For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Dollar Tree Inc. (DLTR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Low · Gem Score -23 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -24 · Value -22 · Sentiment 45 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $77.08 vs $131.91 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Dollar Tree Inc.
DLTR NASDAQDollar Tree Inc. is a North American value retailer that operates discount variety stores under the Dollar Tree and Dollar Tree Canada banners. The company focuses on everyday essentials and impulse items sold at low opening price points, including consumables, household goods, health and beauty products, seasonal merchandise, party supplies, crafts, toys, snacks, and home décor. Its store model is built around convenience, frequent new product assortments, and a broad selection tailored to budget-conscious shoppers. Dollar Tree Inc. also supports its retail network through distribution centers and an online shopping platform, serving customers across the United States and Canada. Headquartered in Chesapeake, Virginia, Dollar Tree Inc. plays a significant role in the consumer staples retail segment by providing accessible, high-turnover merchandise in small-box neighborhood formats.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.22
Total Equity: $3.75B
Shares: 206,300,000
Total Debt: $2.43B
Cash: $717.80M
EBITDA: $2.30B
Total Debt: $2.43B
Cash: $717.80M
Revenue: $19.41B
Revenue: $19.41B
Revenue: $19.41B
Total Equity: $3.75B
Tax Rate: 24.8%
Equity: $3.75B
Total Debt: $2.43B
Cash: $717.80M
Current Liabilities: $3.23B
Long-Term Debt: $2.43B
Total Debt: $2.43B
Total Equity: $3.75B
Shares: 206,300,000
Shares: 206,300,000
CapEx: -$1.13B
Shares: 206,300,000
Stock Price: $131.91
Net Income: $1.28B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 2:08am (34d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $26.3B | $28.3B | $16.8B | $17.6B | $19.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $18.6B | $19.4B | $10.8B | $11.3B | $12.4B |
| Gross Profit | $7.7B | $8.9B | $6.0B | $6.3B | $7.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $5.9B | $6.7B | $4.2B | $4.8B | $5.4B |
| Operating Income | $1.8B | $2.2B | $1.8B | $1.5B | $1.7B |
| Net Income | $1.3B | $1.6B | -$998.4M | -$3.0B | $1.3B |
| EBITDA | $2.5B | $3.0B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.3B |
| EPS | $5.83 | $7.24 | $-4.55 | $-14.05 | $6.23 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.80 | $7.21 | $-4.54 | $-14.03 | $6.22 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 2:00am (34d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $984.9M | $642.8M | $425.2M | $1.3B | $717.8M |
| Total Current Assets | $5.6B | $6.4B | $6.1B | $9.1B | $3.4B |
| Total Assets | $21.7B | $23.0B | $22.0B | $18.6B | $13.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $4.2B | $4.2B | $4.7B | $8.6B | $3.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $2.4B | $2.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $14.0B | $14.3B | $14.7B | $14.7B | $9.7B |
| Total Equity | $7.7B | $8.8B | $7.3B | $4.0B | $3.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $6.5B | $8.1B | $7.1B | $3.9B | $3.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 2:26am (34d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.4B | $1.6B | $2.7B | — | — |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.0B | -$1.2B | -$1.2B | -$1.3B | -$1.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | $410.3M | $366.0M | $1.5B | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$950.0M | -$647.5M | -$500.0M | -$400.0M | -$1.5B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$425.3M | -$327.0M | $45.9M | $754.0M | -$750.5M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 2:08am (34d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.6% | -40.8% | +4.8% | +10.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +15.5% | -32.6% | +4.5% | +12.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +23.5% | -20.7% | -17.6% | +13.1% |
| Net Income Growth | +21.7% | -161.8% | -203.5% | +142.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +18.9% | -27.6% | -8.6% | +15.7% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-04 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays +44%; a −1σ run costs 66%. Ratio 0.7:1 (μ 1.7%, σ 18.7% , 14 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 10.1 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($131.91) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +11% | 17.3% | $265.62 | +101% |
| Base — stabilizes | +7% | 15.0% | $206.88 | +57% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +4% | 12.8% | $157.59 | +19% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +9% | 7.6% | $118.68 | -10% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +20% | 8.8% | $190.44 | +44% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -17% | 7.1% | $44.91 | -66% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-03 02:54The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly tape here is more interesting than any of the models let on. Trailing four quarters give roughly $20.07B in revenue and $1.61B in net income — a 8.0% net margin, materially better than the 6.6% canonical figure and a genuine acceleration from the FY26 print. Q2 FY27 (Aug 2026) at $4.89B rev / 10.5% margin is the standout: net income of $514.5M is up 173% YoY against the $188.4M base. Revenue growth is 7% YoY in that same quarter — decent but decelerating from the 10.4% recent-YoY figure the momentum module cites. The real story is margin, not top-line: operating margin has roughly doubled off the trough, consistent with the Family Dollar divestiture (announced March 2025, closed mid-2025) finally cleaning up the P&L. The 2023-2024 $28B revenue base collapsing to ~$19B is the Family Dollar carve-out, not organic decay — the models treat the trajectory as ambiguous but it's actually a fairly clean recut of a smaller, higher-margin business.
