Skip to main content
Homepage
Full 18-step deep-dive · ~20–30 min · a member feature.
FRESH Analysis Report
Aug 22, 2026
1 day ago · 100% complete
For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page

What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Atlassian Corporation Class A (TEAM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.

Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -21 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 22 · Value -63 · Sentiment 54 (timing only, not weighted)

Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable reference-name attribute you can cite):

  • profile-header / price-overview — company profile, live quote, market cap
  • extended-analysisthe core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memo
  • future-predictions — our forward price-band predictions
  • market-narrative / ai-findings / gpt-critique — narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)
  • Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers): price-history, income-trend, key-metrics, financials (statement tables), insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.

More for machine readers: site briefing at /llms.txt · any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER · raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds); every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.

Atlassian Corporation Class A

TEAM NASDAQ
Technology · Software - Application
Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia atlassian.com Updated Aug 22, 2:55pm
Price
$171.81
Market Cap
$43.5B
Employees
13,301
Beta
1.04
Avg Volume
4,931,393
CEO
Mr. Michael Cannon-Brookes

Atlassian Corporation Class A is a software company that provides collaboration and productivity tools for organizations of all sizes. Its products include project planning and tracking software, team communication platforms, and IT service management solutions that help teams coordinate work, manage requests, and share information across departments. The company serves a broad range of industries, including technology, financial services, healthcare, education, and public sector organizations, with offerings designed for both technical and non-technical users. Atlassian also supports cloud-based software delivery and marketplace integrations, giving customers access to add-on applications and workflow extensions. Founded in 2002 and headquartered in Sydney, Atlassian plays a significant role in enterprise software by helping businesses organize work, improve collaboration, and streamline internal operations.

