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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for TransDigm Group Inc. (TDG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-09): Designation Low · Gem Score -19 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 65 · Value -75 · Sentiment 54 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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TransDigm Group Inc.
TDG NYSETransDigm Group Inc. is a manufacturer and supplier of highly engineered aircraft components for the global aerospace and defense industry. The company focuses on proprietary, specialized parts that are critical for aircraft performance and safety, often with significant aftermarket demand. TransDigm operates through three primary segments: Power and Control, Airframe, and Non-Aviation. The Power and Control segment provides products such as electromechanical actuators, ignition systems, specialized pumps, valves, and power conditioning devices used in aircraft systems. The Airframe segment supplies components integrated into aircraft structures and interiors, serving both commercial and military platforms. The Non-Aviation segment offers engineered products mainly for off-road vehicles and industrial and mining applications. TransDigm often acts as a holding company for a portfolio of niche aerospace businesses, emphasizing mission-critical components with long product lifecycles. Headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio, and founded in the United States, TransDigm plays a prominent role in the industrials sector, particularly within aerospace and defense, by supporting aircraft manufacturers, airlines, maintenance providers, and defense organizations worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 32.08
Total Equity: -$9.68B
Shares: 58,200,000
Total Debt: $29.42B
Cash: $2.81B
EBITDA: $4.53B
Total Debt: $29.42B
Cash: $2.81B
Revenue: $8.83B
Revenue: $8.83B
Revenue: $8.83B
Total Equity: -$9.68B
Tax Rate: 21.1%
Equity: -$9.68B
Total Debt: $29.42B
Cash: $2.81B
Current Liabilities: $2.18B
Long-Term Debt: $29.29B
Total Debt: $29.42B
Total Equity: -$9.68B
Shares: 58,200,000
Shares: 58,200,000
CapEx: -$222.00M
Shares: 58,200,000
Stock Price: $1,245
Net Income: $2.07B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 3:00pm (58d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $4.8B | $5.4B | $6.6B | $7.9B | $8.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.7B | $3.3B | $3.5B |
| Gross Profit | $2.5B | $3.1B | $3.8B | $4.7B | $5.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $822.0M | $884.0M | $919.0M | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Operating Income | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.9B | $3.5B | $4.2B |
| Net Income | $680.0M | $866.0M | $1.3B | $1.7B | $2.1B |
| EBITDA | $1.9B | $2.5B | $3.2B | $3.8B | $4.5B |
| EPS | $10.41 | $13.40 | $22.03 | $25.62 | $32.08 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $10.41 | $13.40 | $22.03 | $25.62 | $32.08 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:31pm (58d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.8B | $3.0B | $3.5B | $6.3B | $2.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $7.0B | $5.6B | $6.7B | $10.0B | $7.0B |
| Total Assets | $19.3B | $18.1B | $20.0B | $25.6B | $22.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $6.3B | $2.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $19.6B | $19.4B | $19.4B | $24.4B | $29.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $22.2B | $21.9B | $21.9B | $31.9B | $32.6B |
| Total Equity | -$2.9B | -$3.8B | -$2.0B | -$6.3B | -$9.7B |
| Retained Earnings | -$3.7B | -$3.9B | -$2.6B | -$7.4B | -$10.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 3:00pm (58d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $913.0M | $948.0M | $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$105.0M | -$119.0M | -$139.0M | -$165.0M | -$222.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $808.0M | $829.0M | $1.2B | $1.9B | $1.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$963.0M | -$437.0M | -$762.0M | -$2.3B | -$419.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $0 | $6.2B | $6.8B | $6.0B |
| Dividends Paid | -$73.0M | -$1.1B | -$38.0M | -$2.0B | -$9.6B |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$912.0M | $0 | $0 | -$500.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $70.0M | -$1.8B | $471.0M | $2.8B | -$3.5B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 3:00pm (58d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +13.2% | +21.3% | +20.6% | +11.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +23.3% | +24.0% | +21.6% | +13.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | +31.0% | +32.0% | +20.8% | +18.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +27.4% | +49.9% | +32.0% | +21.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +27.0% | +29.3% | +20.4% | +17.9% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:31pm (58d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-09-02 | $90.00 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-04 | $75.00 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-17 | $35.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-18 | $18.50 | — | — | — |
| 2019-12-27 | $32.50 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-15 | $30.00 | — | — | — |
| 2017-08-31 | $22.00 | — | — | — |
| 2016-10-20 | $24.00 | — | — | — |
| 2014-06-12 | $25.00 | — | — | — |
| 2013-07-11 | $22.00 | — | — | — |
| 2012-10-23 | $12.85 | — | — | — |
| 2009-10-14 | $7.65 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
TransDigm's raw numbers describe a machine most industrials would kill for: TTM revenue tracking ~$9.5B (annualizing the last four quarters at $2.54B+$2.29B+$2.44B+$2.24B = $9.51B), TTM net income around $2.08B for a 22% net margin, and FY25 op margin of 47%. Growth is real but decelerating — FY25 revenue growth was 11.2% vs the 15.8% five-year CAGR, and the most recent quarter's 18% YoY jump is flattered by mix (Q3 rev was $2.54B on 21% margin vs Q1's $2.29B on 19.5%). FCF of $1.82B on $68B market cap is a 2.7% yield; the equity is priced at ~33x FCF and 33x TTM earnings against an EV/EBITDA of ~22. Balance sheet is the elephant: $29.4B gross debt, $2.8B cash, negative $9.7B equity — this is a private-equity capital structure hiding inside a public compounder. Interest coverage is workable (op income $4.17B against roughly $1.6-1.8B of interest) but leaves no room for aftermarket softness.
