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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Target Corporation (TGT) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Low · Gem Score -38 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 10 · Value -70 · Sentiment 49 (timing only, not weighted)
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Target Corporation
TGT NYSETarget Corporation is an American general merchandise retailer that operates a broad mix of stores and digital commerce channels. The company sells food and beverages, household essentials, apparel, beauty products, electronics, toys, home goods, and seasonal merchandise through its stores and Target.com. It also supports shoppers with private-label brands, same-day fulfillment services, and in-store pickup options that connect its physical locations with its online platform. Target serves individual consumers and families across everyday shopping categories, making it a major participant in U.S. retail distribution. Headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Target Corporation focuses on convenience, assortment, and a unified shopping experience across its brick-and-mortar and digital businesses.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 8.13
Total Equity: $16.17B
Shares: 455,600,000
Total Debt: $14.40B
Cash: $5.49B
EBITDA: $8.25B
Total Debt: $14.40B
Cash: $5.49B
Revenue: $104.78B
Revenue: $104.78B
Revenue: $104.78B
Total Equity: $16.17B
Tax Rate: 22.3%
Equity: $16.17B
Total Debt: $14.40B
Cash: $5.49B
Current Liabilities: $21.23B
Long-Term Debt: $14.40B
Total Debt: $14.40B
Total Equity: $16.17B
Shares: 455,600,000
Shares: 455,600,000
CapEx: -$3.73B
Shares: 455,600,000
Stock Price: $152.63
Net Income: $3.71B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:44pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $106.0B | $109.1B | $107.4B | $106.6B | $104.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $75.0B | $82.2B | $77.8B | $76.5B | $75.5B |
| Gross Profit | $31.0B | $26.9B | $29.6B | $30.1B | $29.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $22.1B | $23.0B | $23.9B | $24.5B | $24.2B |
| Operating Income | $8.9B | $3.8B | $5.7B | $5.6B | $5.1B |
| Net Income | $6.9B | $2.8B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $3.7B |
| EBITDA | $11.6B | $6.5B | $8.5B | $8.5B | $8.3B |
| EPS | $14.23 | $6.02 | $8.96 | $8.89 | $8.16 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $14.10 | $5.98 | $8.94 | $8.86 | $8.13 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:33pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $5.9B | $2.2B | $3.8B | $4.8B | $5.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $21.6B | $17.8B | $17.5B | $19.5B | $20.0B |
| Total Assets | $53.8B | $53.3B | $55.4B | $57.8B | $59.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $21.7B | $19.5B | $19.3B | $20.8B | $21.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $11.6B | $14.1B | $14.2B | $13.9B | $14.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $41.0B | $42.1B | $41.9B | $43.1B | $43.3B |
| Total Equity | $12.8B | $11.2B | $13.4B | $14.7B | $16.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $6.9B | $5.0B | $7.1B | $8.1B | $9.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:44pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $8.6B | $4.0B | $8.6B | $7.4B | $6.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$3.5B | -$5.5B | -$4.8B | -$2.9B | -$3.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $5.1B | -$1.5B | $3.8B | $4.5B | $2.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $825.0M | $2.5B | -$147.0M | -$398.0M | $341.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.5B | -$1.8B | -$2.0B | -$2.0B | -$2.1B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$7.4B | -$2.6B | $0 | -$1.0B | -$408.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$2.6B | -$3.7B | $1.6B | $957.0M | $726.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:44pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +2.9% | -1.6% | -0.8% | -1.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -13.4% | +10.0% | +1.6% | -2.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -57.0% | +48.3% | -2.5% | -8.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -60.0% | +48.8% | -1.1% | -9.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -43.5% | +29.9% | +0.5% | -3.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:33pm (57d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-13 | $1.14 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-11 | $1.14 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-12 | $1.14 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-13 | $1.14 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-14 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-12 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-20 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-21 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-14 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-20 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-14 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-15 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-16 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-14 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-15 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-16 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-17 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-15 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-16 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-17 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw tape is worse than the synthesis lets on. Revenue has gone $109.1B → $107.4B → $106.6B → $104.8B over four years — a slow bleed, not a cycle. But the more damning number is operating income: $8.95B in FY22 collapsed to $3.85B in FY23 and has only clawed back to $5.12B in FY26, still ~43% below the peak on similar revenue. That's not inventory noise anymore; that's structural. Gross margin at 27.9% vs. the ~29% peak, operating margin stuck at 4.9% vs. 8.4% peak — Target has permanently ceded pricing power. FCF at $2.84B against $3.73B capex means the company is barely self-funding after the $2.1B dividend (payout 55%), and the -13.8% FCF CAGR is the number I'd anchor on, not the -1.2% revenue CAGR. The recent quarterly trajectory the model labels "accelerating" is misleading: Q1 FY26 rev $25.44B vs Q1 FY25 $23.85B looks like +6.7%, but Q1 FY25 was itself a trough — YoY comps against FY24's $25.45B show flat-to-down. Net income Q1 FY26 $781M vs Q1 FY25 $1.04B is -25%. Margins are recompressing, not recovering.
