For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Snowflake Inc. (SNOW) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -40 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -4 · Value -76 · Sentiment 47 (timing only, not weighted)
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Snowflake Inc.
SNOW NYSESnowflake Inc. is a cloud-based data platform company that focuses on enabling organizations to manage, analyze, and share data at scale. Its core offering is the Snowflake Data Cloud, a fully managed environment that unifies data from multiple public clouds into a single, centralized platform for analytics and governance. Snowflake Inc. provides cloud-native data warehouse and data lake capabilities, allowing customers to store structured and semi-structured data and run complex queries with high performance. The platform supports a wide range of current use cases, including business intelligence, data engineering pipelines, application development, and artificial intelligence workloads. Snowflake Inc. serves enterprises across industries such as financial services, media, retail, and technology, helping them reduce data silos and create a single source of truth for decision-making. The company was founded in 2012 and is headquartered in the United States, with operations and customers worldwide, and plays a significant role in the modern data infrastructure and software markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -3.95
Total Equity: $1.92B
Shares: 337,493,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.83B
EBITDA: -$1.21B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.83B
Revenue: $4.68B
Shares: 337,493,000
Revenue: $4.68B
Revenue: $4.68B
Revenue: $4.68B
Total Equity: $1.92B
Tax Rate: -1.3%
Equity: $1.92B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.83B
Current Liabilities: $4.42B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $1.92B
Shares: 337,493,000
Shares: 337,493,000
CapEx: -$101.63M
Shares: 337,493,000
Stock Price: $330.49
Net Income: -$1.33B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 8, 2026 12:26am (15d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.2B | $2.1B | $2.8B | $3.6B | $4.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $458.4M | $717.5M | $898.6M | $1.2B | $1.5B |
| Gross Profit | $760.9M | $1.3B | $1.9B | $2.4B | $3.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.5B | $2.2B | $3.0B | $3.9B | $4.6B |
| Operating Income | -$715.0M | -$842.3M | -$1.1B | -$1.5B | -$1.4B |
| Net Income | -$679.9M | -$796.7M | -$836.1M | -$1.3B | -$1.3B |
| EBITDA | -$693.5M | -$778.7M | -$974.9M | -$1.3B | -$1.2B |
| EPS | $-2.26 | $-2.50 | $-2.55 | $-3.86 | $-3.95 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-2.26 | $-2.50 | $-2.55 | $-3.86 | $-3.95 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:44am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.1B | $939.9M | $1.8B | $2.6B | $2.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $4.6B | $5.0B | $5.0B | $5.9B | $5.7B |
| Total Assets | $6.6B | $7.7B | $8.2B | $9.0B | $9.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.7B | $3.3B | $4.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $1.6B | $2.3B | $3.0B | $6.0B | $7.2B |
| Total Equity | $5.0B | $5.5B | $5.2B | $3.0B | $1.9B |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.9B | -$2.7B | -$4.1B | -$7.3B | -$9.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 8, 2026 12:26am (15d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $110.2M | $545.6M | $848.1M | $959.8M | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$16.2M | -$25.1M | -$35.1M | -$46.3M | -$101.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $94.0M | $520.5M | $813.0M | $913.5M | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$362.6M | -$275.7M | -$30.3M | -$178.9M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | -$591.7M | -$1.9B | -$873.5M |
| Net Change in Cash | $267.3M | -$145.8M | $824.2M | $917.7M | $165.6M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 8, 2026 12:26am (15d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +69.4% | +35.9% | +29.2% | +29.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +77.2% | +41.5% | +26.4% | +30.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | -17.8% | -30.0% | -33.0% | +1.4% |
| Net Income Growth | -17.2% | -4.9% | -53.8% | -3.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | -12.3% | -25.2% | -30.6% | +4.6% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:05Even the bull case prices 68% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 100%. Caveat: the company is pre-profit — scenario margins are a glide-path assumption, not a track record.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($330.51) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +57% | 24.3% | $107.32 | -68% |
| Base — stabilizes | +38% | 21.1% | $54.46 | -84% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +19% | 18.0% | $24.70 | -93% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +33% | -23.8% | $0.00 | -100% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw trajectory is genuinely impressive but the deceleration story the models flag is not quite what the numbers show. Sequential quarterly revenue: $868M → $942M → $987M → $1.04B → $1.14B → $1.21B → $1.28B → $1.39B. That's 60% growth over seven quarters, and the most recent Q (Apr-2026) YoY is $1.39B vs $1.04B = 33.7% — actually *accelerating* from the ~27-29% band earlier. Meanwhile net loss per quarter has stayed roughly flat around $295-310M even as revenue grew 60%, which means operating leverage IS materializing on the margin line: net margin improved from -41.3% five quarters ago to -21.2% now. FCF of $1.12B on $4.68B revenue = 24% FCF margin, and that's the number that matters for a narrative_platform where GAAP is polluted by SBC. The synthesis verdict ("High Conviction Required," thesis score -7) is treating this as a decelerating story when the tape actually shows re-acceleration plus margin expansion. That's a meaningful disagreement.
