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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Schlumberger Limited (SLB) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -15 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 20 · Value -43 · Sentiment 12 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $57.04 vs $48.92 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Schlumberger Limited
SLB NYSESchlumberger Limited is a global oilfield services and technology company that provides advanced solutions to the energy industry. The company focuses on reservoir characterization, drilling, production, and processing services that help exploration and production companies optimize hydrocarbon discovery and recovery. Schlumberger delivers technologies such as subsurface imaging, well construction tools, production enhancement services, and integrated project management, supported by a growing suite of digital platforms and software. Its offerings serve conventional and unconventional oil and gas developments, offshore and onshore fields, and increasingly low-carbon and energy transition projects. With a diversified international footprint and a broad portfolio of proprietary technologies, Schlumberger plays a central role in enabling efficient, data-driven operations across the oil and gas value chain. Founded in 1926 and headquartered in Houston, Texas, it operates today as one of the leading providers of technology and services to the global energy sector.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.35
Total Equity: $27.29B
Shares: 1,437,000,000
Total Debt: $9.74B
Cash: $0.00
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $9.74B
Cash: $0.00
Revenue: $35.71B
Revenue: $35.71B
Revenue: $35.71B
Total Equity: $27.29B
Tax Rate: 19.6%
Equity: $27.29B
Total Debt: $9.74B
Cash: $0.00
Current Liabilities: $14.72B
Long-Term Debt: $9.74B
Total Debt: $9.74B
Total Equity: $27.29B
Shares: 1,437,000,000
Shares: 1,437,000,000
CapEx: -$1.69B
Shares: 1,437,000,000
Stock Price: $48.91
Net Income: $3.37B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 5:17pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $22.9B | $28.1B | $33.1B | $36.3B | $35.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $893.0M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.0B |
| Operating Income | $3.4B | $5.0B | $6.5B | — | — |
| Net Income | $1.9B | $3.4B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $3.4B |
| EBITDA | $5.5B | $7.2B | $8.8B | — | — |
| EPS | $1.34 | $2.43 | $2.95 | $3.14 | $2.38 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.32 | $2.39 | $2.91 | $3.11 | $2.35 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 5:02pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Current Assets | $12.7B | $15.0B | $17.7B | $18.6B | $19.5B |
| Total Assets | $41.5B | $43.1B | $48.0B | $48.9B | $54.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $10.4B | $12.0B | $13.4B | $12.8B | $14.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $13.3B | $10.6B | $10.8B | $11.0B | $9.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $26.2B | $25.1B | $26.6B | $26.6B | $27.6B |
| Total Equity | $15.3B | $18.0B | $21.4B | $22.4B | $27.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $8.2B | $10.7B | $13.5B | $16.4B | $18.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 5:17pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.7B | $3.7B | $6.6B | $6.6B | $6.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.1B | -$1.6B | -$1.9B | -$1.9B | -$1.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.5B | $2.1B | $4.7B | $4.7B | $4.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$2.0B | -$1.7B | -$584.0M | $520.0M | -$1.6B |
| Dividends Paid | -$699.0M | -$848.0M | -$1.3B | -$1.5B | -$1.6B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $908.0M | -$50.0M | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 5:17pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +22.5% | +18.0% | +9.5% | -1.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +48.9% | +30.2% | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +82.9% | +22.1% | +6.1% | -24.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | +30.5% | +23.4% | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 23, 2026 8:55pm (30d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-03 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-11 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-03 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-03 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-04 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-05 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-04 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-04 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-05 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-06 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-05 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-05 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-06 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-07 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-06 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-06 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-31 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-08 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-30 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-31 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a deteriorating story that the "fair value" verdict soft-pedals. Revenue rolled from $9.28B in Q4'24 to $8.49B in Q1'25, and net income compressed from $1.10B to $797M — margins have stepped down from a 12-13% band in 2024 to an 8-9% band across the last four quarters, with Q1'26 at 8.6% on $8.72B. That's not cyclical noise; that's a ~350bp margin reset that dropped annual NI from $4.46B (2024) to $3.37B (2025), a 24% earnings decline on 1.6% revenue softness. Extrapolating the current run-rate (~$35B revenue, ~8.5% margin) gives ~$3.0B forward NI, which at today's $72.6B cap is 24x forward — not the 20.8x trailing PE that anchors the "reasonable" narrative. The quarterly trend is flat-to-down, not "accelerating" as the revenue confidence signal claims; that tag looks wrong.
