Business Description
Primoris Services Corporation functions as a prominent specialized contracting firm, offering a wide array of services that include construction, fabrication, upkeep, modernization, and advanced engineering expertise throughout the United States and Canada. The company's operations are divided into three primary divisions: Utilities, Energy/Renewables, and Pipeline Services. The Utilities segment focuses on installing and maintaining both new and existing natural gas distribution networks, electrical transmission and distribution systems, and communications infrastructure. Within the Energy/Renewables segment, Primoris delivers comprehensive services such as engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC), alongside major civil projects like highway and bridge construction, demolition, site preparation, mass excavation, and flood control. This segment also provides retrofits, upgrades, repairs, and routine maintenance for industries ranging from renewable energy and energy storage to renewable fuels, petroleum refining, petrochemicals, and state departments of transportation. Finally, the Pipeline Services segment concentrates on the construction, maintenance, and integrity management of pipelines, in addition to installing compressor and pump stations and metering facilities for clients in the petroleum and petrochemical sectors, as well as gas, water, and sewer utility providers. Founded in 1960, Primoris Services Corporation is headquartered in Dallas, Texas.
Business History
Generated: Jun 10, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (17d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.09
Total Equity: $1.68B
Shares: 54,800,000
Total Debt: $950.90M
Cash: $541.30M
EBITDA: $504.60M
Total Debt: $950.90M
Cash: $541.30M
Revenue: $7.57B
Revenue: $7.57B
Revenue: $7.57B
Total Equity: $1.68B
Tax Rate: 28.4%
Equity: $1.68B
Total Debt: $950.90M
Cash: $541.30M
Current Liabilities: $1.85B
Long-Term Debt: $734.60M
Total Debt: $950.90M
Total Equity: $1.68B
Shares: 54,800,000
Shares: 54,800,000
CapEx: -$129.90M
Shares: 54,800,000
Stock Price: $103.90
Net Income: $274.90M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Primoris is executing well as a mature engineering & construction operator. Revenue more than doubled from $3.50B (2021) to $7.57B (2025), a ~21% CAGR, while operating margin expanded from 4.4% (2022 trough) to 5.5% (2025) and net income jumped from $115.7M to $274.9M. Crucially, the cash story flipped: FCF went from negative $54.1M in 2021 to $381.8M (2024) and $340.5M (2025), and OCF/NI sits at 1.48x with accruals at -2.3% of assets — earnings are real, not paper. Beneish M -2.63 and Altman Z 3.84 corroborate clean accrual behavior and adequate solvency.
Capital discipline is reasonable but not elite. Diluted share CAGR is just 0.8%, SBC is a trivial 0.3% of revenue, and buybacks offset ~50% of SBC — per-share value is protected but not actively grown via repurchase. Net debt of ~$410M against $340M annual FCF is manageable (~1.2x FCF) but means the balance sheet is a working tool, not a cushion. Insider tape shows mixed behavior: a notable open-market purchase by Vadlamudi (~$1.0M), against larger but routine-looking executive sales from Perisich and King — not a red flag, but no broad conviction signal either.
The core quality limitation is structural to the industry: 10-11% gross margins and ~5% operating margins leave little room for error, and E&C revenue is project-based with working-capital swings (visible in the lumpy FCF history). This is a well-run cyclical, not a fortress franchise.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Customer/end-market concentration (utility, renewables, pipeline mix) and backlog composition in 10-K
- Fixed-price vs cost-plus contract mix — drives margin risk
- Debt maturity schedule and covenants behind the $410M net debt position
- Whether 2024-2025 FCF strength reflects sustainable conversion or favorable working-capital timing on specific projects
- Acquisition history — revenue jumped from $4.4B to $7.6B in 3 years; how much was organic vs M&A (PLH Group integration?)
- Goodwill/intangibles balance and any impairment risk from past deals
At $103.90 and a ~$5.6B market cap, Primoris is being valued as a credible specialty-infrastructure compounder rather than as a beaten-down E&C contractor. The e2e read flagged 'High Conviction Required,' which is code for: fair-value methods don't agree, and any bull case leans on continued margin expansion off a still-thin ~5% operating margin base. Earnings quality is clean (score 3, no haircut needed), and operating cash flow inflecting from negative to $340M+ supports a higher deserved value than the trailing optics suggest — but the stock has already moved to reflect that.
Deserved value for a quality-Solid (29) E&C name with net debt, project-based cash flow volatility, and ~5% operating margins sits in the high-$90s to low-$110s range on conservative assumptions — essentially where it trades. There is no visible margin of safety, but also no priced-for-perfection setup demanding heroic growth. The bull case (energy-transition + utility capex cycle, sticky relationships) is plausible but already embedded; the bear case (cyclicality, competitive bidding margin compression) is the risk you accept at this price with no discount.
