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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for T-Mobile US, Inc. (TMUS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +10 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 57 · Value -28 · Sentiment -42 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $195.89 vs $172.71 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
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T-Mobile US, Inc.
TMUS NASDAQT-Mobile US, Inc. is a leading wireless telecommunications provider operating under the T-Mobile and MetroPCS brands. It delivers a comprehensive suite of postpaid and prepaid wireless services, including voice, messaging, and high-speed data plans tailored for consumers and businesses. The company also offers wholesale wireless services to resellers and partners, enabling broader network access. T-Mobile US, Inc. has expanded into fixed-wireless broadband, serving residential and business customers with home internet solutions powered by its extensive 5G network. Additionally, through joint ventures with fiber network owners, it provides fiber broadband to select customers while maintaining stakes in these partnerships for wholesale access. With a strong focus on the U.S. communications sector, T-Mobile US, Inc. supports millions of postpaid phone users, prepaid subscribers, and growing broadband households, playing a pivotal role in the competitive wireless and internet services market. Founded in 1994 and headquartered in Bellevue, Washington, it continues to drive innovation in mobile connectivity and broadband delivery.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 9.72
Total Equity: $59.20B
Shares: 1,131,076,251
Total Debt: $86.28B
Cash: $5.60B
EBITDA: $31.79B
Total Debt: $86.28B
Cash: $5.60B
Revenue: $88.31B
Revenue: $88.31B
Revenue: $88.31B
Total Equity: $59.20B
Tax Rate: 23.0%
Equity: $59.20B
Total Debt: $86.28B
Cash: $5.60B
Current Liabilities: $24.50B
Long-Term Debt: $81.15B
Total Debt: $86.28B
Total Equity: $59.20B
Shares: 1,131,076,251
Shares: 1,131,076,251
CapEx: -$9.96B
Shares: 1,131,076,251
Stock Price: $172.71
Net Income: $10.99B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:27pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $80.1B | $79.6B | $78.6B | $81.4B | $88.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $6.9B | $6.5B | $14.3B | $18.0B | $18.3B |
| Net Income | $3.0B | $2.6B | $8.3B | $11.3B | $11.0B |
| EBITDA | $23.3B | $20.2B | $27.1B | $30.9B | $31.8B |
| EPS | $2.42 | $2.07 | $7.02 | $9.70 | $9.75 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.41 | $2.06 | $6.93 | $9.66 | $9.72 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:02pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $6.6B | $4.5B | $5.1B | $5.4B | $5.6B |
| Total Current Assets | $20.9B | $19.1B | $19.0B | $18.4B | $24.5B |
| Total Assets | $206.6B | $211.3B | $207.7B | $208.0B | $219.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $23.5B | $24.7B | $20.9B | $20.2B | $24.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $67.1B | $65.3B | $71.4B | $74.2B | $81.1B |
| Total Liabilities | $137.5B | $141.7B | $143.0B | $146.3B | $160.0B |
| Total Equity | $69.1B | $69.7B | $64.7B | $61.7B | $59.2B |
| Retained Earnings | -$2.8B | -$223.0M | $7.3B | $14.4B | $21.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:27pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $13.9B | $16.8B | $18.6B | $22.3B | $28.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$12.3B | -$14.0B | -$9.8B | -$8.8B | -$10.0B |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.6B | $2.8B | $8.8B | $13.5B | $18.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.9B | -$52.0M | $0 | -$373.0M | -$3.5B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $3.6B | -$1.8B | $3.4B | $3.5B | -$6.2B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$3.0B | -$13.1B | -$11.2B | -$10.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$3.8B | -$2.0B | $633.0M | $406.0M | $263.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:27pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -0.7% | -1.3% | +3.6% | +8.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -5.1% | +118.0% | +26.2% | +1.5% |
| Net Income Growth | -14.4% | +221.1% | +36.3% | -3.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -13.2% | +34.1% | +14.2% | +2.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:02pm (21d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-28 | $1.02 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-29 | $1.02 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-27 | $1.02 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-26 | $1.02 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-29 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-30 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-28 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-27 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-30 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-31 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-29 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2013-05-01 | $8.10 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:10Recovery pays +18%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 29%. Ratio 0.6:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($172.71) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +12% | 14.3% | $203.18 | +18% |
| Base — stabilizes | +8% | 12.4% | $157.25 | -9% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +4% | 10.6% | $119.22 | -31% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +11% | 8.4% | $122.34 | -29% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a cleaner story than the models suggest. TMUS is generating $88.3B annual revenue growing 8.5% YoY, $18B FCF (up from ~$8B in 2023), 20.7% operating margins, and 18.6% ROE — this is not a "mature earner" in harvest mode, it's a business still inflecting on margins post-Sprint integration. The quarterly trajectory is noisier than the annuals imply: Q4 2025 was a $24.3B revenue blowout but only 8.6% net margin (likely one-time items or accelerated device costs), while Q1 and Q2 2026 show revenue settling to $23.1B and $22.8B — a sequential decline that deserves scrutiny. Recent earnings YoY at -3.1% against 8.5% revenue growth suggests margin pressure is already showing up, which contradicts the bullish FCF CAGR of 43% (that number is flattered by a low 2021-2022 base when Sprint integration crushed reported earnings).