Where I part company with the Market Forces module: the "-1.49x accrual ratio" and "accounting sand" framing looks overwrought given a clean explanation exists (Family Dollar goodwill writedowns in FY25 of ~$3B produced the -73.8% margin quarter; that's not fraud, it's the impairment that preceded divestiture). Insider activity being "zero" is also misleading — the two prints shown are routine RSU/conversion mechanics, not a signal. That said, the FCF quality flag deserves respect: capex ran $1.13B against ~$1.28B in reported NI, and OCF/FCF aren't disclosed here, which is a real gap. ROIC of 22.7% and ROE of 34% are impressive if real, but they lean on a shrunken equity base post-writedown ($3.75B equity vs $24.75B market cap → 6.6x P/B is expensive on book but reasonable on earnings power). The synthesis's $178 composite fair value smells too rich — it's implicitly extrapolating the current 10.5% margin quarter as steady-state, which is aggressive given Q1 FY27 was 7%, showing the margin is lumpy.
The contrarian case: DLTR is a single-format retailer now, exposed to a $1.25-$7 multi-price rollout that is still unproven at scale. Tariff exposure is unusually high — Dollar Tree imports ~40%+ of merchandise, largely from China, and the current tariff regime is a direct gross-margin headwind not yet fully in the numbers. Comp deceleration to 7% YoY revenue growth on a smaller store base with multi-price uplift baked in means underlying traffic/ticket growth is modest. The bear case that the $1.25 anchor is obsolete is real; the bull case that margin expansion is durable requires believing the multi-price transition doesn't cannibalize the treasure-hunt model. Elliott/Starboard involvement historically front-runs value realization but also signals management doesn't have a clear path on its own.
Netting it out: at 21x trailing P/E and 11.7x EV/EBITDA on a post-divestiture business earning ~$6/share run-rate with double-digit YoY EPS growth, DLTR is not obviously cheap and not obviously expensive — it's priced for the recovery to continue but not to accelerate. The synthesis $178 target requires ~20% margin expansion from here plus multiple expansion; I don't see the catalyst. On a normalized 8% net margin on $20.5B revenue = $1.64B NI / 187M shares = ~$8.75 EPS, at a 17-18x mature-retailer multiple that's $150-160 — call it 15-20% upside, not 35%. Fair-to-modestly-undervalued, but the poor cash flow disclosure and tariff overhang keep conviction low. I'd rather own it under $120 than chase it here.
GPT Reading
Dollar Tree looks better than the market mood, but not as cheap as the optimistic composite implies. The core fact pattern is that the business has already repaired a lot of the damage visible in fiscal 2024-2025. Annual revenue rose from $17.58B to $19.41B in FY2026, up 10.4%, while operating income improved from $1.46B to $1.65B despite a heavy baggage year prior. The reported FY2025 net loss of $3.03B and FY2024 loss of nearly $1.0B are clearly not representative of ongoing earnings power, because quarterly results before and after show a business still capable of producing $200M-$500M of quarterly profit. Over the last four reported quarters, net income totals roughly $1.61B on about $20.1B of revenue, an 8% net margin run-rate that is actually slightly better than the FY2026 reported 6.6% margin. On that basis, the current $24.75B market cap implies something like 15-16x trailing normalized earnings, not the headline 21x. For a defensive retailer with 36.3% gross margin, 8.5% operating margin, and 22.7% ROIC, that is not expensive.
What stands out most is the disconnect between the “cash flow quality is poor” warning and the underlying operating economics we can actually observe. I would not dismiss that warning, especially with capex at a hefty $1.13B and no operating cash flow number provided, but I also would not let an accrual-based red flag overwhelm the simple income statement trend. Revenue stepped from $16.78B in FY2024 to $19.41B in FY2026, and quarterly profitability has been consistently positive since the giant FY2025 annual loss event. The latest two quarters were especially solid: $347M on $4.97B of sales and $515M on $4.89B of sales, with net margins of 7.0% and 10.5%. A discount chain putting up double-digit net margin in a quarter is not a distressed asset. Balance sheet risk also looks manageable: $2.43B of debt against $717.8M cash and only 0.65x debt/equity. This is not a levered turnaround where equity holders are one bad season away from dilution.
