For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Expand Energy Corp (EXE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-11): Designation Low · Gem Score -27 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -35 · Value -22 · Sentiment -41 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $357.46 vs $99.05 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Expand Energy Corp
EXE NASDAQExpand Energy Corp is an independent natural gas production company focused on acquiring, exploring, and developing oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids assets in the United States. The company’s operations are centered on major shale basins, including the Marcellus, Utica, Haynesville, and Bossier formations, which are among the country’s most important sources of natural gas supply. Its business serves the upstream energy market, where exploration and production companies play a central role in bringing hydrocarbons from the ground to processing and distribution systems. Expand Energy Corp also participates in the broader energy value chain through its portfolio of producing properties and development acreage. Headquartered in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Expand Energy Corp is one of the largest independent natural gas producers in the U.S. and is positioned as a significant supplier to domestic energy markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.57
Total Equity: $18.58B
Shares: 240,370,000
Total Debt: $5.01B
Cash: $616.00M
EBITDA: $5.45B
Total Debt: $5.01B
Cash: $616.00M
Revenue: $12.12B
Revenue: $12.12B
Revenue: $12.12B
Total Equity: $18.58B
Tax Rate: 20.3%
Equity: $18.58B
Total Debt: $5.01B
Cash: $616.00M
Current Liabilities: $2.90B
Long-Term Debt: $5.01B
Total Debt: $5.01B
Total Equity: $18.58B
Shares: 240,370,000
Shares: 240,370,000
CapEx: -$2.74B
Shares: 240,370,000
Stock Price: $99.05
Net Income: $1.82B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 3:46am (19d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.3B | $11.7B | $8.7B | $4.2B | $12.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $14.0B | $8.0B | $5.6B | $5.0B | $9.7B |
| Operating Income | -$8.7B | $3.8B | $3.1B | -$803.0M | $2.5B |
| Net Income | -$9.7B | $4.9B | $2.4B | -$714.0M | $1.8B |
| EBITDA | -$7.6B | $5.5B | $4.7B | $926.0M | $5.5B |
| EPS | $-40.69 | $20.63 | $10.11 | $-2.98 | $7.67 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-40.69 | $17.78 | $9.39 | $-2.98 | $7.57 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 3:30am (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $905.0M | $130.0M | $1.1B | $317.0M | $616.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.1B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.0B | $2.9B |
| Total Assets | $11.0B | $15.5B | $14.4B | $27.9B | $28.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.4B | $2.7B | $1.3B | $3.1B | $2.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.3B | $3.1B | $2.0B | $5.3B | $5.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.3B | $6.3B | $3.6B | $10.3B | $9.7B |
| Total Equity | $5.7B | $9.1B | $10.7B | $17.6B | $18.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $825.0M | $3.4B | $5.0B | $3.9B | $4.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 4:02am (19d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.2B | $4.1B | $2.4B | $1.6B | $4.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.1B | -$1.8B | -$1.8B | -$1.6B | -$2.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $22.0M | $2.3B | $551.0M | $8.0M | $1.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$2.0B | $0 | -$459.0M | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$94.0M | $0 | $0 | -$20.0M | -$663.0M |
| Dividends Paid | $0 | -$1.2B | -$487.0M | -$388.0M | -$765.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$1.1B | -$355.0M | $0 | -$100.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $273.0M | -$722.0M | $961.0M | -$758.0M | $301.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 3:46am (19d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +121.7% | -25.7% | -51.4% | +186.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +143.4% | -16.9% | -125.6% | +407.7% |
| Net Income Growth | +150.7% | -51.0% | -129.5% | +354.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | +172.7% | -15.6% | -80.2% | +488.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 6:42pm (22d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-13 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-14 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-05 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-13 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-14 | $1.47 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-15 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-11 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-14 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-15 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-15 | $0.72 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-06 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-15 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-16 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-17 | $1.18 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-06 | $1.29 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-14 | $3.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-16 | $2.32 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-18 | $2.34 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-04 | $1.77 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-23 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-06 19:09A +1σ run of quarters pays +335%; a −1σ run costs 86%. Ratio 3.9:1 (μ 152.9%, σ 222.1% , 15 pairs).