On valuation: at 17.8x earnings, 8.7x EV/EBITDA, and 3.1x EV/revenue, TMUS trades at a meaningful premium to VZ (~9x PE) and T (~11x PE). The bull case for that premium rests entirely on (a) fixed wireless access growth and (b) sustained ARPU gains — both increasingly contested. The synthesis fair value of $194-200 implies a ~13% upside, which is thin margin of safety for a name with $86B gross debt against $5.6B cash and a current ratio below 1.0. Debt-to-equity of 1.46 is manageable given $28B operating cash flow, but it caps buyback aggressiveness and leaves little room if FWA economics disappoint. ROIC of 10.1% against a likely 7-8% WACC gives you ~200-300 bps of value creation spread — respectable but not the profile of a stock deserving a growth multiple.
Where I disagree with the models: the synthesis calling this "fair_value with +12.6% upside" and the narrative layer's "steady-compounder / moderate durability" both underweight the deceleration risk visible in the quarterly print. Two consecutive quarters of sequential revenue decline (Q4→Q1→Q2) in a business supposedly benefiting from FWA share gains is a yellow flag, not noise. The Thesis Evaluation scoring this at -1 (essentially balanced) is closer to right than the synthesis's mild bullish tilt. The Pre-Flight note that market prices TMUS as a growth telecom is correct, but the corollary — that the premium is fragile — isn't reflected in the fair value math. Insider activity labeled "net buying" is misleading: those are almost entirely A-Awards (equity comp grants), not open-market purchases; the only real transaction is a 4,799 share S-Sale. That's not a bullish tell.
A careful contrarian would note: FWA subscriber growth has been the entire incremental growth story, and cable operators (Charter, Comcast) plus fiber overbuilders are now aggressively pricing to defend broadband share; the 5G capex cycle looks "done" only until spectrum refarming or 6G buildout begins; and the entire telecom sector has demonstrated that market-share leaders eventually converge to utility-like returns when the competitive tool (in TMUS's case, network superiority from Sprint spectrum) becomes commoditized. The "uncarrier" playbook is 12+ years old and Sievert doesn't have Legere's disruptor mystique. Meanwhile the dividend yield of 2.36% is not enough to make this a defensive holding, but the multiple is too high to make it a growth vehicle. It sits in an awkward middle — precisely where telecom stocks tend to underperform.
My read: $172.71 is closer to fair than the $194-200 composite suggests. I'd anchor fair value at $160-175 based on a normalized 14-15x forward earnings on ~$11B NI (roughly flat to modestly up), which is where VZ+premium math lands you when you accept that FWA is incremental but not transformative. The signal-adjusted +12.6% upside evaporates if you haircut the FCF trajectory to reflect that 2023's $8B was an integration-depressed base, not a normalized starting point — normalized FCF growth is probably 5-8%, not 43%. I dissent partially from the synthesis: this isn't undervalued, it's roughly fairly valued with skewed downside if Q3/Q4 2026 show continued sequential revenue softness or FWA net adds decelerate. Not a short, not a buy at $172 — a hold or trim if you own it, wait for $150s to add.
GPT Reading
What stands out is that T-Mobile is no longer a turnaround or merger-synergy story in the income statement; it is a scaled cash machine, and the market is still giving it only a moderate premium for that. Revenue has grown from $78.6B in 2023 to $88.3B in 2025, about 12% in two years, while operating income jumped from $14.3B to $18.3B and free cash flow reached $18.0B in 2025 on $28.0B of operating cash flow. That is a 20.4% FCF margin in a telecom, which is the key fact here. Even more important, capex was under $10.0B in 2025, so the post-5G build phase is visibly converting into owner earnings. At the current $185.3B market cap, the stock trades at roughly 10.3x trailing FCF and 17.8x earnings. For a business that has moved from $2.6B net income in 2022 to about $11.0B in 2025 and is still growing revenue high-single-digits most recently, that does not look expensive.