The reason I stop short of calling it deeply undervalued is that the business still does not deserve a premium multiple. The annual revenue base is much lower than the $28.33B posted in FY2023, which tells you the company has shrunk or reshaped materially rather than simply compounded through trouble. Price-to-sales at 1.40x and EV/revenue at 1.38x are not giveaway valuations for a brick-and-mortar discounter that still has strategic credibility issues. Current ratio is only 1.07, book value is thin enough that P/B sits above 7x, and the capex burden is meaningful. So yes, normalized earnings power supports upside from $131.91, but the stock is not absurdly mispriced unless the company can prove that the recent 7%-10% quarterly margins are sustainable rather than rebound quarters distorted by cleanup effects.
The best counterargument is that the accounting scars are the story, not noise. A smart bear would point to two consecutive annual net loss years, the missing operating cash flow and free cash flow data, and the model flagging a deeply negative accrual signal. They would also note that FY2026 operating income of $1.65B still trails FY2023’s $2.24B despite a similar gross margin profile, suggesting the company has not actually regained former productivity. If normalized earnings are overstated by working-capital unwind, tax timing, or one-off gains, then the apparent 15-16x earnings multiple is a mirage and the stated 21x P/E is closer to reality. They would further argue that discount retail should be benefiting from macro strain, so merely “recovering” is not enough; if this were truly a best-in-class operator, the market would not still be assigning only moderate confidence to the turnaround. I weigh these points seriously, but the quarterly cadence of profits is too consistent for me to treat the recovery as fake absent harder cash evidence.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next annual cash flow statement shows weak or negative operating cash flow despite another $1.2B-$1.5B of net income, then I would flip bearish quickly because that would validate the accrual trap concern. Likewise, if revenue slips back toward the $4.5B quarterly range and net margin falls under 5%, the recent margin recovery should be treated as temporary and fair value drops toward $110-$120. On the other hand, if Dollar Tree converts the current earnings run-rate into visible free cash flow after capex and sustains annual operating income above $1.8B, then the stock should trade materially above today’s price, with a reasonable path into the $150s.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a post-divestiture cleanup story, not a broken retailer. Dollar Tree shed Family Dollar and the revenue base collapsed from $28.33B in FY2023 to $16.78–$19.41B; that is structural, not demand destruction. On the remaining pure-play base, FY2026 delivered $19.41B revenue, $1.65B operating income and $1.28B net income—an 8.5% operating margin and 6.6% net margin that look nothing like the -$3.03B and -$998M loss years that were dominated by impairments. The last four reported quarters show the operating leverage working: net margins of 5.2%, 9.3%, 7.0% and 10.5% on $4.75–$5.46B quarterly revenue, with the August 2026 print at $514.5M net income the cleanest in the set. Trailing earnings power near $6.80 per share against a $131.91 price puts the stock at roughly 19–21× recovered earnings, 11.7× EV/EBITDA and 1.4× sales—multiples that embed skepticism, not a premium. ROE of 34% and ROIC of 23% on a still-modest $2.43B debt load and 0.65 debt-to-equity ratio are high-quality for discount retail once the one-time charges are stripped out. Recent revenue growth of 10.4% YoY and a 7.6% multi-year CAGR reinforce that the core $1.25/multi-price box is still compounding.
What stands out most is the disconnect between the cleaned-up P&L and the market’s residual discount. The valuation composite pointing near $178 (roughly 35% above the current print) is directionally consistent with a business that has already absorbed the Family Dollar write-downs, restored mid-to-high single-digit net margins, and retained defensive traffic. Gross margin holding at 36.3% gives management room to fund wage and freight pressure without immediately sacrificing the earnings recovery. The balance sheet is not fortress-like—cash is only $718M against $2.43B debt and a current ratio of 1.07—but it is serviceable and no longer carrying a failing banner.
The strongest case against this read is cash conversion and quality. Operating and free-cash-flow lines are blank in the briefing, capex ran a heavy $1.13B, and the secondary signals flag poor FCF quality plus a -1.49× accrual ratio; those are not footnotes, they are red flags that reported $1.28B of net income may be running well ahead of cash. Book value was mauled by the prior losses, so the 7.25× price-to-book is optically rich even if ROE is high on a depressed equity base. Quarterly revenue is tagged as decelerating, macro headwinds hit the low-income consumer first, and insider activity is effectively zero—no open-market accumulation to validate the turnaround. A smart skeptic will also note that 21× earnings is not a distressed multiple if margin expansion stalls or if the multi-price transition simply re-rates the box into ordinary competitive retail rather than a structural winner versus Dollar General. Those points cut conviction and explain why the stock can sit 30%+ below a DCF-style fair value without the market being irrational.
I still weigh the evidence toward undervaluation because the impairment years are behind the reported numbers, the last four quarters show sequential margin durability above 7–10%, and the multiple already prices in execution risk. Proof of cash earnings would remove the largest overhang; failure to convert would confirm the value-trap thesis.
