Business Description
Dollar Tree, Inc. operates discount variety retail stores. It operates in two segments, Dollar Tree and Family Dollar. The Dollar Tree segment offers merchandise at the fixed price of $ 1.25. It provides consumable merchandise, including candy and food, and health and personal care, as well as everyday consumables, such as household paper and chemicals, and frozen and refrigerated food; variety merchandise comprising toys, durable housewares, gifts, stationery, party goods, greeting cards, softlines, arts and crafts supplies, and other items; and seasonal goods that include Christmas, Easter, Halloween, and Valentine's Day merchandise. As of January 29, 2022, this segment operated 8,061 stores under the Dollar Tree and Dollar Tree Canada brands, as well as 15 distribution centers in the United States and 2 distribution centers in Canada. The Family Dollar segment operates general merchandise retail discount stores that offer consumable merchandise, which comprise food and beverages, tobacco, health and personal care, household chemicals, paper products, hardware and automotive supplies, diapers, batteries, and pet food and supplies; and home products, including housewares, home décor, and giftware, as well as domestics, such as comforters, sheets, and towels. It also provides apparel and accessories merchandise comprising clothing, fashion accessories, and shoes; and seasonal and electronics merchandise that include Christmas, Easter, Halloween, and Valentine's Day merchandise, as well as personal electronics, which comprise pre-paid cellular phones and services, stationery and school supplies, and toys. As of January 29, 2022, this segment operated 8,016 stores under the Family Dollar brand; and 11 distribution centers. The company was founded in 1986 and is based in Chesapeake, Virginia.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 5:18pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:15pm (19d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.22
Total Equity: $3.75B
Shares: 206,300,000
Total Debt: $4.62B
Cash: $717.80M
EBITDA: $2.25B
Total Debt: $4.62B
Cash: $717.80M
Revenue: $19.41B
Revenue: $19.41B
Revenue: $19.41B
Total Equity: $3.75B
Tax Rate: 24.8%
Equity: $3.75B
Total Debt: $4.62B
Cash: $717.80M
Current Liabilities: $3.23B
Long-Term Debt: $3.62B
Total Debt: $4.62B
Total Equity: $3.75B
Shares: 206,300,000
Shares: 206,300,000
CapEx: -$1.13B
Shares: 206,300,000
Stock Price: $108.80
Net Income: $1.28B
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:21pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $26.3B | $15.4B | $16.8B | $17.6B | $19.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $18.6B | $9.6B | $10.8B | $11.3B | $12.3B |
| Gross Profit | $7.7B | $5.8B | $6.0B | $6.3B | $7.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $5.9B | $3.7B | $4.2B | $4.8B | $5.5B |
| Operating Income | $1.8B | $2.1B | $1.8B | $1.5B | $1.6B |
| Net Income | $1.3B | $1.6B | -$998.4M | -$3.0B | $1.3B |
| EBITDA | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.2B |
| EPS | $5.83 | $7.24 | $-4.55 | $-14.05 | $6.22 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:17pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $984.9M | $642.8M | $425.2M | $1.3B | $717.8M |
| Total Current Assets | $5.6B | $6.4B | $6.1B | $9.1B | $3.4B |
| Total Assets | $21.7B | $23.0B | $22.0B | $18.6B | $13.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $4.2B | $4.2B | $4.7B | $8.6B | $3.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $2.4B | $3.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $14.0B | $14.3B | $14.7B | $14.7B | $9.7B |
| Total Equity | $7.7B | $8.8B | $7.3B | $4.0B | $3.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $6.5B | $8.1B | $7.1B | $3.9B | $3.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:21pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.4B | $1.6B | $2.7B | $2.9B | $2.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.0B | -$1.3B | -$2.1B | -$1.3B | -$1.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | $408.7M | $361.0M | $576.9M | $1.6B | $1.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$950.0M | -$647.5M | -$500.0M | -$400.0M | -$1.5B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$425.3M | -$327.0M | $45.9M | $754.0M | -$538.7M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:15pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$21.9B $21.6B – $22.0B
