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AGING Analysis Report
Aug 2, 2026
20 days ago · 100% complete
NOT DEPENDABLE This report predates a filing — its financial basis has been replaced.
Report generated: Aug 2, 2026 · Filing on record since: Aug 20, 2026 · 17 days after
Archived report · generated Aug 2, 2026 · 8:57 PM · models: linear-pipeline · cost: $0.190
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For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page

What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Oddity Tech Ltd. (ODD) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.

Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Gem · Gem Score +52 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 61 · Value 45 · Sentiment -53 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $37.33 vs $13.09 at analysis

Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable reference-name attribute you can cite):

  • profile-header / price-overview — company profile, live quote, market cap
  • extended-analysisthe core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memo
  • future-predictions — our forward price-band predictions
  • market-narrative / ai-findings / gpt-critique — narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)
  • Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers): price-history, income-trend, key-metrics, financials (statement tables), insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.

More for machine readers: site briefing at /llms.txt · any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER · raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds); every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.

Oddity Tech Ltd.

ODD NASDAQ
Consumer Defensive · Household & Personal Products
Tel Aviv, 6761304, Israel oddity.com Updated Aug 2, 1:23pm
Price
$14.18
Market Cap
$654.0M
Employees
489
Beta
2.37
Avg Volume
1,222,170
CEO
Mr. Oran Holtzman

Oddity Tech Ltd. operates as a consumer tech company specializing in digital-first brands for the beauty and wellness industries worldwide. It leverages an AI-driven online platform powered by data science, machine learning, and computer vision to analyze consumer needs and deliver personalized beauty, wellness, and technology products. The company offers a diverse portfolio under the IL MAKIAGE and SpoiledChild brands, encompassing face and complexion products, eye, brow and lip makeup, tools, skincare, haircare, and supplements. Additionally, through ODDITY LABS, a biotechnology center, it employs AI-based molecule discovery technology to develop novel ingredients that enhance performance and outcomes in beauty and wellness solutions. Oddity Tech Ltd. serves consumers directly via its innovative e-commerce platform, focusing on precision-driven product recommendations and development in the competitive personal care market. Incorporated in 2013 and headquartered in Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel, it plays a key role in transforming how beauty and wellness products are discovered and purchased digitally.

Runs with full report Generated: Aug 2, 2026 1:33pm
Price Overview
Price at report time
$14.18
as of Aug 2, 8:52pm (20d ago)
Change · Aug 2
-0.47 (-3.18%)
Day Range
$13.92 – $14.60
52-Week Range
$9.25 – $75.45
50-Day MA
$13.99
200-Day MA
$25.51
Volume
626,300.00
Right now · live
Log in to get the live feed
Members see the real-time price and the move since this report (over 20d).
Share Structure
Outstanding 56,656,685.00
Float 34,918,230.00
Free Float 61.6%
Normal free float — 61.6% of shares trade freely, ~38.4% held by insiders/institutions
Healthy float typical of established companies. Good liquidity for entering and exiting positions without major price impact.
Price History (1 Year)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 8:57pm (20d ago)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
The directional story — useful even when net income is negative.
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 8:34pm (20d ago)
Why there are no quarterly figures for Oddity Tech Ltd.

Oddity Tech Ltd. is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.

This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 3 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-03-17, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.

