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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Sherwin-Williams Company (SHW) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -10 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 67 · Value -73 · Sentiment 27 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $179.49 vs $362.71 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
The Sherwin-Williams Company
SHW NYSEThe Sherwin-Williams Company is a global manufacturer and distributor of paints, coatings, and related products serving professional, industrial, commercial, and retail customers. It operates through key business segments including the Paint Stores Group, Consumer Brands Group, and Performance Coatings Group, supported by administrative operations. The company is a leading provider of architectural paint in the United States, supplying premium coatings through an extensive network of branded stores as well as through big-box retailers. Beyond architectural applications, Sherwin-Williams delivers highly engineered coating solutions for construction, industrial, packaging, transportation, and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) markets. Its portfolio spans interior and exterior paints, stains, protective and marine coatings, powder coatings, and application-related supplies tailored to professional users and do-it-yourself consumers. Founded in 1866 and headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio, The Sherwin-Williams Company today plays a central role in the specialty chemicals and building materials ecosystem, offering technologies and products that support durability, appearance, and protection across diverse end markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 10.26
Total Equity: $4.60B
Shares: 250,400,000
Total Debt: $9.67B
Cash: $207.20M
EBITDA: $4.16B
Total Debt: $9.67B
Cash: $207.20M
Revenue: $23.57B
Revenue: $23.57B
Revenue: $23.57B
Total Equity: $4.60B
Tax Rate: 23.1%
Equity: $4.60B
Total Debt: $9.67B
Cash: $207.20M
Current Liabilities: $6.92B
Long-Term Debt: $9.32B
Total Debt: $9.67B
Total Equity: $4.60B
Shares: 250,400,000
Shares: 250,400,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 250,400,000
Stock Price: $362.71
Net Income: $2.57B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 5:05pm (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $19.9B | $22.1B | $23.1B | $23.1B | $23.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $11.4B | $12.8B | $12.3B | $11.9B | $12.1B |
| Gross Profit | $8.5B | $9.3B | $10.8B | $11.2B | $11.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $5.5B | $5.9B | $6.6B | $7.4B | $7.7B |
| Operating Income | $3.1B | $3.4B | $4.2B | $3.8B | $3.8B |
| Net Income | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.6B |
| EBITDA | $3.3B | $3.7B | $4.5B | $4.1B | $4.2B |
| EPS | $7.10 | $7.83 | $9.35 | $10.68 | $10.37 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $6.98 | $7.72 | $9.25 | $10.55 | $10.26 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 5:05pm (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $165.7M | $198.8M | $276.8M | $210.4M | $207.2M |
| Total Current Assets | $5.1B | $5.9B | $5.5B | $5.4B | $6.0B |
| Total Assets | $20.7B | $22.6B | $23.0B | $23.6B | $25.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $5.7B | $6.0B | $6.6B | $6.8B | $6.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | $8.6B | $9.6B | $8.4B | $8.2B | $9.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $18.2B | $19.5B | $19.2B | $19.6B | $21.3B |
| Total Equity | $2.4B | $3.1B | $3.7B | $4.1B | $4.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.1B | $3.5B | $5.3B | $7.2B | $1.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 5:05pm (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.2B | $1.9B | $3.5B | $3.2B | $3.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$210.9M | -$1.0B | -$264.7M | -$78.9M | -$1.2B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $2.1B | $1.2B | -$740.3M | $37.3M | $986.6M |
| Dividends Paid | -$587.1M | -$618.5M | -$623.7M | -$723.4M | -$789.8M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$60.9M | $33.1M | $78.0M | -$66.4M | -$3.2M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 5:05pm (17d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +11.1% | +4.1% | +0.2% | +2.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +9.2% | +15.4% | +4.1% | +2.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | +10.2% | +22.5% | -9.3% | +1.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +8.4% | +18.3% | +12.2% | -4.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +9.4% | +21.7% | -8.6% | +2.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:42am (17d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-22 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-14 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-15 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-16 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-15 | $0.72 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-16 | $0.72 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-16 | $0.72 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-23 | $0.72 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-16 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-17 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-18 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-24 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-17 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-18 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-19 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-25 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-18 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-19 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:04Even the bull case prices 63% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 73%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($362.71) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +9% | 12.7% | $133.22 | -63% |
| Base — stabilizes | +6% | 11.0% | $107.68 | -70% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 9.4% | $85.57 | -76% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +3% | 11.0% | $99.35 | -73% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-11AI shrinks the cost of the non-store overhead - demand forecasting, raw-material procurement, credit and order processing, formulation testing cycles in Performance Coatings - without touching the store-level labor that constitutes the moat, so savings land as operating leverage rather than as a competitive giveaway.
