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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -41 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -17 · Value -60 · Sentiment 24 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $94.82 vs $104.72 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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United Parcel Service, Inc.
UPS NYSEUnited Parcel Service, Inc. is a global logistics and package delivery company that provides transportation, distribution, and supply chain services to businesses and consumers worldwide. Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, it operates extensive networks of ground vehicles, aircraft, and sorting facilities that support time-definite delivery of letters, documents, parcels, and palletized freight. The company’s U.S. Domestic Package operations focus on express and ground services across the United States, while its International Package segment serves customers in Europe, Asia, the Indian sub-continent, the Middle East, Africa, Canada, and Latin America. United Parcel Service, Inc. also offers supply chain solutions, including freight forwarding, contract logistics, and specialized services for healthcare, retail, and industrial clients, helping them manage inventory, transportation, and fulfilment more efficiently. Operating today in the Industrials sector and the integrated freight and logistics industry, United Parcel Service, Inc. plays a central role in global commerce by enabling reliable parcel delivery and end-to-end logistics solutions across a broad range of markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.56
Total Equity: $16.26B
Shares: 850,000,000
Total Debt: $24.19B
Cash: $5.89B
EBITDA: $10.87B
Total Debt: $24.19B
Cash: $5.89B
Revenue: $88.66B
Revenue: $88.66B
Revenue: $88.66B
Total Equity: $16.26B
Tax Rate: 22.2%
Equity: $16.26B
Total Debt: $24.19B
Cash: $5.89B
Current Liabilities: $15.62B
Long-Term Debt: $23.59B
Total Debt: $24.19B
Total Equity: $16.26B
Shares: 850,000,000
Shares: 850,000,000
CapEx: -$3.69B
Shares: 850,000,000
Stock Price: $104.72
Net Income: $5.57B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 6:40am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $97.3B | $100.3B | $91.0B | $91.1B | $88.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $84.5B | $87.2B | $81.8B | $82.6B | $80.8B |
| Operating Income | $12.8B | $13.1B | $9.1B | $8.5B | $7.9B |
| Net Income | $12.9B | $11.5B | $6.7B | $5.8B | $5.6B |
| EBITDA | — | — | $11.9B | $11.5B | $10.9B |
| EPS | $14.75 | $13.26 | $7.81 | $6.76 | $6.56 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $14.68 | $13.20 | $7.80 | $6.75 | $6.56 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:38am (17d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | 2025 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.2B | — | $6.1B | — | $5.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $19.4B | — | $19.3B | — | $19.0B |
| Total Assets | $70.9B | — | $70.1B | — | $73.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $17.7B | — | $16.4B | — | $15.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $22.0B | — | $21.0B | — | $23.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $53.5B | — | $53.3B | — | $56.8B |
| Total Equity | $17.3B | — | $16.7B | — | $16.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $21.1B | — | $20.9B | — | $20.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 6:40am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $15.0B | $14.1B | $10.2B | $10.1B | $8.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$4.2B | -$4.8B | -$5.2B | -$3.9B | -$3.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $10.8B | $9.3B | $5.1B | $6.2B | $4.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$602.0M | -$755.0M | -$1.3B | -$71.0M | -$2.0B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$2.8B | -$2.3B | $1.0B | $298.0M | $2.1B |
| Dividends Paid | -$3.4B | -$5.1B | -$5.4B | -$5.4B | -$5.4B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$500.0M | -$3.5B | -$2.3B | -$500.0M | -$1.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | $4.3B | -$4.7B | -$2.4B | $2.9B | -$225.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 6:40am (17d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +3.1% | -9.3% | +0.1% | -2.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +2.2% | -30.2% | -7.4% | -7.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -10.4% | -41.9% | -13.8% | -3.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | -4.0% | -5.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:05am (16d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-18 | $1.64 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-17 | $1.64 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-17 | $1.64 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-18 | $1.64 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-19 | $1.64 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-18 | $1.64 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-18 | $1.63 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-19 | $1.63 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-10 | $1.63 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-16 | $1.63 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-10 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-11 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-12 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-17 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-10 | $1.52 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-12 | $1.52 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-13 | $1.52 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-18 | $1.52 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-19 | $1.02 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-20 | $1.02 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:14Even the bull case prices 20% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 68%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($104.72) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +2% | 9.2% | $83.73 | -20% |
| Base — stabilizes | +1% | 8.0% | $72.12 | -31% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +1% | 6.8% | $60.97 | -42% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +8% | 2.5% | $33.00 | -68% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-11AI-driven network density optimization - dynamic routing, load planning, sort automation, and predictive maintenance - attacks the largest cost lines (labor, fuel, aircraft utilization) in a business where operating margin has fallen from 13.2% to 8.9% in four years, so even 100bps of AI-sourced cost recovery is material to earnings.