On the synthesis verdict ($697 fair value vs $1,245): I partially agree with the direction but think the DCF anchor is too punitive. A $697 target implies ~18x FCF for a business with 60% gross margins, near-monopoly aftermarket positions, and a 25-year track record of double-digit compounding — that's a distressed-industrial multiple that ignores the actual moat. Where I do agree with the bear case: paying 33x FCF for a business already at 47% op margins means you're underwriting further margin expansion into a decelerating top line, and every dollar of that valuation assumes debt gets refinanced smoothly through the next aerospace cycle. The market-forces framing ("Tailwinds" on a stock 79% above fundamental fair value with a wrecked balance sheet) reads incoherent — you can't call something a tailwind setup when the synthesis flags "extremely fragile" valuation in the same file. The pre-flight and narrative layers are more honest: this is a platform-monopoly narrative with strong intensity, and half the market cap is the story.
The contrarian bull case worth taking seriously: TransDigm's debt is a feature, not a bug — they've compounded equity value at 20%+ for two decades precisely by levering the balance sheet and buying more captive-parts businesses, and negative book equity is the mathematical residue of $75+/share special dividends and buybacks, not distress. Boeing MAX ramp, sustained defense spend, and airline fleet-age (record-old fleets = record aftermarket demand) all argue the pricing runway isn't done. Insider activity is mostly option-exercise sales at small sizes — noise, not a signal, and I'd downgrade the "Neutral Insider Activity" tag to genuinely uninformative. The Q1 FY26 dip to 19.5% margin followed by Q2's snap-back to 21% suggests mix volatility, not structural erosion. Contrarian bear angle the models undersell: if the DOD IG report on spare parts pricing (a recurring risk for TDG) ever produces contract-level rebates or GAO-driven procurement reform, the aftermarket margin structure compresses fast — and at 33x earnings there's no cushion.
Committing: I dissent from the $697 fair value as too aggressive on the downside but agree with the "overvalued" direction. My read is fair value in the $850-950 range — roughly 22-25x FCF, appropriate for a levered compounder with decelerating growth and idiosyncratic regulatory tail risk. At $1,245 that's still 25-35% downside, but not the 44% the composite suggests. The stock is not a short (you don't short monopolies with pricing power just because they're expensive), but I wouldn't be a new buyer here. The right trade is to wait for either (a) a defense-spending scare or aerospace demand wobble that drops it into the $900s, or (b) a special dividend catalyst that resets the setup. The market is paying for perpetual pricing power at 20%+ compounding; the numbers say growth is decelerating to low-teens and margins are already near ceiling. Data caveats: the 2026-dated quarterly and insider entries suggest this file's dates are forward-shifted or mislabeled — worth verifying before sizing anything.
GPT Reading
What stands out is that the underlying business is every bit as good as the legend: revenue has compounded from $4.80B in 2021 to $8.83B in 2025, a 16% annualized clip for what is supposed to be a mature aerospace supplier, while operating income has exploded from $1.69B to $4.17B. That is not just cyclical recovery; operating margin has gone from 35.2% to 47.2%, gross margin to 60.1%, and the latest six quarters show revenue stepping up from $2.01B to $2.54B with net margins mostly living in the low-20s and occasionally hitting 25%. The March 2026 quarter was especially strong at $2.54B of sales and $535M of net income, up 18% and 12% respectively versus the year-ago quarter. This is a rare industrial franchise with software-like economics in a physical product niche, and I think that part of the bull case is real, not promotional.