Revenue
The top line — total sales before any costs or taxes are subtracted. A measure of how much business the company is doing.
Net Income
The bottom line — profit left after subtracting all expenses, interest, and taxes from revenue. Reflects accounting profitability, but includes non-cash items like depreciation, so it isn't the same as cash earned.
Operating Cash Flow
The real cash generated by the day-to-day business — selling products, paying suppliers, collecting from customers. Calculated from net income by adding back non-cash items and adjusting for timing (unpaid bills, unsold inventory). When OCF consistently lags net income, the reported profit may not be converting to real money.
Period Revenue Net Income Net Margin YoY/QoQ
Key Metrics
TD Twelve Data statement HEX SEC filing
Industry comparison last run: Aug 20, 2026 8:50am
P/E Ratio (Price per dollar of earnings)
HEX
Stock Price / EPS (Diluted)
7.88
Stock Price: $14.18
EPS (Diluted): 1.80
P/B Ratio (Price vs net asset value)
HEX
Stock Price / Book Value Per Share
2.20
Stock Price: $14.18
Total Equity: $396.50M
Shares: 61,525,000
EV/EBITDA (Total value vs operating profit)
HEX
Enterprise Value / EBITDA
1.95
Market Cap: $654.05M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $402.21M
EBITDA: $129.46M
Enterprise Value (Takeover price (cap + debt - cash))
HEX
Market Cap + Total Debt - Cash
$251.8M
Market Cap: $654.05M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $402.21M
Gross Margin (Revenue left after direct costs)
HEX
Gross Profit / Revenue
72.7%
Gross Profit: $588.71M
Revenue: $809.84M
Operating Margin (Revenue left after all operations)
HEX
Operating Income / Revenue
14.7%
Operating Income: $118.77M
Revenue: $809.84M
Net Margin (Revenue left as actual profit)
HEX
Net Income / Revenue
13.7%
Net Income: $110.75M
Revenue: $809.84M
ROE (Profit from shareholder equity)
HEX
Net Income / Total Equity
27.9%
Net Income: $110.75M
Total Equity: $396.50M
ROIC (Profit from all invested capital)
HEX
NOPAT / Invested Capital
-1,696.3%
Operating Income: $118.77M
Tax Rate: 18.4%
Equity: $396.50M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $402.21M
Zero debt — invested capital = equity minus cash (very efficient)
Current Ratio (Can it pay short-term bills)
HEX
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
5.24
Current Assets: $601.80M
Current Liabilities: $114.83M
Debt/Equity (Leverage — debt vs equity)
HEX
Total Debt / Total Equity
0.00
Short-Term Debt: $0.00
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $396.50M
Zero debt — this company carries no debt obligations. Strongest possible score.
Rev/Share (Top-line per share)
HEX
Revenue / Shares Outstanding
$13.16
Revenue: $809.84M
Shares: 61,525,000
Book Value/Share (Net assets per share)
HEX
(Total Assets - Total Liabilities) / Shares
$6.44
Total Equity: $396.50M
Shares: 61,525,000
FCF/Share (Real cash generated per share)
HEX
(Operating Cash Flow + CapEx) / Shares
$1.36
Operating CF: $87.58M
CapEx: -$3.94M
Shares: 61,525,000
CapEx is negative (outflow) — added to OCF to get FCF
Div Yield (Annual income from holding)
TD
Last Annual Dividend / Stock Price
Last Dividend: $0.00
Stock Price: $14.18
Payout Ratio (Earnings paid out as dividends)
HEX
Dividends Paid / Net Income
Dividends Paid: N/A
Net Income: $110.75M
Dividends paid not available in cash flow statement
Industry Benchmarks
Last run: Aug 20, 2026 8:50am
Compares ODD against LLM-researched typical ranges for its industry. One research call per industry, cached indefinitely — every stock in the same industry reuses the same baseline.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 8:34pm (20d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue $222.6M $324.5M $508.7M $647.0M $809.8M
Cost of Revenue $69.4M $106.5M $150.5M $178.7M $221.1M
Gross Profit $153.2M $218.1M $358.2M $468.3M $588.7M