I agree with the Valuation Synthesis direction (overvalued) but think the $111 fair value is generous, not conservative. At 18.8x a declining earnings stream with negative FCF CAGR, the multiple is Walmart-like without Walmart's growth (WMT comps +4-5%, TGT comps roughly flat-to-negative). EV/EBITDA of 9.5x is not cheap for a business whose EBITDA has been falling. The Market Forces read of "multi-year strategic repositioning crisis" aligns with what I see in the operating margin collapse — this isn't a temporary consumer weakness story, it's Walmart's grocery/price advantage and Amazon's convenience advantage squeezing Target's discretionary-heavy mix from both sides. The Narrative layer correctly identifies that the 36% premium is story-driven (private label + same-day), but I'd argue narrative durability is weaker than "moderate" — three straight years of declining revenue is starting to break the "omnichannel winner" frame, and one more soft holiday would shatter it.
The contrarian case: Target has a 3% dividend yield, 55% payout ratio that's covered, ROE of 22.9%, ROIC of 15.9% — these are genuinely good capital-efficiency numbers for a retailer, and the market may be right that any margin normalization back to even 6% operating margin (still below peak) would push EPS meaningfully higher. Gross margin at 27.9% has room to expand if freight/shrink normalizes. The stock is down ~35% from 2021 highs and sentiment is genuinely negative — this is not a euphoric setup. Insider activity shows sales but the volumes are trivial (49k shares is noise for a company this size), not a signal. If you believe the consumer stabilizes and Target executes on private label mix shift, $150 could look cheap in two years. But that's a lot of ifs stacked on a business whose fundamentals have deteriorated every year since 2022.
I dissent modestly on magnitude but agree on direction. Fair value on my read is $115-125 — I'll split the difference between the DCF ($111) and give some credit to the dividend/ROIC quality and the low P/S of 0.66. At $152.63, you're paying ~22-30% premium to justified value for a business with negative revenue, earnings, and FCF CAGRs. The Thesis Evaluation's -8 score understates the asymmetry: the bear case (structural share loss + margin compression) is playing out in the actual numbers, while the bull case (private label expansion) is a hope. I'd sell/avoid here, revisit at $120-125 where the dividend yield approaches 3.7% and you're paid to wait, or if Q2/Q3 FY26 prints show operating margin actually inflecting above 5.5%. Don't confuse a de-rated retailer with a cheap one — TGT still isn't cheap on the earnings power it's actually delivering.
GPT Reading
Target’s numbers read like a business that has stabilized, not one that has re-earned a premium. Annual revenue has slipped for three straight years from $109.1B in FY2023 to $107.4B, then $106.6B, then $104.8B in FY2026. The quarterly pattern is similar: the latest quarter at $25.44B was up sequentially in the normal seasonal sense but still only modestly above $23.85B a year earlier, while the holiday quarter fell from $30.92B to $30.45B. Earnings are not collapsing, but they are grinding lower: FY net income moved from $4.14B to $4.09B to $3.71B, and the latest quarter’s $781M was down sharply from $1.04B in the comparable period. What stands out most is margin stagnation. Gross margin at 27.9% is still well below the 29.3% in FY2025 and far below the 29.3%+ to 29.6% type levels the company used to pair with stronger operating leverage; operating margin is 4.9%, versus 8.4% in FY2022. This is not a temporary trough anymore. It looks like a structurally lower-return version of Target.
That matters because the valuation still asks investors to pay for a cleaner recovery than the income statement shows. At $152.63, the stock trades around 18.8x earnings and 9.5x EV/EBITDA for a company with negative 3-year revenue CAGR, negative earnings CAGR, and free cash flow of just $2.84B after $3.73B of capex. On market cap alone, that is roughly a 4.1% FCF yield, which is not compelling for a mature retailer with current ratio below 1.0, net debt of roughly $8.9B, and no visible top-line engine. The balance sheet is manageable, but not a reason to stretch. Return metrics like 22.9% ROE flatter the picture because equity is only $16.2B against a large buyback-shaped capital structure; ROA of 6.2% and the step-down in absolute operating profit from $8.95B in FY2022 to $5.12B in FY2026 are more honest indicators of diminished economics. If the business were re-accelerating, you could defend a high-teens multiple. But paying that multiple for shrinking sales and 3%-4% net margins feels optimistic.
