For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Pinterest, Inc. Class A (PINS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -2 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 33 · Value -31 · Sentiment -15 (timing only, not weighted)
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Pinterest, Inc. Class A
PINS NYSEPinterest, Inc. Class A is a visual discovery and inspiration platform that helps people find, save, and organize ideas across topics such as home decor, fashion, recipes, travel, and lifestyle. The Pinterest service centers on image- and video-based content arranged in personalized boards, making it a tool for users who curate projects, browse trends, and collect reference material for everyday interests. The platform also serves advertisers and merchants through promoted content and shopping-oriented features that connect brands with users during discovery and planning. Pinterest operates across consumer and commercial segments, with its products designed to support idea discovery, content curation, and digital advertising within the broader social media and internet services market. Based in San Francisco, Pinterest, Inc. Class A remains a notable participant in visual search, online inspiration, and audience-driven advertising.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.61
Total Equity: $4.75B
Shares: 687,771,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $969.34M
EBITDA: $345.03M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $969.34M
Revenue: $4.22B
Revenue: $4.22B
Revenue: $4.22B
Total Equity: $4.75B
Tax Rate: 6.5%
Equity: $4.75B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $969.34M
Current Liabilities: $465.47M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $4.75B
Shares: 687,771,000
Shares: 687,771,000
CapEx: -$32.38M
Shares: 687,771,000
Stock Price: $24.02
Net Income: $416.86M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:26am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $4.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $529.3M | $678.6M | $688.8M | $750.4M | $841.5M |
| Gross Profit | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.9B | $3.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $3.1B |
| Operating Income | $326.2M | -$101.7M | -$125.7M | $179.8M | $319.9M |
| Net Income | $316.4M | -$96.0M | -$35.6M | $1.9B | $416.9M |
| EBITDA | $353.7M | -$55.2M | -$104.2M | $201.1M | $345.0M |
| EPS | $0.49 | $-0.14 | $-0.05 | $2.74 | $0.62 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.46 | $-0.14 | $-0.05 | $2.67 | $0.61 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:12am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.1B | $969.3M |
| Total Current Assets | $3.2B | $3.5B | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.6B |
| Total Assets | $3.5B | $3.9B | $3.6B | $5.3B | $5.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $259.8M | $380.5M | $317.1M | $398.1M | $465.5M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $498.5M | $581.1M | $503.7M | $591.5M | $746.9M |
| Total Equity | $3.0B | $3.3B | $3.1B | $4.8B | $4.7B |
| Retained Earnings | -$2.0B | -$2.1B | -$2.2B | -$288.2M | $128.7M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:26am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $752.9M | $469.2M | $613.0M | $964.6M | $1.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | -$29.0M | -$8.1M | -$24.6M | -$32.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | — | $440.2M | $604.9M | $940.0M | $1.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$36.9M | -$86.1M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | -$500.0M | -$600.2M | -$927.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $748.2M | $190.6M | -$249.1M | -$227.3M | -$165.9M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:26am (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +8.7% | +9.0% | +19.3% | +15.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +3.7% | +11.4% | +22.4% | +16.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | -131.2% | -23.6% | +243.1% | +77.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -130.4% | +62.9% | +5,329.2% | -77.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | -115.6% | -88.8% | +293.0% | +71.6% |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-15Pinterest's historic gap versus Meta was ad-stack quality, not audience intent; cheap large-model ranking, automated creative generation and Performance+-style campaign automation close that gap directly, converting existing sessions into higher conversion rates and higher realized CPMs without adding users.
Visual inspiration is exactly the query type generative assistants serve natively — an AI that renders a kitchen remodel or outfit board on demand removes the reason to browse a pinboard, and Pinterest holds no default distribution surface on phones, browsers or OS assistants.
Whether engagement (MAU and sessions per user, especially US/Canada where ARPU is concentrated) holds while assistant-based discovery scales. Watch US/Canada MAU and time-spent disclosures alongside ARPU — ARPU rising while US MAU stalls is the tell that the ad stack is masking a shrinking front door.
A decade of save/click taste graph tied to real products and real people, plus direct SMB and brand advertiser relationships with measurement plumbing; the images are reproducible, the intent-labelled behavioral graph and the ad demand relationships are not.