Operating Expenses $133.7M $190.4M $283.9M $352.7M $469.9M
Operating Income $19.5M $27.7M $74.3M $115.6M $118.8M
Net Income $13.9M $21.7M $58.5M $101.5M $110.7M
EBITDA $23.5M $32.1M $82.9M $125.4M $129.5M
EPS $0.26 $0.41 $1.06 $1.77 $1.95
EPS (Diluted) $0.26 $0.39 $1.00 $1.64 $1.80
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 8:34pm (20d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Cash & Equivalents $28.8M $41.0M $36.5M $50.3M $402.2M
Total Current Assets $145.9M $223.8M $223.4M $601.8M
Total Assets $216.4M $404.9M $438.9M $1.1B
Current Liabilities $90.4M $109.3M $124.8M $114.8M
Long-Term Debt
Total Liabilities $105.4M $121.8M $156.6M $741.3M
Total Equity $68.6M $111.0M $283.1M $282.3M $396.5M
Retained Earnings $43.2M $101.8M $203.3M $314.0M
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 8:34pm (20d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Operating Cash Flow $10.2M $39.0M $87.5M $137.8M $87.6M
Capital Expenditure -$2.4M -$2.3M -$2.1M -$3.3M -$3.9M
Free Cash Flow $7.9M $36.7M $85.4M $134.5M $83.6M
Acquisitions (net) -$11.8M -$23.2M
Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) $-318,000 $-362,000 -$4.3M
Dividends Paid
Stock Buybacks -$147.3M
Net Change in Cash -$9.2M $12.2M -$4.3M $11.6M $351.9M
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 8:34pm (20d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue Growth +45.8% +56.7% +27.2% +25.2%
Gross Profit Growth +42.3% +64.3% +30.7% +25.7%
Operating Income Growth +41.8% +168.6% +55.5% +2.7%
Net Income Growth +56.1% +169.4% +73.4% +9.1%
EBITDA Growth +36.4% +158.5% +51.3% +3.2%
0Company Classification 1Industry Landscape 2Company Momentum 3Forward Projection 4aDCF Valuation 4bEarnings Power Value 4cAnchored PE 4dReverse DCF 4eRevenue-Based DCF 4fAnchored P/S 4gScenario Analysis 4hDividend Discount Model 4iBook Value Analysis 4jInsider Activity 4fCash Flow Quality 4gDebt Maturity Risk 4hMacro Environment 4iSector Intelligence 4jRevenue Confidence 4kSensitivity Analysis 4lSector Demand Cycle 5AI Investigation 5bThesis Evaluation 6Valuation Synthesis
computed not applicable 18 computed · 6 not applicable
Narrative Economics
The story the market is telling about this stock — the intangible X-factor (founder mythology, cult dynamics, TAM-of-imagination) that moves price beyond what cash flows alone explain. After Shiller, Narrative Economics.
No narrative profile yet for ODD — it's generated by the pipeline (market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-13
The creme is there an opportunity here? Caution
Oddity's product economics are durable but its advertised AI edge is the single most commoditizable asset it owns — the opportunity only exists if ODDITY LABS turns intelligence into patented molecules rather than better ad targeting.
Position 47 with a 24-75 range: the physical, repeat-purchase revenue unit scores 78 while intelligence commoditization (33) and entrant compression (27) attack the differentiator the equity story is built on, and agentic discovery (36) threatens a business whose only distribution is bought attention. Watch marketing spend as a percentage of revenue against operating margin — the 17.9%→14.7% step down in 2025 is the first observable that the funnel advantage is being arbitraged. The re-rate trigger is narrow and specific: a shipped SKU containing a LABS-derived proprietary active with patent coverage and gross margin pushing past 75%.
47
AI Position
Mixed - the product survives, the tech premium may not
Cheap machine intelligence commoditizes exactly what Oddity claims as its edge — computer-vision matching, quiz personalization, and creative/media optimization — while leaving intact only the ordinary but real assets of a high-gross-margin repeat-purchase beauty brand plus optional molecule IP from ODDITY LABS.
Exposure 73 Confidence 58 50 = neutral
Primary Tailwind

