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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for W. R. Berkley Corporation (WRB) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score +27 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 76 · Value -6 · Sentiment -5 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $59.71 vs $67.72 at analysis
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W. R. Berkley Corporation
WRB NYSEW. R. Berkley Corporation is an insurance holding company focused on property and casualty insurance. The company operates through two main business segments, Insurance and Reinsurance & Monoline Excess, serving commercial clients with a broad range of underwriting solutions. Its Insurance operations include excess and surplus lines, admitted lines, specialty personal lines, and other commercial coverages tailored to niche and specialty risks. W. R. Berkley also provides reinsurance and monoline excess products, supporting insurers and businesses that need additional risk transfer capacity. The company serves customers across the United States and in international markets including Europe, Asia, Australia, Canada, Mexico, South America, Scandinavia, and the United Kingdom. Headquartered in Greenwich, Connecticut, W. R. Berkley is recognized as a major participant in the commercial insurance market.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.45
Total Equity: $9.71B
Shares: 399,865,843
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.54B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.54B
Revenue: $14.64B
Revenue: $14.64B
Revenue: $14.64B
Total Equity: $9.71B
Tax Rate: 21.7%
Equity: $9.71B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.54B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $9.71B
Shares: 399,865,843
Shares: 399,865,843
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 399,865,843
Stock Price: $67.72
Net Income: $1.78B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 4:28am (35d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $9.5B | $11.2B | $12.1B | $13.7B | $14.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $692.9M | $735.3M | $810.7M | $782.6M | $849.9M |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $1.0B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.8B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $2.46 | $3.33 | $3.40 | $4.39 | $4.48 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.44 | $3.29 | $3.37 | $4.36 | $4.45 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 4:00am (35d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.5B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $32.1B | $33.9B | $37.2B | $40.6B | $44.1B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $25.4B | $27.1B | $29.7B | $32.2B | $34.4B |
| Total Equity | $6.7B | $6.8B | $7.5B | $8.4B | $9.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $9.0B | $10.2B | $11.0B | $12.3B | $13.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 4:46am (35d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.2B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.7B | $3.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$49.6M | -$11.6M | $0 | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $529.2M | -$429.8M | $980,000 | $3.1M | -$2.1M |
| Dividends Paid | -$355.7M | -$235.2M | -$501.5M | -$532.0M | -$700.3M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$122.4M | -$94.1M | -$537.2M | -$303.7M | -$270.2M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$803.5M | -$119.5M | -$86.2M | $611.6M | $565.2M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 4:28am (35d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +18.3% | +8.0% | +13.0% | +6.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +35.1% | +0.0% | +27.1% | +1.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 9:19am (37d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-23 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-23 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-15 | $1.09 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-22 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-23 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-16 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-23 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-24 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-01 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-15 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-22 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-23 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-08 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-12 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-16 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-23 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-24 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-08 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-06 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-12 02:05A +1σ run of quarters pays +26%; a −1σ run costs 11%. Ratio 2.4:1 (μ 6.6%, σ 5.3% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 3.6 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($67.72) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +3% | 19.8% | $94.17 | +39% |
| Base — stabilizes | +2% | 17.3% | $80.11 | +18% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +1% | 14.7% | $66.85 | -1% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +1% | 12.9% | $60.28 | -11% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +12% | 12.9% | $85.06 | +26% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +1% | 12.9% | $60.52 | -11% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-02 05:37The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue has gone $3.40B → $3.55 → $3.67 → $3.67 → $3.77 → $3.72 → $3.69 → $3.72B across the last eight quarters. That's not a growth story — that's a plateau starting mid-2025. YoY Q2 revenue growth is just 1.4% ($3.72B vs $3.67B), and net income actually rose modestly to $452M from $401M (+12.7%). The "revenue_cagr 10%" figure is backward-looking through the 2022-2024 hard-market rate cycle; the run-rate tells you specialty P&C pricing has topped and WRB is now compounding through underwriting margin and float income, not top-line. Full-year 2025 NI of $1.78B was essentially flat vs $1.76B in 2024 despite $950M more revenue — that's margin compression, likely loss-cost inflation eating into rate. ROE of 18.3% is excellent but down from mid-20s peaks earlier in the cycle.
