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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Synopsys, Inc. (SNPS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Low · Gem Score -30 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 37 · Value -75 · Sentiment 0 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
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Synopsys, Inc.
SNPS NASDAQSynopsys, Inc. is a semiconductor and electronic design automation company that provides software, hardware, and intellectual property solutions used to design, verify, and manufacture integrated circuits and complex electronic systems. The company’s products support chip architects, engineers, and manufacturers with tools for logic design, simulation, verification, physical implementation, and design-for-manufacturing workflows. Synopsys also supplies reusable semiconductor IP, including interface, memory, and processor components that help streamline development across advanced chip and system-on-chip projects. In addition, its software integrity offerings support application security, quality, and compliance for development teams in technology-intensive industries. Synopsys serves a broad range of markets, including semiconductors, electronics, automotive, aerospace, industrial systems, and data center infrastructure, making it a key provider of infrastructure for modern silicon and software development.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 8.04
Total Equity: $28.33B
Shares: 165,656,000
Total Debt: $13.48B
Cash: $2.89B
EBITDA: $1.58B
Total Debt: $13.48B
Cash: $2.89B
Revenue: $7.05B
Revenue: $7.05B
Revenue: $7.05B
Total Equity: $28.33B
Tax Rate: 4.0%
Equity: $28.33B
Total Debt: $13.48B
Cash: $2.89B
Current Liabilities: $3.72B
Long-Term Debt: $13.46B
Total Debt: $13.48B
Total Equity: $28.33B
Shares: 165,656,000
Shares: 165,656,000
CapEx: -$169.45M
Shares: 165,656,000
Stock Price: $408.66
Net Income: $1.33B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:00pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $4.2B | $5.1B | $5.8B | $6.1B | $7.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $861.8M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.6B |
| Gross Profit | $3.3B | $4.0B | $4.6B | $4.9B | $5.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $4.5B |
| Operating Income | $734.8M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $914.9M |
| Net Income | $757.5M | $984.6M | $1.2B | $2.3B | $1.3B |
| EBITDA | $938.5M | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.6B |
| EPS | $4.96 | $6.44 | $8.08 | $14.78 | $8.13 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $4.81 | $6.29 | $7.92 | $14.51 | $8.04 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 11:33am (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $3.9B | $2.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $2.8B | $3.0B | $3.4B | $6.5B | $6.0B |
| Total Assets | $8.8B | $9.4B | $10.3B | $13.1B | $48.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.4B | $2.8B | $3.0B | $2.7B | $3.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $25.1M | $20.8M | $18.1M | $15.6M | $13.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.5B | $3.9B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $19.9B |
| Total Equity | $5.3B | $5.6B | $6.2B | $9.0B | $28.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $4.5B | $5.5B | $6.7B | $9.0B | $10.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:00pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$93.8M | -$136.6M | -$189.6M | -$123.2M | -$169.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$28.1M | -$76.8M | -$2.6M | -$2.6M | $13.5B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$753.1M | -$1.1B | -$1.2B | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $197.2M | -$15.3M | $21.3M | $2.5B | -$1.0B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:00pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +20.9% | +15.0% | +4.9% | +15.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +20.2% | +15.0% | +5.7% | +11.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +58.1% | +9.2% | +6.8% | -32.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +30.0% | +24.9% | +84.0% | -41.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +48.2% | +9.1% | +8.9% | -4.6% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly trajectory is the loudest signal and the prior models underweight it. Revenue jumped from $1.64B (Oct 2024) to $2.25B (Oct 2025) to $2.41B (Jan 2026) and $2.28B (Apr 2026) — that's ~40% YoY, not the 15% the momentum tag shows. But net income collapsed in parallel: $1.11B → $448M → $65M → $17M. Margin went from 68% (one-time gain quarter) through 20% to 0.8%. This is the Ansys deal closing: revenue consolidation plus deal amortization, integration costs, and interest expense on the $13.5B debt load (up from a net cash position pre-deal). The 50x trailing P/E is essentially meaningless right now — you're looking at a company mid-swallow of a $35B acquisition, and both the numerator (price) and denominator (earnings) are distorted. The synthesis model's $122 DCF fair value likely doesn't properly capitalize the post-integration Ansys earnings power either; it's anchoring on depressed GAAP.