AI collapses the cost of the content, creative, translation, and customer-service layers that a global online-only beauty operation consumes heavily, and ODDITY LABS' AI-guided discovery of bio-identical actives could convert a software story into patentable physical IP that no model can copy.

Primary Pressure

Oddity's differentiator is an information-processing layer — shade/skin matching, personalization, funnel optimization — and that layer is precisely what falling model costs hand to every DTC challenger and every legacy brand's agency, compressing the tech premium into an ordinary paid-media arbitrage that Meta and TikTok reprice in the auction.

Critical Hinge

Whether repeat-cohort economics hold once the matching engine is table stakes: watch marketing spend as a share of revenue against repeat-customer revenue share and operating margin (already 17.9%→14.7% in 2025).

Hard to Reproduce

Physical formulation and supply chain, a large installed base of paying repeat buyers with first-party shade/skin/repurchase histories, and any patented molecules out of ODDITY LABS — none of which are reproducible by prompting a model.

Forensic fingerprint same 11 factors for every stock · 0 unfavorable · 50 neutral · 100 favorable
Underlying Need Persistence do people still need this at all? 88
Demand for cosmetics, skincare and haircare is durable and non-informational.
People will keep buying pigment, cleansers and supplements regardless of intelligence cost; AI changes how the purchase is discovered and matched, not whether the product is consumed.
Category volume growth in makeup/skincare · Repeat purchase frequency per cohort · Supplement/wellness attach rates
relevance 70 · confidence 86
Solution Persistence will they still solve it this way? 62
Buying beauty online sight-unseen persists, but not necessarily through Oddity's funnel.
Better AI matching increases confidence in unseen purchase — that helps the channel broadly, including Amazon, Sephora's app and AI-native rivals, so the mode survives while Oddity's specific claim on it weakens.
Return rates on shade-matched orders · New customer growth vs repeat mix · Share of orders from owned app
relevance 78 · confidence 55
Intelligence Commoditization does cheap AI power them or copy them? 33
Cheap models copy Oddity's stated moat more than they power it.
Vision-based shade matching, questionnaire personalization and creative generation are now near-commodity capabilities; the same cost curve that lowers Oddity's content spend hands rivals an adequate equivalent stack.
Competitors launching vision matching tools · Cost per creative asset disclosed · Conversion rate trend vs prior years
relevance 92 · confidence 62
Responsibility Transfer are they paid to take the blame? 40
Consumers pay for a product, not for someone to absorb liability.
There is no compliance vertical the customer wants to outsource here; regulatory burden on cosmetics/supplements exists but is not what customers are paying Oddity to carry.
Supplement labeling/claims scrutiny · Adverse-event or recall incidents · Ingredient regulation in EU/US
relevance 18 · confidence 70
Scarcity Migration do their assets get rarer or more common? 48
Algorithmic edge becomes abundant; molecules and brand affinity stay scarce.
The scarce assets migrating upward in value are patentable actives, manufacturing, and a loyal repeat base — Oddity owns some of each, but its most-advertised asset (data science) is the one becoming common.
LABS patents filed or granted · Proprietary ingredient in shipped SKU · Brand-search volume trend
relevance 85 · confidence 52
Customer DIY Preference will customers just build it themselves? 84
Consumers cannot self-manufacture cosmetics; DIY is not the threat vector.
The internalization risk that hits B2B software is absent — the risk is substitution to another vendor, not insourcing.
Private-label/indie brand proliferation · Refill or DIY-kit category growth
relevance 22 · confidence 80
AI Intermediation Position do AI agents go through them or around them? 36
Agentic shopping likely routes around a paid-social-dependent DTC brand.
Oddity's acquisition depends on interrupting feeds; assistants that rank by ingredient efficacy, reviews and price favor scaled or clinically differentiated brands, and Oddity has no retail shelf as a fallback surface.
Traffic share from AI assistants · Presence in agentic checkout programs · Blended CAC vs prior-year trend
relevance 80 · confidence 45
Data Leverage does their data make AI better? 58
Large first-party matching dataset is real but of contested exclusivity.
Tens of millions of self-reported skin/shade profiles plus repurchase outcomes genuinely sharpen recommendation and SKU development, yet foundation models plus competitor-scale data narrow the gap and none of it is regulated or exclusive.
Disclosed user/profile counts · Match accuracy or return-rate metrics · New SKU hit rate from data
relevance 72 · confidence 50
AI Margin Conversion do the AI savings become profit? 50
Content and service savings are real but leak into ad auctions.
Gross margin is already 72.7% so the leverage must come from marketing and support opex — and platform ad pricing tends to absorb efficiency gains, as the 2025 operating margin decline to 14.7% hints.
Marketing as % of revenue · Support headcount per order · Operating margin recovery above 18%
relevance 80 · confidence 48
Revenue Unit Durability does the thing they charge for survive? 78
The monetized unit is a shipped physical good — no seats, no tokens to deflate.
Revenue is per-order product revenue, immune to per-seat or per-task deflation; the risk is volume and CAC, not repricing of the unit itself.
Average order value trend · Repeat order contribution · Discounting depth in promotions
relevance 65 · confidence 78
Entrant Compression how easily can newcomers copy them? 27
AI collapses the cost of launching a credible digital-first beauty brand.
Creative, copy, localization, quiz-tech and vision matching all become near-free, leaving contract manufacturing and ad budget as the only real barriers — both purchasable, which is the opposite of a widening moat.
Number of AI-native beauty launches · CAC inflation across DTC beauty · Growth deceleration toward industry flat
relevance 90 · confidence 60