AI Lens thesis
AI reaches Pinterest through three channels at once: it upgrades the ranking and creative layer that historically capped monetization (clear positive, visible in 80.1% gross margin and $1.25B FCF with only 7.6% GAAP operating margin — plenty of room for operating leverage); it commoditizes the supply of attractive imagery, which floods the feed with synthetic content and erodes the curated aesthetic that is the product's actual differentiator; and it creates a new discovery interface that can satisfy the underlying inspiration need without an ad-supported session. The need survives; the ad-impression unit survives only if the session survives. Pinterest is neither a clean AI winner nor a clean casualty — it is a mid-scale attention pool whose monetization is improving faster than its distribution is deteriorating, for now.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Operating margin is only 7.6% on 80% gross margin — AI applied to content moderation, sales support and advertiser onboarding could convert several points of opex into profit while the third-party demand partnerships (Amazon, Google) carry the fill without headcount.
Downside Synthetic-image saturation degrades the signal in the taste graph itself: if a large share of saved pins are AI-generated and lead to no purchasable product, the intent data that justifies premium CPMs quietly loses its predictive edge and advertisers reprice the inventory.
Outcome range spread 52 · unresolved
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:20The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The quarterly trajectory tells a story the synthesis is glossing over. Ignore the Q4'24 $1.85B NI (tax benefit release) and Q4'25 $277M (seasonal + tax noise), and look at the operating reality: Q1'26 revenue $1.01B with -$73.6M net loss, Q2'26 $1.18B with -$46.7M net loss. Two consecutive GAAP loss quarters after a full year of profitability in 2025. Revenue YoY is still ~15-18% (Q2'26 $1.18B vs Q2'25 $998M = +18%), so this isn't a demand collapse — it's a margin collapse. The 2025 annual op margin was 7.6% ($320M op income on $4.22B); the 1H'26 run-rate has op income negative. Something on the cost side — headcount, infra, or content/AI spend — is outrunning the top line, and neither the "mature earner" archetype nor the "quiet-quality" narrative is capturing that.
The models are internally inconsistent and I think the synthesis verdict of "slight_upside" at $24.12 fair value is too generous. Pre-flight calls it "traditional/mature profitable," rule-based says mature_earner at only 0.53 confidence (weak), and Market Forces flags "collapsing margins" — which is the correct read the composite is ignoring. A 39x trailing P/E on $417M of 2025 NI is not cheap for a company that just printed two loss quarters; if 2026 NI comes in near breakeven or negative, the trailing multiple becomes meaningless and forward P/E on any recovery scenario ($300-400M NI) is 33-44x — hardly a discount. EV/EBITDA of 44x and P/S of 3.9x are also premium-to-fair for a decelerating ad platform. FCF of $1.25B on the 2025 annual is the one genuinely strong number (13x P/FCF), but capex was only $32M — Pinterest is under-investing in infrastructure right at the moment TikTok, Meta Reels, and Google's visual search are compressing its moat, and any catch-up capex or AI infra buildout compresses that FCF fast.
The contrarian bull case exists but it's narrower than the models suggest: $969M cash, zero debt, 7.6x current ratio, 80% gross margins, $1.25B FCF — this is not a company that can go bust, and at $13B market cap you're paying ~10x FCF ex-cash. If the 1H'26 margin compression is transitory (one-time content moderation costs, AI transition spend, or comp true-ups) and 2H'26 reverts to 2025's ~10% net margin cadence, the stock is genuinely cheap. But the insider activity — ten separate sales/conversions in July-August 2026, all C-Conversion→S-Sale patterns totaling ~350K+ shares in 30 days — is not what you see when management thinks margin pressure is transitory. That's programmatic distribution during a period when insiders should be buying if the 1H weakness is noise. Combined with "decelerating quarterly trend" flagged in revenue confidence and "below sector benchmarks," the weight of secondary signals is bearish, not neutral.
I dissent from the "slight upside / fairly valued at $24" synthesis. My read: fair value is closer to $18-20 assuming 2026 net margin normalizes to 5-7% (below 2025's 9.9%) on ~$4.7B revenue, giving ~$280M NI and a fair 25-30x multiple = $7-8.4B EV, or ~$14-16/share plus $2/share net cash = $16-18. To get to $24 fair value you need to believe margins snap back to 10%+ and revenue growth reaccelerates above 18% — possible, but Q1-Q2'26 data argues the opposite direction. The narrative layer calling this "anchored/quiet-quality" is exactly wrong at an inflection point; anchored narratives break violently when the fundamental anchor slips, and two loss quarters is a slipping anchor. I'd want to see the Q3'26 print (margin direction, not revenue) before committing capital. Downside to $18 (~-25%), upside to $28 (~+17%) if margins recover — asymmetry is unfavorable.