AI-native procurement and design tools can commoditize specification at the margin: agentic sourcing for national property-management and OEM accounts, AI color visualization that moves the color decision out of the store, and cheaper formulation work that helps private-label and big-box competitors close the quality gap on architectural paint.
Whether the professional contractor purchase stays a same-day physical pickup with local credit and rep relationships, or migrates to an agentic reorder that treats gallons as a spec-and-price commodity. Watch Paint Stores Group same-store volume versus price, and any growth in digital or national-account ordering that bypasses store consultation.
The store density itself - thousands of local inventory points, tinting equipment, contractor credit lines, and rep relationships built over decades - plus VOC and industrial-spec regulatory qualification and OEM approval lists that no model output can shortcut.
AI Lens thesis
AI reaches Sherwin-Williams almost entirely through cost and demand channels, not through the product: the underlying need (surfaces must be coated) is physical and permanent, the monetized unit (a gallon, mixed and delivered locally) is untouched by software, and the labor that applies the paint is exactly the kind of dexterous on-site work machine intelligence is worst at - which if anything keeps contractor time scarce and premium product mix intact. The genuine effects are second-order: internal SG&A and logistics automation against a 48.8 percent gross margin and 16.2 percent operating margin structure where the gap is store overhead, AI-assisted formulation shortening industrial coatings development, and AI-driven data center and electrification construction adding incremental protective-coatings demand. The offsetting pressures are real but narrow - cheaper formulation and design tools nudging private label upward, and agentic procurement commoditizing large-account specification. Net: a low-exposure name where AI is a modest margin friend and a modest commoditization risk, and the honest output is a narrow range around slightly favorable.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside AI-driven data center, grid, and semiconductor fab construction is a direct volume tailwind for Performance Coatings protective and marine products - an AI beneficiary line that sits inside a company nobody classifies as AI-exposed.
Downside AI-assisted formulation plus contract manufacturing lowers the technical barrier to a credible pro-grade private label, letting big-box and regional players attack the Consumer Brands and lower-end pro tiers where Sherwin-Williams already faces DIY softness.
Outcome range spread 24
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a story of a compounder running out of compound. Revenue CAGR of 1.1% over five years ($19.94B in 2021 to $23.57B in 2025) is not a growth business — it's a GDP-tracker with pricing. Earnings CAGR of 3.7% is barely inflation. Most damning: 2025 full-year net income of $2.57B was *below* 2024's $2.68B, so the trailing "growth compounder" thesis broke last year and nobody adjusted the multiple. Meanwhile the stock trades at 35x earnings, 4.15x EV/revenue, and 23.5x EV/EBITDA — multiples that price a 10%+ grower. Operating margin at 16.2% and ROIC of 20.9% are genuinely excellent, but ROE of 55.8% is a leverage artifact ($9.67B debt vs $4.60B equity, D/E of 2.1, current ratio 0.87). This is a well-run mature business wearing a growth-stock costume.
The quarterly trajectory in the file is where I get suspicious of the dataset itself — "2026-06-30" and "2026-03-31" prints are labeled but the current date context suggests these may be mis-tagged or forward-projected; treat with care. That said, if we take them at face value, Q2'26 rev of $6.79B vs Q2'25 of $6.31B is +7.6% YoY with margin expansion to 12.4% from 12.0% — a genuine reacceleration. But Q1'26 net income of $534.7M vs Q1'25's $503.9M is only +6.1% with margins flat. So even the optimistic read is high-single-digit earnings growth, not the 12-15% the multiple demands. The synthesis DCF of $175 signal-adjusted to $195 looks aggressive on the downside — I'd argue fair value is higher because SHW's distribution moat (5,000+ company-owned stores servicing pro contractors) genuinely does deserve a premium to a commodity chemicals DCF. But 86% premium? No.
Where I partially disagree with the models: the narrative layer nails the setup but the market-forces "neutral" call is too generous — this is a stock where the asymmetry is skewed to the downside because there is no realistic scenario where SHW surprises to the upside enough to justify 35x, whereas any housing/contractor softness compresses the multiple to 22-25x fast (implying $230-260). The contrarian argument for staying long: SHW has repeatedly defied bearish calls for a decade, Berkshire-adjacent quality names get bid regardless of DCF, and the pro-contractor lock-in via store network is a real quasi-monopoly that PPG and Benjamin Moore cannot replicate at scale. Buffett-style: you pay up for compounders and let time work. Fair. But time works when earnings compound — and 2025 earnings went backwards. The insider data (four small A-Awards, likely director grants) is essentially null — no signal either way, and the model correctly flagged it as such rather than confabulating.