Where I agree with the model stack: the Market Forces "strong headwinds" call and the bear narrative are closer to what the tape says than the synthesis "fair value" verdict. The synthesis composite of $60.20 implicitly assumes mean reversion to 2024 margins — but with ChampionX integration costs, ongoing NAM weakness, and international pricing pressure evident in the Q1'26 print, there is no visible catalyst for a 12% margin snapback in 2026. The pre-flight thesis correctly names the tension (market pricing sustained mid-cycle margins) but doesn't stress-test what happens if the 8.5% margin is the new floor rather than the trough. Insider activity is being called "neutral" — I read 80k+ shares of sales in May 2026 against modest option exercises and awards as mildly negative, not neutral. Nobody's buying.
The contrarian bull case: SLB generated $4.8B FCF on $35.7B revenue (13.4% FCF margin), still covers its 2.37% dividend at a 47% payout, D/E is only 0.36, and ROE remains 12.4% even in a compressed period. If oil capex re-accelerates on a supply shock or OPEC+ discipline breaking down the other direction, operating leverage on an international-mix book is real — 2024 showed you can do $1.1B/quarter NI on similar revenue. At $48.91 you're paying 15x mid-cycle earnings of ~$4.5-5B, which is not expensive for the global #1 in a consolidating industry. The Delfi/digital optionality is real but small (single-digit % of revenue) and shouldn't anchor the thesis. The honest bull argument is "cheap enough on normalized earnings if you believe the cycle isn't broken" — but that's a macro bet on oil capex, not a stock-picking edge.
Where the data is thin: no gross margin disclosure in the annuals provided, no cash balance given (only debt), and the dating on quarterly data showing 2026-03-31 suggests we're mid-2026 with only one quarter of visibility into whether the 8.5% margin regime persists or recovers. Without knowing segment mix (Digital & Integration vs. Reservoir Performance vs. Well Construction vs. Production Systems), I can't tell if the margin compression is North America pressure pumping (transitory) or international pricing (structural). That matters enormously and none of the prior models addressed it. I dissent from the synthesis "fair value +2.6%" framing: the composite is averaging a backward-looking DCF against a deteriorating trajectory and calling it a wash. The Market Forces model, calling headwinds, is directionally more honest. My read is mildly overvalued at $48.91 on current run-rate earnings — fair value closer to $42-45 unless margins recover to 10%+ within two quarters, in which case $55+ is defensible. This is a "wait for the next print or a $43 handle" setup, not a buy here.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is that SLB is not being valued as a distressed cyclical despite the numbers already showing a mid-cycle roll-over. Revenue peaked at $36.29B in 2024 and slipped to $35.71B in 2025, while net income fell much harder from $4.46B to $3.37B, a 24% drop on just a 1.6% revenue decline. That is operating leverage working the wrong way. The quarterly path is also weaker than the “steady compounder” framing implies: recent quarters have settled into an $8.5B-$9.0B run-rate outside seasonally stronger Q4, versus $9.1B-$9.3B in mid-2024, and net margins have compressed from 12.2%-12.9% in 2024’s middle quarters to 8.3%-9.4% in most of 2025 and 8.5%-8.6% in the latest two quarters. If this were just a revenue wobble, 20.8x earnings might be fine; for a business showing sharp margin compression, it looks full.
The cash flow is the main support for the equity case, but even there I think investors are paying for quality they mostly already have. $6.49B of operating cash flow and $4.80B of free cash flow on a $72.6B market cap is roughly a 6.6% FCF yield. That is respectable, not cheap, especially for an oilfield services name with macro sensitivity and no visible topline growth. The balance sheet is healthy enough — $9.74B debt against $27.29B equity, debt/equity 0.36, current ratio 1.33 — so I do not see solvency risk. But strength of balance sheet should protect downside, not justify a premium multiple when earnings power is clearly below 2024 levels. At 1.97x sales and 2.58x book, the stock is priced for stability in returns; yet ROE is only 12.4% and net margin 9.5%, both already below what the market seemed willing to underwrite when margins were running 12%+.