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($99.05) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +89% | 25.9% | $1,978.48 | +1897% |
| Base — stabilizes | +59% | 22.5% | $878.73 | +787% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +30% | 19.2% | $346.52 | +250% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +64% | 22.5% | $972.00 | +881% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +50% | 13.5% | $431.32 | +335% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -50% | 11.3% | $13.49 | -86% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-04 04:14The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a clean story: EXE is a post-merger natural gas E&P (Southwestern + Chesapeake) mid-way through a commodity and integration re-rate. Trailing four quarters run rev $14.33B with NI $3.23B — a 22.5% net margin — versus the ugly 2024 comp ($4.24B rev, -$714M NI) when Henry Hub was sub-$2. Q1 2026 alone did $4.40B / $1.16B NI at 26.4% margin, annualizing to $17.6B revenue and ~$4.6B in earnings. Against a $23.7B market cap and ~$28B EV, that's roughly 5x earnings and ~3.5x EV/EBITDA on run-rate — not the 13x trailing P/E the canonical metrics show. FCF of $1.84B on $4.58B OCF is real but capex-heavy at $2.74B; on Q1 2026 cadence, FCF should scale materially higher. Leverage is benign: $5.01B debt / $18.58B equity, 0.27x D/E, current ratio 1.0.
The synthesis "fair value $312" is nonsense on its face — that's a 3x from spot on an E&P that just cycled from losses to profits on a commodity move. Any DCF spitting out $312 is extrapolating peak-cycle margins across a permanent horizon. But the flip side is that the momentum layer, the market forces call ("speculative"), and the "low revenue confidence / decelerating" tag are equally miscalibrated — revenue went from $505M in Q2 2024 to $4.40B in Q1 2026, which is a merger-plus-price step-function, not deceleration. The classification models are washing merger accounting through their trend detectors and producing garbage. The narrative layer is actually the sharpest piece here: fallen-angel, fragile bear thesis, ESG-driven capital rotation vs. LNG export tailwind. That framing is directionally right.
The contrarian case a skeptic should press: Q1 2026's 26.4% margin coincided with a genuine winter gas spike; strip prices for 2026-2027 are materially lower than Q1 realizations. Normalize NI to something like $2.5B run-rate (halfway between 2025's $1.82B and Q1-annualized), and you get ~9.5x P/E, ~4.5x EV/EBITDA — cheap but not screamingly so for a commodity price-taker with $2.7B annual capex and only $616M cash. The insider "significant buying" signal is 4,000 shares total across three purchases against ~19,000 shares of awards — that's routine director qualifying buys alongside comp grants, not a conviction signal; the model is overreading it. Weak FCF quality is fair: $1.84B FCF on $1.82B NI is fine, but capex intensity means any gas price crack compresses FCF fast. Debt refinancing risk on $5B is manageable at current cash generation but not trivial if 2027 sees $2.50 Henry Hub.
My read: EXE is undervalued, but nowhere near $312. Fair value on mid-cycle assumptions ($3.25-3.75 Henry Hub, ~$3B normalized NI, 8-9x multiple for a de-rated but well-capitalized gas pure-play with LNG optionality) lands around $120-135, or 20-35% upside. The synthesis verdict of "fair value" is wrong in mechanism (the $312 DCF is fantasy) but the "signal-adjusted" caveat and Market Forces "neutral" both nudge toward the right zone by accident. I partially agree with the composite direction (undervalued) but reject the magnitude entirely. The narrative layer is the most honest input: the discount is real, the driver is ESG capital rotation plus commodity skepticism, and it will compress when either LNG export capacity firms Henry Hub or gas-fired power demand from AI data centers becomes a consensus story — both plausible catalysts within 12-24 months. Position sizing should respect that this is still a price-taker with a single commodity exposure; the fragile-narrative reversal cuts both ways.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say this is not a stable “mature earner”; it is a cyclical gas producer coming off a violent reset and recovery, and the market is valuing it roughly like one. Annual revenue went from $8.72B in 2023 to $4.24B in 2024 and back to $12.12B in 2025, while net income swung from +$2.42B to -$714M to +$1.82B. That alone should make anyone suspicious of any model spitting out a $300+ fair value. The recent quarterly sequence is better, though: revenue rose from $2.00B in 4Q24 to $2.20B, $3.69B, $2.97B, $3.27B, and then $4.40B in 1Q26, while net margin recovered from -19.9% in 4Q24 to 26.4% most recently. On a trailing four-quarter basis using the quarterly data, EXE has about $14.3B of revenue and roughly $3.2B of net income, which puts the current $23.7B equity value at only about 7.4x trailing earnings. That is inexpensive on the surface, but cheapness here mostly reflects commodity leverage and a business mix that can see profits cut in half quickly if gas prices soften.