Runs with full report Generated: Aug 22, 2026 3:22pm
Price Overview
Price at report time
$171.81
as of Aug 22, 3:16pm (1d ago)
Change · Aug 22
-3.10 (-1.77%)
Day Range
$168.01 – $176.00
52-Week Range
$56.01 – $184.00
50-Day MA
$106.06
200-Day MA
$107.91
Volume
3,275,000.00
Right now · live
Log in to get the live feed
Members see the real-time price and the move since this report (over 1d).
Share Structure
Outstanding 159,005,198.00
Float 156,913,157.00
Free Float 98.7%
High free float — 98.7% of shares trade freely, ~1.3% held by insiders/institutions
Very liquid — most shares trade freely. Low insider ownership can mean less management alignment, but makes large position sizing straightforward.
Price History (1 Year)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:33pm (1d ago)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
The directional story — useful even when net income is negative.
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:33pm (1d ago)
Revenue
The top line — total sales before any costs or taxes are subtracted. A measure of how much business the company is doing.
Net Income
The bottom line — profit left after subtracting all expenses, interest, and taxes from revenue. Reflects accounting profitability, but includes non-cash items like depreciation, so it isn't the same as cash earned.
Operating Cash Flow
The real cash generated by the day-to-day business — selling products, paying suppliers, collecting from customers. Calculated from net income by adding back non-cash items and adjusting for timing (unpaid bills, unsold inventory). When OCF consistently lags net income, the reported profit may not be converting to real money.
Period Revenue Net Income Net Margin YoY/QoQ
Key Metrics
TD Twelve Data statement HEX SEC filing
Industry comparison last run: Aug 22, 2026 3:20pm
P/E Ratio (Price per dollar of earnings)
HEX
Stock Price / EPS (Diluted)
-818.14
Stock Price: $171.81
EPS (Diluted): -0.21
P/B Ratio (Price vs net asset value)
HEX
Stock Price / Book Value Per Share
42.23
Stock Price: $171.81
Total Equity: $1.06B
Shares: 260,163,000
EV/EBITDA (Total value vs operating profit)
HEX
Enterprise Value / EBITDA
294.32
Market Cap: $43.49B
Total Debt: $989.56M
Cash: $1.24B
EBITDA: $151.02M
Enterprise Value (Takeover price (cap + debt - cash))
HEX
Market Cap + Total Debt - Cash
$44.4B
Market Cap: $43.49B
Total Debt: $989.56M
Cash: $1.24B
P/S Ratio (Price per dollar of revenue)
HEX
Stock Price / Revenue Per Share
6.80
Stock Price: $171.81
Revenue: $6.57B
Shares: 260,163,000
EV/Sales (Total value vs revenue — works when P/E can't)
CALC
6.76
Gross Margin (Revenue left after direct costs)
HEX
Gross Profit / Revenue
84.8%
Gross Profit: $5.58B
Revenue: $6.57B
Operating Margin (Revenue left after all operations)
HEX
Operating Income / Revenue
0.2%
Operating Income: $10.36M
Revenue: $6.57B
Net Margin (Revenue left as actual profit)
HEX
Net Income / Revenue
-0.8%
Net Income: -$53.83M
Revenue: $6.57B
ROE (Profit from shareholder equity)
HEX
Net Income / Total Equity
-5.1%
Net Income: -$53.83M
Total Equity: $1.06B
ROIC (Profit from all invested capital)
HEX
NOPAT / Invested Capital
-3.1%
Operating Income: $10.36M
Tax Rate: 344.1%
Equity: $1.06B
Total Debt: $989.56M
Cash: $1.24B
Current Ratio (Can it pay short-term bills)
HEX
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
0.78
Current Assets: $2.80B
Current Liabilities: $3.57B
Debt/Equity (Leverage — debt vs equity)
HEX
Total Debt / Total Equity
0.93
Short-Term Debt: $0.00
Long-Term Debt: $989.56M
Total Debt: $989.56M
Total Equity: $1.06B
Rev/Share (Top-line per share)
HEX
Revenue / Shares Outstanding
$25.26
Revenue: $6.57B
Shares: 260,163,000
Book Value/Share (Net assets per share)
HEX
(Total Assets - Total Liabilities) / Shares
$4.07
Total Equity: $1.06B
Shares: 260,163,000
FCF/Share (Real cash generated per share)
HEX
(Operating Cash Flow + CapEx) / Shares
$5.07
Operating CF: $1.35B
CapEx: -$34.06M
Shares: 260,163,000
CapEx is negative (outflow) — added to OCF to get FCF
Div Yield (Annual income from holding)
TD
Last Annual Dividend / Stock Price
Last Dividend: $0.00
Stock Price: $171.81
Payout Ratio (Earnings paid out as dividends)
HEX
Dividends Paid / Net Income
Dividends Paid: N/A
Net Income: -$53.83M
Dividends paid not available in cash flow statement
Industry Benchmarks
Last run: Aug 22, 2026 3:20pm
Compares TEAM against LLM-researched typical ranges for its industry. One research call per industry, cached indefinitely — every stock in the same industry reuses the same baseline.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:33pm (1d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Revenue $2.8B $3.5B $4.4B $5.2B $6.6B
Cost of Revenue $452.9M $633.8M $803.5M $894.9M $996.8M
Gross Profit $2.3B $2.9B $3.6B $4.3B $5.6B
Operating Expenses $2.3B $3.2B $3.7B $4.5B $5.6B
Operating Income $70.1M -$345.2M -$117.1M -$130.4M $10.4M
Net Income -$519.5M -$486.8M -$300.5M -$256.7M -$53.8M
EBITDA $121.8M -$284.3M -$38.3M -$38.0M $151.0M
EPS $-2.05 $-1.90 $-1.16 $-0.98 $-0.21
EPS (Diluted) $-2.05 $-1.90 $-1.16 $-0.98 $-0.21
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:16pm (1d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Cash & Equivalents $1.4B $2.1B $2.2B $2.5B $1.2B
Total Current Assets $1.9B $2.7B $3.1B $3.9B $2.8B
Total Assets $3.3B $4.1B $5.2B $6.0B $6.1B
Current Liabilities $1.6B $2.0B $2.6B $3.2B $3.6B
Long-Term Debt $999.4M $962.1M $985.9M $987.7M $989.6M
Total Liabilities $3.0B $3.5B $4.2B $4.7B $5.0B
Total Equity $327.4M $654.7M $1.0B $1.3B $1.1B
Retained Earnings -$1.9B -$2.5B -$3.2B -$4.2B -$6.1B
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:33pm (1d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Operating Cash Flow $821.0M $868.1M $1.4B $1.5B $1.4B
Capital Expenditure -$70.6M -$25.7M -$32.6M -$44.9M -$34.1M
Free Cash Flow $750.5M $842.5M $1.4B $1.4B $1.3B
Acquisitions (net) -$19.4M -$5.8M -$847.8M -$14.2M -$1.2B
Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) $1.0B $0 -$1.0B $0 $0
Dividends Paid
Stock Buybacks $0 -$150.0M -$395.3M -$779.4M -$1.8B
Net Change in Cash $449.0M $716.6M $74.2M $335.6M -$1.3B
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:33pm (1d ago)
Metric 2023 2024 2025 2026
Revenue Growth +26.1% +23.3% +19.7% +26.0%
Gross Profit Growth +23.4% +22.6% +21.5% +29.0%
Operating Income Growth -592.6% +66.1% -11.4% +107.9%
Net Income Growth +6.3% +38.3% +14.6% +79.0%
EBITDA Growth -333.4% +86.5% +0.8% +497.3%
0Company Classification 1Industry Landscape 2Company Momentum 3Forward Projection 4aDCF Valuation 4bEarnings Power Value 4cAnchored PE 4dReverse DCF 4eRevenue-Based DCF 4fAnchored P/S 4gScenario Analysis 4hDividend Discount Model 4iBook Value Analysis 4jInsider Activity 4fCash Flow Quality 4gDebt Maturity Risk 4hMacro Environment 4iSector Intelligence 4jRevenue Confidence 4kSensitivity Analysis 4lSector Demand Cycle 5AI Investigation 5bThesis Evaluation 6Valuation Synthesis
computed not applicable 17 computed · 7 not applicable
Narrative Economics
The story the market is telling about this stock — the intangible X-factor (founder mythology, cult dynamics, TAM-of-imagination) that moves price beyond what cash flows alone explain. After Shiller, Narrative Economics.
No narrative profile yet for TEAM — it's generated by the pipeline (market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-22 15:39

The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.