AI Lens thesis

The underlying need — buying makeup and skincare without trying it on — persists and is arguably strengthened by better AI matching, and the monetized unit is a physical shipped product, which is durable. But Oddity is not paid for compliance, liability, or workflow ownership; it is paid because it acquires customers online more cheaply than incumbents and converts them without a store. Cheap intelligence attacks that specific advantage from two sides: it lets AI-native entrants stand up equivalent quiz/vision/creative stacks for near zero, and it lets platform ad systems capture the efficiency gains as higher clearing prices. Simultaneously, agentic shopping threatens to move discovery from bought social feeds — where Oddity is strong — to assistants that rank on efficacy, ingredients, and reviews, where a scaled prestige brand or a clinically differentiated ingredient wins. The favorable path runs through ODDITY LABS: AI applied to molecules produces excludable, patentable scarcity; AI applied to funnels produces a commodity.

Thesis breaker A shipped LABS-derived proprietary active driving gross margin above ~75% with rising repeat-purchase share would break the bear read; conversely, marketing intensity rising while revenue growth decelerates toward industry flatness would confirm the funnel edge has been arbitraged away.
What the market may be underestimating

Upside Cost of launching and localizing new brands falls sharply with generative content and AI-run support — Oddity's real asset may be a repeatable brand-launch machine (a third and fourth brand at low incremental opex) rather than the matching algorithm itself.

Downside If AI shopping agents become a meaningful discovery channel, Oddity has no retail shelf, no fragrance/prestige halo, and no third-party review depth to be surfaced by — it is structurally more dependent on paid social than any legacy peer, so agentic disintermediation hits it harder than the sector.

Outcome range spread 51 · unresolved

24Bear case
46Central case
75Bull case
Three headline numbers, deliberately never blended: Position (which way), Exposure (how much it matters at all), Confidence (how sure). The fingerprint asks every stock the same 11 questions so companies a sector label would lump together get told apart. Not an input to GEM/Coal or the Q/V/S lenses.
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-20 11:04

The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.