This is the common, correct verdict: a good-but-not-fortress business the market already understands, trading near deserved value. I'd want a real pullback before underwriting new capital.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward backlog growth and book-to-bill — is the capex cycle still accelerating or peaking?
- Operating margin trajectory in the next 1-2 quarters — does the 5% base move toward 6%+ or stall?
- Net debt trajectory and any guidance on capital return vs reinvestment
- Segment mix detail — how much of OCF inflection is recurring utility/maintenance vs one-time large project completions
The tape is roughly neutral with VIX in the upper half of its range and the S&P just off highs, but PRIM's 1.38 beta means even modest risk-off twitches get amplified here. More importantly, the May 2026 50% earnings-day crash is still the dominant overhang on this name; that kind of guide-down event leaves a sentiment scar that takes quarters, not weeks, to heal, especially in a steady-compounder archetype where the whole story rests on predictability. The narrative intensity is minimal and the cult coefficient is low, so there is no fan base to defend the stock on weak days.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Next earnings print - a clean beat or reaffirmed guide would flip the read
- Whether analyst targets hold or start drifting toward the $84 spot price (capitulation signal)
- 10y yield direction and any energy capex commentary from majors
- Backlog/book-to-bill disclosure at next update
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:04am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.5B | $4.4B | $5.7B | $6.4B | $7.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.1B | $4.0B | $5.1B | $5.7B | $6.8B |
| Gross Profit | $416.7M | $456.9M | $587.5M | $703.2M | $813.1M |
| Operating Expenses | $246.5M | $261.5M | $334.4M | $385.8M | $399.2M |
| Operating Income | $170.2M | $195.3M | $253.1M | $317.5M | $413.9M |
| Net Income | $115.7M | $133.0M | $126.1M | $180.9M | $274.9M |
| EBITDA | $275.9M | $297.7M | $362.9M | $415.8M | $504.6M |
| EPS | $2.19 | $2.50 | $2.37 | $3.37 | $5.09 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $200.5M | $248.7M | $217.8M | $455.8M | $541.3M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.3B |
| Total Assets | $2.5B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.2B | $4.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $759.1M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | $594.2M | $1.1B | $885.4M | $660.2M | $734.6M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.6B | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.7B |
| Total Equity | $990.1M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $727.4M | $847.7M | $961.0M | $1.1B | $1.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:01am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $79.7M | $83.3M | $198.6M | $508.3M | $470.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$133.8M | -$94.7M | -$103.0M | -$126.6M | -$129.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$54.1M | -$11.3M | $95.5M | $381.8M | $340.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$607.0M | -$387.2M | $9.3M | $99.3M | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$14.7M | -$6.0M | $0 | $0 | -$11.8M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$125.3M | $53.3M | -$35.4M | $237.9M | $79.9M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (17d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$8.6B $8.2B – $9.0B
|
$9.3B $9.2B – $9.3B
|
$10.1B $9.7B – $10.7B
|
$10.9B $10.4B – $11.5B
|
| EBITDA |
$585.5M $561.2M – $612.6M
|
$634.5M $631.7M – $637.3M
|
$689.6M $662.4M – $730.5M
|
$741.8M $712.5M – $785.8M
|
| Net Income |
$294.3M $286.1M – $363.8M
|
$328.9M $284.2M – $395.2M
|
$409.5M $388.5M – $441.1M
|
