Business Description
Vornado's property holdings are predominantly focused on the crucial New York City market, complemented by a top-tier asset in both Chicago and San Francisco. The company is also at the forefront of the real estate sector regarding its sustainability initiatives. Demonstrating this commitment, Vornado manages an extensive portfolio exceeding 23 million square feet of LEED-certified buildings and was recognized with the Energy Star Partner of the Year Award for Sustained Excellence in 2019. A significant corporate milestone was reached in 2012 when Vornado celebrated five decades of being listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
Business History
Generated: Jun 9, 2026 7:14pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:11pm (3d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.40
Total Equity: $5.99B
Shares: 191,759,000
Total Debt: $7.19B
Cash: $840.85M
EBITDA: $1.77B
Total Debt: $7.19B
Cash: $840.85M
Revenue: $1.81B
Revenue: $1.81B
Revenue: $1.81B
Total Equity: $5.99B
Tax Rate: 1.4%
Equity: $5.99B
Total Debt: $7.19B
Cash: $840.85M
Current Liabilities: $1.10B
Long-Term Debt: $6.47B
Total Debt: $7.19B
Total Equity: $5.99B
Shares: 191,759,000
Shares: 191,759,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 191,759,000
Stock Price: $38.45
Net Income: $904.96M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:18pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $797.3M | $873.9M | $905.2M | $0 | $0 |
| Gross Profit | $791.9M | $926.1M | $906.0M | $1.8B | $1.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $546.9M | $638.2M | $605.4M | $1.5B | $1.5B |
| Operating Income | $245.0M | $287.9M | $300.6M | $263.9M | $272.2M |
| Net Income | $176.0M | -$346.5M | $105.5M | $70.4M | $905.0M |
| EBITDA | $840.5M | $423.3M | $845.6M | $880.6M | $1.8B |
| EPS | $0.53 | $-2.13 | $0.23 | $0.04 | $4.40 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:11pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.8B | $889.7M | $997.0M | $733.9M | $840.9M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.7B | $2.3B | $2.0B | $1.7B | $2.0B |
| Total Assets | $17.3B | $16.5B | $16.2B | $16.0B | $15.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $949.0M | $1.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $8.0B | $7.8B | $7.7B | $7.7B | $6.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $10.1B | $10.0B | $9.8B | $9.8B | $8.7B |
| Total Equity | $6.2B | $5.8B | $5.5B | $5.2B | $6.0B |
| Retained Earnings | -$3.1B | -$3.9B | -$4.0B | -$4.1B | -$3.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:18pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $761.8M | $798.9M | $648.2M | $537.7M | $1.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Free Cash Flow | $761.8M | $798.9M | $648.2M | $537.7M | $1.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$32.9M | $1.2M | -$52.6M | -$115.4M | $15.3M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.6M | $0 | -$29.2M | $0 | -$51.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $200.0M | -$909.2M | $240.4M | -$312.0M | $27.9M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:11pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$2.0B $1.8B – $2.2B
|
$2.1B $2.1B – $2.2B
|
$2.0B $1.9B – $2.1B
|
$2.0B $1.9B – $2.1B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.1B $976.5M – $1.2B
|
$1.2B $1.1B – $1.2B
|
$1.1B $1.0B – $1.1B
|
$1.1B $1.0B – $1.2B
|
| Net Income |
$65.3M $61.8M – $68.8M
|
$103.0M $96.2M – $109.8M
|
$0 | $0 |
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:18pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +13.3% | +0.6% | -1.3% | +1.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +16.9% | -2.2% | +97.3% | +1.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +17.5% | +4.4% | -12.2% | +3.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -296.9% | +130.4% | -33.3% | +1,185.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | -49.6% | +99.8% | +4.1% | +100.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:17pm (3d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-08 | WIGHT RUSSELL B JR | P-Purchase | 1,000.00 | $17.44 | $17,437 |
| 2026-06-08 | WIGHT RUSSELL B JR | P-Purchase | 1,000.00 | $17.63 | $17,625 |
| 2026-06-08 | WIGHT RUSSELL B JR | P-Purchase | 1,000.00 | $15.00 | $15,001 |