Cheap intelligence lowers the coordination cost of building alternative delivery networks: shippers, regional carrier consortia, and Amazon-style in-house fleets can now orchestrate multi-carrier, multi-leg routing with software rather than with UPS's proprietary planning stack, which turns UPS into a commodity capacity supplier priced on the margin.
Whether AI accrues to UPS as retained margin or is competed away into lower yield per parcel - the observable is revenue-per-piece versus cost-per-piece disclosed by segment, and whether operating margin inflects above 10% while volume stays soft.
The physical asset base is the moat: 1,800-plus facilities, aircraft fleet, air rights and international customs authorizations, last-mile density, and a unionized labor contract that is a cost but also a barrier no AI-native can assemble.
AI Lens thesis
UPS is hired to physically move a parcel from A to B with a time guarantee; that need and that solution both survive cheap intelligence intact, because the scarce assets are trucks, planes, sort capacity, and route density rather than information processing. AI therefore reaches UPS almost entirely through the cost line and the intermediation layer, not through demand destruction. On cost, the opportunity is genuine and large: labor is the dominant expense, and AI-assisted routing, volume forecasting, dynamic sort staffing, automated customs classification, and self-service support directly reduce hours per piece - this is the Smart-Facility thesis with an intelligence multiplier. On the other side, AI erodes UPS's historical informational advantage in network planning and makes shipper-side optimization software good enough to arbitrage carriers piece by piece, which pressures the monetized unit - price per parcel - and accelerates the shift of UPS from chosen partner to interchangeable capacity. The company is also already losing share while the industry grows, so any AI-enabled cost win must be judged against whether it is handed straight to customers as lower yield.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Agentic commerce could concentrate rather than fragment shipping: if AI purchasing agents optimize for guaranteed delivery windows and automated claims resolution, the carrier with the best machine-readable API, tracking data, and liability guarantee becomes the default execution rail, and UPS's healthcare and customs-brokerage franchises are the highest-value versions of that.
Downside AI-optimized shipper software makes rate shopping continuous and automatic, stripping the inertia and contract stickiness that has historically let UPS hold announced general rate increases - a slow, invisible compression of yield rather than a visible loss of accounts.
Outcome range spread 39
Claude Reading
The raw trajectory here is worse than the "mature earner at 16x" framing suggests. Revenue has gone from $100.3B (2022) to $91.1B (2024) to $88.7B (2025), and the two most recent quarters — Q1'26 at $21.20B and Q2'26 at $22.83B — are down from $21.55B and $22.25B in the year-ago comparable, meaning the decline is accelerating, not stabilizing. More alarming: Q2'26 net margin collapsed to 2.6% ($604M NI on $22.83B) versus 6.0% a year prior. That's not "cyclical softness" — that's a 340bp margin evaporation in a single quarter, which if annualized wipes out roughly $3B of net income against a $5.57B 2025 base. The synthesis's $88 signal-adjusted fair value may itself be too generous if Q2'26 margins are the new run-rate rather than an aberration.
The dividend is the crux and the models are underweighting the risk. Payout ratio is 96.9% on 2025 earnings of $5.57B; FCF was $4.77B against a dividend obligation that at $6.56/share on ~850M shares runs ~$5.6B annually. That's already negative coverage on FCF before considering that TTM earnings are deteriorating. The 6.26% yield isn't a "floor" — it's a market signal that a cut is being priced with non-trivial probability. Debt-to-equity of 1.49x with $24.2B total debt against $16.3B equity leaves limited room to defend the dividend via leverage without credit rating consequences. The "steady-compounder" narrative label is generous; this looks more like a dividend-at-risk industrial in the mold of pre-cut IBM or pre-cut AT&T setups.
