For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Wingstop Inc. (WING) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -16 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 59 · Value -77 · Sentiment -63 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $39.14 vs $129.49 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Wingstop Inc.
WING NASDAQWingstop Inc. is a restaurant company that specializes in cooked-to-order chicken wings, tenders, and chicken sandwiches, complemented by signature sides, dips, and a range of bold flavors. Wingstop focuses on a fast-casual dining model centered on flavor customization, offering both classic and boneless wings, dry rubs, and housemade sauces that appeal to individual tastes and group meals. The company operates primarily through franchised restaurants in the United States and international markets, using an asset-light structure that supports its role as a brand-led restaurant franchisor. Wingstop also emphasizes digital ordering and delivery as important parts of its customer experience, helping connect its menu to dine-in, pickup, and off-premises occasions. Headquartered in Dallas, Texas and founded in 1994, Wingstop Inc. remains a specialized player in the global restaurant industry with a clear focus on chicken-centric menu innovation and flavor-driven brand positioning.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.21
Total Equity: -$736.76M
Shares: 28,074,000
Total Debt: $1.21B
Cash: $196.57M
EBITDA: $204.36M
Total Debt: $1.21B
Cash: $196.57M
Revenue: $696.85M
Revenue: $696.85M
Revenue: $696.85M
Total Equity: -$736.76M
Tax Rate: 26.5%
Equity: -$736.76M
Total Debt: $1.21B
Cash: $196.57M
Current Liabilities: $81.97M
Long-Term Debt: $1.21B
Total Debt: $1.21B
Total Equity: -$736.76M
Shares: 28,074,000
Shares: 28,074,000
CapEx: -$47.44M
Shares: 28,074,000
Stock Price: $129.49
Net Income: $174.27M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:40pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $282.5M | $357.5M | $460.1M | $625.8M | $696.9M |
| Cost of Revenue | $57.4M | $63.4M | $70.6M | $91.6M | — |
| Gross Profit | $225.1M | $294.1M | $389.4M | $534.2M | — |
| Operating Expenses | $151.3M | $202.2M | $276.8M | $368.6M | — |
| Operating Income | $73.8M | $91.9M | $112.6M | $165.6M | $179.3M |
| Net Income | $42.7M | $52.9M | $70.2M | $108.7M | $174.3M |
| EBITDA | $81.7M | $102.8M | $125.8M | $185.1M | $204.4M |
| EPS | $1.43 | $1.77 | $2.36 | $3.72 | $6.23 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.42 | $1.77 | $2.35 | $3.70 | $6.21 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:25pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | — | $184.5M | $90.2M | $315.9M | $196.6M |
| Total Current Assets | — | $226.7M | $144.3M | $395.6M | $267.5M |
| Total Assets | — | $424.2M | $377.8M | $716.2M | $693.4M |
| Current Liabilities | — | $62.4M | $71.0M | $87.4M | $82.0M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | $706.8M | $712.3M | $1.2B | $1.2B |
| Total Liabilities | — | $815.1M | $835.2M | $1.4B | $1.4B |
| Total Equity | -$390.9M | -$390.9M | -$457.4M | -$675.6M | -$736.8M |
| Retained Earnings | — | -$393.3M | -$460.0M | -$676.9M | -$744.9M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:40pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $48.9M | $76.2M | $121.6M | $157.6M | $153.1M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$28.0M | -$23.9M | -$40.8M | -$51.9M | -$47.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $20.9M | $52.3M | $80.8M | $105.7M | $105.6M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$2.4M | $247.0M | -$3.7M | $500.0M | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | -$19.8M | -$141.3M | -$24.9M | -$28.9M | -$32.4M |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | -$125.4M | -$314.7M | -$221.9M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$4.4M | $150.8M | -$86.0M | $239.9M | -$131.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:40pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +26.6% | +28.7% | +36.0% | +11.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +30.7% | +32.4% | +37.2% | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +24.6% | +22.5% | +47.1% | +8.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +24.1% | +32.5% | +54.9% | +60.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +25.9% | +22.4% | +47.1% | +10.4% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:26pm (21d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-15 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-06 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-21 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-15 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-16 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-07 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-15 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-16 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-16 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-07 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-16 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-17 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-18 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-09 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-09 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-11 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-19 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-23 | $4.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-10 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-18 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:17Even the bull case prices 64% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 76%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($129.49) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +20% | 18.6% | $47.03 | -64% |
| Base — stabilizes | +13% | 16.2% | $34.51 | -73% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +7% | 13.7% | $24.88 | -81% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +6% | 17.8% | $30.49 | -76% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: quarterly revenue has gone from $155.7M (Q2 2024) to $183.7M (Q1 2026) — that's roughly 18% total growth over seven quarters, or ~10% annualized. This is decidedly not a 23% CAGR business anymore; the trailing three-year CAGR is inflated by post-pandemic normalization. Recent YoY of 11.4% and sequential prints of $174→$175→$175→$183 confirm deceleration. Net margins are steady in the 15-17% band on operations, but the Q1 2025 $92.3M NI is clearly a non-recurring gain (tax benefit or one-time item) that's inflating the annual $174M NI figure and the reported 25% net margin. Normalize that and you get closer to ~$110M in true earnings on $697M revenue — a ~16% margin, which matches every other quarter. That materially changes the P/E: normalized, it's closer to 32x, not 21x.