I also don’t fully buy the idea that the latest data show stabilization. Yes, 2026 Q1 revenue of $8.72B is up modestly from 2025 Q1’s $8.49B, but net income fell from $797M to $752M and margin slipped from 9.4% to 8.6%. That is a worse mix than a simple cyclical plateau. The strongest recent quarter on earnings was 2025 Q2 with $1.01B of net income and 11.9% margin, and SLB has not come close to sustaining that since. If the bull case is that international resilience and technology mix offset North America softness, the evidence in these reported numbers is partial at best. The market seems to be awarding a mature-quality multiple to a business whose earnings trend is deteriorating faster than revenue, and that mismatch usually ends with a derating rather than a rerating higher.
The best case against my view is straightforward: this is exactly the kind of company that screens “expensive” near a temporary earnings trough and then surprises positively. Even after the profit drop, SLB still produced $3.37B of annual net income and nearly $5B of free cash flow, pays a 2.4% dividend with a sub-50% payout ratio, and has enough balance-sheet flexibility to keep returning capital through a soft patch. If margins merely recover from the current 8.5%-8.6% range toward 11%-12% on flat revenue, EPS power rises quickly and 20.8x trailing earnings can compress to something much more reasonable on forward numbers. A fair value argument around the low-$50s is not crazy if 2025 proves to be the trough year for earnings and if quarterly revenue stays above $8.5B while cost actions restore profitability. I weigh that less heavily because the actual sequence of reported quarters has shown repeated inability to hold double-digit margins, not a one-off stumble.
What would change my mind is specific evidence that 2024’s profitability was not the peak. I would turn constructive if SLB can post two consecutive quarters with revenue above $9.0B and net margin back above 10.5%, or if annualized free cash flow moves sustainably above $5.5B without balance-sheet stretch. Conversely, if revenue slips below an $8.5B quarterly run-rate or margins remain sub-9% through the next few prints, the market should stop treating this as a stable earner and start valuing it more like a late-cycle service name. On that basis, I think the stock deserves a lower multiple than it has today.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a high-quality mature earner losing altitude on margins while the market still pays a full cycle multiple. Annual revenue slipped from $36.29B in 2024 to $35.71B in 2025, a modest 1.6% contraction, yet net income collapsed from $4.46B to $3.37B—a 24% drop that compressed net margin from the 12–13% range printed through most of 2024 into the mid-8% zone in the three most recent quarters ($752M on $8.72B, $824M on $9.74B, $739M on $8.93B). That is not noise; it is structural margin erosion showing up in real time. At $48.91 the stock still commands a 20.8x trailing PE and 2.0x sales on a business whose earnings CAGR is already –10.4%. Free-cash-flow remains the bright spot—$4.80B against only $1.69B of capex and a clean $9.74B debt load against $27.29B of equity—but investors are paying roughly 15x that FCF for a company whose top-line growth has stalled and whose profitability is visibly rolling over.
What stands out most is the divergence between cash generation and reported profitability. Operating cash flow of $6.49B still covers the dividend (2.4% yield, 47% payout) with room to spare and keeps the balance sheet fortress-like (D/E 0.36, current ratio 1.33). Yet ROE has already slipped to 12.4% and ROA to 6.2%, levels that look pedestrian once you strip away the peak-margin years. Insider activity is a steady drip of sales, not accumulation. The revenue “acceleration” flag in the secondary signals is cold comfort when the absolute level is still below the 2024 run-rate and every incremental dollar is converting to less net income.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward: $4.8B of annual free cash flow at a $72.6B enterprise is a 6.6% FCF yield, the international franchise and digital overlay (Delfi) give SLB more resilience than pure North American peers, and the signal-adjusted fair-value work already haircuts the $60 composite down to roughly $50—right on top of today’s price. A patient capital allocator can argue that you are being paid a mid-single-digit cash yield to own the best balance sheet in oilfield services while waiting for the next upstream spending upcycle. That case is real; I simply weigh the 400 bp margin compression and the –24% earnings print more heavily than the residual cash-flow yield, because cyclicals that lose pricing power rarely re-rate upward until the margin trough is visibly behind them.