Where I partially disagree with the prior models: the Pre-Flight thesis and Market Narrative both treat the 32% drawdown as potentially over-discounted, and the synthesis lands at "fully priced" with -15.5% downside. I think that understates the tail. If 2026 earnings normalize at, say, $4.00-4.50/share (down from $6.50-ish TTM) given the Q1-Q2'26 trajectory, then 15x puts fair value at $60-68, not $88-97. The bull case requires believing the Amazon insourcing headwind is transitory and the Teamsters cost step-up gets offset by automation — but there's zero evidence in the numbers yet. Operating income has gone $13.1B → $9.1B → $8.5B → $7.9B over four years. That's a franchise in structural decline, and the Market Forces "deteriorating franchise" call is the most honest read of the tape. The narrative layer's "18% story premium" seems roughly right in direction but possibly too small — I'd argue closer to 25-30% of the current price is defensive-yield story that unwinds if the dividend is trimmed.
A careful contrarian would note: (1) UPS has weathered cycles before and the 2021-2022 numbers show what peak earnings power looks like ($12-13B operating income) — if global freight recovers and Amazon insourcing plateaus, mean-reversion math is powerful; (2) EV/EBITDA of 8.2x is not expensive for an infrastructure asset with irreplaceable network density; (3) insider/buyback capacity exists once the payout is right-sized. But the contrarian case requires a catalyst — either a dividend reset that resets expectations, a volume inflection, or a margin surprise — and none is visible in the Q2'26 print. I dissent modestly from the synthesis: I think $88 fair value is optimistic given the margin trajectory, and the real risk-adjusted fair value is $70-80 assuming a dividend trim to a 60-70% payout and 2026 EPS of $4.50. At $104.72, that's 20-30% downside, not 15%. The stock is not a screaming short because the yield attracts sticky capital and any positive Q3 print reverses sentiment fast, but new money here is buying a deteriorating P&L at a price that requires you to believe the last two quarters are noise.
GPT Reading
UPS at $104.72 looks expensive for what the business is currently earning. The headline multiple of ~16x earnings flatters the situation because the earnings base has been eroding for several years: revenue peaked at $100.3B in 2022 and is down to $88.7B in 2025, while net income has been cut from $11.6B to $5.6B. That is not a temporary wobble in one bad quarter; it is a three-year compression in both scale and profitability. Operating income has slid from $13.1B in 2022 to $7.9B in 2025, taking operating margin from roughly 13% to 8.9%. The more recent quarterly run rate is worse still. First-half 2026 revenue was $44.0B versus $42.8B in first-half 2025, so sales are not collapsing, but net income was only $1.47B versus $2.47B, a roughly 40% drop. Q2 2026 margin of 2.6% on $22.83B of revenue is especially ugly for a company that needs enormous fixed-cost absorption to work.
That is the core issue: the stock is being treated like a stable yield vehicle while the income statement is showing a structurally lower-earning business. The 6.3% dividend yield looks attractive until you compare it with a 96.9% payout ratio on annual earnings and $4.77B of free cash flow against a market cap of $89B. On price-to-FCF, this is around 18-19x for a business with negative revenue CAGR, negative earnings CAGR, and rising evidence of margin stress. Debt is manageable for an investment-grade industrial, but $24.2B of debt against $5.9B of cash and only $16.3B of equity leaves less room for prolonged disappointment than the “defensive” label implies. Even the apparently strong ROE of 34% is not a sign of great economics here; with modest equity and meaningful leverage, it overstates underlying business quality. If I anchor on normalized earnings power, I do not see a credible case for paying over 1x sales and about 8.2x EV/EBITDA unless margins clearly recover. Right now they are moving the other way.
What stands out to me is that revenue is actually fairly steady, but profit conversion is deteriorating quarter by quarter. That suggests this is less a demand story than a cost/mix/competitive story. Annual revenue from 2023 to 2025 barely moved from $91.0B to $88.7B, yet net income fell from $6.7B to $5.6B and now the TTM path implied by 2026 quarters points lower again. In other words, UPS has not lost the business outright; it has lost the economics of that business. For a network operator, that is a more serious warning sign than a cyclical dip in package counts. The market may be hoping for an eventual margin snapback through pricing, automation, and network optimization, but the latest half-year numbers do not show that. At $104.72, investors are paying as if 2025 was trough-ish, while 2026 is so far arguing that 2025 may have been too optimistic.