The strongest pushback is that Target is still a very profitable, cash-generative franchise, and the worst of the margin damage is clearly behind it. Net income recovered from the FY2023 trough of $2.78B to $4.14B in FY2024, and even after softening again remains far better than crisis levels. Quarterly net margins between 3.1% and 4.3% are pedestrian, but they are also stable enough to support the dividend, which yields about 3.0% with a 55% payout ratio. Gross profit dollars remain substantial at $29.3B, operating cash flow at $6.56B is healthy, and EV/revenue below 0.75x is not egregious for a scaled omnichannel retailer. Bulls can also argue that the latest quarter’s revenue growth versus the prior-year quarter suggests the sales line may be bottoming, and that even modest margin normalization could produce meaningful EPS lift because the cost base is already reset.
I weigh those arguments less heavily because stabilization is already in the price, while true recovery is not yet in the numbers. A business doing $104.8B of revenue and $3.71B of net income is fine; it is just not obviously worth paying a premium multiple for when Walmart and Amazon are still the two dominant gravitational forces in value retail and convenience. Insider activity doesn’t rescue the case either: the recent tape is mostly awards plus open-market sales, not conviction buying into weakness. The core issue is simple: if Target has become a 4.5%-5.0% operating margin retailer rather than a 6%-8% one, then $150+ is rich. On a more conservative 15x-16x earnings range applied to a $3.7B-$4.0B earnings base, fair value lands closer to the low $120s to mid $130s, not the low $150s.
What would change my mind is evidence that this is more than a flatlining retailer. I’d want to see at least two consecutive quarters of real revenue growth, not just easy comparisons—something like quarterly sales consistently above $26B outside holiday and a holiday quarter back above $31B. More important, I’d need operating margin to move decisively above 5.5% and stay there, implying annual operating income can climb back toward $6B without financial engineering. If free cash flow can sustainably exceed $4B while capex remains near current levels, the stock could justify today’s multiple. Absent that, the market is paying up for a turnaround that remains mostly theoretical.
Grok Reading
Target’s numbers describe a mature discounter still shrinking at the top line while the market pays a growth multiple for a turnaround that has not yet arrived. Annual revenue has slipped three straight years from $109.1B to $107.4B to $106.6B to $104.8B, a −1.2% CAGR, and trailing net income has rolled over again to $3.71B from $4.09B and $4.14B the prior two years. Free cash flow of $2.84B after $3.73B of capex is the weakest link: the −13.8% FCF CAGR and roughly 24× price-to-FCF multiple sit badly against an 18.8× earnings multiple that already embeds mid-single-digit margin recovery. Operating margin is stuck at 4.9% and net margin at 3.5%, well below the 2022 peak and still below the 4%+ net the price appears to require. Balance-sheet leverage is manageable (net debt ~$8.9B, D/E 0.89) and ROE remains a respectable 23%, but those are maintenance metrics, not evidence of reacceleration.
Quarterly prints reinforce the same picture rather than refute it. The May 2026 quarter’s $25.44B revenue did grow versus the year-ago $23.85B, yet net margin compressed to 3.1% from 4.3% and absolute NI fell to $781M from $1.04B. Holiday-quarter revenue also slipped year-over-year ($30.45B vs $30.92B). The “accelerating” revenue-confidence flag therefore captures a single easier comparison, not a durable inflection; the trailing four-quarter stack is still negative and the earnings trajectory is worse. At $152.63 the stock trades at a clear premium to the ~$111–$124 composite fair-value range produced by the quantitative stack, and EV/EBITDA of 9.5× only looks cheap if one assumes the margin and FCF recovery that the last three years have failed to deliver.
The cleanest opposing case is that Target is simply a high-ROE cash compounder being marked to a temporary trough. Bulls will correctly note that EV/sales of 0.75× and P/S of 0.66× are not extreme for a national brand, the 3% dividend is covered at a 55% payout, operating cash flow remains solid at $6.56B, and private-label mix plus same-day fulfillment could still lift gross margin from the current 27.9% without needing large top-line growth. A smart skeptic of the bear case would also point out that 2023 was the inventory-glut trough; subsequent years have already stabilized earnings well above that low, so mean-reversion math favors some multiple support. Those points keep the stock from being a short-the-world idea, but they do not justify paying 19× earnings and 24× FCF for negative revenue and FCF CAGRs while share continues to leak to Walmart and Amazon.
