For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Wabtec Corporation (WAB) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -11 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 70 · Value -78 · Sentiment 42 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $123.15 vs $292.31 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Wabtec Corporation
WAB NYSEWabtec Corporation is a leading global provider of technology-based equipment, systems, digital solutions, and services for the freight rail and passenger transit industries. The company operates primarily through its Freight and Transit segments, supplying diesel-electric locomotives, components for freight cars, braking systems, signaling and train control technologies, and digital platforms that enhance network efficiency and asset performance. Wabtec also serves adjacent markets such as mining, marine, and industrial transportation with propulsion systems, power conversion equipment, and related components. Its offerings span the full lifecycle of rail assets, from new locomotive manufacturing and modernization to aftermarket parts, maintenance, and long-term service agreements. Headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and founded in 1869, Wabtec supports freight railroads, public transit agencies, leasing companies, and industrial operators worldwide, playing a central role in improving the safety, reliability, and productivity of rail and heavy-transport infrastructure.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.83
Total Equity: $11.19B
Shares: 171,100,000
Total Debt: $5.54B
Cash: $789.00M
EBITDA: $2.29B
Total Debt: $5.54B
Cash: $789.00M
Revenue: $11.17B
Revenue: $11.17B
Revenue: $11.17B
Total Equity: $11.19B
Tax Rate: 25.7%
Equity: $11.19B
Total Debt: $5.54B
Cash: $789.00M
Current Liabilities: $5.15B
Long-Term Debt: $4.29B
Total Debt: $5.54B
Total Equity: $11.19B
Shares: 171,100,000
Shares: 171,100,000
CapEx: -$260.00M
Shares: 171,100,000
Stock Price: $292.31
Net Income: $1.17B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 21, 2026 1:19am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $7.8B | $8.4B | $9.7B | $10.4B | $11.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $5.5B | $5.8B | $6.7B | $7.0B | $7.4B |
| Gross Profit | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.9B | $3.4B | $3.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.0B |
| Operating Income | $876.0M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.8B |
| Net Income | $558.0M | $633.0M | $815.0M | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| EBITDA | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.3B |
| EPS | $2.96 | $3.46 | $4.54 | $6.05 | $6.84 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.96 | $3.46 | $4.53 | $6.04 | $6.83 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 21, 2026 1:02am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $473.0M | $541.0M | $620.0M | $715.0M | $789.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $3.8B | $4.3B | $4.9B | $4.9B | $5.7B |
| Total Assets | $18.5B | $18.5B | $19.0B | $18.7B | $22.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.9B | $3.5B | $4.1B | $3.8B | $5.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.1B | $3.8B | $3.3B | $3.5B | $4.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $8.2B | $8.4B | $8.5B | $8.6B | $10.9B |
| Total Equity | $10.2B | $10.1B | $10.5B | $10.1B | $11.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $4.1B | $4.6B | $5.3B | $6.2B | $3.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 21, 2026 1:19am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.8B | $1.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$130.0M | -$149.0M | -$186.0M | -$207.0M | -$260.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $943.0M | $889.0M | $1.0B | $1.6B | $1.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$435.0M | -$89.0M | -$308.0M | -$168.0M | -$2.5B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$5.6B | -$6.1B | -$5.5B | -$2.3B | -$3.2B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$300.0M | -$473.0M | -$409.0M | -$1.1B | -$223.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$126.0M | $68.0M | $79.0M | $95.0M | $74.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 21, 2026 1:19am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +6.9% | +15.7% | +7.3% | +7.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +7.2% | +15.9% | +14.3% | +13.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +15.4% | +25.2% | +27.1% | +11.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +13.4% | +28.8% | +29.6% | +10.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | +9.0% | +20.6% | +17.5% | +8.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 11:42am (4d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-18 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-22 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-17 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-12 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-14 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-27 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-21 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-13 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-14 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-24 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-22 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-14 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-11 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-26 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-23 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-10 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-12 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-19 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-24 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-12 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-21 01:30Even the bull case prices 47% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 68%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($292.31) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +22% | 12.2% | $154.78 | -47% |
| Base — stabilizes | +15% | 10.6% | $109.73 | -62% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +7% | 9.0% | $75.94 | -74% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +8% | 11.1% | $94.37 | -68% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-21 01:27The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw print first: quarterly revenue has accelerated from $2.58B in Q4'24 to $3.18B in Q2'26 — that's 23% growth in six quarters, not the 7.5% "mature industrial" narrative. Q2'26 net margin of 12.4% is a real step-up from the ~10-11% base in 2024, and TTM revenue is now running ~$12B against $11.17B for full-year 2025. The Q4 seasonality dip (6.8% margin in Q4'25, 8.2% in Q4'24) is a recurring pattern, not deterioration. Earnings CAGR of 19.8% against revenue CAGR of 7.4% is genuine operating leverage — that's the whole bull case in one line. FCF of $1.50B against $49.4B market cap is a 3% yield, and $1.76B OCF against $260M capex is capital-light for an industrial. ROIC of 8.4% is unimpressive but stable.