| 2026-06-08 | WIGHT RUSSELL B JR | P-Purchase | 1,000.00 | $17.69 | $17,690 |
| 2026-05-21 | Puri Mandakini | A-Award | 7,168.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | McGuire Raymond J | A-Award | 7,168.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | MANDELBAUM DAVID | A-Award | 7,168.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | WIGHT RUSSELL B JR | A-Award | 7,168.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | TISCH DANIEL R | A-Award | 7,168.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Bassey Beatrice Hamza | A-Award | 7,168.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Helman William W | A-Award | 7,168.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Beinecke Candace K | A-Award | 7,168.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Fascitelli Michael D | A-Award | 7,168.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-18 | ROTH STEVEN | G-Gift | 26,428.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | Chera Haim | C-Conversion | 100,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | Chera Haim | C-Conversion | 100,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-12 | TISCH DANIEL R | P-Purchase | 30,000.00 | $25.55 | $766,500 |
| 2026-03-02 | Maddock Deirdre K. | A-Award | 4,061.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | TISCH DANIEL R | P-Purchase | 70,000.00 | $26.30 | $1.8M |
| 2026-03-02 | TISCH DANIEL R | P-Purchase | 40,000.00 | $27.09 | $1.1M |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 9, 2026 7:11pm (3d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-12-18 | $0.74 | 2025-12-08 | 2025-12-18 | 2025-12-29 |
| 2024-12-16 | $0.74 | 2024-12-05 | 2024-12-16 | 2024-12-27 |
| 2023-12-14 | $0.30 | 2023-12-05 | 2023-12-15 | 2023-12-27 |
| 2023-01-27 | $0.38 | 2023-01-18 | 2023-01-30 | 2023-02-10 |
| 2022-11-04 | $0.53 | 2022-10-27 | 2022-11-07 | 2022-11-18 |
| 2022-08-05 | $0.53 | 2022-07-28 | 2022-08-08 | 2022-08-19 |
| 2022-05-06 | $0.53 | 2022-04-27 | 2022-05-09 | 2022-05-20 |
| 2022-01-28 | $0.53 | 2022-01-19 | 2022-01-31 | 2022-02-11 |
| 2021-11-05 | $0.53 | 2021-10-28 | 2021-11-08 | 2021-11-19 |
| 2021-08-06 | $0.53 | 2021-07-29 | 2021-08-09 | 2021-08-20 |
| 2021-05-07 | $0.53 | 2021-04-28 | 2021-05-10 | 2021-05-21 |
| 2021-01-29 | $0.53 | 2021-01-20 | 2021-02-01 | 2021-02-12 |
| 2020-11-06 | $0.53 | 2020-10-29 | 2020-11-09 | 2020-11-20 |
| 2020-08-07 | $0.53 | 2020-07-30 | 2020-08-10 | 2020-08-21 |
| 2020-05-08 | $0.66 | 2020-04-29 | 2020-05-11 | 2020-05-22 |
| 2020-01-24 | $0.66 | 2020-01-15 | 2020-01-27 | 2020-02-14 |
| 2019-12-27 | $1.95 | 2019-12-18 | 2019-12-30 | 2020-01-15 |
| 2019-11-01 | $0.66 | 2019-10-25 | 2019-11-04 | 2019-11-18 |
| 2019-08-02 | $0.66 | 2019-07-25 | 2019-08-05 | 2019-08-16 |
| 2019-05-03 | $0.66 | 2019-04-24 | 2019-05-06 | 2019-05-17 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue is dead flat at $441-461M per quarter for two years running, with the most recent print ($459.1M in Q1 2026) actually showing a -$7.3M net loss. The 2025 annual NI of $905M is almost entirely the Q2 2025 spike of $759M — that's a gain on sale, not operations. Strip it out and you get roughly $146M of "real" NI on $1.81B revenue, or ~8% net margin. The reported 9.2x P/E and 50% net margin are arithmetic artifacts of that one quarter; on normalized earnings this trades closer to 50x, not 9x. The synthesis verdict and pre-flight both flag this correctly, but I want to underscore how aggressively the headline metrics mislead.
Where I disagree with the model cluster: the Market Forces "financial distress" framing is overcooked. Operating CF of $1.26B on a $7.2B market cap is a 17% CFO yield, and the current ratio of 1.8 with $841M cash is not a liquidity crisis. The missing total debt field is the real gap — for an office REIT this is the single most important number, and without it neither I nor the prior models can credibly assess the maturity wall the Market Forces module is invoking. That module is asserting distress without showing the debt stack; that's analytically sloppy. Conversely, the Narrative layer's $26.46 DCF fair value strikes me as too punitive — it implies essentially terminal decline, ignoring that VNO's PENN District redevelopment and Manhattan trophy book do have a re-rating path if rates come in 150bps. The truth sits between $26 (pure secular decline DCF) and the $38.45 tape.