Sustained free-cash-flow conversion above 70% of net income for two consecutive quarters, or another print of ~10% net margin with stable same-store sales, would push me to higher conviction and a clearer upside target near the $170–180 zone. Conversely, a return to sub-5% net margins, a material uptick in leverage, or explicit guidance that multi-price mix is diluting unit economics would flip the stance to fairly valued or worse at $132.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Dollar Tree is a scaled discount retailer whose reported trajectory is genuinely uneven. Revenue optically dropped from $28.33B (2023) to $16.78B (2024) - almost certainly reflecting the Family Dollar divestiture/reclassification - and has since rebuilt to $19.41B in 2026. Gross margin has actually improved from 29.4% to 36.3%, and operating margin sits at 8.5%, but net income swung through a $-998M loss in 2024 and a $-3.03B loss in 2025 before recovering to $1.28B in 2026. Altman Z of 3.79 sits in safe territory and accruals of -5.7% of assets are clean, so the mechanical earnings-quality checks do not flag manipulation. Capital return discipline is a real positive: diluted shares have fallen from 229.0M to 206.3M (-2.6% CAGR) with buyback/SBC ratio of 935%, meaning per-share value is being concentrated, not diluted, and SBC at 0.3% of revenue is negligible. However, free cash flow has turned decisively negative - $-1.30B in 2025 and $-1.13B in 2026 - after two prior positive years, which is a meaningful shift for a supposed cash-generative discounter. Combined with net debt of $-1.71B and only $717.8M liquid cash (2.9% of market cap), the balance sheet is a constraint rather than a cushion. The classification as a mature_earner with 'Poor Cash Flow Quality' is the honest read: this is a large, entrenched retail operator whose per-share discipline is admirable but whose cash conversion has deteriorated exactly when it should be steadiest.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Nature and cash impact of the $3.03B 2025 net loss - impairment vs cash charges vs Family Dollar separation costs
- Cause of $-1.13B FCF in 2026 - working capital, capex surge, or operating deterioration
- Family Dollar divestiture terms and any residual liabilities or indemnifications
- Debt maturity schedule and covenants given negative FCF backdrop
- Same-store sales trend at core Dollar Tree banner to gauge underlying demand
- Capex composition - growth store openings vs maintenance vs tariff/supply-chain investment
The composite fair value of $177.11 and signal-adjusted $178.81 imply ~35% upside from $131.91, but the range across methods is telling: DCF at $152, anchored P/E at a runaway $339 (which I largely discard as overreliant on peak/normalized multiples), and an EPV floor of just $65. Strip out the anchored-P/E outlier and the honest deserved-value band is roughly $110 (EPV-weighted) to $155 (DCF), centering near $135-145 - i.e. the stock is fair to modestly cheap, not deeply undervalued. The Mixed quality grade (score -24, two years of negative FCF, Family Dollar impairment overhang) argues for haircutting the DCF rather than trusting it at face value.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Family Dollar strategic review outcome and any further impairments
- FCF trajectory in the next 2 quarters - return to positive is the key deserved-value swing factor
- Gross margin cadence post multi-price rollout
- Capex normalization vs current elevated levels
- Any updated FY guidance on operating margin
The tape around DLTR has quietly turned constructive. Q2 print delivered tariff-refund-aided margin expansion, positive traffic, and raised guidance, and the news cycle is now framing dollar stores as taking share from traditional grocers as pressured consumers trade down. That is a clean, easy-to-tell story for a defensive name, and analyst targets are being nudged higher rather than cut - a meaningful tone shift from the prior 'Family Dollar overhang / activist churn' narrative.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether analyst target hikes broaden or stall after the post-print pop
- Any renewed activist noise or management departure that would re-open the Family Dollar wound
- Monthly retail traffic data confirming the trade-down narrative is durable, not a one-quarter tariff-refund artifact
- VIX behavior - a spike above 20 would amplify the defensive bid
Discount retail is the structural beneficiary of a squeezed low- and middle-income consumer: elevated rates, sticky food and shelter inflation, and eroded pandemic savings keep pushing baskets down the price ladder. That tailwind is real but not free — the same import-heavy supply chain that enables the price point is the one most exposed to tariff and freight cost shocks, and a fixed-price format has the least room to pass them through. The decisive company-specific mechanism is that DLTR has already begun dismantling its own price-point rigidity: multi-price gives it the pass-through valve it historically lacked, converting the format's biggest structural vulnerability into an assortment-expansion lever. That is why this looks like durable share capture rather than a cyclical trade-down borrow. The offsetting world fact is that the category cycle is turning down at the margin, so the company's excess growth must increasingly come from execution, not from the tide.
When we made this prediction on Sep 3, 2026, DLTR was $130.61. We expect it to be $148.50 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $115.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 3, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.