The synthesis verdict of $135 fair value against $292 is, frankly, hard to defend without knowing the DCF assumptions — a 54% haircut on a company compounding earnings ~20% with expanding margins and $1.5B FCF requires either a very high discount rate or a hard assumption that margins mean-revert. At $292 and $1.5B FCF, the FCF yield is ~3%; if you believe FCF grows at even 10% for five years (well below the 21.5% trailing CAGR), a reasonable terminal gets you well north of $135. The synthesis and market-forces outputs directly contradict each other — synthesis says -54% downside, market-forces says +20-30% upside — and I think market-forces is directionally closer to right on the fundamentals, though the price already reflects a lot of that. The "high debt risk" flag is overwrought: $5.54B debt against $1.79B operating income is 3.1x, and interest coverage on ~$1.76B OCF is comfortable. Debt-to-equity of 0.50 is not distressed.
The contrarian case that actually bites: this is still a rail-cycle business. North American Class I freight volumes have been flat-to-down for a decade, and Wabtec's locomotive OE demand tracks that. The recent acceleration likely reflects a locomotive replacement cycle plus backlog conversion — both finite. Insider activity is small-lot selling only, no buys, which is mildly negative but not a red flag at this scale. EV/EBITDA of 23.6x is genuinely expensive for an industrial with 8.4% ROIC; peer group (comparables like GE Vernova aside) typically trades 12-16x. The narrative layer's read that the premium is "belief in transformation, not current cash generation" is fair — but the transformation is showing up in the numbers (margin expansion is real), so the premium isn't purely hopium. The right skeptical question is whether Q2'26's 12.4% margin is a peak or a floor; a decelerating quarterly trend flag from the revenue-confidence signal is worth watching, though I don't see deceleration — I see acceleration through Q2'26.
I partially dissent from the synthesis. The $135 fair value looks too punitive; a fairer anchor is $200-230 based on 18-20x forward EBITDA and mid-teens forward P/E on ~$5.20 forward EPS. That still means $292 is overvalued by ~20-30%, consistent with market-forces being wrong on direction (they say undervalued) and synthesis being right on direction but wrong on magnitude. This is a quality compounder priced for continued margin expansion and locomotive-cycle strength — both of which are real but cyclical. I wouldn't short it, and I wouldn't buy it here; the right move is to wait for either a cycle-driven drawdown into the $220s or evidence that the aftermarket/digital mix shift is durable enough to sustain 12%+ net margins through a freight downturn. The bull thesis needs Q3-Q4'26 margins to hold above 11% to survive.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is that the operating business is plainly good, but the stock already prices it like something better than a good industrial. Wabtec has put together a credible multi-year climb: revenue from $7.82B in 2021 to $11.17B in 2025, operating income from $876M to $1.79B, and net income from $558M to $1.17B. That is not cosmetic improvement; operating margin expanded from 11.2% to 16.1% while gross margin rose from roughly 30% to 34.1%. The quarterly run-rate into 2026 is also solid, with revenue at $2.95B and $3.18B in the first two quarters versus $2.61B and $2.71B the year before, and net margins in both 2026 quarters holding at 12.3%-12.4%. On a trailing basis, the business looks like it can support something like $1.35B-$1.45B of annualized earnings if current margins persist. That is a healthy industrial franchise with real execution behind it.
But the price being asked is for a much rarer animal. At $49.4B market cap, investors are paying 4.5x sales, 23.6x EV/EBITDA, and 42.8x earnings for a company growing revenue high single digits and earning a 10.5% ROE and 8.4% ROIC. Those return metrics are decent, not elite, and they matter because the premium multiple only makes sense if Wabtec is becoming a structurally higher-return platform business rather than a well-run cyclical supplier. I do see evidence of improvement in mix and execution, but not enough to justify an all-weather compounder multiple. Free cash flow of $1.50B on a $49.4B equity value is about a 3.0% FCF yield. For an industrial with $5.54B of debt, only $789M of cash, and a current ratio of 1.11, that is simply not cheap. You can admire the business and still say the stock is pricing in years of nearly flawless delivery.