Negative equity of -$737M against $1.21B debt is the standard franchisor capital-return playbook (levered buybacks + dividends), not distress — Domino's runs the same structure. Operating CF of $153M covers interest comfortably; the synthesis's "dangerously low interest coverage" flag looks overstated for a franchise model with $153M OCF and no meaningful capex burden ($47M). That said, $1.21B of debt on $105M FCF is 11.5x FCF-to-debt, which is aggressive and does constrain optionality if same-store sales roll over. Insider activity is entirely awards, zero open-market buying or selling — non-informative, and I'd flag that the synthesis's "No Insider Transactions" label is misleading since there are nine awards on a single day (likely annual comp grants).
Where I disagree with the models: the synthesis calls this "high debt risk" and "sector in contraction" — the first is overstated for a franchisor, the second is generic macro noise. Market Forces calling this a "decelerating growth story with unsustainable margins" is half right on deceleration but wrong on margins — franchisor royalty streams are structurally high-margin and stable; that's the whole point of the model. However, the narrative layer nails it: this is a $130 stock trading at ~32x normalized earnings for a business growing revenue 11% and facing genuine questions about domestic saturation and chicken-cost cyclicality. The pre-flight note that the stock fell 71% from $381 to $130 while earnings grew 55% is the single most important data point — that's a multiple compression from ~70x to ~32x, and the question is whether 32x is the floor or a waypoint. For a QSR franchisor decelerating to low-teens growth, Domino's trades at ~27x, Chipotle at ~45x (but with company-owned unit growth). WING at 32x normalized sits between them without Chipotle's growth or Domino's scale moat.
The contrarian case the models underweight: franchise royalty businesses with negative working capital and 25%+ operating margins deserve premium multiples through cycles, and if international unit growth actually delivers (management has guided aggressively), the deceleration reverses. Wingstop opened ~350 net new units in 2024; if that pace holds, system sales growth compounds even with flat SSS. The bull case isn't crazy — it's just fully priced. My independent read: fair value on normalized earnings and 12-14% forward growth is $95-110, meaningfully above the synthesis's $78 but well below spot $129. The synthesis is directionally right (overvalued) but too bearish on magnitude; Market Forces' "avoid or short" is overreach — this is a quality compounder trading at a full multiple, not a broken business. I'd partial-agree: overvalued by 20-25%, not 40%.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is that the business is still fundamentally strong, but the stock is no longer obviously expensive on the numbers provided. Revenue has compounded from $282.5M in 2021 to $696.9M in 2025, a 2.5x increase in four years, while operating income rose from $73.8M to $179.3M and free cash flow reached $105.6M. That is not a tired restaurant concept; it is a high-quality franchised growth model still scaling. Even the recent quarterly run-rate shows resilience rather than deterioration: revenue moved from $155.7M in June 2024 to $183.7M in March 2026, and the “normal” net margin excluding the obvious one-off in March 2025 sits around 15%-17%, which is excellent for restaurants. The annual net margin of 25.0% is overstated by that anomalous $92.3M quarter, but even backing that out leaves a business with real earning power, not accounting smoke.