The synthesis verdict of "+7.3% signal-adjusted upside to $72.70" leans heavily on Market Forces' tailwind call, which I think is directionally wrong for the next 12 months. E&S pricing power is fading — public commentary from Markel, Kinsale, and Arch all point to rate deceleration in casualty and softening property cat pricing after two benign hurricane seasons. The pre-flight thesis correctly identifies WRB as premium-quality but the "sustained mid-to-high single-digit growth" assumption is exactly what the recent four quarters are challenging. Meanwhile the narrative layer's "anchored, minimal intensity, 6.9% below DCF" is the most honest read in the stack — this is a fairly-valued compounder, not a mispriced one.
The contrarian short case worth taking seriously: WRB at 2.79x book with ROE trending from 20%+ toward high-teens implies the implied cost-of-equity math is tightening. If ROE normalizes to 15% (still excellent) as the cycle softens, justified P/B under a Gordon growth frame (r=10%, g=4%) drops to ~1.8x, implying book-anchored fair value closer to $52-55 versus current $67.72. The 15.2x P/E looks cheap only if you believe 2025's $1.78B NI is the new floor; if reserve development turns adverse (social inflation is real in casualty) or cat losses normalize, forward earnings could easily print $1.6B and the multiple re-rates against you simultaneously. The insider activity is all awards and tax-withholding in-kinds on a single August 2026 date — zero open-market buying, which is neutral-to-mildly-negative for a stock the models are calling undervalued.
Where the data is thin: no debt figure, no combined ratio, no reserve development disclosure, no investment yield trajectory — all of which matter more than revenue for an insurer. The debt_to_equity=0 tag is almost certainly wrong (WRB has senior notes outstanding); this is an FMP data quality issue and it means any DCF or EV-based valuation in the stack is running on incomplete inputs. Also worth flagging: the "decelerating quarterly trend" note in Revenue Confidence contradicts the Market Forces "priced for stagnation" framing — the models are internally inconsistent about whether growth is decelerating (it is) or being underestimated (probably not). I side with the deceleration read. On balance I partially agree with the synthesis — WRB is a high-quality name I'd own on weakness — but I dissent on the direction of surprise. Fair value is closer to $62-68 (in-range), not $72.70. The 2.76% dividend and steady book value compounding provide a floor, but there's no catalyst for multiple expansion when the underwriting cycle is rolling over. Wait for a cat quarter or reserve charge to buy in the mid-$50s.
GPT Reading
WRB looks like a very good insurer priced about like a very good insurer. The numbers show a business that has compounded cleanly for years: revenue rose from $9.48B in 2021 to $14.64B in 2025, a roughly 11% annual clip, while net income went from $1.02B to $1.78B and ROE sits at 18.3%. That is a strong operating record for a P&C carrier, especially with no reported debt, $2.54B of cash, and $3.58B of operating cash flow in 2025. On quality alone, WRB deserves to trade above average financials. The issue is that the market already knows this. At $67.72, investors are paying 15.2x earnings and 2.79x book for a company whose 2025 net margin was 12.2% and whose growth, while solid, is no longer accelerating.
What stands out in the more recent data is that revenue has kept grinding upward but earnings have flattened. Annual revenue increased 6.9% in the latest quarter versus the prior year, yet recent earnings growth was only 1.3%. Quarterly net income has oscillated between $401M and $576M over the last eight reported quarters without a clear upward trend, and margins have mostly lived in a 10.8% to 14.0% band after hitting 15.7% in 4Q24. In other words, WRB is writing more business, but not converting that top-line growth into incremental profitability at the same rate. For an insurer, that can mean any mix of softer pricing, loss-cost pressure, reserve normalization, or simply less help from favorable items. Whatever the cause, it argues against paying materially more than the current multiple. A company trading at nearly 1.85x sales and almost 3x book should either be showing clearer earnings leverage or have a visible runway to higher ROE than the current 18%-ish level.
I also think some of the “slight upside” framing from the prior models is too generous because it leans on the steadiness of the franchise without fully penalizing the cyclicality embedded in specialty P&C. WRB may be disciplined, but it is not immune to the insurance cycle. If premium growth settles into mid-single digits and margins remain around 12%-13%, then earnings power is more “durable compounding” than “re-rating candidate.” On 2025 net income of $1.78B against a $25.14B market cap, the earnings yield is only about 7.1%, which is fine but not compelling for a catastrophe- and reserve-sensitive business. The 2.76% dividend yield and 39% payout ratio are supportive, but they do not create enough valuation support by themselves if underwriting conditions soften. My read is that fair value is roughly around the current price, maybe low-$60s to around $70, rather than clearly above it.