Growing Top line is still compounding ~25% against a flat-to-shrinking personal-care category — genuine share gain — but earnings growth has decayed to single digits and FCF is flat, so the growth is increasingly being bought with launch and acquisition spend. conf 6/10
Share gain Category shrinking · Household & Personal Products is flat-to-down (industry revenue 0.3% CAGR, recent industry YoY -1.6%, category median -1.3%) while the company grew 25.2% — a ~27pp positive gap.
Next 2 quarters
Growing
Revenue momentum is broad and the repeat base gives visibility; two more quarters of double-digit top-line growth is the base case. Earnings, however, remain hostage to launch and media spend, which is exactly what broke the newest print.
≈ inline with expectations
Year 1
Growing
Full-year revenue should still compound at a healthy double-digit rate given the category-independent share mechanism, but the direction of change in earnings growth is down as new-brand and lab investment scales, so the year is a revenue-growth/earnings-flat shape.
≈ inline with expectations
Years 2–3
Holding
Structurally the company should retain a growing revenue base, but I will not underwrite compounding earnings power at the historical rate: acquisition cost inflation, a contracting category profit pool, unproven new brands and a biotech arm years from monetisation all argue for roughly flat-to-modestly-higher earnings power rather than durable acceleration.
↑ above expectations
The creme: each rung's call measured against what's already printed (vs analyst estimates · vs guidance / FY consensus · vs price-implied growth) — expectations in print are already in the price, so only the variant margin can pay. Hover a rung's chip for the margin read.
Growth drivers
72 Share gain in a stagnant category — Recent revenue +25.2% YoY versus industry -1.6% and category median -1.3%: a ~27pp gap. Digital-first direct model takes share from shelf-space incumbents rather than depending on category expansion, so growth does not require the cycle to turn.
47 Repeat/subscription economics on owned data — IL MAKIAGE and SpoiledChild are online-only with first-party matching data; repeat purchase and replenishment revenue lowers the marginal cost of each incremental cohort and gives visibility into the next two prints independent of new-customer intake.
34 Brand and product pipeline (new brands + ODDITY LABS) — Multi-brand playbook plus a molecule-discovery arm gives a mechanism for growth beyond the two existing brands. Optionality is real but unproven commercially — it funds the years 2-3 case, not the next two quarters.
20 Industry-wide gross margin expansion — +2.0pp gross margin trend industry-wide plus a DTC price architecture supports high gross margin, giving room to absorb marketing inflation before revenue growth breaks.
Growth risks
65 Earnings growth decaying far faster than revenue — Recent earnings YoY +9.1% versus a 37.6% multi-year earnings CAGR, and FCF CAGR is slightly negative (-1.0%). The gap between 25% revenue and 9% earnings is the clearest evidence that incremental growth is being purchased.
60 Customer acquisition cost dependence — Growth is a function of paid digital media efficiency, an input the company does not control. Platform pricing or algorithm shifts translate almost immediately into either slower revenue or thinner margins — the single most likely mechanism for a step-down.
44 Launch-spend volatility versus models — The newest print missed sharply (-0.17 vs -0.05 estimate) while prior quarters were near or above. That pattern says new-brand and lab investment is lumpy and poorly modelled, so near-term earnings prints are unreliable.
35 Category slowdown and industry earnings decline — Sector phase is slowdown (demand score -1), industry earnings CAGR -38.6% and net margins -4.0pp. A share gainer inside a contracting profit pool eventually faces a shrinking absolute opportunity and rational discounting by incumbents.
32 Concentration in one flagship brand — A large share of revenue still rides IL MAKIAGE. If its cohort quality erodes, no other asset is yet large enough to carry growth.
The world is moving purchase discovery for beauty from shelf and store associate to algorithmic matching, and Oddity is one of the few operators whose entire cost structure is built for that channel rather than retrofitted into it. That is a durable tailwind for share. The offset is that the same world has raised the price of digital attention: acquisition costs are now the binding constraint on how fast an online-only brand can compound, and the profit pool of the broader category is contracting (industry earnings -38.6% CAGR, net margins -4pp). Macro is neutral — 10y at 4.71 with a positive curve — so this is not a demand-shock story; it is a unit-economics story. The forward question is not whether the channel shift continues (it does) but whether Oddity can widen the gap between lifetime value and rising acquisition cost while funding new brands and a biotech arm at the same time.
Growth position composite -15
ShrinkingStallingHoldingGrowingAccelerating
70Next 2 quarters · Growing
70Year 1 · Growing
50Years 2–3 · Holding
-15Composite (−100…+100)
A research prediction, not advice. Forward-graded: each rung is scored against the prints that follow it. Not an input to the GEM designation — track record first.
Claude Reading
Independent analyst synthesis · claude-opus-4-7 · generated 2026-08-20 10:52:36
Verdict Undervalued but synthesis overshoots — fair value $22-$28 not $42; starter position warranted, but the flat FCF against 25% revenue growth is the one metric that could invalidate the thesis fast.