The key contradiction versus the bearish model outputs is that the valuation metrics shown here do not describe a dangerously overvalued growth fantasy. At $129.49 and a $3.53B market cap, the stock is on about 20.9x earnings, 5.2x sales, and 22.2x EV/EBITDA. For a capital-light franchisor growing revenue 11.4% year over year and earnings 60.3% off a depressed comparison, that is not cheap, but it is also not “priced for perfection.” If anything, the stock looks like the market has already derated it from a premium compounder into a more ordinary mature consumer name despite operating margin of 25.7% and ROA above 25%. The market narrative says fundamentals only support something like $78, but the raw business trajectory here looks better than that kind of multiple implies. A company generating $153.1M of operating cash flow on under $700M of revenue, with modest capex needs relative to system growth, deserves a premium.
The real issue is not demand collapse or “unsustainable margins”; it is leverage and the quality of the equity base. Total debt of $1.21B against $196.6M of cash is substantial for a company with $105.6M of free cash flow, and the negative equity of -$736.8M means this is financially engineered, not conservatively capitalized. On rough math, net debt is about $1.01B, or nearly 10x annual free cash flow and around 5.5x operating income. That is manageable for a stable royalty-heavy franchise if rates and traffic cooperate, but it meaningfully reduces room for error. So my read is that WING is not a broken growth story; it is a good business carrying enough leverage that you should refuse to pay a hero multiple. At ~21x earnings, though, investors are not paying a hero multiple anymore.
The best case against my view is straightforward: the annual earnings base is flattered by the March 2025 quarter’s absurd 53.9% net margin and $92.3M of net income on $171.1M of revenue. If that quarter contains a tax benefit or some other non-recurring item, then the true earnings power is closer to the recent quarterly cadence of roughly $27M-$30M per quarter, or maybe $110M-$120M annualized, not $174.3M. On that normalized basis, the P/E is not 20.9x but more like 30x+, and EV/EBITDA would also be less forgiving. Add in 11.4% recent revenue growth that is decent but no longer hypergrowth, and the bear can argue the stock still carries a quality premium without enough unit-growth proof to justify it. That is a serious argument, and if I were short the stock, that accounting normalization point would be my centerpiece.
What would change my mind is also specific. If the next few quarters show revenue stalling in the low-single digits while net margin slips below 14%-15%, then the “premium franchisor” case weakens fast because leverage becomes the dominant factor. Likewise, if debt stays around $1.2B with no visible deleveraging despite $100M+ annual free cash flow, equity holders are not being compensated for balance-sheet risk. On the other hand, if quarterly revenue clears $190M-$195M with net income holding near $30M absent one-offs, and cash flow continues to convert above $140M in operating cash annually, then the current price would look more like a reasonable entry into a still-compounding franchise than a trap.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a high-quality franchise engine that has already passed its acceleration phase. Revenue compounded at 23% from $282M in 2021 to $697M in 2025, and operating margins held near 26%—exactly what a capital-light franchisor should deliver. But the trajectory has bent: the last four reported quarters sit in a $171–184M band, recent revenue growth has slowed to 11.4% year-over-year, and the eye-catching 2025 net income of $174M is an artifact of a single $92M quarter that produced a 54% margin. Strip that out and normalized earnings sit closer to $105–110M, which turns the stated 20.9× P/E into something nearer 32× on a $3.53B market cap. Free cash flow of $106M is real and high-quality, yet it services $1.21B of debt against negative equity of –$737M; net leverage near 10× FCF is not a footnote for a decelerating consumer name.
The valuation synthesis and market-forces layer are directionally correct even if their language is harsh. EV/Revenue of 6.5× and EV/EBITDA of 22× still embed a multi-year growth premium that the recent top-line print no longer supports. The narrative layer—Wingstop as the next Chipotle/Domino’s platform monopoly—explains the residual 65% gap above the ~$78–86 DCF anchor, but that story is now colliding with saturating domestic density, commodity wing costs, and unproven international scale. The re-rating from $381 to $129 already priced in a large sentiment shift; it has not yet priced the business as a mid-teens grower with heavy leverage.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward: 25% operating margins, 25% ROA, a 3.3 current ratio, and still-positive double-digit revenue growth are rare in restaurants, and the stock has already been cut by more than 60%. A bull can claim the market over-corrected, that franchise unit economics remain intact, and that any re-acceleration in digital or international openings would justify a quick multiple expansion back toward 25–30×. Those points have merit on quality; they do not erase the fact that earnings power is being overstated by a one-time item, that debt service will constrain capital returns, and that every independent model still lands fair value 30–40% below the current quote.
