the last printed year grew only about 5%, trailing twelve-month revenue sits near $494M, and the most recent quarter actually slipped sequentially from $124.8M to $121.0M. Gross margin holds at a pristine 85%, free cash flow printed $112M on only $3M of capex, and operating cash flow of $115M is the cleanest signal in the packet. That is a double-digit FCF yield on a sub-$1B equity value even after netting the $183M of net debt. The catch is that GAAP operating income is a rounding error—$5.8M, or 1.2% of sales—and the $173M net-income figure is an optical illusion driven by a single $162M quarter that produced a 130% net margin. Strip that one-time item and you are looking at mid-single-digit millions of true earnings power, which is why the 6.4x trailing P/E is meaningless and the 67x EV/EBITDA is the more honest multiple.
What stands out against the rule-based “mature earner” label and the fair-value composite near $12.70 is how little operating leverage has actually arrived. Five years of scale produced a swing from –$96M operating loss to +$6M operating profit; that is progress, not a durable earnings engine. Revenue confidence is tagged decelerating for a reason: quarterly prints have been stuck in a $120–125M band for a year. The balance sheet is serviceable—current ratio 2.0, cash $237M—but $421M of debt against $271M of equity is not fortress quality for a company whose top line is barely growing. Insider filings are almost entirely awards and withholdings, so the “unusual selling” flag looks overstated; the real secondary signal is the growth rate itself.
The strongest opposing case is the melting-ice-cube framing: a point solution losing share to hyperscalers and full-stack observability platforms, with reported profitability as accounting cosmetics and 30–50% downside if FCF follows revenue into stasis. A smart bear cites the 5% recent revenue growth, the sequential decline, the 2.6x EV/sales multiple that already assumes no re-rating, and the fact that $112M of FCF on sub-2% operating margins can evaporate the moment retention slips or price competition appears. I weigh that risk seriously, but I do not let it dominate: FCF conversion has been real for the latest year, the product remains mission-critical for existing enterprise install base, and at roughly 2.2x sales the market has already priced in the growth disappointment. A value trap requires cash flows to collapse; so far they have not.
Re-acceleration of quarterly revenue above 8–10% year-over-year for two consecutive prints, or a clear path to mid-teens operating margins without one-time gains, would flip me decisively more bullish. Conversely, another sequential revenue decline paired with FCF dropping below $80M annualized would confirm the structural-share-loss thesis and push the stock toward the low end of its $5–17 range. Until one of those arrives, the stock screens as modestly cheap on cash generation and fairly valued on growth-adjusted earnings power.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
None surfaced.
None surfaced.
The composite fair value of $15.34 and signal-adjusted $12.68 bracket the $11.90 price, implying a modest 7% upside on the more conservative anchor. The inputs disagree sharply: DCF at $16.53 depends on continued FCF growth, EPV floor is negative (-$3.13) reflecting GAAP unprofitability, and an anchored PE of $31.44 looks like a runaway method leaning on peer multiples that a decelerating point-solution SaaS name may not deserve - I discount it heavily. Stripping that outlier, the honest deserved value sits in the low-to-mid teens, essentially where the stock trades. Earnings quality is only 'adequate/mixed,' which argues for haircutting the deserved value rather than paying up. The bear case (hyperscaler and Datadog encroachment on incident management) is credible enough that I would not extend a premium multiple, while the bull case of mission-criticality is already reflected in a market cap near $918M on ~$450M+ ARR. Net: no meaningful margin of safety, no obvious overpricing - a coin-flip setup where the price roughly matches the deserved value.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Net revenue retention trend and enterprise ARR mix in latest 10-Q
- SBC as % of revenue and diluted share count growth
- FCF guide vs GAAP operating loss - reconcile the gap
- Any commentary on Datadog/ServiceNow/hyperscaler competitive displacement in transcripts
- Guidance for FY revenue growth - deceleration below ~8% would break the DCF
PD sits in a low-heat narrative pocket - archetype is quiet-quality, intensity minimal, cult coefficient low. Nobody is telling a loud story here, bull or bear, so there is no strong sentiment vector pushing the tape either way. Price ($11.90) is essentially hugging fair value, which is what you see when the market has largely stopped debating a name. The risk-on regime (VIX 14.3, S&P near highs) is a mild tailwind for small/mid software, but with beta 0.92 PD does not amplify the tape. The May 29 gap (new CEO, usage-based pricing pivot, AI angle, buyback) briefly gave the story some juice, but that narrative energy has clearly faded - no follow-on news flow and no analyst re-rating pulse in the feed. What is left is the structural bear overhang: hyperscaler and Datadog encroachment on incident management is the durable headwind narrative in this cohort, and PD has no counter-story loud enough right now to offset it. Aug 27 earnings is the next binary - it will either reignite the usage-based/AI pricing narrative or reinforce the point-solution-being-squeezed read. Into the print, sentiment is a wash leaning slightly cautious.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Aug 27 FY27 Q2 print - does usage-based pricing traction re-ignite the AI narrative or confirm the point-solution squeeze
- Any Datadog/hyperscaler product announcement encroaching further on incident management
- Sell-side target revisions or tone shift into the print - currently silent
- Whether the risk-on regime holds; a VIX spike would hit small SaaS harder than the 0.92 beta suggests
PagerDuty's underlying job — accountable human response to service disruption — is durable, but its economics rest on two AI-vulnerable layers: a seat-priced roster of on-call engineers and an event-correlation layer whose intelligence was once hard and is becoming a commodity LLM function. The decisive structural fact is data position: PagerDuty sees alerts, acknowledgements and human actions, while root-cause telemetry, traces and logs sit in Datadog, Splunk and cloud-native stacks — so the most capable AI SRE is likelier to be built by the observability owner, which can then bundle on-call and demote PagerDuty toward a paging gateway. Against that, AI-native rivals (incident.io, Rootly) show entrant cost has collapsed, and PagerDuty is already growing ~7pp below industry. The offsetting path is real but narrow: become the governance and execution layer that both humans and agents route through, priced on automation actions, using cheap AI to convert its 85% gross margin and newly positive FCF into durable operating leverage.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- ARR per customer trend
- Paid users per account
- Shift toward consumption pricing
- Displacement losses to observability bundles
- Datadog/ServiceNow on-call adoption disclosures
- Multi-product attach rate at PagerDuty
- AIOps SKU pricing and discounting
- Competitor free-tier correlation features
The world is moving from human-paged incident response toward automated and AI-mediated remediation. That cuts both ways for PagerDuty specifically: if agents triage and fix incidents, the value of a per-responder paging seat erodes; if PagerDuty owns the orchestration and system-of-record layer that agents act through, per-account value rises. Nothing in the measured trajectory yet shows the second outcome winning — growth is decelerating, not inflecting. Meanwhile the surrounding stack keeps consolidating: observability, ITSM and cloud-native tooling all absorb incident routing as a feature, which is precisely the mechanism that produces a 7.6pp growth gap versus a healthy industry. The offset is that digital estates are genuinely more complex and downtime costs more, so the underlying need does not disappear — it gets re-hosted. Structurally this reads as a durable, cash-generative franchise whose category position is slowly narrowing rather than a business facing collapse.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for PD — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.