I would flip constructive on two concrete data points: consecutive quarters of net margin back above 11% with revenue holding above $9B, or a clear re-acceleration in international product sales that lifts the full-year 2026 earnings run-rate back toward $4.2B-plus. Until then the stock is a show-me story priced as if the show has already started.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
SLB is a mature, cash-generative oilfield services business: revenue grew from $22.9B (2021) to a peak of $36.3B (2024) before slipping to $35.7B (2025), with FCF steadily rising to $4.80B and OCF/NI at a healthy 1.71x. Accruals at -4.5% of assets and no mechanical earnings-quality flags suggest reported earnings are backed by cash. Diluted share count has been essentially flat at ~1.44B (0.2% CAGR) with modest SBC at 0.9% of revenue - per-share value is not being eroded by dilution.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Operating margin trajectory in 2024 and 2025 (raw data shows 0 - likely artifact); confirm from 10-K income statement
- Debt maturity schedule and refinancing risk on the $8.6B net debt position
- Customer/geographic concentration and exposure to specific NOC contracts
- Segment-level performance (Digital & Integration vs. Reservoir Performance vs. Well Construction vs. Production Systems) to see where 2025 profit compression originated
- Terms and dilutive impact of the ChampionX acquisition on share count going forward
- Nature of insider sales - 10b5-1 plans vs. discretionary
The signal-adjusted composite fair value is $50.16 against a $48.92 price - roughly 3% upside, which is noise, not mispricing. The DCF pins $52.75 and the EPV floor $43.42, bracketing today's price tightly; the $91.89 anchored-PE reading is an outlier that assumes cycle-normal multiples on a business whose earnings just fell 24% and should be discounted heavily. Averaging the two credible methods lands near $48, right where the stock trades.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward capex guidance from major E&P customers
- Segment margin trajectory (Digital & Integration vs Well Construction)
- Any one-off charges in the recent 24% earnings drop
- Buyback pace vs debt paydown priority
SLB sits in an unusual sentiment pocket: the tape is risk-off (VIX in the 97th percentile, S&P off its highs, stress score -47), but the stock's 0.73 beta and defensive-cyclical profile blunt the blow. Energy is not the tip of the spear when the market de-risks growth and story stocks, so the macro headwind lands as a light press rather than a mauling. On the narrative side, the archetype is a steady-compounder with minimal intensity and low cult - there is no runaway story to collapse, and no dysphoria to fade. Fundamentals are doing the work, which mutes both directions of sentiment force. What is actively pushing UP: a clean Q2 beat that produced two straight double-digit up days on July 24, a fresh wave of 'Wall Street likes SLB' pieces, and Zacks-style attention flow. Analyst tone is clearly constructive with a highly optimistic ABR. What is pushing DOWN: a persistent bear framing that oil services is a structurally lower-capex, energy-transition-loser cohort, plus Middle East disruption chatter and slight negative price momentum over 3 years. Net: the earnings-driven tailwind and analyst optimism roughly cancel a hostile macro tape and a slow-burn secular bear narrative. Pressure is mildly positive, not decisive.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the post-earnings bid holds or fades within 2-3 weeks - typical half-life for energy beats in a risk-off tape
- Any escalation in Middle East disruption headlines that would re-open the near-term risk discount
- Sector rotation signal: XLE / OIH relative strength vs SPX - is energy attracting defensive capital or being sold with growth
- Crude tape and rig-count trend - the exogenous variable that can flip services sentiment overnight
- Analyst target revisions post-Q2 - are upgrades broad-based or one or two outliers
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. No usable fair-value anchor — composite, DCF and anchored-PE are all absent from valuation-synthesis. Typical for pre-profit / narrative-platform names where those methods don't apply.