$451.0M $427.8M – $485.8M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:04am (17d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +26.4% | +29.3% | +11.4% | +19.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +9.7% | +28.6% | +19.7% | +15.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +14.8% | +29.6% | +25.4% | +30.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +14.9% | -5.2% | +43.4% | +52.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +7.9% | +21.9% | +14.6% | +21.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:03am (17d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-27 | Vadlamudi Koti | P-Purchase | 7,815.00 | $127.96 | $1.0M |
| 2026-05-28 | Perisich John M. | S-Sale | 2,133.00 | $125.75 | $268,221 |
| 2026-05-28 | Perisich John M. | S-Sale | 9,450.00 | $126.68 | $1.2M |
| 2026-05-28 | Perisich John M. | S-Sale | 6,017.00 | $127.66 | $768,121 |
| 2026-05-28 | Perisich John M. | S-Sale | 6,147.00 | $128.65 | $790,789 |
| 2026-05-28 | Perisich John M. | S-Sale | 5,855.00 | $129.85 | $760,286 |
| 2026-05-28 | Perisich John M. | S-Sale | 105.00 | $130.26 | $13,677 |
| 2026-05-27 | Vadlamudi Koti | A-Award | 7,815.00 | $127.96 | $1.0M |
| 2026-05-26 | King David Lee | S-Sale | 12,333.00 | $118.55 | $1.5M |
| 2026-05-26 | King David Lee | S-Sale | 3,917.00 | $119.66 | $468,722 |
| 2026-05-26 | King David Lee | S-Sale | 3,750.00 | $120.27 | $451,006 |
| 2026-04-30 | Ching Michael E. | A-Award | 268.00 | $37,500.00 | $10.1M |
| 2026-04-30 | Rodriguez Jose Ramon | A-Award | 268.00 | $37,500.00 | $10.1M |
| 2026-04-30 | MASHINSKI CARLA S | A-Award | 268.00 | $37,500.00 | $10.1M |
| 2026-04-30 | Wagner Patricia K | A-Award | 268.00 | $37,500.00 | $10.1M |
| 2026-04-30 | Schauerman John P. | A-Award | 268.00 | $37,500.00 | $10.1M |
| 2026-04-30 | MCCALLISTER TERRY D | A-Award | 268.00 | $37,500.00 | $10.1M |
| 2026-04-30 | Saluja Harpreet | A-Award | 268.00 | $37,500.00 | $10.1M |
| 2026-04-30 | King David Lee | A-Award | 268.00 | $37,500.00 | $10.1M |
| 2026-04-15 | MCCALLISTER TERRY D | P-Purchase | 10.14 | $164.40 | $1,668 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 10, 2026 3:00am (17d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-30 | $0.08 | 2026-04-30 | 2026-06-30 | 2026-07-15 |
| 2026-03-31 | $0.08 | 2026-02-17 | 2026-03-31 | 2026-04-15 |
| 2025-12-31 | $0.08 | 2025-10-29 | 2025-12-31 | 2026-01-15 |
| 2025-09-30 | $0.08 | 2025-07-30 | 2025-09-30 | 2025-10-15 |
| 2025-06-30 | $0.08 | 2025-04-30 | 2025-06-30 | 2025-07-15 |
| 2025-03-31 | $0.08 | 2025-02-24 | 2025-03-31 | 2025-04-15 |
| 2024-12-31 | $0.08 | 2024-11-04 | 2024-12-31 | 2025-01-15 |
| 2024-09-27 | $0.06 | 2024-08-05 | 2024-09-27 | 2024-10-11 |
| 2024-06-28 | $0.06 | 2024-05-01 | 2024-06-28 | 2024-07-15 |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.06 | 2024-02-21 | 2024-03-28 | 2024-04-15 |
| 2023-12-28 | $0.06 | 2023-11-07 | 2023-12-29 | 2024-01-12 |
| 2023-09-28 | $0.06 | 2023-08-02 | 2023-09-29 | 2023-10-13 |
| 2023-06-29 | $0.06 | 2023-05-03 | 2023-06-30 | 2023-07-14 |
| 2023-03-30 | $0.06 | 2023-02-22 | 2023-03-31 | 2023-04-14 |
| 2022-12-29 | $0.06 | 2022-11-03 | 2022-12-30 | 2023-01-13 |
| 2022-09-29 | $0.06 | 2022-08-03 | 2022-09-30 | 2022-10-14 |
| 2022-06-29 | $0.06 | 2022-05-04 | 2022-06-30 | 2022-07-15 |
| 2022-03-30 | $0.06 | 2022-02-24 | 2022-03-31 | 2022-04-14 |
| 2021-12-30 | $0.06 | 2021-11-03 | 2021-12-31 | 2022-01-14 |
| 2021-09-29 | $0.06 | 2021-08-03 | 2021-09-30 | 2021-10-15 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a more uncomfortable story than the synthesis admits. Strip out the TTM-flattering metrics and look at the quarterly trajectory: Q3'25 was the peak at $2.18B revenue / 4.3% margin / $94.6M NI. Since then, two consecutive sequential declines — Q4'25 dropped to $1.86B / 2.8% margin, and Q1'26 collapsed to $1.56B / 1.1% margin / $17.4M NI. That Q1'26 print is below Q2'24's $1.56B / 3.2% — meaning revenue is flat year-over-two-years on the most recent data point, and net income is down ~65% from that comp. The "19% revenue growth in 2025" and "52% earnings YoY" cited everywhere are backward-looking annual artifacts that bake in the H1-H3 2025 surge; the run-rate has already broken. Q1 seasonality in E&C is real, but Q1'26 margin of 1.1% versus Q1'25 of 2.7% is not seasonality — that's margin compression on a smaller revenue base.