I agree with the synthesis direction but dissent on magnitude. $195 fair value implies a 46% drawdown, which is a "sell everything" call inconsistent with SHW's demonstrated resilience and moat quality. My fair value range is $240-280 (20-23x on ~$11-12 normalized EPS with 5-7% growth and 16-17% op margins), implying 25-35% downside not 46%. The stock is overvalued but not catastrophically so — it's priced for a story that's slowly eroding, and the rerating happens gradually via multiple compression during any cyclical wobble, not a cliff. The trigger I'd watch: two consecutive quarters of negative YoY earnings (Q4'25 was $476.8M vs $480.1M — already inflected) combined with any pro-contractor volume weakness commentary. Housing starts and existing home sales are the exogenous variable; if 2026 mortgage rates stay above 6.5%, DIY and remodel demand stays soft and SHW's pricing lever runs out. I would not short (moats + buyback discipline + narrative durability protect the downside floor), and I would not buy here. Trim above $360, revisit at $270.
GPT Reading
Sherwin-Williams looks like a very good business priced like an exceptional growth asset, and the numbers here don’t support that distinction. Revenue has essentially stalled at a high level: $23.57B in 2025 versus $23.10B in 2024 and $23.05B in 2023. That is roughly 2% growth last year and basically no growth over two years. Operating income tells an even less flattering story for the multiple: $3.82B in 2025 is still below the $4.16B posted in 2023. Net income rose to $2.57B in 2025, but that is not a breakout result against a current $88B market cap and 35.4x earnings. On a sales basis, investors are paying 3.85x revenue for a paint and coatings company growing barely above inflation. That can work for a software compounder; it is a stretch for a mature chemicals franchise, even a best-in-class one.
The quarterlies show why the stock still commands admiration: margins are resilient and the business keeps squeezing more from a flat top line. Q2 2026 revenue was $6.79B, up from $6.31B a year earlier, but net income was $843.6M versus $754.7M, lifting margin from 12.0% to 12.4%. Q1 2026 was similar, with revenue up to $5.67B from $5.31B and net income up to $534.7M from $503.9M. Gross margin for 2025 was 48.9% and operating margin 16.2%, both strong for an industrial business. ROIC at 20.9% is the real quality marker. The problem is that the market already more than pays for these strengths. An EV/EBITDA of 23.5x and EV/revenue of 4.15x imply not just durability, but sustained premium growth and little cyclicality. Yet the reported growth profile is low-single-digit revenue and mid-single-digit earnings at best.
The balance sheet and valuation mismatch make the premium harder to defend. Sherwin has just $207M of cash against $9.67B of debt and only $4.60B of equity, which helps explain the eye-popping 55.9% ROE and 19.8x book multiple. That is not a sign of hidden cheapness; it is what happens when a great business is layered with leverage and buybacks. The current ratio of 0.87 is not alarming for this model, but it does mean this is not some fortress-balance-sheet defensive stock that deserves any price. Operating cash flow of $3.45B is solid, but even capitalizing that generously does not get me close to $363 unless I assume years of high-single-digit earnings growth plus sustained all-time-ish margin performance. The raw data instead say “elite operator, mature category.”
The best argument against my view is that Sherwin is not a normal coatings company and should not be valued like one. The store network, contractor relationships, brand power, and pricing discipline may justify a persistent premium, and recent quarterly revenue acceleration from $6.31B to $6.79B suggests the annual flatness may understate current momentum. Net income in the latest two quarters rose faster than sales, and if that trend holds, the 2025 annual numbers may prove to be a trough-ish bridge rather than a ceiling. A 20.9% ROIC business with nearly 49% gross margins can compound value through mix, pricing, and share gains even when end markets are soft. If investors believe Sherwin can convert 2%-4% organic growth into 8%-10% EPS growth for a long time, then a premium multiple is understandable. I weigh that less heavily because the present multiple already discounts that optimistic path with little room for macro or housing weakness.
What would change my mind is simple: I’d need to see the annual numbers start matching the story embedded in the price. If 2026 can exit with revenue clearly above $24.5B, operating income back through the 2023 peak and toward $4.3B-$4.5B, and net income pushing past $2.9B with no balance-sheet deterioration, then the stock would look more like an expensive quality compounder than a stretched mature earner. Absent that, any sign that quarterly revenue growth slips back toward 0%-2% or margins stall around the low-16% operating range should force a rerating. At $363, the burden of proof is on sustained acceleration, not on business quality.