GPT Reading
What stands out is that Pinterest is being valued like a stable, mid-teens growth ad platform, but the income statement underneath is less stable than that framing suggests. Revenue has been good: from $3.06B in 2023 to $3.65B in 2024 and $4.22B in 2025, a solid 15.6% increase last year, and the first half of 2026 kept that pace with Q1 up 18% and Q2 up 18% versus the prior year periods. The problem is that this growth is not dropping through cleanly. Q2 2026 revenue of $1.18B was strong against $998.2M a year ago, yet net income swung from +$38.8M to -$46.7M. Q1 showed the same pattern: revenue rose from $855.0M to $1.01B while net income fell from +$8.9M to -$73.6M. For a company with 80% gross margins and virtually no capex requirements, two consecutive quarterly losses in the face of high-teens growth tell me expenses are rising fast enough to challenge the “mature earner” label.
That matters because the stock is not optically expensive on sales, but it is expensive on actual earnings power if the recent margin slippage is real. At $13.1B market cap and roughly $12.1B enterprise value after net cash, investors are paying about 2.9x trailing revenue using the latest annual run rate adjusted for cash, which is not demanding for an internet platform. But they are also paying about 31x trailing net income and 44x EV/EBITDA for a business that produced only $319.9M of operating income in 2025, an operating margin of 7.6%. That is a full multiple for a company still proving that revenue growth can coexist with durable profitability. The cash flow looks excellent at first glance — $1.28B operating cash flow and $1.25B free cash flow in 2025 on only $32.4M of capex — but that gap versus just $416.9M of net income is wide enough that I don’t want to blindly capitalize FCF as if it were all recurring owner earnings. In ad platforms, stock comp and working-cap timing can flatter cash generation relative to economic profitability.
The annual net income series also needs cleaning before any model-driven comfort. 2024’s $1.86B net income on $3.65B revenue is obviously non-recurring given only $179.8M of operating income that year; if you don’t strip that out, P/E and ROE screens become misleading. Once normalized, the business has moved from operating losses in 2022 and 2023 to modest profitability in 2024 and 2025, but not yet to the kind of margin structure that deserves a premium multiple. The balance sheet is undeniably strong — no debt, nearly $1.0B of cash, current ratio above 7x — so this is not a solvency story. It is a quality-of-earnings and valuation-discipline story. At $24, I think the market is roughly right if you assume 15%-ish revenue growth continues and margins recover; I am less willing than the neutral models to give full credit for that recovery after two quarters of backward movement. My lean is that fair value is a bit lower, around $20-$22, until management shows that 2026 losses are investment-driven and temporary rather than the new cost base.
The best counterargument is straightforward and not weak: this is still one of the cleaner assets in digital advertising. Gross margin remains around 80%, the platform is capital-light, revenue growth has actually accelerated versus the 2023 base, and free cash flow generation relative to market cap is powerful — $1.25B of 2025 FCF against a $13.06B market cap is roughly a 9.6% FCF yield. If that cash flow is even mostly real, the stock is not expensive at all. A bull would also argue that quarterly net losses are noise around a business investing into monetization and international scale, and that Q4 seasonality can still make the full-year P&L look healthy, as seen by the $277.1M profit in Q4 2025. On that view, buying a debt-free platform at under 4x sales with high-teens top-line growth is exactly how you get paid before margins inflect upward. I weigh that argument less heavily because the market already knows the platform is high gross margin and asset-light; what is newly informative is that this advantage did not protect earnings in the last two reported quarters.
What would change my mind is evidence that the 2026 profit dip is already troughing while growth holds. Specifically, if the next two quarters show revenue still growing at 15%+ and net margin returns to at least mid-single digits outside of any one-off gains, I would be more comfortable underwriting 10%+ operating margins and a value above $24. Sustained operating income running above roughly $500M annualized, without relying on below-the-line items, would make today’s multiple look reasonable. Conversely, if revenue slows toward 10%-12% while losses persist into Q4 or management leans heavily on stock-based compensation to defend free cash flow, I would move more decisively bearish because the stock would then be valued on a profitability profile it has not earned.