What stands out positively is that the balance sheet is not the problem. Debt of $5.01B against $18.58B of equity is manageable, debt-to-equity at 0.27 is conservative for an E&P, and EV/EBITDA of 5.1x is not demanding if current run-rate earnings are even close to sustainable. Cash generation also looks real enough for the cycle: 2025 operating cash flow was $4.58B and free cash flow was $1.84B after $2.74B of capex. That supports the dividend, which only consumes about 42% of earnings and yields 2.3%, and it leaves room for debt reduction or buybacks if pricing holds. The sharp step-up in 1Q26 to $4.40B of revenue and $1.16B of net income matters because it suggests the 2025 annual numbers may still understate the earning power of the current asset base in a better gas tape. A 26% net margin for an upstream producer is strong. Small insider open-market purchases in June are not decisive, but they are directionally better than seeing executives sell into the rebound.
Still, I do not buy the heroic undervaluation case. The contradiction is that the valuation engine seems to extrapolate a favorable earnings regime while the underlying history screams mean reversion. This company produced $4.94B of net income in 2022, $2.42B in 2023, then lost money in 2024 before recovering to $1.82B in 2025; that is not a franchise that deserves a smooth DCF with a precision target. The current ratio of 1.0 and cash of only $616M also tell you this remains an asset-heavy operator that must keep drilling and spending; free cash flow is not annuity-like. If I normalize this business somewhere between 5x and 7x mid-cycle EBITDA or around 9x-11x mid-cycle earnings, the current $99 price looks closer to fair than dislocated. The market is not “forgetting” anything; it is discounting the fact that 2024 happened only a year ago and could happen again in some form. For me, the stock is investable, but only as a commodity call with a decent balance sheet, not as a misunderstood compounding machine.
The strongest case against my skepticism is straightforward: the company may have structurally improved and the market may still be anchoring too hard to the 2024 trough. If the recent quarterly figures are the new baseline, then annualized earnings power is much higher than the reported 2025 P/E implies. The last three quarters delivered $547M, $553M, and $1.16B of net income, and 1Q26 revenue of $4.40B was more than double 1Q25’s $2.20B. On that trajectory, EV/EBITDA at 5.1x and price-to-book at 1.28x would indeed look cheap, especially for a large-scale gas producer with manageable leverage and solid free cash generation. A bull would also say the company earned through the downcycle without overlevering, and that LNG demand, tighter gas balances, or merger synergies could make the 2024 collapse less relevant than I think. I weigh that argument less heavily because commodity producers almost always look optically cheapest near favorable strip conditions, and the earnings record here is too path-dependent to capitalize at a premium multiple.