|
$23.1B $23.0B – $23.1B
|
$24.2B $23.9B – $24.4B
|
$25.0B $24.7B – $25.2B
|
| EBITDA |
$2.7B $2.7B – $2.7B
|
$2.8B $2.8B – $2.8B
|
$3.0B $2.9B – $3.0B
|
$3.1B $3.0B – $3.1B
|
| Net Income |
$1.6B $1.5B – $1.6B
|
$1.5B $1.4B – $1.9B
|
$1.8B $1.8B – $1.8B
|
$1.6B $1.6B – $1.6B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:21pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -41.4% | +8.9% | +4.8% | +10.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -25.3% | +4.1% | +4.6% | +12.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +15.9% | -15.5% | -17.6% | +9.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +21.7% | -161.8% | -203.5% | +142.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -2.5% | -11.7% | -7.2% | +11.3% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:21pm (19d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | C-Conversion | 602,170.00 | $148.86 | $89.6M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 2,230,455.00 | $111.31 | $248.3M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | J-Other | 10,266,164.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | C-Conversion | 602,170.00 | $148.86 | $89.6M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 33,981.00 | $148.86 | $5.1M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 900,360.00 | $153.87 | $138.5M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 2,501,339.00 | $153.87 | $384.9M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 6,231,104.00 | $148.86 | $927.6M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 70,259.00 | $105.21 | $7.4M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 21,499.00 | $105.48 | $2.3M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 146,571.00 | $105.71 | $15.5M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 178,586.00 | $104.25 | $18.6M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 237,336.00 | $105.37 | $25.0M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 190,199.00 | $104.87 | $19.9M |
| 2026-06-24 | Mantle Ridge LP | S-Sale | 78,711.00 | $105.77 | $8.3M |
| 2026-04-01 | Maheshwari Aditya | A-Award | 1,955.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Maheshwari Aditya | F-InKind | 773.00 | $108.70 | $84,025 |
| 2026-04-01 | Glendinning Stewart | A-Award | 18,399.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Glendinning Stewart | F-InKind | 4,864.00 | $108.70 | $528,717 |
| 2026-04-01 | Aflatooni Robert | A-Award | 8,739.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The revenue line in this file is deeply misleading and none of the prior models flagged it hard enough. DLTR sold Family Dollar — that's why FY2026 revenue prints $19.4B versus $30.6B run-rate in late FY2025 (the $7.57B and $7.38B quarters). The "recent_revenue_yoy: 10.4%" and "revenue_cagr: 7.6%" numbers in the momentum block are comparing post-divestiture continuing ops against pre-divestiture consolidated figures and are essentially garbage. Real Dollar Tree banner same-store growth is mid-single digits. So when the synthesis says the market expects "3.7% annual FCF growth," that's roughly right for the remaining business, but the framing that this is a "turnaround" is stale — the turnaround was the decision to jettison Family Dollar, and that's already executed. This is now a cleaner, higher-margin pure-play discounter, not a two-headed mess.
On the standalone Dollar Tree numbers, the trajectory is actually quite good and the models are underweighting it. Q1 FY2026 (May print) did $4.98B revenue with $347M NI (7.0% margin) versus $4.64B and 7.4% prior year — call it 7% top-line growth at maintained margins, with the holiday quarter (Jan 2026) hitting 9.3% net margin and $506M NI. Annualizing the last four quarters gives roughly $19.75B revenue and $1.29B NI, so the trailing P/E of 16.6x on a $20.9B cap checks out. FCF of $1.40B against a $20.9B EV gives ~6.7% FCF yield, and the 35.9% ROE / 10.9% ROIC are legitimately strong for a discount retailer — better than DG (struggling) and competitive with COST on capital efficiency though obviously not on scale. The Market Forces verdict calling this "distressed turnaround" and "speculative bet" is just wrong post-divestiture; that take was written for the old conglomerate.