Growing Atlassian is still compounding revenue in the mid-20s while its category grows ~17% and the broader application-software industry ~8% — genuine share gain — but the quarterly trend is decelerating, so the honest call is durable Growing, not Accelerating, and the structural rung sits under the 32.5% the price assumes. conf 7/10
Share gain Category growing · Application software is in a steady phase (demand score 0) with category median recent growth of 17.0% and industry revenue CAGR of 6.5%; Atlassian's recent 26.0% YoY runs 9pts above the category median and ~18pts above industry revenue growth.
Next 2 quarters
Growing
Cloud migration and tier-mix revenue is largely contracted and visible one to two quarters out, and the base rate is a tight mid-20s band with low volatility (3.2%). Nothing in the inputs suggests a step-down inside two prints; expect roughly 20-25% revenue growth with continued margin leverage.
↑ above expectations
Year 1
Growing
Full-year trajectory stays clearly positive but the decelerating quarterly trend argues for a lower number than the trailing 26%. Migration cohorts, ITSM, and enterprise tier attach carry the year; law-of-large-numbers and SMB seat sensitivity trim it.
≈ inline with expectations
Years 2–3
Growing
Structural earnings power grows: the installed base is genuinely embedded, switching costs on accumulated project history are real, and margin expansion has industry-wide support. But growth compresses toward high-teens as migration revenue exhausts and the seat-based monetization unit gets tested by AI agents and Microsoft bundling. Growing, not Accelerating.
↓ below expectations
The creme: each rung's call measured against what's already printed (vs analyst estimates · vs guidance / FY consensus · vs price-implied growth) — expectations in print are already in the price, so only the variant margin can pay. Hover a rung's chip for the margin read.
Growth drivers
75 Share gain inside a steady category — Recent revenue YoY 26.0% against category median 17.0% and industry ~8.0% — an 18pt gap versus the industry. That spread is too wide and too persistent (3-yr revenue CAGR 22.8%, all years positive, volatility only 3.2%) to be noise; it reflects real seat and product expansion, not one-off pricing.
65 Cloud migration + enterprise upsell mechanics — The growth is arithmetic, not narrative: on-prem/Data Center cohorts convert to cloud editions at materially higher ARPU, then layer premium/enterprise tiers, ITSM, and AI add-ons on an already-installed seat base. Migration and tier-mix are contracted, visible revenue rather than new demand creation, which is why growth has stayed in a tight band.
53 Earnings leverage running ahead of revenue — Four consecutive large EPS beats (+24%, +7%, +31%, +25%) against estimates, in an industry where operating margins expanded 5.2pp and net margins 9.9pp over three years. Incremental revenue on a shared cloud platform drops through at high margin, so earnings power is compounding faster than the top line.
42 Land-and-expand beyond technical teams — Jira/Confluence expansion into non-engineering functions (marketing, HR, ops) and JSM into service management widens the addressable seat pool inside accounts already paying — expansion revenue that does not require winning new logos, the cheapest form of growth available to them.
Growth risks
65 Decelerating trend on a larger base — The revenue confidence read explicitly flags the quarterly trend as decelerating. Mid-20s growth on this revenue base mathematically compresses toward high-teens/low-20s within a year or two; nothing in the mix argues for re-acceleration absent a new product line at scale.
53 Seat-based model versus AI agents and Microsoft — Atlassian monetizes per human seat. If AI coding/work agents reduce headcount growth in software organizations — or Microsoft bundles Teams/Azure DevOps/Copilot workflow tooling at zero marginal price — the unit of monetization erodes even as usage rises. This is the single structural question, and it is unresolved rather than disproven.
53 Price-implied bar of 32.5% — The reverse-DCF assumes 32.5% growth versus a business currently printing 26% and decelerating, and a house projection of 29.7%. The bar sits above the observed trajectory, so even a good outcome can undershoot what is already printed on the structural rung.
30 Macro and SMB seat sensitivity — Macro backdrop flagged as headwinds with 10y at 4.69. Atlassian's SMB and startup cohorts are the most hiring-sensitive part of the base; a tech employment freeze shows up directly as slower net seat expansion, and free cash flow CAGR of -3.5% suggests cash conversion is already noisier than revenue.
The world is doing two contradictory things to Atlassian. Digital work is fragmenting across more tools and more non-technical teams, which expands the surface Jira/Confluence/JSM can occupy — that is the tailwind carrying mid-20s growth against an 8% industry. Simultaneously, AI agents are attacking the seat as the billing unit: if work gets done by fewer people orchestrating software, per-user pricing has to convert into consumption or outcome pricing, and that transition is a re-underwriting event for every collaboration vendor, not just this one. Hyperscaler bundling (Microsoft) is the second-order pressure — not a share-taking threat today given switching costs on years of embedded project history, but a permanent ceiling on pricing power. Macro headwinds with the 10y at 4.69 slow tech hiring, which is the direct input to net seat adds. Net: the category grows, Atlassian keeps taking share for now, but the mechanism of monetization is under revision on a 2-3 year clock.
Growth position composite +16
ShrinkingStallingHoldingGrowingAccelerating
70Next 2 quarters · Growing
70Year 1 · Growing
70Years 2–3 · Growing
+16Composite (−100…+100)
A research prediction, not advice. Forward-graded: each rung is scored against the prints that follow it. Not an input to the GEM designation — track record first.
Claude Reading
Independent analyst synthesis · claude-opus-4-7 · generated 2026-08-22 15:32:36
Verdict Fairly valued to modestly undervalued at $172 — real 26% grower with 20% FCF margins deserves ~$180-$200; dissenting from the synthesis's bearish lean, but not a table-pound given multiple risk if growth slips below 20%.