Grok Reading
Pinterest at $24 prints as a capital-light ad platform that still grows the top line but has lost the earnings trajectory the trailing multiples pretend is intact. Revenue ran $4.22B in 2025, up roughly 16% from $3.65B, and the recent quarters keep delivering mid-teens growth—Q2 2026 at $1.18B versus $998M a year earlier, Q1 at $1.01B versus $855M. Gross margin sits near 80% and the balance sheet is fortress-clean: $969M cash, zero debt, current ratio above 7. Free cash flow of $1.25B in 2025 implies a trailing FCF yield near 9.5% on the $13B enterprise, which is the single most attractive number in the packet. That cash generation, not the GAAP earnings, is why the stock has a floor. The problem is what happened after the 2025 print: H1 2026 swung to cumulative losses of roughly $120M on $2.19B of revenue, flipping operating leverage into reverse after four consecutive profitable quarters. Trailing PE near 39x and EV/EBITDA above 44x are therefore capitalizing a profitability peak that is already rolling over, while ROE and ROIC languish in the high single digits. Insider activity is unambiguously one-way—repeated conversions followed by open-market sales through July and August 2026—and the secondary flags (decelerating quarterly revenue trend, below-sector benchmarks, macro headwinds) line up with the margin break rather than contradicting it.
The 2024 net-income spike to $1.86B was almost entirely a Q4 non-operating item and should be ignored for run-rate analysis; normalized earnings power is closer to the $320M of 2025 operating income, and even that is now in question. Seasonality remains extreme—Q4 still does the heavy lifting—so the real test is whether Q3/Q4 2026 can restore the 8–20% net margins seen in the back half of 2025. Until then the 17.6% revenue CAGR and 43.9% FCF CAGR are backward-looking ornaments on a business whose competitive moat in visual discovery is being pressured by short-form video platforms, exactly as the market-forces note warns. At 3.9x sales the multiple is not egregious for 15% growth, but it is not cheap once you stop annualizing the 2025 earnings peak and start annualizing the 2026 margin compression.
The strongest counter-argument is the cash-flow machine itself. A skeptic of my caution would note that $1.25B of FCF on minimal capex, zero leverage, and still-positive mid-teens top-line growth is precisely the profile that re-rates when ad budgets stabilize, and that the composite valuation already sits within pennies of the current price. They would also argue that Q1/Q2 losses may reflect temporary investment or mix rather than structural decay, and that an 80% gross-margin business with high-intent users retains pricing power that Instagram and TikTok cannot fully commoditize. I weigh that less heavily because the same data set already shows operating margin stuck at 7.6% even in the good year, earnings down 78% year-on-year on the recent print, and insiders selling into strength rather than buying the dip. Cash flow quality is adequate, not exceptional, once you discount the risk that 2026 FCF follows net income lower.
I would flip constructive on two hard prints: a return to double-digit operating margins in Q3 or Q4 2026 together with revenue growth re-accelerating above 18%, or a clear capital-return program (buybacks/dividend) that converts the FCF yield into shareholder yield while growth holds. Absent those, the stock is a fairly valued, low-narrative hold with downside skew if the margin recovery fails to appear by year-end.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Pinterest is a mature earner that has turned the corner on cash generation: revenue compounded from $2.58B (2021) to $4.22B (2025), gross margin has held around 78-80%, and FCF has climbed from $440M in 2022 to $1.25B in 2025. The balance sheet is pristine - $969M liquid cash, no net debt, and an Altman Z of 12.16 - so survival is not on the table. Earnings-quality mechanicals are clean (Beneish -3.15, accruals -8.8% of assets), and the 2024 net income of $1.86B was inflated by a deferred-tax valuation-allowance release, which is why 2025 net income normalized to $417M while FCF kept climbing - a positive tell, not a negative one. The soft spot is compensation. SBC runs 20.9% of revenue - roughly $880M/yr - which is the bulk of the delta between GAAP operating margin (7.6%) and the adjusted profitability the company markets. Buybacks recover only 63% of SBC, so repurchases are largely offsetting dilution rather than returning capital; diluted share count is roughly flat (688M vs 692M in 2021), which is disciplined but only because cash is being spent to hold the line. Insider activity is one-directional: 23 sells, zero buys in 12 months, with founder Silbermann on what looks like a systematic 10b5-1 conversion-and-sale program - not alarming in isolation but worth noting alongside heavy SBC. Net: a structurally profitable, cash-generative platform with a clean balance sheet and clean accounting, held back from a higher grade by heavy stock-based comp and a still-modest GAAP operating margin.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Composition of 2024 net income - confirm the size of the deferred tax valuation allowance release vs. operating earnings
- SBC trajectory: is stock comp as a % of revenue trending down as the company scales, or sticky at ~21%?