The contrarian case I'd actually take seriously is different from what the bear narrative offers. It's not the $1.25 ceiling — that ship sailed and worked. It's that (1) tariff exposure is acute since Dollar Tree sources heavily from China and the fixed-price model has limited ability to pass through 10–25% input cost shocks without breaking unit economics again, (2) DG is wounded and will fight viciously on price and footprint in 2026–2027, compressing the rural moat, and (3) the insider activity is 100% awards and tax-withholding F-InKind events — zero open-market buys despite a stock that traded down to $84 in the last 52 weeks. Insiders had a layup buying opportunity and passed. The "Neutral Insider Activity" tag is too generous; absence of buys at the lows is a soft negative. Also worth noting: cash of $718M with undisclosed debt (the file shows "—") is a real gap — DLTR carried ~$3.4B long-term debt last I checked, so EV/EBITDA of 12.1x is the right anchor, not the P/E.
I dissent mildly from the "Reasonable Premium" synthesis verdict — I think it's closer to fairly valued to modestly cheap on the continuing-ops business. At 12x EV/EBITDA, 16.6x P/E, ~6.7% FCF yield, with 7% organic top-line growth and a freshly simplified business, this is priced like a mature compounder with execution risk, which is roughly right. The bull case to $130–140 requires margin expansion past 8% operating (currently 8.2% — basically there) and continued mid-single-digit comps; the bear case to $85–90 requires tariff-driven margin compression back to 5–6%. Risk/reward at $108.8 is symmetric rather than asymmetric, so I wouldn't chase, but I'd disagree with the Market Forces "speculative" framing — this is now an ordinary mid-cap retailer at a fair price. The real question is whether you want consumer-defensive exposure at all given the macro headwinds flag, and there I'd argue DLTR's trade-down beneficiary status is underappreciated if the consumer weakens further.
GPT Critique
Dollar Tree's recent financial data reveals a company undergoing significant structural changes. The divestiture of Family Dollar is a pivotal development, fundamentally altering its revenue profile. The sharp decrease in annual revenues from $26.32 billion in FY2022 to $19.41 billion in FY2026 reflects this strategic shift. Despite this, the company has managed to maintain its operational strength with a rebound in net income to $1.28 billion in FY2026 from a significant loss in FY2025. The company’s robust operating cash flow of $2.53 billion and free cash flow of $1.40 billion, coupled with a decent operating margin of 8.23%, indicate solid financial health. The current revenue growth of 7% in the latest quarter and stable net margins suggest that Dollar Tree is managing well as a standalone entity, albeit with the challenge of maintaining this growth in the face of market headwinds.
I agree with Opus that the "turnaround" narrative is outdated and that Dollar Tree is now a cleaner, more focused business post-divestiture. The assertion that the company is no longer a "two-headed mess" is accurate, as the divestiture of Family Dollar allows for clarity in operations and financial reporting. I also concur with the assessment that Dollar Tree is fairly valued given its current financial metrics—specifically, the P/E ratio of 16.6x and a 6.7% FCF yield are fitting for a mature discount retailer. However, I diverge from Opus on the magnitude of insider activity's significance. While Opus notes a lack of insider buying as a soft negative, I see it as a more neutral factor given the structural changes and the potential need for insiders to maintain liquidity during a transitional period.
Opus' concern about potential tariff exposure is valid, as it could impact Dollar Tree's cost structure. The heavy reliance on Chinese imports is a vulnerability that cannot be overlooked, especially in a volatile geopolitical climate. However, I believe the market has reasonably incorporated this risk into the current valuation. Moreover, Opus' skepticism regarding Dollar General's competitive threat is compelling. A wounded competitor could indeed disrupt Dollar Tree's pricing strategy and market share, though I consider this a moderate risk given Dollar Tree’s established brand strength and operational efficiency.
A careful skeptic might argue that both my and Opus’s analyses underplay the potential for macroeconomic deterioration to impact consumer spending in discount stores. If economic conditions worsen significantly, even value-focused retailers like Dollar Tree might see compressed margins and reduced consumer traffic, contrary to the notion of being a "trade-down beneficiary." Additionally, the undisclosed total debt figure is a notable omission that could conceal leverage risks not fully reflected in the EV/EBITDA metric.