The best pushback is straightforward: this is still a huge cash-generating franchise with durable scale, over $8.4B of operating cash flow, nearly $4.8B of free cash flow, and valuation metrics that are not extreme for a dominant logistics asset. At roughly 1.0x sales and 8.2x EV/EBITDA, UPS is not priced like a glamour stock, and if margins merely stabilize around 2025 levels the stock can work fine, especially with a 6%+ yield paying investors to wait. The quarterly revenue line also argues that the franchise is more resilient than the bears admit: Q2 2026 revenue of $22.83B was up from $21.22B a year earlier, and Q1 2026 was only modestly below Q1 2025. A bull would say the ugly first-half earnings reflect transient cost resets, not permanent impairment, and that any return toward even 10% operating margins would make today’s P/E look cheap. I weigh that less heavily because there is no evidence yet of that recovery; the burden of proof is on the turnaround, not on skepticism.
What would change my mind is simple and measurable. If UPS can show two consecutive quarters with operating and net margin rebuilding meaningfully—say quarterly net margin back above 6% and a clear path to annual operating income above $9B again—then the current price would look more reasonable. I would also want to see free cash flow hold above $5B without relying on squeezing capex too hard, because underinvestment in the network would only defer the problem. On the other hand, if the next two quarters continue the 2026 pattern of low-single-digit revenue growth with margins stuck in the 3%-4% range, then the market will have to stop valuing UPS as a stable compounder and start valuing it as an ex-growth industrial with a stressed payout. In that case, a price beginning with an 8 or low 9 feels more appropriate than $104.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a franchise in structural earnings compression, not a temporary soft patch. Annual revenue has slid from $100.34B in 2022 to $88.66B in 2025, a −1.3% CAGR, while net income has collapsed from $11.55B to $5.57B over the same span—an earnings CAGR of roughly −9%. The quarterly sequence is worse: operating and net margins that held in the 5.5–7.3% range through 2025 have cratered to 4.1% in Q1 2026 and 2.6% in Q2 2026, with net income of just $604M on $22.83B of revenue. Trailing-twelve-month earnings from the four most recent quarters sum to roughly $4.57B, which at an $89B market cap implies a mid-to-high teens multiple on still-falling profits—not the 16x the annual snapshot advertises. Free cash flow of $4.77B against $3.69B of capex remains real, but a 96.9% payout ratio on a 6.3% dividend yield means the income story is already consuming nearly every dollar of reported earnings. Debt of $24.2B against $16.3B of equity and only $5.9B of cash leaves limited room if volumes or pricing keep deteriorating.
What stands out is the gap between the “mature earner / steady compounder” archetype and the actual trajectory. ROE at 34% looks impressive until you notice how thin the equity base is and how much of the return is financial leverage rather than operating excellence; ROIC of 17.7% is still respectable, but operating margin has compressed to 8.9% annually and is running far lower on a recent-quarter basis. EV/EBITDA of 8.2x and a price-to-sales of 1.0x are not screaming expensive in isolation, yet they are being applied to a business whose revenue, earnings, and FCF are all in multi-year decline (−3.2% FCF CAGR). The prior valuation synthesis putting composite fair value near $88–$98 versus $104.72 is directionally correct: the market is still paying a modest premium for a recovery that the last six quarters have not delivered. Amazon’s logistics build-out and post-Teamsters labor cost structure are visible in the margin line, not just in the narrative layer.
The strongest case against this read is the cash generation and the yield floor. Operating cash flow of $8.45B and FCF of $4.77B are not trivial; the business still converts revenue into cash at a high rate, current ratio sits above 1.2, and a 6.3% dividend attracts passive and income capital that can stabilize the stock even when fundamentals soften. EV/EBITDA near 8x and P/E near 16x are not bubble multiples for a network-effect logistics operator, and if automation and network redesign restore even 150–200 bps of margin, earnings power rebounds quickly off the depressed base. A smart opponent would also note that 2022 was an anomalous pandemic peak, so comparing to that year overstates the secular decline, and that e-commerce and cross-border volumes remain structural tailwinds if UPS simply stops losing share. I weigh those points, but they do not override two consecutive quarters of sub-3–4% net margins and a payout ratio that leaves almost no coverage cushion if NI stays near the recent run-rate.