The quarterly pattern is better than the “mature earner” label implies. The last four quarters sum to about $91.5B of revenue, above 2025’s full-year $88.3B run rate, and the most recent quarter’s $22.79B was up roughly 7.9% from $21.13B a year earlier. Net income in that quarter was basically flat year over year at $3.24B versus $3.22B, which is why a screen can call recent earnings soft, but the bigger picture is that margins remain structurally elevated: the last eight quarters have all landed between 8.6% and 15.2%, and most have been in the low-to-mid teens. Annual operating margin was 20.7% in 2025, versus just 8.2% in 2022. That is not a cyclical spike; it looks like a business that has reset to a much higher efficiency level after absorbing Sprint. The valuation synthesis calling for around $194 fair value is directionally sensible to me, though I would get there less from abstract multiple blending and more from the simple fact that a business generating $18B of FCF with revenue still rising should not be trapped near a utility multiple.
The leverage is real but manageable in context. Total debt of $86.3B against only $5.6B of cash is substantial, and debt-to-equity of 1.46 means this is not a balance-sheet-light compounder. But telecoms are financed on cash flow, and T-Mobile’s cash flow covers that burden far better than the raw debt number suggests. On $18.0B of FCF and $18.3B of operating income, the capital structure is aggressive rather than alarming. The bigger issue for valuation is not solvency; it is whether this is near peak economics. My read is that the market is still over-discounting mean reversion. At 8.7x EV/EBITDA and 2.2x sales, the stock is priced like a good telecom, not like a business that has materially out-earned the old sector template. If T-Mobile can hold net margins around 12%-13% while growing revenue even 4%-6%, current price leaves room for appreciation into the low $190s or better.
The best case against that view is straightforward: the earnings growth may already have peaked, and the latest data give ammunition to that concern. 2025 net income of $10.99B was actually slightly below 2024’s $11.34B despite revenue rising nearly $7B, and quarterly margins have clearly come off their best levels, from 15.2% in 2025-06 and 2024-09 to 8.6% in 2025-12 and 10.8% in 2026-03 before recovering to 14.2% in 2026-06. If fixed wireless and subscriber additions are becoming more expensive to win, then revenue growth could persist while profit growth stalls. In that scenario, the premium to AT&T and Verizon is exactly the trap: investors are still paying 17.8x earnings for what could settle into a low-growth, capital-hungry utility with limited pricing power. Add nearly $81B of net debt and a current ratio just under 1.0, and the bear case is that this is a very good operator already valued for most of its superiority.
What would change my mind is evidence that the 2025-2026 margin compression is structural rather than quarterly noise. If the next few quarters show revenue still around $23B-$24B but net income stuck closer to $2.3B-$2.6B and FCF slipping materially below the $18B annualized level, then I would stop treating the stock as modestly cheap and start treating it as fairly valued to expensive. Conversely, if T-Mobile can print another couple of quarters of 7%-8% revenue growth with net margins back in the 13%-15% range, the market will have a harder time justifying a low-double-digit FCF multiple. For now, I think the data support a business that has matured into a stronger earner than the market narrative fully credits.
Grok Reading
T-Mobile’s raw financials describe a post-integration cash compounder that the market is still treating like a fading growth story. Annual revenue finally broke out of the $78–81B range that defined 2021–2024, reaching $88.31B in 2025 (+8.5% YoY), while free cash flow hit $18.0B on only $9.96B of capex and $27.95B of operating cash flow. That is a roughly 9.7% FCF yield at the $185B enterprise value implied by today’s $172.71 share price—an unusually rich cash return for a company still posting mid-to-high single-digit top-line growth (recent quarterly YoY +7.9% in Q2 2026 and +10.6% in Q1). Operating income held essentially flat at $18.28B versus $18.01B the prior year, producing a durable 20.7% operating margin, and ROE sits at a solid 18.6%. The balance sheet carries $86.3B of debt against $5.6B cash, but $18B of annual FCF covers interest and deleveraging comfortably. Relative to the peer set the 17.8× P/E and 8.7× EV/EBITDA look like a justified premium rather than a bubble; AT&T and Verizon trade at single-digit earnings multiples precisely because they lack TMUS’s network quality edge and residual share-gain runway.
The quarterly pattern reinforces the same picture without the smoothness the bulls would prefer. Net income margins have swung between 8.6% and 15.2% over the last eight quarters, and absolute NI of $10.99B in 2025 actually slipped from $11.34B in 2024 even as revenue rose, hinting at promotional intensity or mix shift. Sequential revenue also cooled from the $24.33B seasonal peak in Q4 2025 to $22.79B in Q2 2026. Still, the multi-year trajectory—from stagnant revenue and sub-$7B operating income pre-2023 to today’s $18B-plus run-rate—shows the Sprint synergies and 5G densification did permanently lift the earnings power. With FCF already at $18B and capex normalized, the market’s implied negative FCF growth (per the thesis layer) looks overly punitive.