The contrarian read nobody is making: insider activity is misread. Ten consecutive "A-Award" grants of identical 7,168 share lots on the same date is a board/executive comp grant, not "Net Insider Buying" — the Secondary Signals layer got this wrong. The G-Gift is a charitable transfer, also not a buy signal. So one of the supposedly bullish secondary signals evaporates on inspection. On the other hand, the bear case has its own blind spot: NYC Class A office leasing actually firmed through 2025, SL Green and VNO both reported improving occupancy and rent spreads, and the "remote work permanent" narrative is two years stale. If you're underwriting permanent impairment at current Manhattan trophy cap rates (~6-7%), you're fighting the most recent leasing data. The Q1 2026 revenue tick to $459M from $453M is small but it's the first sequential acceleration in a year.
My verdict: I dissent partially from the "High Conviction Required" synthesis — that's a cop-out framing. The real call is that VNO at $38 is priced for muddle-through, not catastrophe and not recovery. Normalized FFO (what actually matters for REITs, not GAAP NI) on a $7.2B cap with $1.26B operating CF gives you a ~10-11x P/FFO, in line with peer SLG and below BXP. That's fair, not cheap. The narrative model's $26 fair value requires believing trophy Manhattan office cap rates expand another 200bps from here, which would require a recession AND rate shock. The bull case to $50+ requires the Fed cutting and PENN District lease-up — both plausible, neither imminent. Without the debt maturity schedule I can't size the tail risk properly, and that's the single piece of data I'd demand before sizing a position. The 3.2% dividend is real cash but represents a payout ratio that constrains balance sheet flexibility if 2026-2027 maturities need refinancing at 7%+ rates.
GPT Critique
Analyzing Vornado Realty Trust's financial data independently, a few key points stand out. Revenue has been notably stagnant, with quarterly figures hovering between $441M and $461M for the past two years, demonstrating a lack of growth momentum in a challenging office real estate market. This stagnation is coupled with volatility in net income, most noticeably the $759M spike in Q2 2025, which is largely due to a one-time gain rather than operational performance. Stripping away this anomaly, the net income picture is far less stellar, averaging around $146M annually, equating to an approximate net margin of 8%. This suggests that the current P/E ratio of 9.2x is misleading, and when adjusted for normalized earnings, the multiple is closer to 50x, indicating a potentially overvalued position at the current price of $38.45.
Opus argues that the market is overestimating Vornado's financial distress by focusing on the Market Forces model's implication without clear debt data. I agree that the absence of explicit debt levels in the data is a critical omission. Given the substantial operating cash flow of $1.26B and a strong current ratio of 1.8, Vornado does not appear to be on the brink of a liquidity crisis. However, without a clear view of debt maturities, especially in a rising rate environment, the full risk picture remains obscured. Opus's insistence on the importance of debt metrics to assess Vornado's true financial health is well-founded.
Where I diverge from Opus is on the valuation synthesis and narrative model. Opus suggests that the DCF fair value of $26.46 is too punitive, whereas I see it as a more realistic reflection of Vornado's challenges, given the secular decline in office space demand and the ongoing impact of remote work. While NYC Class A office leasing may have shown some resilience, the broader trends indicate fundamental shifts that could continue to pressure Vornado's valuation. The narrative that Vornado is trading at a 45% premium to DCF due to speculative optimism about its Manhattan assets seems overly optimistic in the absence of significant macroeconomic shifts or strategic real estate developments.
A skeptic might argue that both perspectives underestimate the potential for a more severe downturn in the office real estate sector, especially if economic conditions worsen or if Vornado's redevelopment projects fail to deliver anticipated returns. They might also question the reliability of insider transaction signals, considering the misinterpretation of executive compensation awards as insider buying.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses agree more than they disagree: quality is -16 (Mixed — real cash, real assets, real leverage, no growth) and value is -64 (Rich — ~45% above my $26.46 anchor). When a Mixed-quality, $6.3B-net-debt office REIT is trading at a premium to DCF, the answer is simple — I'm not the marginal buyer here. The bull case is a Manhattan replacement-cost/NAV story plus Tisch putting $2.6M of his own money down at $25.50, and I respect both, but Tisch bought in the mid-$20s, not at $38. That's the tell. The market is pricing in an NYC office inflection and a cap-rate tailwind that isn't yet in the numbers, and on a leveraged equity stub small misses on either lever swing hard against me.