That said, valuation math is unforgiving. At $330 and $114.5B market cap on $4.68B TTM revenue (really closer to $5.02B annualizing the last four quarters), you're paying ~23x sales. If Snowflake compounds revenue at 28% for three years, that's ~$10.5B; slap a generous 12x sales on a matured 25% grower with 30% FCF margins and you get ~$126B — barely 10% above today. To justify $330 requires either (a) growth staying north of 30% for longer than three years, or (b) terminal FCF margin closer to 35-40%. The bear case the synthesis leans on — hyperscaler commoditization at weight 78 — is real but hasn't shown up in the numbers yet; Databricks pressure hasn't kept Snowflake from re-accelerating. The contrarian argument the models under-weight: AI workload consumption is genuinely lifting the top line right now, and if that's a durable S-curve rather than a pull-forward, the 33% YoY print may be the floor for the next four quarters, not the ceiling.
The insider selling is the signal I trust least on the bear side — these look like programmatic 10b5-1 dispositions at fresh highs (stock re-rated from ~$118 to $330), which is what rational insiders do; it's not a fundamental tell. The macro headwinds flag is stale given the acceleration in the print. Where I'd push back on the bull case: gross margin at 67.2% is fine for software but not spectacular for a "platform monopoly" — Microsoft-caliber platforms run 70%+ and Snowflake's COGS is structurally tied to AWS/Azure/GCP compute resale, which caps how much operating leverage can ever emerge. That's the durable bear point the models should have weighted higher than commoditization: Snowflake pays rent to its competitors. Every dollar of revenue growth carries ~33 cents of hyperscaler tax that won't compress.
Net: I partially dissent from the synthesis "High Conviction Required" framing, which reads as a soft sell. The trajectory is better than the models credit — acceleration to 33.7% YoY with FCF margin above 20% is a rare combination and deserves a premium. But $330 already prices in three more years of that combination without stumbling, and the structural gross-margin ceiling means the "eventual 30% operating margin" assumption in the market thesis is optimistic; I'd model 22-25%. Fair value on a 28% three-year CAGR to ~$10B revenue, 12x terminal sales, 10% discount: roughly $250-270. So the stock is ~20-25% overvalued, not catastrophically mispriced, and a genuine growth surprise (say, a 40%+ YoY print driven by AI consumption) could re-rate it higher before gravity wins. I'd not short it; I'd not chase it at $330. Buyers get paid below $265; sellers get paid above $360. The narrative is unanchored enough that momentum can carry it 20% above fair value for quarters at a time — which is why the pure valuation call is right but the timing is not.
GPT Reading
What stands out is that Snowflake is still being valued like a company on the verge of elite software economics, while the reported numbers show a business that is growing well but not fast enough to justify perfection. Revenue has risen from $2.81B in FY2024 to $4.68B in FY2026, and the latest quarter at $1.39B was up about 34% from $1.04B a year earlier, so this is not a broken growth story. But against a $114.6B market cap and roughly 23.8x trailing sales, investors are paying a massive premium for a company whose annual growth has already stepped down from the hypergrowth phase into the high-20s/low-30s. That multiple can work for a business growing 40%+ with obvious future margin inflection; it is much harder to defend for one growing around 29% with no GAAP profitability in sight.
The most important contradiction in the data is the gap between healthy cash generation and persistently ugly income statement economics. Snowflake produced $1.22B of operating cash flow and $1.12B of free cash flow in FY2026, which is real and matters, especially with no debt and $2.83B of cash. But operating losses barely improved year over year: FY2025 operating loss was -$1.46B and FY2026 was still -$1.44B, despite more than $1B of incremental revenue. Net loss similarly moved only from -$1.29B to -$1.33B. On a quarterly basis, net margins improved from -41.3% in April 2025 to -21.2% in April 2026, but that is improvement from very bad to less bad, not evidence of a model already scaling cleanly. Gross margin at 67.2% is solid, yet not so extraordinary that it overwhelms the valuation debate; for a software name priced at over 23x revenue, I would want to see clearer operating leverage than a business still losing roughly $300M per quarter.