I would flip to neutral or constructive only on two concrete developments: two consecutive quarters of positive comparable sales that push trailing twelve-month revenue back above $107B with net margin sustainably above 4%, and free cash flow reclaiming $4B+ on a trailing basis (implying capex discipline or working-capital release). Absent those prints, the premium to intrinsic value looks like narrative pricing of an omnichannel recovery that the income statement has not confirmed.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Target throws off real cash: FCF of $2.84B on the trailing year, OCF/NI of 1.67x, accruals at -4.8% of assets, and Altman Z of 3.2 all point to earnings that are backed by cash rather than accounting stretch. Capital discipline is intact - diluted shares have compounded down about 1.9% annually (492.7M in 2022 to 455.6M in 2026), SBC is a trivial 0.3% of revenue, and buybacks are running nearly 9x SBC. Liquid cash of $10.1B against modest net debt (-$4.3B net) is a constraint but not a threat for a business of this scale.
The concern is the operating trajectory. Revenue has gone backwards from $109.12B (2023) to $104.78B (2026), operating margin peaked at 8.4% in 2022 and now sits at 4.9%, and net income has nearly halved from $6.95B to $3.71B over four years. FCF is also choppy ($5.08B, -$1.51B, $3.82B, $4.48B, $2.84B). This is a mature discount retailer losing ground - likely to Walmart, Costco, and Amazon - not a broken one, but the earnings power is drifting the wrong way. Insider tape shows only sales (CEO Cornell sold ~$6.5M in May 2026), which is routine for executives at this level but adds no positive signal.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Comparable-store sales and traffic trend in latest 10-K/10-Q vs Walmart and Costco
- Whether margin compression is driven by markdowns, theft/shrink, mix shift, or wage inflation
- Debt maturity schedule and any covenant sensitivity given -$4.3B net cash position
- Digital and same-day-delivery growth rate as a share of total revenue
- Any impairment or restructuring charges distorting the 2023 net income trough
The three valuation methods triangulate to a deserved price in the $100-125 range: DCF $99, EPV floor $107, and an anchored-PE stretch of $188 that leans on historical multiples this softening business no longer deserves. Composite $123.52 and signal-adjusted $111.49 both sit well below the $152 tape, implying roughly 20-27% downside to fair value. Earnings quality is clean so no haircut is needed, but the Company-Quality lens flags four straight years of revenue and margin erosion - that argues for trimming, not extending, the multiple.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Comp-store sales trajectory and whether digital growth is offsetting store softness
- Operating margin cadence - is the four-year slide bottoming or continuing
- Private label mix and gross margin contribution in latest 10-Q
- Capex and buyback pace given the balance-sheet constraint
- Guidance revisions vs consensus for FY revenue and EPS
Sentiment on Target has flipped meaningfully positive in the last few sessions. The active narrative is no longer 'mature retailer in secular decline' but 'turnaround gaining traction' - Oppenheimer flagging a possible guidance raise into Q2, TD Cowen lifting the price target, and financial media running explicit comeback pieces ('Rallied Over 50% This Year', 'Comeback Is Just Getting Started'). The chief-AI-officer hire feeds a modernization sub-narrative that stories-hungry analysts can hang a multiple on. This is exactly the kind of coordinated tone shift that presses a stock higher regardless of intrinsic value. The macro tape is a mild helper, not the driver. Risk-on at +47 with VIX 15.5 is a supportive backdrop, and with beta 0.97 in consumer defensive, TGT is not especially levered to the tape either way; higher rates and a 26 market PE are a generic drag but do not bite a low-multiple discount retailer with a fresh turnaround story. Cult coefficient is low and narrative durability only moderate, so this is a real tailwind but not a mania - the pressure is a persistent bid from re-rating analysts and momentum chasers, not a euphoric squeeze. The main asymmetry: consensus is warming into a Q2 print, which sets the bar higher and makes the sentiment fragile to any miss or soft guide.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Q2 fiscal 2026 print - whether guidance actually gets raised as Oppenheimer suggests, or merely reaffirmed
- Whether additional sell-side desks pile onto the upgrade cycle in the next two weeks or the revision wave stalls
- Comp-store traffic commentary - the bear case still hinges on discretionary softness and any crack there breaks the turnaround narrative
- Peer read-through from Walmart/Costco prints shaping the discount-retail tone
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for TGT — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.