Business Description
Shake Shack Inc. owns, operates, and licenses Shake Shack restaurants (Shacks) in the United States and internationally. Its Shacks offers hamburgers, hot dogs, chicken, crinkle cut fries, shakes, frozen custard, beer, wine, and other products. As of December 29, 2021, it operated 369 Shacks, including 218 domestic company-operated Shacks, 25 domestic licensed Shacks, and 126 international licensed Shacks. Shake Shack Inc. was founded in 2001 and is headquartered in New York, New York.
Business History
Generated: Jun 3, 2026 6:19pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:17pm (24d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.14
Total Equity: $525.33M
Shares: 41,847,000
Total Debt: $317.24M
Cash: $360.12M
EBITDA: $181.37M
Total Debt: $317.24M
Cash: $360.12M
Revenue: $1.45B
Revenue: $1.45B
Revenue: $1.45B
Total Equity: $525.33M
Tax Rate: 31.5%
Equity: $525.33M
Total Debt: $317.24M
Cash: $360.12M
Current Liabilities: $244.92M
Long-Term Debt: $247.73M
Total Debt: $317.24M
Total Equity: $525.33M
Shares: 41,847,000
Shares: 41,847,000
CapEx: -$165.85M
Shares: 41,847,000
Stock Price: $55.53
Net Income: $45.73M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The forensic picture has genuinely improved. Revenue compounded from $740M (2021) to $1.45B (2025), operating margin inflected from -2.1% to 5.9%, FCF flipped from -$43M to +$56.5M, and net cash is positive at $42.9M. Share count actually DECLINED from 44.2M to 41.8M in the latest year — that's the opposite of the usual restaurant-growth dilution story, and SBC is a modest 1.4% of revenue. Earnings quality screens largely clean: OCF/NI of 2.35x, negative accruals (-7.3%), self-funding. This is no longer a cash-burning concept story.
The catches are real though. The Beneish M of 8.37 is wildly elevated — likely driven by the margin/revenue inflection itself rather than fraud, but it deserves a look at gross margin reporting (the 2025 GM of 18% vs prior 45.8% looks like a reclassification/cost-of-revenue redefinition, not a real collapse — needs filing confirmation). Altman Z of 2.08 sits in the grey zone. And the pipeline's AI flag is correct: at $55.53 on ~$45.7M net income, this is ~49x trailing earnings for a restaurant chain with 369 units and a Q1 miss already on the tape.
The insider tape is the most interesting non-obvious signal. On 2026-05-15, SEVEN insiders — including founder Danny Meyer ($2.0M), Robert Lynch (CEO, $302K), and four directors — executed open-market P-purchases on the SAME DAY totaling ~$3.2M. That is a textbook cluster-buy, not routine activity, and it directly contradicts the 'neutral' upstream label. Cluster buys by the founder + CEO + multiple directors after a guidance disappointment are historically one of the higher-signal insider patterns.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:24pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $739.9M | $900.5M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $433.4M | $518.9M | $609.3M | $678.7M | $1.2B |
| Gross Profit | $306.5M | $381.5M | $478.2M | $573.9M | $259.8M |
| Operating Expenses | $322.4M | $408.4M | $472.3M | $570.9M | $174.0M |
| Operating Income | -$15.9M | -$26.9M | $5.9M | $3.0M | $85.8M |
| Net Income | -$4.6M | -$21.2M | $20.3M | $10.2M | $45.7M |
| EBITDA | $44.5M | $51.5M | $111.7M | $120.9M | $181.4M |
| EPS | $-0.22 | $-0.66 | $0.51 | $0.26 | $1.14 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:19pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $302.4M | $230.5M | $224.7M | $320.7M | $360.1M |
| Total Current Assets | $409.7M | $344.0M | $334.4M | $368.2M | $430.3M |
| Total Assets | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $121.5M | $147.7M | $164.1M | $187.3M | $244.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | $243.5M | $244.6M | $245.6M | $246.7M | $247.7M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| Total Equity | $409.5M | $412.2M | $443.4M | $470.0M | $525.3M |