The quarterly pattern also argues against paying peak-type valuation. The December quarters remain visibly weaker on margin: 8.2% net margin in 2024-12 and 6.8% in 2025-12 versus 10.6%-12.4% in the surrounding periods. Some seasonality or charges may be involved, but it is a reminder this is not a frictionless software-like earnings stream. Recent revenue growth of 7.5% and earnings growth of 10.8% are good, yet they are not the kind of numbers that normally sustain a low-40s P/E absent a major rerating catalyst. If I annualize the first half of 2026, I get about $6.13B of first-half revenue and $757M of net income; even giving credit for second-half strength, the stock is still around the high-30s on a forward earnings view. That is expensive for a rail-exposed industrial unless one believes margin expansion has a long runway from here and deserves a permanent premium.
The best argument against my skepticism is straightforward: the business may be in the middle innings of a real quality transformation, and the raw numbers do support that possibility. Revenue has compounded at about 7%-8%, earnings close to 20%, and free cash flow above 20%, which means margins and cash conversion are both improving faster than sales. Operating cash flow of $1.76B against $1.17B of net income is strong, capex is modest at $260M, and debt to equity below 0.5 is not distressing. If the installed base, aftermarket, and digital layers are steadily lifting mix, then today’s 16.1% operating margin may not be the ceiling. A bull can reasonably argue that the market is paying up for durability, not just growth, and that rail’s decarbonization and efficiency tailwinds deserve a valuation above generic industrial peers. I weigh that less heavily because the valuation gap versus current economics is too large: the company would need to keep compounding earnings at a strong double-digit rate for several years just to grow into today’s price.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of 7%-8% sales growth; it would be proof that the premium multiple is being earned. Specifically, I would want to see full-year revenue pushing above $12.5B, operating margin sustaining 17%+, net income running comfortably above $1.45B, and free cash flow moving toward $1.8B without balance-sheet strain. That would show the business is in fact becoming a higher-return compounder rather than merely a better cyclical. On the downside, if margins slip back toward 14%-15% operating, if the second-half pattern again reveals fragility, or if orders/growth soften while the multiple stays elevated, the stock should de-rate hard. My read is simple: this is a strong company and an overpriced stock.
Grok Reading
Wabtec’s operating record is clean and directionally better than a generic industrial. Revenue has compounded at 7.4% from $7.82B in 2021 to $11.17B in 2025, while net income nearly doubled from $558M to $1.17B and free cash flow hit $1.50B on only $260M of capex—an FCF conversion well above net income and a genuine quality signal. The last two reported quarters print $2.95B and $3.18B of revenue with net margins locked at 12.3–12.4%, erasing the seasonal Q4 soft patches (6.8% and 8.2%) that still drag the annual net margin to 10.5%. Operating margin at 16.1% and gross margin at 34.1% show the post-GE Transportation mix shift is real, not just narrative. Balance sheet leverage is moderate (debt/equity 0.50, net debt roughly $4.75B against $1.76B of operating cash flow), so the valuation engine’s “dangerously low interest coverage” flag looks overstated relative to the cash generation on display.
The price, however, has completely detached from that solid but unspectacular base. At $292 and a $49.4B enterprise, the stock screens at 43x trailing earnings, 24x EV/EBITDA, 4.5x sales, and a free-cash-flow yield of only ~3.0%. ROE is 10.5% and ROIC 8.4%—perfectly adequate for a mid-single-digit grower, wholly inadequate for a mid-40s multiple. The DCF-style anchor near $135 implies the market is paying a ~116% narrative premium for margin expansion, digital upsell, and rail decarbonization that has not yet shown up as double-digit top-line acceleration. Recent revenue growth is still only 7.5% year-over-year; the 19.8% earnings CAGR is mostly operating leverage and mix, which has a finite runway once the easy post-merger cost and aftermarket capture is exhausted. Insider activity is a steady drip of small sales with zero buys—consistent with a fully valued name, not a hidden compounder.
I am therefore reading this as a high-quality mature earner that the market has already re-rated into a platform fantasy. The strongest counter-argument is straightforward: if services and digital can push operating margin from 16% toward the low-20s while revenue re-accelerates into the low-double digits on freight recovery and international locomotive demand, then today’s earnings power is understated and a mid-30s multiple on forward earnings could still produce acceptable returns. Earnings and FCF have been compounding near 20%, the installed base is a real switching-cost moat, and the Market Forces layer correctly notes structural tailwinds from rail-as-green-transport. That bull case is coherent; it is also already fully in the price. Paying 43x for 7–8% organic growth and mid-teens incremental margins leaves no room for a freight downturn, modal share loss to trucking, or simply slower margin capture than the 2019 merger thesis promised.