The market is effectively underwriting a future where Snowflake becomes a dominant data platform with much fatter margins, and that future is possible, but the current numbers do not force that conclusion. If I annualize the latest quarter, revenue run-rate is about $5.6B; at today’s market cap, that is still above 20x run-rate sales. To earn into that valuation over a reasonable period, Snowflake likely needs to compound revenue near 25%-plus for several more years and eventually produce operating margins north of 20%. Yet the historical evidence here is mixed: revenue keeps climbing, but losses remain structurally large, and recent quarterly growth is good rather than spectacular. The stock can work from here only if investors are right that Snowflake is not just a warehouse vendor but the control plane for enterprise data and AI workloads. That is a big strategic bet, not something proven by these financials alone. The insider tape leaning heavily toward sales does not prove management distrust, but at this valuation it removes a potential source of comfort rather than adding one.
The best counterargument is straightforward: this is exactly how great platform software names look before the margin unlock fully shows up in GAAP numbers. Revenue has nearly quadrupled from $1.22B in FY2022 to $4.68B in FY2026, gross profit rose to $3.15B, free cash flow surpassed $1B, and quarterly net margins have improved by roughly 20 points over the last year. A bull will say the company has already crossed the hard part: it has scale, balance-sheet strength, positive cash generation, and a still-robust 29%-34% growth profile in a huge category. On that view, the lack of debt and $2.83B cash pile justify patience, and the valuation reflects scarcity: there are not many pure-play assets with this combination of growth, strategic relevance, and cash flow. I weigh that differently because the valuation already assumes the operating model matures elegantly. When a company at $115B is still posting annual operating losses of $1.4B, “trust the future margin curve” is no longer a cheap option.
What would change my mind is either a much lower price or a much stronger proof of scale economics. If the stock fell into the $220-$250 range without a deterioration in growth, I would be far more open to the argument that the market had overcorrected. Alternatively, I would turn more constructive at current levels if Snowflake can show two things at once over the next few quarters: sustained revenue growth reaccelerating into the mid-30s and a meaningful operating loss reduction, ideally quarterly net losses moving clearly below $200M with annualized free cash flow pushing toward $1.5B. Absent that, I think investors are paying a platform-monopoly multiple for a company whose actual reported numbers still look like a very good business, not yet a great one.
Grok Reading
The numbers on Snowflake tell a story of durable demand colliding with a valuation that has already capitalized the best version of the outcome. Revenue scaled from $1.22B to $4.68B in four years and the latest quarter printed $1.39B, up roughly 34% from the $1.04B year-ago period, with trailing growth still near 29%. Gross margin holds at 67%, free cash flow reached $1.12B on only $102M of capex, and the balance sheet is pristine—$2.83B cash, zero debt. That cash-generation profile is real and underappreciated by anyone still fixated solely on the GAAP net loss of $1.33B. Yet operating loss barely budged: $1.46B last year to $1.44B this year despite an extra billion dollars of revenue. The operating-margin line sits at –30.6% with no visible inflection. At $330 and a $114.5B enterprise, the stock trades at 23.8x trailing sales and roughly 20x a generous forward-revenue number. That multiple only clears if 25%+ growth persists for half a decade and operating margins ultimately climb into the mid-20s—precisely the path the income statement has so far refused to confirm.