| Retained Earnings | $3.6M | -$3.5M | $16.8M | $27.0M | $72.7M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:24pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $58.4M | $76.7M | $132.1M | $171.2M | $222.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$101.5M | -$142.6M | -$146.2M | -$135.5M | -$165.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$43.1M | -$65.8M | -$14.0M | $35.7M | $56.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $155.5M | -$71.9M | -$5.9M | $96.1M | $39.4M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:17pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$1.9B $1.8B – $2.0B
|
$2.2B $2.2B – $2.2B
|
$2.5B $2.4B – $2.6B
|
$2.8B $2.7B – $2.9B
|
| EBITDA |
$388.5M $374.2M – $398.7M
|
$438.3M $437.7M – $438.9M
|
$505.9M $489.6M – $520.0M
|
$572.2M $553.7M – $588.1M
|
| Net Income |
$71.0M $32.2M – $84.0M
|
$92.6M $73.3M – $93.9M
|
$102.1M $97.8M – $105.8M
|
$128.9M $123.5M – $133.6M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:24pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +21.7% | +20.8% | +15.2% | +15.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +24.5% | +25.3% | +20.0% | -54.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | -69.6% | +122.0% | -48.7% | +2,722.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -365.4% | +195.5% | -49.6% | +348.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +15.9% | +116.8% | +8.2% | +50.0% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:23pm (24d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | Hook Michelle Greig | A-Award | 20,548.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-10 | Walker Tristan | A-Award | 2,570.00 | $54.48 | $140,014 |
| 2026-06-10 | Meyer Daniel Harris | A-Award | 6,333.00 | $54.48 | $345,022 |
| 2026-06-10 | LAWRENCE JEFFREY D | A-Award | 4,589.00 | $54.48 | $250,009 |
| 2026-06-10 | GEORGE LORI A | A-Award | 2,754.00 | $54.48 | $150,038 |
| 2026-06-10 | Flug Jeffrey | A-Award | 2,891.00 | $54.48 | $157,502 |
| 2026-06-10 | Chapman Charles J III | A-Award | 4,039.00 | $54.48 | $220,045 |
| 2026-06-10 | Balbale Sumaiya | A-Award | 4,498.00 | $54.48 | $245,051 |
| 2026-05-23 | Lynch Robert | F-InKind | 3,687.00 | $62.72 | $231,249 |
| 2026-05-23 | Lynch Robert | F-InKind | 2,305.00 | $62.72 | $144,570 |
| 2026-05-11 | Hook Michelle Greig | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-05-15 | Silverman Josh | P-Purchase | 100.00 | $61.21 | $6,121 |
| 2026-05-15 | Silverman Josh | P-Purchase | 8,190.00 | $60.37 | $494,404 |
| 2026-05-15 | Flug Jeffrey | P-Purchase | 1,000.00 | $61.30 | $61,296 |
| 2026-05-15 | Chapman Charles J III | P-Purchase | 1,000.00 | $61.32 | $61,320 |
| 2026-05-15 | Chapman Charles J III | P-Purchase | 780.00 | $61.43 | $47,915 |
| 2026-05-15 | Chapman Charles J III | P-Purchase | 220.00 | $61.32 | $13,490 |
| 2026-05-15 | Balbale Sumaiya | P-Purchase | 4,068.00 | $61.42 | $249,866 |
| 2026-05-15 | Lynch Robert | P-Purchase | 5,000.00 | $60.39 | $301,940 |
| 2026-05-15 | Meyer Daniel Harris | P-Purchase | 32,258.00 | $61.88 | $2.0M |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a less heroic story than the bull case implies. Annual revenue went from $900M (2022) to $1.45B (2025) — a 17% CAGR, decent but not extraordinary for a "high-growth" tag. The 2025 operating income of $85.8M vs $3.0M in 2024 looks like a step-function improvement, but the annual 2025 gross margin shown ($259.8M / $1.45B = 17.9%) is wildly inconsistent with 2024's reported $573.9M gross on $1.25B (45.8%) — this is almost certainly a cost-reclassification (food/paper now in COGS vs. previously labor-inclusive) and the models seem to have glossed over it. That makes the "operating leverage" narrative harder to verify cleanly. Most damning: the Q1 2026 print — $366.7M revenue with a $290K net loss — is a sharp deceleration from Q4 2025's $400.5M/$11.8M and breaks the margin expansion story flat. Recent_revenue_yoy of 15.4% papers over the fact that quarterly NI has gone $17.1M → $12.5M → $11.8M → -$0.3M. That's not "decelerating," that's rolling over.