But the stock is priced as if those economics are nearly untouchable forever. At $68.4B market cap, investors are paying 38.6x earnings, 8.2x sales, 21.8x EV/EBITDA, and over 11x EV/revenue for a company that, despite elite margins, produced $1.82B of free cash flow last year. That is roughly a 2.7% FCF yield on market cap for a heavily levered balance sheet carrying $29.4B of debt against $2.8B of cash and negative equity of $9.7B. Even granting that negative equity is engineered through distributions and not an indicator of distress by itself, the enterprise is not being bought at a “great business, fair price” multiple; it is being bought at a “great business, almost no bad outcomes allowed” multiple. The latest annual operating cash flow of $2.04B also trails net income of $2.07B more closely than I’d like for such an aggressively capitalized story, so while cash conversion is still solid, this is not some hidden-cash-flow bargain.
The key contradiction with the more exuberant narrative is that the recent numbers are strong, but not so strong that they obviously justify this valuation. 2025 revenue growth was 11.2%, not 20%+, and quarterly sequential progression has not been perfectly smooth: $2.15B, $2.24B, $2.44B, $2.29B, then $2.54B. Net income has similarly moved around between $445M and $610M over the last four quarters before the latest print. This is still an aerospace supplier exposed to production cadence, retrofit demand, and aftermarket activity; it is not a compounding annuity detached from macro and airline health. A 38x P/E for that setup can work if growth re-accelerates and leverage steadily de-risks, but with debt still above 3x annual revenue and roughly 14x annual net income, the margin for error is thin. My read is simple: this is an exceptional company and an overvalued stock.
The best argument against that view is that TransDigm has repeatedly earned the right to look optically expensive. From 2021 to 2025, net income tripled from $680M to $2.07B, free cash flow reached $1.82B on just $222M of capex, and the current ratio of 3.2 suggests no near-term liquidity issue. If the company can sustain even low-teens revenue growth while preserving a 47% operating margin and continue layering on pricing, mix, and aftermarket gains, then today’s multiple could compress organically without any stock decline. A defender would also say EV/EBITDA near 22x is not insane for a business with this moat, this recurring installed-base exposure, and this level of margin superiority versus industrial peers. I weigh that differently because the stock already reflects that superior quality in full, while the balance sheet leaves less room than normal for operational wobble, refinancing pain, or any regulatory challenge to spare-parts pricing.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of “pretty good.” I’d want to see a sustained step-up that proves the current price can be grown into: revenue holding above $2.5B for multiple quarters, annualized FCF pushing toward $2.4B-$2.6B rather than $1.8B, and debt coming down meaningfully from $29.4B without sacrificing growth. If management can show that the March 2026 quarter is the new run-rate rather than a high point, and if margins stay around 22%-25% net while cash conversion improves, I could justify a premium multiple. Short of that, I think fair value is materially below the current quote, even for a best-in-class aerospace compounder.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a genuine compounder that has nearly doubled revenue from $4.80B in FY2021 to $8.83B in FY2025 while lifting operating income from $1.69B to $4.17B—an earnings trajectory that produced a 26.4% earnings CAGR against a still-impressive 15.8% revenue CAGR. Gross margin at 60.1% and operating margin at 47.2% are not industrial margins; they are software-like extraction rates on a captive aerospace aftermarket, and the latest quarterly print ($2.54B revenue, 21% net margin) shows the machine is still running. Free cash flow of $1.82B on only $222M of capex confirms the asset-light character of the model. That quality is real and is why the stock has been allowed to trade like a growth compounder rather than a parts supplier.
What the valuation synthesis correctly flags, and what the raw balance sheet makes unavoidable, is that the market has already capitalized roughly a decade of that excellence at once. At $1,244.6 the stock sits at 38.6× earnings, 8.2× sales and 21.8× EV/EBITDA with an enterprise value that embeds $29.4B of debt against only $2.81B of cash and negative equity of $9.68B. The 464% payout ratio is not a dividend policy; it is the signature of a levered capital-return machine that has already pulled future cash flows forward. Recent revenue growth has decelerated to 11.2% year-over-year, and the quarterly sequence ($2.01B → $2.15B → $2.24B → $2.44B → $2.29B → $2.54B) shows the step-function post-pandemic recovery is maturing. Paying 38× for mid-teens growth that is already slowing, while carrying net leverage that leaves interest coverage uncomfortably thin if refinancing rates stay elevated, is a fragile setup. The DCF anchor near $700 is directionally right; the $1,245 price is a 75–80% narrative premium on irreversible pricing power, not a cash-flow multiple.
The strongest case against an overvalued read is straightforward and must be respected: TransDigm’s installed base on commercial and defense platforms is multi-decade, substitution risk is near zero on many SKUs, and the company has repeatedly demonstrated that it can raise price faster than cost. If aerospace OEM production rates continue climbing, defense budgets hold, and management keeps delivering 20%+ FCF growth while refinancing the wall of debt without margin compression, today’s multiple can be grown into rather than compressed. Bulls will also note that EV/EBITDA of 22× is not outrageous for a 47% operating-margin business with high incremental returns, and that negative equity is an accounting artifact of aggressive buybacks rather than operating distress. That argument has worked for a decade. I weigh it less heavily now because the easy volume recovery is behind the company, secondary signals already flag macro headwinds and decelerating revenue confidence, and the refinancing calendar on nearly $30B of debt is no longer a theoretical risk—it is the binding constraint on the entire capital-structure thesis.