Quarterly sequential adds remain healthy ($1.04B → $1.14B → $1.21B → $1.28B → $1.39B), but the year-over-year rate is decelerating and the models correctly flag consumption volatility as a live risk. The 58x price-to-book and negative earnings multiples are noise; the relevant lens is whether the FCF margin near 24% can expand further while revenue keeps compounding. Insider activity leans the other way: a steady drumbeat of open-market sales and option-related disposals in late July, with no offsetting buys. Combined with hyperscalers (BigQuery, Redshift, Fabric) and Databricks pressing on price and capability, the competitive moat is narrower than the “data-cloud OS” narrative implies. Roughly 70% of the current capitalization is story premium; the remaining 30% is the cash-flow trajectory that is already visible.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and quantitative. Positive $1.12B free cash flow at this scale, zero leverage, and a sticky consumption model with multi-cloud positioning give Snowflake a real shot at becoming the default analytics layer for enterprises that refuse single-vendor lock-in. If net revenue retention stabilizes and AI/workload monetization re-accelerates product-led expansion, the same 24x sales multiple that looks rich today becomes ordinary for a 30% grower with expanding FCF margins. Bulls will also note that GAAP losses are inflated by stock-based compensation and that cash earnings power is already elite; a re-rating higher is possible if the next two printings show operating leverage finally appearing. I weigh this less heavily because the last twelve months already delivered a billion dollars of incremental revenue with virtually zero reduction in the operating loss—evidence that the cost structure is still chasing growth rather than harvesting it—and because the competitive set has infinite balance-sheet capacity to compress pricing.
What flips the view is simple: two consecutive quarters of re-acceleration above 35% year-over-year revenue growth accompanied by GAAP operating margin improvement of at least 500 bps, or a clear deceleration below 20% that forces the multiple to compress toward 12–15x sales. Until one of those arrives, the asymmetry sits with the bears.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Snowflake is a genuine hyper-scaler on the top line: revenue grew from $1.22B (FY22) to $4.68B (FY26), a ~40% CAGR, with gross margins holding in the mid-60s (67.2% latest). Free cash flow has scaled cleanly from $94M to $1.12B, and the balance sheet is fortress-grade with $2.83B net cash, zero net debt, and an Altman Z of 8.25. The business self-funds and mechanical earnings-quality checks (Beneish -3.5, no accrual red flags) are clean.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Remaining performance obligations (RPO) and net revenue retention trend in latest 10-K/10-Q
- Customer concentration - especially top-10 and hyperscaler dependency (AWS/Azure/GCP)
- Consumption-model revenue visibility and any signs of workload growth deceleration
- SBC trajectory as % of revenue and management guidance on GAAP profitability path
- Buyback authorization size and cadence relative to ongoing SBC issuance
- Detail behind 10b5-1 plans for insider sales to distinguish programmatic from discretionary
Snowflake trades at $330.51 for a $114.5B market cap on roughly $4.5B of revenue - about 25x sales for a business growing ~25% and slowing. The e2e read is blunt: you are paying $25 per revenue dollar on the market's implicit assumption that growth accelerates from here. Nothing in the setup supports that - competition from Databricks, BigQuery, and Redshift is intensifying, and the platform-monopoly narrative is a hope, not a proven flywheel. Deserved value on a quality-adjusted basis is materially lower. Even generously crediting the $2.83B net cash and $1.12B FCF (a ~1% FCF yield), and applying a rich 15-18x sales multiple appropriate for a durable 25% grower with 67% gross margins, deserved value lands somewhere in the $200-240 range per share. The gap to $330.51 is not a margin of safety - it is a premium the buyer pays. Earnings quality helps the story (real FCF, real cash), but ~30% of revenue leaking out as SBC with buybacks only offsetting ~60% of dilution quietly lowers per-share deserved value. This is a good business at a full-to-rich price. The market already understands Snowflake; there is no dislocation to exploit here.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Next-quarter product revenue growth rate and NRR - is deceleration stabilizing or continuing?
- Guidance on FY operating margin and FCF margin trajectory
- SBC as % of revenue and net dilution after buybacks
- Any disclosure on competitive win/loss vs Databricks in AI/ML workloads
The tape is working for SNOW right now. VIX at 14.9, S&P at highs, and a mild risk-on regime give a beta-1.32 high-multiple software name room to breathe rather than get marked down. More importantly, the sector narrative just flipped intraday: Atlassian's blowout is being framed as a 'game changer' that 'kills AI-displacement worries' for enterprise software, sparking a sector re-rating. That is the exact overhang that had been suppressing SNOW's platform-monopoly story, and its removal is a direct tailwind to this name specifically.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the TEAM-driven software re-rating holds through next week or fades as a one-day squeeze
- Analyst target revisions on SNOW in the wake of the sector re-rate
- Any Databricks IPO / pricing headlines that would reactivate the competitive bear case
- 10y yield behavior; a move back above 4.8% would pressure the multiple
- SNOW's own next print and NRR datapoint - the narrative is moderate-durability, not bulletproof
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 8, 2026, SNOW was $330.51. We expect it to be $285.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $215.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 8, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.