The raw numbers tell a more coherent story than the models suggest. Atlassian just printed FY26 revenue of $6.57B, up 25.9% from $5.22B, with the Jun-26 quarter at $1.77B (up 28% YoY vs the $1.38B Jun-25 quarter). More importantly, FY26 operating income flipped positive ($10.4M vs -$130.4M) and FCF hit $1.32B on a 20.1% FCF margin — that is not a "pre-profit" company, and the classification confidence of 0.51 tells you the rule engine knows it. The GAAP net loss of $54M on $6.57B revenue is almost entirely stock-based comp; the cash economics are those of a scaled compounder. At $43.5B market cap and ~$1.32B FCF, this is trading at ~33x FCF with 26% top-line growth — not obviously insane for durable SaaS.

Where I break with the synthesis and market-forces layers: the "manufacturing unsustainable growth through aggressive accounting" claim in Market Forces is not supported by anything in this file — FCF grew from $1.35B OCF on healthy conversion, and revenue acceleration from 22.8% CAGR to 26% YoY recent is the opposite of decelerating fundamentals (the "decelerating" tag in Revenue Confidence looks like a sequential-quarter artifact, not a YoY trend). The Thesis Evaluation's -8 score leans heavily on "SMB saturation" and "Microsoft bundling," both of which have been the bear case for five straight years while Atlassian compounded revenue from $2.8B to $6.6B — a 2.35x in four years. The Pre-Flight layer has this right and the synthesis layer is over-indexing on multiple compression risk it can't quantify.

The contrarian case that actually has teeth is not Microsoft — it's the multiple. EV/Sales at 6.8x with 26% growth and 20% FCF margins is roughly Rule-of-46, which is genuinely healthy, but the P/B of 42 and thin $1.06B equity base reflect years of SBC-funded losses; if growth decelerates to 15% (plausible as the datacenter migration tailwind exhausts in FY27-28), fair multiple compresses toward 5x sales = ~$140. Insider activity is small-ticket routine selling (13 shares, 3 shares — these are RSU tax withholdings, not conviction signals; the Neutral tag is correct). The debt/equity of 0.93 and current ratio of 0.78 look ugly but are typical of deferred-revenue-heavy SaaS and not a real liquidity concern with $1.24B cash and $1.32B annual FCF. The real fragility: one Q — Mar-26 — showed revenue at $1.79B then Jun-26 dipped to $1.77B sequentially. That is worth watching but is likely seasonality on annual renewals.

I dissent from the synthesis's "High Conviction Required" framing (which reads as a soft bearish hedge) and from Market Forces' "unsustainable growth" claim. At $172 with 26% growth, 20% FCF margins, and a legitimate workflow moat that has survived a decade of "Microsoft will kill them" predictions, this is fairly valued to modestly undervalued — not a screaming buy, but the bear thesis requires growth to break below 18% within 4 quarters, which the trajectory doesn't support. Fair value band $165-$200 based on 30-35x FY27E FCF of ~$1.55B (assuming 18% FCF growth). The narrative-economics "40-50% is story" claim is overstated when the company is generating $1.3B of real cash.

GPT Reading
Independent reading · gpt-5.4 · generated 2026-08-22 15:32:51
Verdict Fair-to-overvalued at $171.81 — strong cash generation is real, but the stock already prices in a cleaner, more durable margin inflection than the reported numbers have yet proven; I’d need a pullback toward $140 or sustained positive GAAP margins to get constructive.

Atlassian’s numbers read much better than the “pre-profit” label suggests, but they also do not support an easy premium-growth multiple. Revenue has scaled from $4.36B in FY24 to $5.22B in FY25 and $6.57B in FY26, a two-year CAGR a bit above 22%, while quarterly revenue climbed from $1.19B in Sep-2024 to $1.77B in Jun-2026. That is real expansion, and the latest reported quarter was up about 28% year over year against $1.38B a year earlier. Gross margin remains exceptional at 84.8%, and the more important fact is cash generation: $1.35B of operating cash flow and $1.32B of free cash flow on $6.57B of revenue is roughly a 20% FCF margin. For a software company with only $34.1M of capex, that says the core product engine is very healthy even if GAAP earnings are still noisy.

What stands out, though, is the mismatch between that healthy cash machine and the still-anaemic income statement. FY26 operating income was just $10.4M, an operating margin of 0.2%, and net income was still negative at -$53.8M. The quarterly trend is improving, but not cleanly: net margins moved from -10.4% in Sep-2024 to -3.0%, -5.2%, -1.7%, -3.6%, -2.7%, then -5.5%, before finally printing +7.9% in Jun-2026. That last quarter is encouraging, but one profitable quarter does not prove durable operating leverage. At the current $43.5B market cap, investors are paying about 6.8x sales and roughly 33x trailing free cash flow. That is not absurd for a sticky enterprise software asset, but it is a full price for a company whose GAAP profitability is only just poking above zero and whose annual FCF has not compounded with revenue; the provided data even shows FCF CAGR slightly negative. If revenue settles from the mid-20s into the mid-teens before margins structurally inflect, today’s multiple is too generous.