That said, I don't think the synthesis is wrong that this is overvalued — I just think $122 is too aggressive on the downside and the reasoning is off. The real question: what does the combined SNPS+Ansys look like normalized? Pre-deal Synopsys did ~$6.1B revenue at 22% operating margin (~$1.35B op income, $2.26B NI with tax benefits). Ansys added roughly $2.3B revenue at similar or better margins. A normalized combined entity should do ~$9-10B revenue with $2.5-3B operating income within 2-3 years if synergies land. On $80B market cap that's 27-32x normalized op income, or roughly 8-9x EV/revenue against $91B EV. For a 10-12% grower with dominant EDA moat, that's rich but not absurd — comparable to CDNS. Fair value probably sits $250-300, not $122 and not $409. The FCF CAGR of -5.6% and $1.35B FCF against $91B EV (67x) is the more damning number than P/E.
The contrarian case: EDA is a genuine duopoly (SNPS + CDNS), switching costs are extreme, AI chip design complexity is a real secular tailwind not a fad, and Ansys extends the moat into multiphysics simulation where chips-meet-systems is where design is heading. Insider activity is just option exercises and tax withholding — noise, not signal, and the models correctly flagged it neutral. The debt (0.48 D/E, 4.7x debt/EBITDA-ish) is manageable for a software company with 77% gross margins and sticky revenue. If you believe in the AI/advanced-node capex cycle running another 5-7 years, paying 9x revenue for the toll-booth isn't crazy — it's what people have paid for MSFT, ADBE, INTU at various points. The narrative model's "234% premium" framing is math-correct but assumes the DCF inputs are right; they probably underweight Ansys accretion.
Where I land: I agree with the synthesis direction (overvalued) but dissent hard on magnitude. $122 implies a 70% drawdown that would require either a semiconductor capex bust or competitive disruption — neither imminent. More likely path is multiyear time-based derating as revenue growth normalizes to low-teens post-Ansys-anniversary and margins recover to mid-20s operating, with the stock going sideways for 2-3 years while earnings catch up. Fair value $270-310. At $409 you're paying ~35-40% premium to that, which is expensive but not a short. The data thinness that matters most: we don't have clean pro-forma Ansys numbers, we don't have management's synergy guide with credibility yet, and the FY2026 quarterly print noise makes any trailing multiple garbage. Wait for two clean post-integration quarters (roughly Q3-Q4 FY26 reporting) before the P/E means anything again. The prior models correctly identify overvaluation but the pre-flight's "revenue growth will re-accelerate from 15% to 20%+" thesis is basically already happening at 40% headline — just from M&A, not organic, which is the actual bear case nobody is stating cleanly.
GPT Reading
The first thing that jumps out is that the “mature earner” label is flattering the current financials. Synopsys absolutely has the profile of a strategic, high-gross-margin franchise, but the earnings line has become far less clean than the stock multiple suggests. Revenue is still solid: fiscal 2025 grew to $7.05B from $6.13B, up 15%, and the last four quarters annualize to roughly $8.7B, so the top line is not broken. But profitability is wobbling badly. Annual operating income fell from $1.36B in 2024 to $915M in 2025 despite that 15% revenue growth, and the most recent two quarters produced just $82M of combined net income on $4.69B of revenue, a net margin under 2%. Even allowing for accounting noise, that is a very awkward setup for a stock at 50.8x earnings, 9.6x sales, and 49.3x EV/EBITDA. If I’m paying a premium multiple for a software-infrastructure name, I want either accelerating growth or visibly expanding margins; Synopsys currently offers neither in the reported numbers.
The second issue is cash generation versus valuation. Fiscal 2025 free cash flow was $1.35B on $7.05B of revenue, a 19% FCF margin that is respectable but not exceptional enough to support an almost $79B equity value. On that base, the stock trades around 58x trailing FCF. The business does have enviable gross margins near 77%, but those have not translated into strong returns lately: ROIC of 2.3%, ROA of 2.8%, and ROE of 4.7% are all weak for a company being priced like a category-defining compounder. Some of that is balance-sheet distortion, but not all of it. Debt also matters more than the narrative admits. With $13.48B of debt against $2.89B of cash, net debt is roughly $10.6B, which is not alarming in isolation but is meaningful when annual operating cash flow is only $1.52B and operating income has compressed. The market is paying for pristine durability at the same moment the reported income statement is getting messier.