The strongest counter-argument is that the growth premium is already fully reflected and the easy share gains are over. Wireless penetration is saturated, recent earnings growth has turned negative (-3.1% YoY), and the revenue-confidence flag shows deceleration. Fixed-wireless broadband—the only incremental growth vector of size—faces structural capacity ceilings and aggressive fiber/cable responses that could both cap subscriber adds and cannibalize higher-margin mobile ARPU. Debt-to-equity of 1.46× and a current ratio of 1.0 leave little margin for error if promotional intensity rises or if spectrum/capex needs re-accelerate. In that bear case TMUS re-rates toward a 12–14× P/E utility multiple on flattish earnings, implying downside into the mid-$140s. The valuation synthesis’s own internal disagreement (methods mixed, composite treated with caution) and the near-zero thesis score (-1) acknowledge exactly this risk.
I would flip to a more cautious stance if the next two quarters show postpaid phone net adds falling below 500k or fixed-wireless gross adds stalling while churn rises, or if FCF drops below $16B as capex creeps higher. Conversely, sustained FCF above $20B together with stable-to-rising blended ARPU would confirm the cash-compounder thesis and justify a move toward the $195–200 fair-value zone already flagged by the models.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
T-Mobile is executing at a high level operationally: revenue grew from $80.1B (2021) to $88.3B (2025), operating margin expanded from 8.6% to 20.7%, net income scaled roughly 3.6x to $11.0B, and FCF ramped from $1.6B to $18.0B - an 11x lift in four years. OCF/NI of 3.56x and accruals of -6% of assets confirm the earnings are cash-backed, not accounting-manufactured. Per-share discipline is genuine: diluted shares fell from 1.25B to 1.13B (-2.6% CAGR) and buybacks ran 11x SBC, so the value is being concentrated rather than leaked to comp.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and weighted average interest rate to gauge refinancing exposure
- Postpaid net add and churn trends to confirm operating momentum is subscriber-driven, not one-off
- Capex intensity forward guide - FCF durability depends on 5G capex normalization
- Whether the 'net insider buying' label reflects transaction count vs dollar value (tape shows dollar-net selling)
- Segment/spectrum asset carrying values and any goodwill impairment risk from Sprint integration
The composite fair value of $200.22 and signal-adjusted $194.48 sit roughly 12-16% above the $172.71 price. That is a real gap but not a margin of safety worth calling undervaluation on a $185B mature telecom - it is inside the noise band of DCF assumptions. The method spread is telling: DCF pings $273.64 (embeds durable FCF growth on the post-Sprint cost base), EPV floor is $143.37, and an anchored-PE lands at $110.22. Splitting those, a skeptical deserved value clusters in the $150-195 range, bracketing today's price.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Postpaid net add trajectory vs cable MVNO competition
- Fixed-wireless broadband ARPU and churn as fiber overbuild accelerates
- Capex intensity guide for 2025-26 and buyback pace vs debt paydown
- Any one-offs in the $18B FCF figure (working capital, tax timing)
The pressure on TMUS right now is event-driven and negative. Reuters/Semafor reporting that US management no longer supports the $300B Deutsche Telekom deal is a clean, headline-grade catalyst that removes a latent takeout/consolidation optionality the market had been carrying, and it landed on Friday afternoon as the tape was already mixed. That kind of merger-collapse story tends to overhang a stock for days to weeks as arbs and event-driven funds unwind, and analyst desks recut models without the deal premium. The narrative is a steady-compounder with only moderate intensity and low cult - there is no fervent story to absorb the blow. With beta 0.32 the macro tape barely matters here (mildly positive regime, rates elevated but this name is not rate-sensitive to a first order); the pressure is name-specific. Cramer chatter about an Apple angle is minor offset. Net: modest but real headwind, driven by the merger news and the absence of a counter-narrative, not by macro.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Deutsche Telekom official response or denial in coming days
- Sell-side notes cutting/keeping deal-related target premium
- Whether event-driven/arb unwind flows persist into next week
- Any subscriber or fixed-wireless data point that reactivates the growth story
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jun 28, 2026, TMUS was $182.68. We expect it to be $222.90 by Dec 2026, and we consider it great value under $165.00. This is an early model (v0.3.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jun 28, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.