The balance sheet is fine, not pristine. Cash of $1.24B exceeds debt of $989.6M, so there is no financing stress here, but equity is only $1.06B, which is why the 42x book multiple is basically meaningless rather than impressive. The current ratio of 0.78 also reminds you this is an efficient subscription software model, not a fortress built on current assets. Insider activity is all sells, albeit tiny-ticket in share count and not enough on its own to signal much. The bigger issue is that the market narrative still gives Atlassian credit as a compounding workflow monopoly, while the actual reported figures show a business in transition from excellent gross margin and cash conversion to as-yet-unproven GAAP earnings power. I do not see a broken business here; I see a good one already valued for a cleaner margin profile than it has actually delivered.

The best argument against this caution is straightforward: software earnings are often a poor lens at this stage, and Atlassian’s cash flow may be the more relevant economic truth. A 20% FCF margin today on an 85% gross-margin base can become much higher if expense growth moderates, and the annual operating line already improved from -$117.1M in FY24 to -$130.4M in FY25 and then to +$10.4M in FY26 while revenue added over $2.2B across the period. If the Jun-2026 quarter’s 7.9% net margin is the start of a genuine turn rather than a blip, then a 6.8x sales multiple is not demanding for a category leader still growing 25%+. In that framing, the stock is not expensive but simply early to the margin unlock. I weigh that less heavily because the quarter-to-quarter profit path has been too erratic, and because paying over 30x FCF for a company with only a one-quarter proof point on GAAP profitability leaves little room for a growth wobble.

What would change my mind is evidence that profitability is becoming repeatable, not just eventual. If the next 2-3 quarters sustain revenue above roughly $1.85B-$1.95B while holding GAAP net margin positive and lifting operating margin into a durable mid-single-digit range, I would be more willing to underwrite the current valuation and likely above it. Conversely, if revenue growth slips toward the mid-teens while FCF margin stays around 20% and GAAP net income falls back negative, then fair value looks closer to 5x sales, or roughly the low-$130s to mid-$140s per share rather than $171.81.

Grok Reading
Independent reading · grok-4.5 · generated 2026-08-22 15:33:46
Verdict Modestly overvalued at $172 / ~33× FCF; quality franchise but growth deceleration and stalled FCF compounding leave little margin of safety

Atlassian’s numbers tell a story of a scaled SaaS franchise that has largely completed the hard part of growing into a multi-billion-dollar revenue base, yet has not delivered the operating leverage the valuation already assumes. Revenue compounded from $2.80B in FY2022 to $6.57B in FY2026—a 22.8% CAGR—with the latest full year up roughly 26% and trailing quarters still printing $1.59B–$1.79B. Gross margin sits at an elite 84.8%, free cash flow reached $1.32B on only $34M of capex, and the balance sheet is net-cash positive ($1.24B cash versus $990M debt). That cash engine is the real asset: roughly 20% FCF margins while GAAP operating income is a rounding error at $10.4M and annual net income remains slightly negative at –$54M. The most recent quarter’s $139M profit and 7.9% net margin is the first clean GAAP breakout after a string of losses, which matters—but one quarter does not reverse years of thin reported earnings.

What stands out against the bullish compounder narrative is the disconnect between top-line growth and cash compounding. FCF CAGR is listed at –3.5% even as revenue grew low-to-mid twenties; the company is converting more sales into cash than into reported profit, yet that cash pile is not expanding in line with the revenue base. Sequential revenue also slipped from $1.79B to $1.77B in the latest quarter, and the secondary signals flag decelerating quarterly trends. At a $43.5B market cap the stock trades at 6.8× sales and roughly 33× trailing FCF—pricing that only works if 20%+ growth persists and FCF margins climb toward the mid-to-high twenties. EV/EBITDA above 290× and a 42× price-to-book simply confirm how little tangible earnings or equity capital currently support the multiple. Insider activity is a wash of small sales, not a signal either way.

The strongest case against this caution is straightforward and data-backed: $1.32B of free cash flow on an asset-light model with 85% gross margins and a still-visible cloud-migration runway is exactly what premium SaaS is supposed to look like before full operating leverage appears. A smart opponent would note that stock-based compensation, not structural cash burn, is the main reason GAAP stays near break-even, that net cash and $1.35B of operating cash flow remove balance-sheet risk, and that a durable workflow moat in Jira/Confluence has historically justified 6–8× sales for compounders that later print 25–30% FCF margins. If the recent $139M quarterly profit marks the start of sustained GAAP profitability and the cloud mix continues to lift LTV, today’s 33× FCF compresses quickly. I weigh that case as real but already in the price: the market is not giving Atlassian a distressed multiple; it is paying for the best version of the migration-and-moat story while FCF growth lags revenue and competitive bundling from Microsoft remains unresolved.

I would flip more constructive on two concrete prints: two consecutive quarters of sequential revenue re-acceleration above ~8% with FCF margins holding or expanding above 22%, and a full-year operating margin that clears 8–10% rather than the current 0.2%. Sustained FCF above $1.6B on the next annual report while growth stays north of 18% would also justify the current $172 area. Absent that, the stock is priced for durability it has not yet fully earned in the cash-flow trajectory.

Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Each AI above independently stated a direction (undervalued, fairly valued, or overvalued) and how strongly it believes it (conviction, 0–5). We combine those into a Bull-Bear Index on a 0–10 scale: 5 is neutral, 10 is maximum bullish (undervalued at full conviction), 0 is maximum bearish. We compute the score ourselves with the same arithmetic for every seat — the models never grade their own bullishness — so the three are directly comparable. Δ shows how far each seat sits from the panel average of 3.0; a large Δ marks the dissenting voice, usually the one worth reading.
Claude claude-opus-4-7 5.0
fairly valued · conviction 3/5 · Δ +2.0 vs panel · self: 6.0
GPT gpt-5.4 2.0
overvalued · conviction 3/5 · Δ -1.0 vs panel · self: 4.0
Grok grok-4.5 2.0
overvalued · conviction 3/5 · Δ -1.0 vs panel · self: 4.0
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Separate reads — Company Quality (is it a great business?), Valuation (is it mispriced?), and General Sentiment (how macro + narrative are pushing it), kept deliberately apart · 2026-08-22 15:40:07
Delvantic - Cairn AI
Quality - wait for a dip 7/10
Great business, wrong price - a Solid-grade cash engine trading at a platform-monopoly multiple that leaves no margin of safety despite a friendly tape.
The cruxWhether TEAM sustains 20%+ growth long enough to grow into a price that already assumes it - if growth settles into the mid-teens, the SBC-adjusted math breaks down fast.
Forensic checks Derived mechanically from TEAM's filed financials — not from the AI lenses
Liquidity & RunwaySelf-Funding
DilutionStable Share Count
Earnings QualityHigh Earnings Quality
The four lensesswitch a tab for its full read — score + evidence
Company Quality
+22
Solid
edge √Σ 115 · risk √Σ 93 · conf 7/10

Atlassian is a scaled application-software business with revenue compounding from $2.80B (2022) to $6.57B (2026) - roughly 24% CAGR - while gross margin holds an elite 82-85% band. FCF has stepped from $750M to $1.32B, funding the business entirely; net cash is positive at $250M and Altman Z of 4.7 sits comfortably in safe territory. Mechanical earnings-quality checks are clean (Beneish -2.88, no accrual games), and the negative OCF/NI ratio simply reflects that GAAP net income remains slightly negative while cash generation is robust - a signature of deferred-revenue SaaS economics, not manipulation. The blemish is compensation architecture. SBC runs 24.4% of revenue, meaning 'adjusted' profitability materially overstates the economic reality; buybacks recover only 56.6% of SBC, so repurchases are largely a dilution mop rather than shareholder return. Diluted shares still crept from 253M to 260M (0.7% CAGR) - contained, but persistent. Operating margin has hovered at or below breakeven for five years (2.5, -9.8, -2.7, -2.5, 0.2), so GAAP operating leverage remains elusive despite revenue more than doubling. Insider tape shows only small routine sales (13 sells, $1.5M total) - non-directional and consistent with vesting mechanics.

Strengths 3
m78
Elite gross margin and revenue compounding
Gross margin 82-85% across five years while revenue grew from $2.80B to $6.57B (~24% CAGR) - hallmarks of a durable software franchise.
m72
Strong, self-funding cash generation
FCF grew from $750M to $1.32B; company funds itself with net cash of $250M and no external-capital dependency.
m45
Clean earnings-quality diagnostics
Beneish M -2.88, Altman Z 4.7 (safe), no mechanical red flags; accruals negative (conservative).
Concerns 4
m65
SBC at 24.4% of revenue is a large real cost
Stock-based comp equal to roughly $1.6B on $6.57B of revenue means non-GAAP profitability materially overstates economic earnings.
m50
Buybacks only offset 57% of SBC
Repurchases are functioning as dilution management, not capital return; per-share value protection is partial, share count still up ~3% cumulatively over 5 years.
m42
GAAP operating margin still ~0 after five years of scaling
Operating margin: 2.5, -9.8, -2.7, -2.5, 0.2 - no visible operating leverage on GAAP basis despite revenue more than doubling.
m12
Insider sales small and routine
$1.5M total sales over 12 months, no buys - non-directional; typical vesting activity, no informational signal.
This is a genuinely good business - the kind of gross margin and cash generation profile you cannot fake, and the forensic checks come back clean. What keeps me from grading it higher is the compensation model: management is paying itself roughly a quarter of revenue in stock and using more than half of free cash flow to plug the resulting dilution rather than return capital. That is a real economic cost the GAAP line correctly reflects and the 'adjusted' narrative obscures. Growth and cash quality carry it above the 'sound' anchor; the SBC-and-flat-GAAP-margin combination keeps it from being unambiguously 'solidly healthy'.
Verify before trusting this (6)
  • Segment/cloud vs data-center revenue mix and whether cloud migration is driving the recent margin uptick
  • Customer concentration and net revenue retention disclosed in 10-K
  • Whether SBC as % of revenue is trending down as company scales
  • Composition of the 13 insider sellers (execs vs board) and whether any are 10b5-1 planned
  • Deferred revenue growth and RPO trajectory to validate cash-flow durability
  • Any convertible notes or off-balance-sheet obligations behind the $250M net cash figure
Valuation / Mispricing
-63
Rich
edge √Σ 22 · risk √Σ 96 · conf 7/10
price $171.81 vs a dilution-adjusted deserved value roughly $140-150 - about 15-20% too rich, no margin of safety. attractive below $135.00

Atlassian trades at roughly $43.5B market cap on a business where SBC at 24% of revenue means GAAP earnings materially understate the true owner economics - and even generously adjusted FCF multiples on a mid-teens grower do not get you to $171.81 without underwriting sustained 20%+ growth for many years. The e2e read is explicit: the price embeds a cloud-migration-plus-platform-monopoly outcome, and the bear case (Microsoft/open-source commoditization, TAM saturation on the freemium funnel) is not remotely reflected. A Solid-grade business deserves a premium, but the dilution-adjusted deserved value sits below spot, not above.