The best argument against my caution is straightforward: WRB has earned the premium. A debt-free balance sheet, nearly $10B of equity, 18% ROE, and multi-year double-digit revenue growth are not common. Net income has also been far more resilient than the recent quarterly chop implies: 2024 net income was $1.76B and 2025 was $1.78B despite normal insurance volatility, which suggests the franchise can absorb swings and still compound book. If the company can continue growing revenue from $14.64B toward $15.5B-$16B while maintaining even a 12% net margin, earnings would still move higher, and 15x earnings would not be demanding for a best-in-class specialty underwriter. The market tailwind case also matters more here than in commodity insurers because WRB’s niche positioning can preserve pricing discipline longer than broader P&C peers.
What would change my mind is evidence that the recent disconnect between premium growth and earnings is temporary rather than structural. If upcoming quarters show net income consistently back above $550M with margins re-expanding toward 15% on revenue still around $3.7B-$3.9B, I would accept that the franchise deserves a premium and that fair value is meaningfully above $70. Conversely, if revenue keeps growing mid-single digits but quarterly earnings remain stuck near $400M-$500M and book value growth slows, then even 15x earnings and 2.8x book will look rich for a mature insurer. For now, this is a high-quality company without a high enough margin of safety.
Grok Reading
W. R. Berkley’s numbers describe a high-quality specialty P&C franchise whose growth engine is visibly downshifting. Annual revenue compounded from $9.48B in 2021 to $14.64B in 2025, a clean ~10% CAGR, and net income rose from $1.02B to $1.78B. That history justifies the 18.3% ROE and the $3.58B of operating cash flow against $1.78B of net income—classic float economics working as advertised. But the recent tape tells a different story. Quarterly revenue has been stuck in a $3.55–3.77B band for eight straight quarters; trailing revenue growth has slowed to 6.9% and earnings growth has collapsed to 1.3% year-over-year, with 2025 net income essentially flat versus 2024 ($1.78B vs $1.76B). Margins are oscillating between roughly 11% and 14% with no clear upward drift. At $67.72 the stock trades at 15.2x earnings, 2.8x book and 1.85x sales—multiples that already capitalize mid-teens ROE and steady specialty underwriting. Paying 15x for a business whose earnings just stopped growing is not a bargain; it is a full price for execution that is already in the rear-view mirror.
The operating cash conversion and fortress-looking balance sheet ($2.54B cash, reported debt-to-equity of zero, $9.71B equity) remain genuine strengths, and the 2.8% dividend at a 39% payout is sustainable and shareholder-friendly. Those features explain why the stock has earned a modest premium to diversified P&C peers and why the steady-compounder narrative has durability. They do not, however, justify treating decelerating top-line and stalled earnings as temporary noise. Specialty E&S pricing power is real until capacity returns or loss costs re-accelerate; the quarterly run-rate already hints that the hard-market tailwind is moderating. The valuation synthesis’s signal-adjusted $72.70 (+7%) embeds a growth recovery the last six quarters simply do not show, and the composite fair value of $65.14 already sits below the current price. Methods disagree for a reason: the market is still pricing the 2021–2024 trajectory, not the 2025–2026 reality.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and worth taking seriously. An 18% ROE specialty underwriter with $3.58B of operating cash flow, a multi-decade underwriting culture, and minimal narrative froth (low cult coefficient, anchored mode) rarely stays cheap for long. Historical earnings CAGR of 13.5% and a PE only modestly above the long-run P&C average leave room for the stock to grind higher if rate adequacy holds and book value compounds at mid-teens. A smart opponent would also note that insurance earnings are lumpy by nature—one soft catastrophe quarter or reserve release can mask underlying improvement—and that the 2.8x price-to-book is not egregious for a consistent mid-teens ROE name. I weigh that evidence as real quality, not as free upside. Quality already appears in the multiple; incremental return from here requires re-acceleration that the momentum data and secondary signals (macro headwinds, decelerating revenue confidence) currently contradict. Flat earnings at a 15x multiple is fair value, not a discounted compounder.