On valuation: 54x TTM P/E and 15.7x EV/EBITDA on a restaurant doing 5.9% operating margins with $56.5M FCF (capex $165.8M is eating most of operating cash) is rich. EV/Revenue of 2.6x for a fast-casual chain with sub-6% operating margins implies the market is paying ~44x operating earnings — Chipotle territory without Chipotle's 17% operating margins or $400K+ AUV economics. The reverse-DCF implication of 60% FCF growth from a $56M base is heroic when Q1 just printed a loss. The synthesis "High Conviction Required" verdict is a polite way of saying "priced for perfection and not delivering it this quarter."
Where I diverge from the prior models: the pre-flight calls this "high-growth," the classifier says "mature_earner" at 0.48 confidence, and the synthesis splits the difference. I think the classifier is closer to right than the AI overlay — 17% revenue CAGR with deteriorating quarterly margins and a Q1 loss is not a growth story you pay 54x for; it's a brand-premium consumer cyclical facing the exact "macro headwinds" the secondary signals flagged. The market-forces note about 2024 anomalies and high accruals deserves more weight than it got — the 2024→2025 NI jump from $10.2M to $45.7M is largely a one-time operational reset, not a new run-rate. The insider activity is mildly bullish (small open-market purchases at ~$55 in May 2026, post-Q1 miss), but these are tiny lots — 100 to 8,190 shares — not conviction buys from C-suite. F-InKind transactions are just tax withholding, not signal. The narrative layer's "40-50% of valuation is story" estimate feels directionally right; I'd push it to 50-60% given the Q1 print.
The contrarian case for going long here: SHAK is down 62% from highs, Q1 restaurant comps are notoriously noisy (weather, calendar shifts), $360M cash with manageable capex gives runway, and the licensing/international model genuinely is capital-light optionality the DCF can't capture. If Q2 reaccelerates and the cost-reclassification noise clears, the multiple compression already happened and you're buying a founder-led brand at 2.2x sales. But that requires believing Q1 was a blip — and the trajectory of quarterly NI ($17M → $12M → $12M → -$0.3M) argues it's a trend. I dissent modestly from the "High Conviction Required" hedge: the data leans negative, not neutral. Fair value on a normalized 4% net margin, 12% revenue growth, and a 25x multiple (still generous for the category) gets you to ~$1.7B market cap, or roughly $42/share — 24% below current. The bull case to $80 requires margin expansion to 8%+ and sustained mid-teens growth, which Q1 explicitly contradicts.
GPT Critique
Shake Shack's financial performance reveals a company in transition, grappling with growth expectations and operational realities. The revenue growth from $900.5M in 2022 to $1.45B in 2025, a 17% CAGR, indicates solid expansion, but not the explosive growth typically associated with high-growth labels. The recent Q1 2026 revenue of $366.7M, paired with a net loss of $290K, underscores a troubling trend, especially compared to the Q4 2025 performance of $400.5M revenue and $11.8M net income. This suggests not just deceleration but potentially a significant operational challenge. The cash flow situation, with operating cash flow at $222.4M but only $56.5M in free cash flow due to heavy capex of $165.8M, signals a tight balancing act between expansion and profitability.
Opus argues that Shake Shack's valuation is overstretched at a 54x P/E ratio, especially given the 5.9% operating margin and the recent quarterly loss. I agree with this assessment; the premium valuation seems unwarranted given the current financial trajectory and the market's implied expectations of a 60% FCF growth rate, which seems overly optimistic. The discrepancies in gross margin reporting between 2024 and 2025, likely due to cost reclassification, add opacity to the operating leverage narrative, making the investment case even shakier.
I also concur with Opus's skepticism toward the "high-growth" label applied to Shake Shack. The 17% CAGR over the past few years does not justify such a label, especially when accompanied by declining quarterly net income. The narrative of a brand-premium consumer cyclical is more fitting, reinforcing Opus's view that Shake Shack is not delivering the growth story its valuation demands. The insider transactions indicate mild bullish sentiment, but as Opus notes, the small scale of these purchases does not suggest strong insider confidence.
Where I might diverge slightly is on the potential for future growth. While Opus is skeptical about the Q1 miss being a blip, I see room for cautious optimism if Shake Shack can leverage its $360M cash position and capitalize on its international and licensing models. These models could offer a pathway to growth that the current domestic strategy is struggling to provide. However, this optimism is contingent on a clear and sustained improvement in operational execution.
A careful skeptic might argue both Opus and I are underestimating the potential for operational adjustments and the impact of Shake Shack's brand strength. They might point to the company's ability to navigate macroeconomic headwinds and the potential for a bounce-back in Q2 results. They could also highlight the historical resilience of the brand and the potential for strategic pivots to reignite growth.