My play: zero position at $38.45, and I set a staged bid ladder. Starter (0.5% of book) at $29 where the risk/reward turns honest — that's a Mixed-quality office REIT trading at fair, not a gift. Add to a full 1.5–2% position in the $25–27 zone where I'm buying alongside Tisch at or below model, with trophy-NAV optionality as the free call. Below $22 on a forced-selling / rate-shock flush I'd go to 3% and treat it as a deep-value office trade, not a hold-forever compounder — this is never a core compounder given the leverage and the secular office overhang. Catalysts that would force me off the sidelines earlier: a major asset sale at a tight cap rate that re-rates NAV, or a refi that visibly de-risks the debt stack. Until then, the gap between the two scores IS the trade, and the trade is patience.
Vornado is a mature NYC-concentrated office REIT throwing off real cash — FCF stepped up to $1.26B in 2025 from $537.7M in 2024, and OCF/NI of 3.44x with accruals of -3.8% of assets says reported earnings are conservative, not inflated (Beneish M -2.3 corroborates). Revenue is essentially flat in a $1.79–1.81B band over five years, operating margin sits in a tight 14.8–16.6% range, and diluted share count actually shrank slightly (CAGR -0.1%) — this is a steady-state asset operator, not a growth story. Insider behavior is a real positive: Tisch put down ~$2.6M of his own money in March 2026 open-market buys at $25.50–25.55, and net insider buying is genuine (not just awards).
The quality concern is structural leverage. Net debt of ~$6.3B against $840.9M cash and an Altman Z of 0.43 sits squarely in the distress zone — caveat that Z-score is poorly calibrated for REITs, where high secured property debt is the business model, but it still flags that the equity is a thin sliver on top of a large debt stack. Net income is volatile and gain/impairment-driven ($-346.5M in 2022, $70.4M in 2024, $905.0M in 2025 — the 2025 spike likely reflects asset sales/revaluations, not operating step-change), which is why FCF is the more honest read.
Dilution discipline is acceptable but not shareholder-friendly: buybacks recover only 49.1% of SBC, so repurchases are mopping up grants rather than returning capital. The 'GM% = 100' in 2024–2025 is a presentation change (COGS reclassified), not a margin expansion — operating margin is the cleaner series and it's flat.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Debt maturity ladder and weighted-average rate — refinancing wall is the key survival variable
- Source of 2025 $905M net income spike: asset sales, JV gains, or fair-value marks?
- Tenant concentration and lease expiry schedule on the NYC office portfolio
- Whether dividend was suspended/cut (REIT context — coverage from FCF vs distributions matters)
- Secured vs unsecured debt mix and any covenant headroom
- Same-store NOI trend and occupancy at flagship assets (Penn District, etc.)
- Any preferred equity or OP unit overhang not visible in diluted share count
The e2e composite and signal-adjusted fair value both land at $26.46, while the stock changes hands at $38.45 — a ~45% premium to deserved value. Even acknowledging that DCFs on cyclical, asset-heavy REITs understate trophy-asset optionality and replacement cost, the gap is large and points in the wrong direction. Earnings quality is clean (no haircut needed), so I can't argue the FV is artificially depressed by accrual games; the leveraged balance sheet ($6.3B net debt on ~$1.8B rev) actually argues for a HIGHER discount rate, not a lower one.
The bull case rests on a replacement-cost / NAV argument that Manhattan trophy towers are worth more than DCF implies — fair, but that's the kind of optionality you want to buy at a discount, not a premium. The bear case (permanent WFH impairment, negative NYC absorption) is the more sober read at this price. Tisch's ~$2.6M insider buying is a real positive signal but is small relative to a $7.2B cap and doesn't close a 45% gap. The deserved price for a Mixed-quality, structurally leveraged office REIT is below today's quote, not above it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest NAV / per-share replacement-cost estimate from management and sell-side, with cap-rate assumptions
- Same-store NOI trend and Manhattan office leasing spreads in the most recent 10-Q
- Debt maturity ladder and refinancing terms over next 24 months
- Status/timing of PENN District redevelopment monetization and any asset sales
- Updated FFO/AFFO guidance and dividend policy