I would flip to neutral or constructive only on clear evidence that the growth algorithm has changed—specifically, two consecutive quarters of ≥12% organic revenue growth with operating margin ≥18%, or an explicit disclosure of high-teens recurring digital/aftermarket ARR growing faster than equipment. A sustained print of FCF above $1.8B with net debt/EBITDA compressing under 1.5x while the multiple holds would also force a reassessment that the premium is being earned rather than hoped. Until then the asymmetry sits with the valuation, not the operations.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The business is executing at a high level. Revenue has grown from $7.82B (2021) to $11.17B (2025), a ~9% CAGR, while gross margin has stepped up from 30.3% to 34.1% and operating margin has nearly doubled from 11.2% to 16.1%. Net income has more than doubled ($558M to $1.17B) and FCF has run $889M-$1.63B, converting well (OCF/NI 1.66x, accruals -2.8% of assets, Beneish M -2.46). This is the profile of a mature rail-equipment franchise with genuine operating leverage, not accounting-driven earnings. Capital allocation reinforces the story: diluted shares have shrunk from 188.1M to 171.1M (-2.3% CAGR) with buyback/SBC of 894% and SBC only 0.7% of revenue - per-share value is being concentrated. Altman Z of 3.77 sits in the safe zone. The one real constraint is the balance sheet: net debt of ~$4.75B against only $789M liquid cash, and $1.25B of short-term debt exceeds cash on hand, creating refinancing exposure. FCF of $1.5B/yr comfortably services this, but it does mean the balance sheet is a constraint rather than a cushion. Insider tape is mildly negative but small in dollar terms (~$4M of sales, no buys) and looks like routine executive liquidation rather than a signal.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity schedule and refinancing terms for the $1.25B short-term portion
- Backlog composition and customer concentration in Freight vs Transit segments
- Whether recent margin gains reflect mix (services/aftermarket) or one-time price capture
- Nature of the 2026-dated insider sales - 10b5-1 plan vs discretionary
- Pension and off-balance-sheet obligations given the industrial footprint
Price is $292.31 against a signal-adjusted fair value of $135 and a composite of $123 - the market is paying roughly 2.2x deserved value. The three methods bracket the case: DCF at $170 (most generous, assumes the post-GE Transportation margin ramp continues), anchored P/E at $80, and an EPV floor at $71. Even taking the most bullish DCF at face value, upside is negative ~42%; on the composite, downside is ~54%. Earnings quality is clean so no haircut is warranted, and the Strong quality grade legitimately lifts the deserved multiple - but not to today's price.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Segment-level operating margin trajectory (Freight vs Transit) to test the DCF margin-expansion assumption
- Backlog conversion rate and pricing on the locomotive modernization pipeline
- Free cash flow guide and buyback pace vs debt paydown priorities
- Any one-off gains inflating recent EPS that would lower the anchored earnings base
The dominant non-fundamental force on WAB is a strong, still-durable turnaround narrative — post-GE Transportation integration, rail-tech consolidation, aftermarket/digital upsell — and the tape is actively rewarding it: the stock trades at $292 versus a $135 DCF anchor, a gap that exists purely because sentiment is paying for the story. The July 28 buyback plus Q2 print delivered a 16.7% single-day spike and, even after the give-back, cemented management-shareholder alignment as an active positive catalyst in recent memory. News flow is benign-to-positive (long-term compounder pieces, value screens featuring the name), and there is no visible crack in the story yet. Macro is a light crosswind, not a press: regime is neutral (+17), VIX 16, S&P barely off highs. WAB's 0.93 beta and defensive-ish rails profile mean risk-off episodes barely graze it, and the 10y at 4.65% is a generic industrials headwind rather than a name-specific one. The turnaround archetype is the vulnerability — these narratives snap fast if a margin quarter disappoints — but right now there is no catalyst forcing that reassessment. Net: narrative tailwind clearly outweighs a modest rate/valuation-of-market headwind.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Next earnings print for margin trajectory - the single most likely narrative-break event
- Any analyst downgrade or target cut citing GE Transportation integration or freight-volume softness
- Rail-sector rotation signals (peer prints, freight data) that could shift the modal-shift bear story back into focus
- Whether the post-buyback bid persists or fades as the July catalyst rolls off
The world is buying efficiency, not tonnage. Rail operators facing flat-to-down volumes and modal competition from trucking respond by spending on braking, controls, digital dispatch and locomotive modernization to squeeze more ton-miles out of existing assets — which is precisely Wabtec's content. That is why the category's revenue line can shrink while its margins expand 6-8pp and earnings compound: value is migrating from steel and volume into systems and aftermarket. Transit electrification and international fleet renewal add a second, budget-funded leg less correlated to North American freight. The constraint is macro: 4.65% long rates and tariff friction slow lumpy equipment approvals, so the near-term shape is annuity-led growth with deferred order intake, not a volume boom. Nothing here supports a step-change in the growth rate; it supports steady compounding in a category losing revenue.
When we made this prediction on Aug 21, 2026, WAB was $293.86. We expect it to be $273.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $170.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 21, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.