What would change my mind is not a story about LNG or a spreadsheet fair value; it is evidence that the higher run-rate survives weaker conditions. If EXE can post another two or three quarters with revenue above $3.5B, net margins staying above 20%, and free cash flow annualizing comfortably above $2.5B without meaningfully increasing debt, then I would move bullish and accept that today’s price is too low. Conversely, if revenue slips back toward the $2.5B-$3.0B range and margins fall into the low teens or worse, the current multiple will prove less cheap than it looks and I would turn outright bearish below the surface-level valuation comfort.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a company that was nearly broken in 2024 and has been forcibly rebuilt. Revenue collapsed from $11.74B in 2022 to $4.24B in 2024 with a $714M net loss and an operating loss of $803M; 2025 then delivered $12.12B of revenue and $1.82B of net income, and the March 2026 quarter printed $4.40B of revenue at a 26.4% net margin—the cleanest print in the entire series. That is not organic growth; it is scale purchased through natural-gas consolidation, which is why operating cash flow hit $4.58B and free cash flow still cleared $1.84B after $2.74B of capex. At a $23.7B market cap and roughly $28B enterprise value the stock trades at 13.1x trailing earnings, 5.1x EV/EBITDA, 1.28x book and a 7.8% FCF yield on equity—mid-cycle E&P multiples, not peak ones. Balance-sheet leverage is modest ($5.01B debt against $18.58B equity, D/E 0.27, net debt only ~$4.4B), the dividend is covered at a 42% payout and a 2.3% yield, and the most recent insider tape shows open-market purchases alongside awards. The story the ledger tells is a low-multiple cash machine that has already absorbed its trough year and is now running at a higher absolute earnings base.
What the quantitative composite gets wrong is the $312 “fair value.” That figure embeds sustained high gas prices and full reserve realization that the same briefing simultaneously labels fragile and narrative-driven. A more disciplined cross-check—15x a normalized $2.0–2.5B earnings power, or 7–8x EV/EBITDA on mid-cycle cash generation—points to something closer to $130–160, not a triple. The 186% recent revenue jump and 17.9% revenue CAGR are real, but they are merger math; earnings CAGR is still negative at –13.3% because 2022’s $4.94B net income remains the high-water mark. ROE of 9.8% and ROIC of 8.6% are adequate, not exceptional, and the current ratio of 1.0 leaves little working-capital cushion. So the stock is cheap relative to the cash it is already throwing off, yet the $215% upside signal is an artifact of an aggressive DCF, not a verdict the underlying data can carry alone.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward: this remains a pure commodity E&P whose margins swung from –45% to +26% inside eight quarters, whose FCF quality is flagged as weak, and whose revenue confidence is low because the quarterly sequence is still choppy ($2.20B → $3.69B → $2.97B → $3.27B → $4.40B). Macro headwinds and the energy-transition capital-rotation narrative are not imaginary—they explain why a 5.1x EV/EBITDA name with positive FCF and low leverage still sits at $99 instead of re-rating. Merger integration risk is explicitly called out; if realized synergies disappoint or gas settles back toward $2.50/mcf, the 2025 recovery earnings prove transitory and the multiple compresses further. A skeptic would also note that 2022–2023 profitability already showed what peak-cycle looks like, and the market is rationally refusing to capitalize that again. I weigh those risks as real but already largely in the price: at 5x EV/EBITDA and sub-1.3x book the downside from mid-cycle disappointment is limited compared with the upside if LNG export capacity and firmer gas simply hold the current earnings run-rate.
I would flip to a clear overvalued stance if trailing-twelve-month net income fell back below $1.0B or if EV/EBITDA sustained above 9x without a matching step-up in realized gas prices and free-cash-flow conversion. I would become table-pounding bullish if two consecutive quarters hold revenue above $4B with net margins ≥20% and free-cash-flow conversion stays above 35% of operating cash flow, confirming the new scale is durable rather than a one-quarter spike.