The prior models broadly acknowledge "high conviction required" but I think they're still too generous. Market Forces calls it tailwinds; the narrative layer calls it a steady-compounder anchored to fundamentals. Both underweight the fact that the most recent quarter shows the cyclical contractor thesis playing out in real time — margins reverting toward the historical 2-2.5% range the pre-flight memo explicitly warned about. The insider activity table is also being mischaracterized as "Net Insider Buying": I count one 7,815-share purchase that exactly matches a 7,815-share award the same day (i.e., almost certainly an option exercise or RSU mechanic, not open-market conviction buying), against roughly 46,000 shares of straight sales in the same window. That's net selling dressed up by the classifier. The synthesis layer giving credit for "Net Insider Buying" is wrong on the tape.
A contrarian read: PRIM trades at 22.6x TTM PE and 13.3x EV/EBITDA on peak-cycle earnings. If 2026 reverts to a 2.5% net margin on, say, $7.8B revenue (modest growth), that's ~$195M NI — putting forward PE at ~29x, not 22x. The FCF CAGR of 88.8% is a base-effect mirage (working capital release, not durable cash earning power); operating CF of $470M on $275M NI implies meaningful working-capital tailwind that won't repeat if backlog converts more slowly. The bull case requires IRA/IIJA spending to remain politically protected through a potentially hostile administration, utility capex to keep accelerating, AND margins to hold at the new 4%+ level — three independent conditions. The bear case requires only one to break, and Q1'26 suggests one already has. Balance sheet data is missing (total debt and equity blank), which is a real gap given E&C companies live and die by surety capacity and working capital lines — I can't underwrite leverage risk without it.
Where I land: I dissent modestly from the "High Conviction Required" framing, which reads as a polite hold. Given Q1'26's actual print, this is closer to a sell-the-rip than a wait-and-see. Fair value on normalized 3% net margin and a 16-18x multiple (appropriate for a cyclical contractor, not a compounder) on ~$235M normalized NI gets you to $4.0-4.3B market cap, or $73-79 per share — roughly 25-30% below current. The $205 prior high was clearly bubble pricing; the current $104 is not yet cheap, it's just less expensive. I'd want to see either Q2'26 reaccelerate to $1.9B+ with 3.5%+ margins, OR the stock at $80 with the balance sheet disclosed and debt manageable, before committing. The narrative layer is right that this is a workmanlike story, not a cult — which means there's no premium to compress further from sentiment, only from earnings disappointment, and earnings are disappointing right now.
GPT Critique
In my independent analysis of Primoris Services Corporation, a few key points stand out from the raw data. Primoris has shown impressive revenue growth over the past five years, with a CAGR of 15.1%, reaching $7.57 billion in 2025 from $3.50 billion in 2021. This expansion seems buoyed by the secular tailwinds in infrastructure and energy transition sectors. However, recent quarterly data reveal a stark contrast to this growth narrative. The Q1 2026 revenue of $1.56 billion and net income margin of just 1.1% represent a concerning decline from previous quarters, suggesting potential challenges in maintaining past growth momentum.
I partially agree with Opus's assessment, particularly their conclusion about the recent decline in performance. Opus points out that Q1 2026's 1.1% net margin is a significant drop from previous quarters, signaling that the growth narrative might be faltering. This aligns with the data indicating a sequential revenue and margin decline since Q3 2025. Opus's skepticism about the optimistic forecasts for Primoris's sustained growth seems justified given these recent financial results. However, I diverge in my interpretation of their insider activity analysis. While Opus sees the insider transactions as net selling, the sheer volume of sales compared to purchases supports a bearish sentiment, even if the classification was technically inaccurate.
Where I disagree with Opus is their valuation range. Opus suggests a fair value of $75-80, but based on the company's historical growth and the potential for margins to stabilize at a higher level than currently observed, I believe the market has undervalued the resilience of Primoris's business model. The infrastructure sector is notoriously cyclical, yet Primoris has demonstrated the ability to capture growth opportunities effectively. If margins return to around 3% on slightly increased revenues, I would argue for a slightly higher fair value range of $80-85 per share.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I underestimate the potential for policy and economic shifts to impact Primoris's long-term prospects. With significant reliance on government infrastructure spending and energy transition projects, any changes in political priorities could quickly alter Primoris's growth trajectory and valuation assumptions. Additionally, the lack of detailed balance sheet data could mask potential leverage risks that might not be fully accounted for in either analysis.