Grok Reading
Sherwin-Williams at $362.71 is a high-quality paint franchise being priced like a structural compounder while the income statement tells a mature, low-growth story. Annual revenue crawled from $23.05B in 2023 to $23.10B in 2024 to $23.57B in 2025; the computed revenue CAGR is 1.1% and recent revenue YoY is only 2.1%. Net income actually fell from $2.68B in 2024 to $2.57B in 2025, and operating income remains below the 2023 peak of $4.16B at $3.82B. A 35.4x P/E, 23.5x EV/EBITDA, and 19.8x P/B against mid-single-digit (or worse) earnings growth and a −4.2% recent earnings YoY is the central contradiction: the multiple embeds 12–15% perpetual compounding that the last five years of numbers simply do not deliver. Gross margin at 48.9% and ROIC at 20.9% confirm real operating excellence, but excellence without growth does not justify an 86% premium to a ~$195 DCF anchor.
The balance sheet reinforces the mature-earner reality rather than the platform-monopoly narrative. Debt sits at $9.67B against $207M of cash and only $4.60B of equity, producing a 2.10 debt-to-equity ratio and a sub-1.0 current ratio of 0.87. ROE of 55.9% is mechanically inflated by that leverage and the thin equity base; it is not evidence of explosive economic profit growth. Operating cash flow of $3.45B is solid and funds the business, yet free-cash-flow CAGR is reported at −1%, and the dividend yield is a token 0.88%. Quarterly prints remain seasonally coherent—Q2 2026 revenue of $6.79B and 12.4% net margin versus softer winter quarters—but the pattern is cyclical paint demand, not secular acceleration. Insider activity is noise (tiny A-Awards), offering no signal that management sees dislocation.
The valuation synthesis verdict of overvalued at a signal-adjusted fair value near $195 versus $363 is directionally correct and should not be waved away by brand reverence. At 3.85x sales and 4.15x EV/revenue for ~1% top-line growth, the market is paying a specialty-software multiple for a specialty-chemicals volume business exposed to housing, contractor budgets, and input costs. The pre-flight thesis that 35x earnings prices high-single-digit growth and sustained elevated margins is exactly the bet; the momentum tape shows that bet is not being cashed.
The strongest opposing case is the durability of the moat and the track record of defying housing softness. The 5,000-plus store network, professional-contractor lock-in, and pricing power have allowed gross margins to expand from the low-40s toward 49% over the five-year window even as volumes wobbled, and ROIC above 20% is rare in Basic Materials. A smart opponent would note that SHW has repeatedly beaten low expectations through price/mix, that institutional sponsorship and the “best-in-class compounder” sell-side frame have kept the multiple elevated through prior slowdowns, and that any normalized mid-cycle earnings power plus modest multiple compression still leaves a franchise worth owning—just not at 35x. That argument is real; it explains why the stock has not already rerated. It does not erase the arithmetic: paying 35x for 2% revenue growth and declining annual net income is a hope multiple, not a cash-flow multiple. The narrative layer’s own bear case—that this is a cyclical dressed as structural—fits the reported CAGRs better than the bull story of unassailable 12–15% compounding.