Cheap signals 1
m22
High-quality cash engine deserves a premium
Fortress gross margins and clean forensics justify a quality premium over generic SaaS - just not enough of one to bridge the gap to $171.81.
Rich / priced-in 3
m68
Priced for 20%+ growth in perpetuity
The e2e synthesis flags the multiple as embedding 20%+ durable growth, but the freemium base is saturating and enterprise land-and-expand math decays. If growth settles into the mid-teens, the multiple compresses meaningfully.
m55
SBC-adjusted economics are worse than headline
SBC at ~24% of revenue and buybacks that barely offset dilution mean true FCF to shareholders is well below reported FCF. Deserved value on a dilution-honest basis is lower than the bull FCF-yield story suggests.
m40
Competitive overhang not in the price
Microsoft (Teams, Azure DevOps, Loop) and open-source Jira/Confluence alternatives are structural risks to pricing power. A premium multiple assumes none of this bites.
Good business, wrong price. At $171.81 I am being asked to pay a platform-monopoly multiple for a company whose growth is quietly decelerating and whose GAAP profitability is masked by 24%-of-revenue SBC. I want this ~15-20% lower - call it $135 - before the risk/reward turns. Above $170 I am renting other people's optimism.
Verify before trusting this (5)
  • Cloud revenue growth deceleration curve in next 2 quarters
  • Net revenue retention trend (is it drifting below 115%?)
  • SBC as % of revenue - any sign of moderation
  • Enterprise seat expansion vs new-logo mix
  • Any guidance revision around FY growth targets
General Sentiment
+54
Tailwind
tail √Σ 123 · head √Σ 63 · conf 7/10

The active narrative on TEAM is a strong, durable platform-monopoly story with medium cult coefficient, and it is currently being fed - not starved - by the news flow. Three of the last big moves were earnings-driven upside gaps (a 37.6% surge on the Q2 print, a 29.6% surge on Q3, and another beat in early August with 28% revenue growth, 31% cloud growth, and a one-million AI user milestone). That directly neutralizes the bear angle (Microsoft/AI commoditization) and instead recasts TEAM as an AI winner. The just-announced Code Context beta and the 'winning in 2026 vs HubSpot/Monday' framing keep that story on the front foot, and the CFO's sale is small, forced, and explicitly framed as retained-confidence - not a sentiment negative. Macro is the only real crosswind: 10y at 4.69% and a 25.7 market PE are structurally hostile to high-multiple SaaS names where roughly 40-50% of the price is story. But the tape today is mildly risk-on (VIX 15, score +32), and TEAM's beta of 1.04 is only average, so the macro press is ordinary, not decisive. Momentum is strong-positive and the analyst tone (per the trade-press framing) is leaning toward TEAM as the sector's 2026 winner. Net: narrative, news, and momentum all push the same direction; rates/multiple compression risk is the lone offset. That is a tailwind, not a strong one, because the story is already priced and any AI-adoption stumble would flip the reflex quickly.

Tailwinds 5
m72
AI narrative flipped from threat to proof
The core bear case was MSFT/AI commoditization; instead TEAM is being covered as an AI beneficiary (one-million AI users, Code Context beta, cross-sell expansion). That reframing is the single biggest sentiment force on the name right now.
m68
Three consecutive blowout earnings gaps
37.6%, 29.6%, and another beat in August have hard-wired a 'beat-and-raise' reflex into the tape. Positioning and dip-buying behavior around TEAM prints is now conditioned bullish.
m55
Durable platform-monopoly archetype
Strong intensity, durable, medium cult - Jira/Confluence embeddedness is an easy story to keep telling, which sustains multiple support even on quiet news days.
m40
Sector leadership framing vs HubSpot/Monday
Trade press is anointing TEAM the 2026 software winner, which pulls incremental sector flows toward this specific ticker rather than peers.
m25
Risk-on tape, average beta
VIX 15, regime score +32 and beta 1.04 mean the macro tape is a mild positive, not a shield and not a hammer.
Headwinds 2
m55
High-multiple SaaS meets 4.69% 10y
Rates and a 25.7 market PE are a persistent drag on story-heavy SaaS where ~40-50% of price is narrative. Any duration-shock day marks TEAM down more than the tape.
m30
Story running ahead of mature-SaaS math
A 32%+ growth expectation is baked in; sentiment is asymmetric - a single in-line quarter or AI-adoption slowdown would puncture the narrative faster than it built.
Sentiment on TEAM is a real tailwind, but not a screaming one. The narrative machine is working in this stock's favor - AI got reframed from existential threat to growth driver, three straight earnings gaps have trained the tape to buy dips, and the platform-monopoly story is durable. The only genuine press against it is macro: rates and multiple risk on a name where nearly half the price is story. On balance the non-fundamental forces lean up, so I read this as a Tailwind, with the caveat that the same narrative intensity that lifts it now makes it fragile to the first disappointing print.
Verify before trusting this (4)
  • Next print - does cloud growth stay above 30% and does the AI user count keep compounding, or does the beat-and-raise streak break
  • Any 10y move back toward 5% - high-multiple SaaS is where that pain lands first
  • Microsoft/Copilot competitive headlines that could re-open the commoditization bear case
  • Sell-side target revisions after the August print - are they chasing higher or fading the move
The market-wide tape + this name's exposure to it (beta / sector / narrative durability). Context on the non-fundamental pressure — not a call on the business or the price. processId: detail-general-sentiment
Growth Outlook
+16
Growing
edge √Σ 120 · risk √Σ 104 · conf 7/10