What I think the market is really doing is capitalizing the AI-chip design story several years in advance. There is a legitimate moat here: EDA tools are mission-critical, switching costs are high, and the complexity of leading-edge design should support steady demand. That explains why revenue has held up and why a simple low-multiple value framework will undershoot fair value. But the current price does not just assume moat; it assumes a reacceleration and a normalization of profitability that are not visible yet. At $408, investors are effectively looking through the drop from $2.26B of annual net income in 2024 to $1.33B in 2025 and through the latest near-breakeven quarters as though they barely matter. That is plausible if these are temporary integration or accounting effects, but when a stock already discounts excellence, “temporary” has to be proven quickly, not hoped for. My read is that the stock deserves a premium to ordinary infrastructure software, but not this premium. A range closer to 30-35x a normalized earnings power of roughly $8-10 per share would get you something like $240-$350, and even that embeds quality.
The strongest case against my view is straightforward: reported net income is likely understating the true earning power of the franchise, while current numbers may be distorted by acquisition-related charges, amortization, or other non-core items ahead of a strategic integration. The revenue trajectory is still healthy, with quarterly sales rising from $1.46B in January 2025 to $2.41B in January 2026, and the latest quarter at $2.28B still implies around 42% growth versus the $1.60B quarter a year earlier. Gross margin remains elite, the current ratio at 1.6 is fine, and debt-to-equity at 0.48 is not stretched for a software company pursuing a large strategic move. If AI-driven semiconductor complexity really creates a step-change in tool demand, then today’s 10x sales could prove less absurd than it looks, especially if margins rebound toward prior 20%+ net levels. I weigh that argument less heavily because the market is not asking me to buy at a reasonable premium while waiting for proof; it is asking me to pay a near-flawless multiple before that proof is in the reported numbers.
What would change my mind is not another generic AI TAM argument but a financial reset in the right direction. If Synopsys can show two to three consecutive quarters with revenue sustaining above $2.3B while net margin recovers back into the mid-teens, or if annualized FCF moves decisively above $2.2B without leverage rising further, then the current premium would become easier to defend. I would also revisit the bearishness if the debt-funded strategic expansion clearly lifts operating income rather than diluting it — for example, if annual operating income returns above $1.4B on a revenue base above $8.5B. Until then, the stock looks priced for the best version of the story while the raw data are still telling a sloppier one.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a franchise that just levered itself into a different company. Revenue stepped up sharply through the Ansys close—trailing annual sales of $7.05B versus $6.13B the prior year, with recent quarters running $2.2–2.4B against a $1.5–1.7B run-rate a year earlier—but the income statement and returns collapsed underneath that top line. Net margin fell from the low-20s to 2.7% and then 0.8% in the two most recent prints; annual operating income dropped from $1.36B to $915M even as revenue rose; ROE sits at 4.7% and ROIC at 2.3%. Free cash flow of $1.35B is still real and the 77% gross margin confirms the software economics remain intact, yet the balance sheet now carries $13.5B of debt against $2.9B of cash. At $409 and a $79B enterprise, the market is paying roughly 51× trailing earnings, 49× EV/EBITDA and 11× sales for a business whose near-term incremental returns on the capital just deployed are barely above the cost of funds. That is not a mature-earner multiple; it is a perfection multiple on a still-digesting deal.