Margin recovery in the next two reported quarters back toward the mid-5% net range, or a clear sequential stabilization in revenue above the low-$22B quarterly level with guidance that implies full-year earnings reacceleration, would force a reassessment. A sustained drop in the payout ratio below ~80% driven by earnings growth rather than a dividend cut, or concrete evidence that UPS is recapturing Amazon-related or small-package density without further price sacrifice, would also flip the skew.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
UPS still throws off real cash: $4.77B FCF in 2025, OCF/NI of 1.44x, and accruals at -4% of assets - the earnings are cash-backed and mechanically clean (Altman Z 2.95 grey but not alarming). Capital return is disciplined: diluted share count has drifted from 878M to 850M (-0.8% CAGR) with buybacks running 280% of SBC, so per-share economics are being concentrated rather than eroded. Liquid cash of $5.89B is thin against $18.31B net debt, so the balance sheet is a constraint rather than a cushion, but $4-5B annual FCF comfortably services it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether recent margin compression reflects the Amazon volume glidedown (known strategic choice) versus broader pricing weakness
- Segment-level margins (US Domestic vs International vs Supply Chain) to see where erosion is concentrated
- Pension and lease obligations behind the $18B net debt figure
- Sustainability of the dividend given FCF now barely covers it plus buybacks
- Labor cost trajectory under the 2023 Teamsters contract
The composite FV of $97.69 and the signal-adjusted FV of $88.47 both sit below the $104.72 price, implying -7% to -16% downside before you even stress the assumptions. The DCF pins deserved value at $71.64 and the EPV floor at $82.55 - both meaningfully under the tape. The only anchor supporting the price is the anchored-PE at $164.91, which I discount heavily: it capitalizes a multiple against earnings that have declined every year since 2021, so it is almost certainly extrapolating a peak-earnings/peak-multiple regime that no longer applies.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Q4 and forward guidance on US Domestic operating margin - is the automation payoff finally showing up?
- Amazon volume disclosure and remaining insourcing runway
- Teamsters contract cost cadence through 2025-2026 - already fully absorbed or still ramping?
- Free cash flow conversion vs GAAP EPS to confirm the anchored-PE is not capitalizing accrual-heavy earnings
The macro backdrop is mildly supportive: a risk-on tape with VIX at 15.5 and indices near highs favors cyclicals and industrials, and UPS at beta 1.04 participates without being whipped around. The 10y at 4.65% is a background drag on all equities but hits this name less than long-duration growth. Net macro pressure on UPS specifically is a light positive.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether sell-side target revisions actually move up post-print or the raise gets faded
- Any follow-through commentary on Amazon volume trajectory in coming weeks
- Teamsters cost cadence updates that could reignite the bear narrative
- Rotation out of defensives if the risk-on regime deepens into a growth-led melt-up
UPS is hired to physically move a parcel from A to B with a time guarantee; that need and that solution both survive cheap intelligence intact, because the scarce assets are trucks, planes, sort capacity, and route density rather than information processing. AI therefore reaches UPS almost entirely through the cost line and the intermediation layer, not through demand destruction. On cost, the opportunity is genuine and large: labor is the dominant expense, and AI-assisted routing, volume forecasting, dynamic sort staffing, automated customs classification, and self-service support directly reduce hours per piece - this is the Smart-Facility thesis with an intelligence multiplier. On the other side, AI erodes UPS's historical informational advantage in network planning and makes shipper-side optimization software good enough to arbitrage carriers piece by piece, which pressures the monetized unit - price per parcel - and accelerates the shift of UPS from chosen partner to interchangeable capacity. The company is also already losing share while the industry grows, so any AI-enabled cost win must be judged against whether it is handed straight to customers as lower yield.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- operating margin inflection above 10%
- revenue per piece versus cost per piece
- announced rate increase realization rate
- capacity utilization in air network
- facility automation percentage
- competitor capacity additions
- revenue per piece by segment
- surcharge and accessorial revenue
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 11, 2026, UPS was $104.72. We expect it to be $95.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $85.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 11, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.