- Whether founder Silbermann's sales are under a Rule 10b5-1 plan and the size relative to remaining ownership
- User engagement metrics (MAU, ARPU by geography) to assess platform durability versus ad-market cyclicality
- Customer/advertiser concentration disclosures in the 10-K
- Buyback authorization remaining and pace of repurchases vs. SBC grant run-rate
The composite fair value is $21.34 and the signal-adjusted FV is $24.12 against a $24.06 price - literally zero upside on the blended read. The method spread is enormous and telling: DCF says $36.25, anchored P/E says $9.53, and the EPV floor collapses to $3.32. That $3-$36 range is not a signal, it is a Rorschach test - the DCF is optimistic on growth and margin, while the anchored P/E and EPV punish the fact that GAAP earnings are heavily subsidized by $880M of stock comp on $417M of net income. Averaged honestly, deserved value lands right around where the stock trades.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- SBC trajectory as a percent of revenue - any moderation directly lifts deserved value
- ad revenue growth guidance and MAU/ARPU trends outside US
- buyback pace net of dilution - are they actually shrinking the share count
- any one-time items inflating the $1.25B FCF figure
The tape is friendly-ish (Risk-On +52, VIX 14.3) and PINS's 0.91 beta means the macro backdrop is neither a meaningful tailwind nor a threat. What actually matters here is the narrative vacuum: this is a 'quiet-quality' name with minimal intensity and a low cult coefficient, so it does not participate in the AI/social-media enthusiasm driving flows into peers. The Q2 print beat but got sold anyway, a classic tell that positioning and story - not numbers - are setting the price. The Zillow off-site ad targeting deal is a genuine, if modest, positive news pulse that gives the bull case a fresh data point on monetization, and the upcoming Goldman Communacopia slot on Sept 9 is a chance for management to reintroduce the story. Against that, digital-ad narrative energy is being sucked into Reddit, Meta, and AI-adjacent names, leaving PINS as the utility nobody argues about. Net: pressure is roughly balanced, with a slight lean to headwind from narrative neglect offset by a friendly tape and a real news catalyst.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Analyst tone and target revisions post-Q2 print given the negative reaction despite the beat
- Whether the Zillow deal generates any follow-on partnership news or ad-CPM commentary
- Bill Ready's Sept 9 Goldman session for any narrative refresh or new AI/agentic-shopping angle
- Sector rotation - if AI-social flow reverses and capital rotates back into 'quiet quality', PINS is a prime beneficiary
AI reaches Pinterest through three channels at once: it upgrades the ranking and creative layer that historically capped monetization (clear positive, visible in 80.1% gross margin and $1.25B FCF with only 7.6% GAAP operating margin — plenty of room for operating leverage); it commoditizes the supply of attractive imagery, which floods the feed with synthetic content and erodes the curated aesthetic that is the product's actual differentiator; and it creates a new discovery interface that can satisfy the underlying inspiration need without an ad-supported session. The need survives; the ad-impression unit survives only if the session survives. Pinterest is neither a clean AI winner nor a clean casualty — it is a mid-scale attention pool whose monetization is improving faster than its distribution is deteriorating, for now.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- US/Canada MAU trajectory
- Sessions per user disclosures
- Share of visits from search referrals
- Any assistant/agent distribution deals
- Traffic mix from AI referrers
- Checkout or catalog API partnerships
- Impressions growth versus ARPU growth
- Ad load ceiling commentary
Digital advertising is in an expansion phase with industry-wide margin gains, driven by AI-optimized bidding and measurement that lifts ROAS and pulls budget from offline and untargeted channels. That flow benefits any platform with proprietary intent data, and Pinterest's planning/shopping signal is a legitimate differentiated dataset. Against it: rates near 4.63% and a headwind macro squeeze the discretionary consumer verticals Pinterest indexes to, and the same AI wave lets giants absorb long-tail budgets while assistants begin answering discovery queries directly. Net world read is mildly supportive — the category tide carries Pinterest, but does not hand it share.