The world is doing two contradictory things to Atlassian. Digital work is fragmenting across more tools and more non-technical teams, which expands the surface Jira/Confluence/JSM can occupy — that is the tailwind carrying mid-20s growth against an 8% industry. Simultaneously, AI agents are attacking the seat as the billing unit: if work gets done by fewer people orchestrating software, per-user pricing has to convert into consumption or outcome pricing, and that transition is a re-underwriting event for every collaboration vendor, not just this one. Hyperscaler bundling (Microsoft) is the second-order pressure — not a share-taking threat today given switching costs on years of embedded project history, but a permanent ceiling on pricing power. Macro headwinds with the 10y at 4.69 slow tech hiring, which is the direct input to net seat adds. Net: the category grows, Atlassian keeps taking share for now, but the mechanism of monetization is under revision on a 2-3 year clock.

Growth drivers 4
m75
Share gain inside a steady category
Recent revenue YoY 26.0% against category median 17.0% and industry ~8.0% — an 18pt gap versus the industry. That spread is too wide and too persistent (3-yr revenue CAGR 22.8%, all years positive, volatility only 3.2%) to be noise; it reflects real seat and product expansion, not one-off pricing.
m65
Cloud migration + enterprise upsell mechanics
The growth is arithmetic, not narrative: on-prem/Data Center cohorts convert to cloud editions at materially higher ARPU, then layer premium/enterprise tiers, ITSM, and AI add-ons on an already-installed seat base. Migration and tier-mix are contracted, visible revenue rather than new demand creation, which is why growth has stayed in a tight band.
m53
Earnings leverage running ahead of revenue
Four consecutive large EPS beats (+24%, +7%, +31%, +25%) against estimates, in an industry where operating margins expanded 5.2pp and net margins 9.9pp over three years. Incremental revenue on a shared cloud platform drops through at high margin, so earnings power is compounding faster than the top line.
m42
Land-and-expand beyond technical teams
Jira/Confluence expansion into non-engineering functions (marketing, HR, ops) and JSM into service management widens the addressable seat pool inside accounts already paying — expansion revenue that does not require winning new logos, the cheapest form of growth available to them.
Growth risks 4
m65
Decelerating trend on a larger base
The revenue confidence read explicitly flags the quarterly trend as decelerating. Mid-20s growth on this revenue base mathematically compresses toward high-teens/low-20s within a year or two; nothing in the mix argues for re-acceleration absent a new product line at scale.
m53
Seat-based model versus AI agents and Microsoft
Atlassian monetizes per human seat. If AI coding/work agents reduce headcount growth in software organizations — or Microsoft bundles Teams/Azure DevOps/Copilot workflow tooling at zero marginal price — the unit of monetization erodes even as usage rises. This is the single structural question, and it is unresolved rather than disproven.
m53
Price-implied bar of 32.5%
The reverse-DCF assumes 32.5% growth versus a business currently printing 26% and decelerating, and a house projection of 29.7%. The bar sits above the observed trajectory, so even a good outcome can undershoot what is already printed on the structural rung.
m30
Macro and SMB seat sensitivity
Macro backdrop flagged as headwinds with 10y at 4.69. Atlassian's SMB and startup cohorts are the most hiring-sensitive part of the base; a tech employment freeze shows up directly as slower net seat expansion, and free cash flow CAGR of -3.5% suggests cash conversion is already noisier than revenue.
vs expectations: ~6m above · 1y inline · 2-3y below
The forward growth verdict — is the business itself likely to grow (next 2 quarters / year 1 / years 2–3), judged against its category and against printed expectations. The full horizon ladder + creme renders on the Growth Outlook card above. Not a call on the price (Valuation owns that) or the tape (Sentiment owns that).
Please log in to view trade setups
The Augustus trade-setup read is a members feature.
Log in
Lenses kept deliberately separate — Company Quality (price-agnostic), Valuation (price-conditional), General Sentiment (non-fundamental macro/narrative pressure), and Growth Outlook (the forward growth verdict). The scores are not blended. Filing-level items (convertibles, lock-ups, customer concentration) are v2 — see each lens's "verify."
Price Prediction
Lower -12.7% v0.6.0 View full prediction →

When we made this prediction on Aug 23, 2026, TEAM was $171.81. We expect it to be $150.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $135.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 23, 2026.

Price when predicted$171.81
Our estimate for Feb 2027$150.00-12.7%
Great value below$135.00
Price history shown (6 Months)

Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.

Community AI Feedback
No community reviews yet for TEAM. Be the first — hit How to Contribute, have any AI review this page, and paste its take back here.
My Notes personal — only you see this
v1.1.562 · 9b2927c4 · 2026-08-22 16:52:06