What stands out most is the gap between the narrative the market is paying for and the cash-flow trajectory the models are discounting. Revenue CAGR over the measured window is ~10% and recent year-over-year growth ~15%, but earnings CAGR is only 4% and FCF CAGR is negative. The $122 composite fair-value anchor from the quantitative stack is harsh if one simply annualizes post-deal revenue and assumes full margin recovery, yet even a generous recovery path—say mid-20s operating margins on a $9–10B revenue base within a couple of years—still struggles to justify more than the high-$200s without embedding double-digit perpetual growth and zero competitive leakage. The platform-monopoly story is real: EDA switching costs are extreme and AI-driven design complexity is a genuine multi-year tailwind. It does not, however, automatically convert into 40–50× earnings once the company has layered on Ansys-scale integration risk and leverage.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward. Synopsys remains one of two indispensable gatekeepers for advanced chip design; every leading-edge tape-out still runs through its tools, and Ansys adds physics simulation that deepens the lock-in rather than diluting it. If management delivers the synergy targets, restores operating margins toward the mid-20s, and begins meaningfully de-levering while semiconductor design starts continue to proliferate, earnings power could double from the currently depressed base and the multiple would compress through the denominator rather than through price. Historical software-infrastructure averages of 25–35× would then look conservative rather than punitive, and the current 15% revenue growth could re-accelerate if AI ASIC and automotive design activity stays elevated. That bull path is coherent; it is also already the base case embedded in a $409 stock, leaving almost no room for execution slippage, a semi capex air-pocket, or slower-than-advertised Ansys cost takeout.
I would flip if the next two quarters show sequential operating-margin expansion back above 15–18% with clear evidence that Ansys accretion is landing on schedule, if net debt begins a visible decline toward 1.5× EBITDA or lower, and if organic (ex-Ansys) revenue growth holds in the low-to-mid teens rather than decelerating. Until those prints arrive, the stock is pricing the best case as the base case while the reported economics still look like a leveraged integration in progress.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Synopsys is a structurally advantaged software business: gross margins have held in a tight 77-80% band across five years, revenue compounded from $4.20B (2021) to $7.05B (2025) - roughly 14% CAGR - and FCF has stayed in a $1.28B-$1.60B range every year. Earnings quality is clean on the mechanical checks: OCF/NI of 1.38x, accruals -3% of assets, Beneish M -1.8. Dilution is well controlled with diluted shares only drifting from 157.3M to 165.7M (1.3% CAGR) and buybacks at 102% of the 12.7%-of-revenue SBC. This is a mature, self-funding compounder in a duopoly-like EDA market. That said, 2025 shows real turbulence. Operating margin cratered from 22.1% to 13.0% and net income fell from $2.26B to $1.33B despite revenue growing 15%. Diluted share count jumped 6.3% in one year (155.9M to 165.7M) and net debt swung to -$10.52B - consistent with the Ansys acquisition closing, but not yet confirmed here. Altman Z sits in the grey zone at 2.94. Insider tape is neutral: option-exercise-and-withhold mechanics dominate, with one modest $6.7M sale by Ghazi - no directional signal. Overall a high-quality franchise absorbing a large deal; the underlying economics remain excellent but the current-year P&L is noisy and the balance sheet is temporarily a constraint rather than a cushion.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Whether the 2025 OpM drop to 13% and NI decline are fully attributable to Ansys acquisition/integration charges and amortization, and the underlying organic operating margin
- Terms and maturity schedule of the debt taken on for the Ansys deal, and deleveraging trajectory
- Whether the 6.3% share count jump in 2025 reflects one-time Ansys stock consideration or an ongoing higher issuance run-rate
- Customer concentration and exposure to China/export-control risk in the EDA business
- Progress on integrating Ansys and any early cross-sell or margin recovery guidance
- SBC trajectory post-deal - whether the 12.7% of revenue figure normalizes lower on the combined base
The e2e composite fair value of $125 (DCF $149, EPV $78) implies roughly -70% downside from $411. Even if you treat those methods as too harsh - EDA duopolies deserve premium multiples, gross margins are 77-80%, and 2025's optical margin dent is Ansys-integration noise - stretching a generous multiple onto normalized post-deal FCF still lands deserved value well south of the current print. The $10.5B net debt and share issuance from Ansys mean per-share economics need years of synergy execution to justify today's cap of ~$79B.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Post-Ansys pro-forma operating margin and FCF run-rate in next 10-Q
- Management's synergy timeline and integration cost cadence
- Backlog and RPO growth to confirm AI/advanced-node demand is translating to bookings
- Any customer concentration disclosures (TSMC/Samsung/Intel) and internal-tool competitive commentary
None surfaced.
None surfaced.
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for SNPS — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.