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Expand Energy (post-Chesapeake/Southwestern combination) is a mature natural gas producer whose financials swing hard with the commodity cycle: revenue went $5.3B (2020) to $11.7B (2022) to $8.7B (2023) to $4.24B (2024) back to $12.12B (2025), with operating margin oscillating from -164% to +36% to -19% to +20%. Net income printed -$9.73B in 2020 and -$714M in 2024, so 'earnings power' is fundamentally price-taking. That said, 2025 shows a functioning business: $1.84B FCF, $1.82B net income, and share count essentially flat (diluted CAGR 0.1%, buybacks 955% of SBC), which is unusually disciplined for E&P. Balance sheet is a constraint, not a cushion: $616M cash against $4.4B net debt (cash/mktcap 2.6%), Altman Z 2.42 in the grey zone. Earnings quality flags are mixed - accruals -22.3% of assets and OCF/NI 0.4x in the trailing snapshot suggest reported NI is running ahead of cash conversion in the period measured, though full-year 2025 FCF roughly matches NI. Insider tape is a genuine positive: three open-market P-purchases by Wichterich and Teunissen totaling ~$561K in April-June 2026, zero sales, alongside routine awards. Directors putting cash in at these levels is a credible signal on direction, but does not neutralize the cyclicality or leverage.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Post-merger debt maturity ladder and covenant headroom given $4.4B net debt
- Hedge book coverage for 2026-2027 gas volumes - key to margin durability
- Reconciliation of 2025 OCF to NI to confirm the 0.4x OCF/NI trailing ratio is a timing artifact not a persistent quality issue
- Southwestern merger integration status and any synergy/impairment disclosures
- Reserve life, PV-10 sensitivity, and F&D costs versus peers
- Whether the buyback program continues to fully offset SBC through cycle troughs
The composite fair value of $324 and signal-adjusted $312 imply 215% upside, but that headline is driven by an anchored-PE of $626 and a DCF of $311 that both extrapolate a good gas year forward. The EPV floor at $47 is the other bookend and reflects a bad-cycle earnings power. Splitting the difference for a $4.4B-net-debt cyclical E&P with a history of large loss years (2020 -$9.7B, 2024 -$714M) lands you in the $90-140 zone - roughly where the stock trades.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Realized vs strip gas price sensitivity in guidance
- Hedge book coverage for 2025-2026
- Maintenance capex vs growth capex split (validates DCF FCF)
- Net debt trajectory and any covenant headroom
- LNG offtake or firm transport commitments
EXE sits in the crosshairs of an ESG/energy-transition narrative that has structurally de-rated oil and gas E&Ps, and the story-side pressure here is heavier than the tape. The archetype is fallen-angel with fragile durability and low cult - meaning there is no loyal buyer base defending the stock when the bear narrative flares. Momentum is technically positive over 6 months (+186% burst) but 3-year relative performance is -12.7pp and the stock is down 9.4% over six months vs S&P +12.1%, confirming the market is treating the LNG/Gulf Coast bull thesis with skepticism. The low beta (0.32) means the risk-on tape barely helps this name - it does not trade with the index, it trades with the gas narrative and rate/commodity flows. Analyst tone via RBC is constructive on Gulf Coast demand and the Twin Eagle asset, which is a mild tailwind, but the broader news flow ('shareholders have lost 9.4%') reinforces the fallen-angel framing. With 10y at 4.79% and market PE 25.8, capital rotation into secular growth continues to starve legacy energy names of a bid. Net pressure is a moderate headwind: the narrative is fragile-bearish, the tape is neutral-to-mildly-supportive, and there is no cult to catch falling knives.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Winter gas strip and LNG export utilization - the single biggest narrative lever
- Whether sell-side revisions follow RBC's Gulf Coast/Twin Eagle framing or stay cautious
- Any signs of generalist/ESG-lite funds re-engaging with domestic gas as an 'energy security' theme
- Peer tape (CRGY +24.7% post-earnings) as a signal of sector sentiment inflection
- 10y yield direction - falling rates would ease the transition-narrative pressure on legacy energy
The world is bending in this business's favor on the demand side: US LNG export capacity is on a multi-year contracted ramp and domestic power load is growing for the first time in a generation, which structurally raises the call on domestic dry gas. That is a real, capital-committed change, not a narrative. The offset is that gas supply is elastic — Appalachia, Haynesville and Permian associated gas can all respond, so the demand growth is more likely to firm the price floor than to create a sustained price spike. Macro is a headwind at the margin (10y 4.79 raises the cost of the industry's capital and pressures consolidation economics), but energy demand is comparatively insensitive to rates. The energy-transition capital-rotation bear point is a flow argument, not a demand argument: physical gas burn is rising through the medium term regardless of who owns the equity. Net: a growing addressable demand pool, a price-capped realization environment, and a company positioned as the low-cost scale supplier into it.
When we made this prediction on Sep 4, 2026, EXE was $97.78. We expect it to be $117.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $75.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.