Mind-changers would be concrete: two consecutive quarters of revenue growth at or above 6–7% with operating margin holding above 16%, a full-year 2026 net income print that decisively clears $2.9B and restores positive earnings CAGR above 8%, or clear evidence that architectural volumes are re-accelerating with housing starts rather than merely holding share. A sustained drop in net debt or a current ratio rebuild above 1.0 would also reduce the leverage overhang. Absent those, the gap between $363 and fundamental value near the high-$100s to low-$200s remains the dominant feature.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Sherwin-Williams shows the profile of a mature, high-integrity earner. Revenue has grown from $19.94B (2021) to $23.57B (2025), but the real story is margin expansion: gross margin lifted from 42.8% to 48.8% and operating margin sits at 16.2% versus 15.5% four years ago, indicating pricing power and recovery from raw-material cost shocks. Net income rose from $1.86B to $2.57B and FCF from $2.24B to $3.45B, with OCF/NI at 1.23x and accruals at -2.4% of assets - cash conversion is clean and Beneish M of -2.5 shows no manipulation flags. Altman Z of 3.89 places it firmly in the safe zone. Capital return is disciplined: diluted shares fell from 267.1M to 250.4M (-1.6% CAGR) while SBC is a modest 0.5% of revenue, meaning buybacks genuinely concentrate per-share value rather than mask dilution. The main blemish is the balance sheet: net debt of $9.46B against just $207M liquid cash, with $350M short-term debt exceeding cash on hand. For a business generating $3.45B FCF this is easily serviceable, but it is a constraint, not a cushion, and leaves less optionality in a downturn. Insider activity shows only routine equity awards - no directional buying to lean on, but no selling pressure either.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and weighted average interest rate on the $9.46B net debt position
- Whether recent revenue deceleration reflects volume weakness or price/mix, per segment (Paint Stores vs Consumer vs Performance Coatings)
- Customer/channel concentration in Paint Stores Group and any exposure to housing turnover
- Pension and lease obligations off-balance-sheet contributions to effective leverage
- Recent buyback authorization size and pace versus FCF
The e2e composite fair value sits at $175.23, with a signal-adjusted FV of $195.03 and an anchored-PE read of $234.31 - all well below the $362.71 price. Even giving full credit to the highest method (anchored-PE), the stock trades roughly 55% above it; against the signal-adjusted composite the implied downside is about 46%. The EPV floor of $116.15 shows what the business is worth on current earnings power without growth credit - a stark reminder that a lot of future compounding is already in the tape. Quality is real (67 score, clean earnings, moat via 5,000+ stores, 600bp gross margin expansion) and that justifies a premium multiple - but a premium is not infinity. The market is paying for a mid-teens perpetual compounder in a mature, cyclical paint business carrying $9.46B net debt. Earnings quality is high, so no haircut is warranted, but there is also no hidden value to unlock. The gap is not a fat-finger mispricing; it is the classic 'great company, full price' setup where forward returns compress toward mid-single digits unless multiples expand further.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward organic volume growth by segment (Pro Architectural vs DIY vs Industrial)
- Gross margin sustainability now that raw material tailwind is fading
- FCF conversion and buyback pace vs debt paydown priorities
- Any 2025 guidance revision reflecting housing/repaint cycle
The macro tape is mildly supportive (risk-on +47, VIX 15.5, indices near highs) and SHW's 1.09 beta means it participates without being whipped. More importantly, the active narrative on this name is a strong, moderately durable 'platform-monopoly compounder' story - the market is treating SHW as a quasi-utility with structural pricing power, which is precisely the kind of story that holds a premium multiple in a calm tape. That narrative, not the DCF, is what has the stock at $363 vs a $195 anchor, and it is currently intact. Momentum reads strong-positive with declining leverage and low revenue volatility, which reinforces the 'safe compounder' framing and gives holders no reason to sell. The only real sentiment headwinds are macro-structural: 10y at 4.65% and a market PE of 26 make any premium-multiple defensive name vulnerable to a rates or risk-off shock, and the bear counter-narrative (mature cyclical mispriced as a compounder) is a live but dormant risk. Net: the pressure on this specific name leans positive - the story is winning, the tape is friendly, and there is no visible narrative crack yet.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Housing turnover and contractor demand data prints that could animate the bear cyclical narrative
- Any analyst downgrade or target cut that cracks the compounder framing
- 10y yield break above 4.75-5.00 that pressures premium-multiple defensives
- VIX spike or regime flip to risk-off that would hit high-multiple names first
- Guidance or margin commentary that challenges the pricing-power story
AI reaches Sherwin-Williams almost entirely through cost and demand channels, not through the product: the underlying need (surfaces must be coated) is physical and permanent, the monetized unit (a gallon, mixed and delivered locally) is untouched by software, and the labor that applies the paint is exactly the kind of dexterous on-site work machine intelligence is worst at - which if anything keeps contractor time scarce and premium product mix intact. The genuine effects are second-order: internal SG&A and logistics automation against a 48.8 percent gross margin and 16.2 percent operating margin structure where the gap is store overhead, AI-assisted formulation shortening industrial coatings development, and AI-driven data center and electrification construction adding incremental protective-coatings demand. The offsetting pressures are real but narrow - cheaper formulation and design tools nudging private label upward, and agentic procurement commoditizing large-account specification. Net: a low-exposure name where AI is a modest margin friend and a modest commoditization risk, and the honest output is a narrow range around slightly favorable.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Store network expansion versus rivals
- Contractor account retention rates
- Skilled painter labor availability
- Regional competitor store closures
- US existing home sales and turnover
- Nonresidential construction starts
- Industrial production and OEM build rates
- Maintenance repaint cycle timing
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 11, 2026, SHW was $362.71. We expect it to be $335.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $260.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 11, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.