I would reverse to a fair-or-better stance if the next two quarters reaccelerate organic revenue growth sustainably above 15% while operating margin holds or expands through 48%, or if management materially de-levers (net debt/EBITDA moving decisively lower) without sacrificing the buyback/dividend machine. A clear, multi-quarter demonstration that airlines and OEMs cannot push back on aftermarket pricing would also justify a higher terminal multiple. Conversely, any guidance cut tied to pricing pushback, a defense budget reset, or a refinancing that lifts cash interest by more than ~150 bps would confirm the premium is air.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
TransDigm is operating at a rare quality level on the P&L: revenue has grown from $4.80B (2021) to $8.83B (2025), a ~16% CAGR, while gross margin expanded from 52.4% to 60.1% and operating margin from 35.2% to 47.2%. Net income tripled from $680M to $2.07B over the same span, and FCF ran $1.82B in 2025 with OCF/NI of 1.13x and negative accruals (-0.6% of assets) — the earnings are cash-backed and the Beneish M of -2.31 shows no manipulation flags. This is the signature of a proprietary-parts aftermarket moat with genuine pricing power. The offset is entirely on the capital structure: net debt of roughly $26.6B against $2.81B cash and only $1.82B FCF means the leverage ratio is high and Altman Z of 1.85 sits in the grey zone. This is a deliberate LBO-style capital model that management has run successfully for two decades, funding special dividends and M&A with debt rather than diluting holders — diluted share count is essentially flat (58.4M to 58.2M) and buybacks exceed SBC 1.87x. Insider tape shows persistent selling (93 sells, $46M, zero buys), including founder Nick Howley exercising and selling on 2026-07-20. For a company with heavy option-based comp this is typical mechanical monetization rather than a distress signal, but it is not a vote of confidence either.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and weighted average coupon vs current refi rates
- Aftermarket vs OEM revenue mix and organic growth ex-acquisitions
- Customer/platform concentration in defense and commercial aerospace
- Whether recent insider option-exercise-and-sell activity is 10b5-1 plan-driven
- Any covenant headroom given the leverage profile
Every valuation lane points below the tape: DCF $602, EPV floor $542, anchored P/E $846, composite $648, signal-adjusted $697. Even the most generous method (anchored P/E, which already embeds premium multiples for the aftermarket monopoly) implies ~$846 versus a $1,240 print — a ~32% overshoot on the friendliest read, and ~44% on the composite. This is not a case where one lane is a runaway; the lanes cluster in the $540-$850 band, which tightens conviction that the market is capitalizing near-perfect execution.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Aftermarket pricing/volume trends in latest 10-Q and transcript — any sign of airline pushback or price givebacks
- Defense mix and book-to-bill; program cadence into FY guidance
- Interest expense trajectory and refinancing schedule against the $26.6B debt stack
- Any large special dividend signal that changes the per-share cash-return math
The non-fundamental setup is favorable. TransDigm just printed a Q3 beat and raised FY26 sales, EBITDA and commercial aftermarket guidance - exactly the kind of headline that feeds the platform-monopoly archetype the market already loves. News flow is uniformly reverent ('compounder', 'monopoly or PE in disguise'), reinforcing the cult-medium narrative with strong intensity. Analyst tone is implicitly positive given target/estimate revisions typically follow a raised guide. With beta 0.91 and a defensive aerospace-aftermarket profile, TDG is minimally exposed to the mildly risk-on tape but also insulated from macro headwinds like the 4.65% 10y and PE-26 market. The Heico income piece nearby also signals investors are treating this sub-sector as a place to sit, not sell. The counter-pressure is the 79% premium to DCF: durability is only 'moderate' and any crack in the aftermarket pricing story (airline/OEM pushback headlines, a defense budget scare) would hit hard because so much of the cap is narrative. For now, no such crack exists in the tape - post-print momentum, raised guide, and a friendly regime dominate.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any airline or OEM public pushback on TransDigm spare-parts pricing (congressional or DoD IG mentions historically move this name)
- Post-print analyst target revisions and whether the raise is fully absorbed or leaves further upgrades
- Defense budget headlines or continuing-resolution risk that could dent the aftermarket-plus-defense narrative
- Whether aerospace peers (HEI, HWM) hold their bid - a sector rotation out would drag TDG regardless of its own print
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for TDG — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.