I would flip if the next two quarters show sustained revenue growth re-accelerating above 15% with stable unit economics, or if net debt is reduced by at least $300M while FCF holds above $110M. A clean print without further one-time gains that still delivers ~$30M+ quarterly net income on rising comps would also force a re-rating of the earnings base. Until then the residual narrative premium looks unjustified.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Wingstop is a highly asset-light franchisor showing textbook operating quality: revenue nearly 2.5x from $282.5M (2021) to $696.9M (2025), gross margin expanding to 86.2%, operating margin steady in the mid-20s, and net income compounding from $42.7M to $174.3M. FCF has scaled from $20.9M to $105.6M with OCF/NI of 1.33x and negative accruals (-5.7% of assets), pointing to earnings backed by cash rather than accounting flatter. Beneish M at -2.09 is clean; no manipulation flags. Capital allocation is shareholder-friendly for a growth franchise: diluted shares fell from 29.9M to 28.1M (-1.6% CAGR), buybacks running 867% of SBC, and SBC only 3.6% of revenue. Insider tape shows only routine director equity awards, no open-market activity either way - neutral but not confirming. The one genuine constraint is the balance sheet: net debt of roughly $1.01B against only $196.6M cash and $105.6M annual FCF, with Altman Z at 2.15 (grey zone). This is a levered recap structure common in mature franchisors, serviceable given the cash generation, but it removes the 'fortress' descriptor and would bite hard in a same-store-sales downturn.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Franchise vs company-owned revenue mix and royalty rate trajectory to confirm the asset-light thesis
- Debt structure, maturities, covenants, and rate on the ~$1B gross debt (likely securitization notes)
- Same-store sales cadence and net new unit openings by quarter for durability of comp growth
- Reason for flat 2025 FCF despite net income jumping 60% - working capital, tax timing, or capex
- Any customer, geographic, or supplier (chicken wing input) concentration disclosed in 10-K
The composite fair value sits at $85.89 and the signal-adjusted FV at $78.46, implying roughly 35-40% downside from $129.49. The two grounded methods are even harsher: DCF at $49.31 and EPV floor at $35.20. The only method supporting the price is anchored-PE at $209.75, which is a runaway output - it simply extrapolates the current premium multiple rather than testing it, and should be discounted heavily. Strip it out and deserved value clusters in the $50-80 range, well below spot. The business is genuinely elite (86% gross margin, high-teens growth, buying back stock), which justifies a premium multiple - but not this one. To underwrite $129 you need many years of 20%+ unit growth, sustained AUV gains, successful international rollout, and no wing-cost or competitive shock - essentially the bull case executed cleanly. That is priced in, not offered as optionality. Add a leveraged balance sheet (about 10 years of FCF in net debt) and the margin of safety is negative. This is a great business at a full-to-heroic price, which is exactly the setup that scores poorly on a mispricing lens regardless of quality.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Same-store sales trend and AUV trajectory in latest quarter
- International unit opening pace and cohort economics
- Bone-in wing cost exposure and any hedging disclosure
- Interest expense run-rate and refinancing schedule on the leveraged capital structure
- Franchisee development pipeline and any signs of saturation in mature US markets
Wingstop's entire premium sits on a platform-monopoly story (next Chipotle, next Domino's) whose intensity is still strong but whose durability is only moderate, and the recent tape is quietly eroding it. Sales slipping into the headlines, momentum decelerating from a 23% CAGR to 11% recently, and articles openly questioning fair value are exactly the kind of drip that de-rates a narrative-heavy name. The bull thesis needs constant proof; each soft print chips at the multiple. That is a headwind specific to this ticker, not to restaurants broadly. On the macro side the tape is only mildly constructive (regime +22, VIX 16), but WING's 1.78 beta means any risk-off flinch hits it roughly double. With the 10y at 4.68% and market PE near 27, long-duration growth-multiple consumer names (and WING trades like one, not like a wing shop) are structurally pressured. Add the Jersey Mike's IPO breaking below issue as a fresh reminder that the market is no longer paying up for restaurant growth stories, and the sentiment cross-current for WING is negative. Nothing here is catastrophic - the narrative is bruised, not broken - but the net non-fundamental pressure leans down.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Next same-store sales print - a second soft comp would break the narrative durability, a reacceleration would repair it
- Sell-side target revisions after recent sales slip - watch for downgrades or estimate cuts as tone shift
- International unit growth commentary - the key remaining leg of the platform story
- Any further restaurant-sector risk-off signals (Jersey Mike's, CAVA, CMG action)
- 10y yield direction - a break above 4.8% pressures growth-multiple QSR harder
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.