What would flip the view is concrete: two consecutive quarters of revenue growth back above 9–10% with net margins stable above 13%, or a clear print of combined-ratio improvement that lifts trailing earnings growth back into the high single digits while ROE holds near 18%. Conversely, a sub-5% revenue quarter paired with margin compression below 11% or a material reserve strengthening would confirm the cycle has turned and push the stock toward the low-$60s fair-value anchor. Until one of those paths clarifies, the risk-reward at $67.72 is roughly balanced with a mild tilt toward disappointment.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
W. R. Berkley has posted uninterrupted top-line growth from $9.48B in 2021 to $14.64B in 2025 (about 11% CAGR), with net income rising from $1.02B to $1.78B and free cash flow expanding from $2.18B to $3.58B. OCF/NI of 2.04x and accruals of -4% of assets point to conservative, cash-backed earnings — typical of a well-reserved P&C underwriter where float generation runs ahead of GAAP profit. Diluted share count has shrunk from 419M to 400M (roughly -1.2% CAGR) while SBC is a trivial 0.4% of revenue and buybacks run 5x SBC, so per-share value is being concentrated, not eroded. Liquid cash of $2.54B against no net debt drag (net cash position per module) and self-funding operations means no reliance on capital markets. The Altman Z of 1.2 is a model artifact — Z-scores are unreliable for insurers, whose balance sheets are dominated by investment portfolios and loss reserves rather than industrial working capital. Insider tape shows only routine equity awards and tax-withholding (A/F codes); no open-market buys or sells to read into. The Berkley family remains embedded operationally, consistent with the long-standing owner-operator culture. Gross/operating margin fields show 0 because the classifier does not map insurance premium-and-loss accounting — not a real margin issue.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Combined ratio trend and reserve development (favorable vs adverse) over the last 5 years
- Investment portfolio composition and credit quality
- Catastrophe exposure and reinsurance program
- Segment mix and any customer/broker concentration
- Berkley family voting/economic ownership and succession plan
The valuation math is tight and boring in the right way. Composite fair value comes in at $65.14 (anchored-PE method), roughly 4% below the $67.72 price; the signal-adjusted FV of $72.70 implies about 7% upside. That is a coin-flip range centered almost exactly on today's quote - the market is paying a fair price for a business the Company-Quality lens grades Strong (76). Earnings quality is good, so no haircut is warranted; if anything, that supports the higher end of the range rather than the lower. There is no visible margin of safety here. To call WRB cheap I would need the price to reflect a discount to the deserved multiple on a proven specialty P&C compounder - it does not. To call it rich I would need heroic assumptions baked in - also not the case. The bull thesis (steady book value compounding, disciplined underwriting) is largely priced in; the bear tail (reserve inadequacy, cycle turn) is not obviously discounted either. This is a hold-at-fair-price situation, not a mispricing.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Reserve development trends in latest 10-Q - adverse development would compress deserved multiple
- Net premium growth and combined ratio trajectory vs guidance
- Investment yield on the float as rates evolve - a swing factor for run-rate EPS
- Any share repurchase pace change that alters per-share compounding math
WRB is a classic steady-compounder with a durable but low-intensity narrative - no mania to unwind, no story to defend. With a beta of 0.29, the neutral-to-slightly-soft tape (S&P -2.2% off highs, VIX 16.3) barely registers here; this name is engineered to sit out macro chop. The bull framing (disciplined specialty underwriting, float economics, Berkshire-adjacent quality) is intact but not driving flows, and there is no active de-rating narrative on the stock. Recent news flow on peers (RDN, KNSL) surfaces a mild sector crosswind: softer pricing and rising competition in specialty and E&S lines. That is a modest headwind to the rate-hardening leg of the bull story, but it is a slow-moving industry theme, not a sharp sentiment break. Analyst tone appears quiet - no revision cascade visible. Net: pressure is close to zero, with a slight lean to headwind from the softening-pricing chatter offset by low macro sensitivity and a durable, uncontested narrative.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether P&C pricing commentary hardens into a full soft-market narrative across specialty carriers
- Analyst target revisions post next print - any downgrades tied to reserve or pricing concerns
- Sector rotation into defensive financials if the tape turns risk-off
- Reserve development commentary from peers that could spread to WRB
The world helping WRB is the rate regime: a 4.75% 10y with a positively sloped curve turns insurance float into a compounding annuity, and that is why profits are growing faster than premiums. The world hurting it is capital abundance — several years of hard-market returns have pulled capacity back into property and specialty, which is deflating rate exactly where WRB's growth came from. Meanwhile claims-cost inflation (medical, litigation finance, repair) does not soften with the pricing cycle, so the loss-cost floor keeps rising while price flattens. Net: this is a mid-to-late-cycle specialty underwriter with an intact franchise, a growing investment engine, and a shrinking pricing tailwind. Nothing structural is breaking; the growth rate is simply normalizing toward exposure growth plus float income rather than rate plus exposure plus float.
When we made this prediction on Sep 2, 2026, WRB was $67.99. We expect it to be $72.20 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $58.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 2, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.