The raw numbers here are unusually clean for a supposed "fallen angel." Revenue compounded from $222M (2021) to $810M (2025) — a 38% CAGR that decelerated only modestly to 25% YoY in the most recent print. Gross margin held at 72.7%, operating margin expanded to 14.7%, net margin 13.7%. The balance sheet carries $402M cash against zero debt, so enterprise value is roughly $200M against $110M net income and $84M FCF — that's ~2x EV/earnings and ~2.4x EV/FCF. Even if you assume growth zeros out tomorrow and margins compress 300bps, the multiple is absurd for a business generating this return profile. ROE of 27.9% and current ratio of 5.2 are not the fingerprints of a business in distress.

Where I push back on the prior models: the synthesis fair value of $41.78 (+219%) is directionally correct but the framing is soft. The DCF isn't asking you to believe in the biotech pipeline or AI moat — it's asking you to believe FCF doesn't collapse. Reverse-DCF implying -1.1% FCF growth against a demonstrated 26% revenue CAGR is not a "show me" setup; it's a mispricing wide enough that even a bear case (say, revenue growth halving to 12%, margins compressing to 10%) still supports $25+. The Market Forces "Neutral" call and the Thesis Evaluation score of +2 both feel like the models over-weighting narrative risk (single brand, CAC inflation) versus the arithmetic reality that at 0.99x sales and 7.3x earnings, you are paid to wait. The Narrative layer's "fragile durability" is the most honest take — but fragile narrative + strong cash flow is historically a good setup, not a bad one, as long as the P&L doesn't crack.

The contrarian case worth taking seriously: DTC beauty is a graveyard of one-brand wonders (Revlon, e.l.f. pre-repositioning, countless Instagram flameouts). IL MAKIAGE and SpoiledChild are the entire business; if U.S. customer cohorts saturate, CAC can double in two quarters and you'd see it first in FCF — which is already flat-to-down (fcf_cagr -1%) while revenue grew 25%. That divergence is the single most important red flag in this file and no model foregrounded it adequately. FCF of $84M against $111M net income is a ~75% conversion, which is fine but deteriorating from prior years. If working capital or ad-spend inflation is chewing through cash, the "cheap on earnings" story degrades fast. Also: insider activity shows sales and option exercises, zero open-market buys — at 7x earnings, if management believed the DCF, they'd be buying. That silence is loud.

I partially agree with the synthesis: ODD is undervalued, but $41-$42 is aggressive. My fair value is $22-$28 — anchoring on 10-12x earnings for a decelerating-but-still-growing DTC brand with net cash, which gives ~$1.85 EPS × 12 = $22, plus $8/share net cash = ~$30 gross, discounted for single-brand risk. That's still +80-130% upside from $12.29 and doesn't require the biotech or AI narratives to resurrect. The trade is: buy the arithmetic, not the story. The catalyst path is two quarters of stable-to-growing FCF and any credible SpoiledChild traction; the kill switch is a single quarter where revenue growth drops below 10% AND FCF conversion breaks below 60%. Position sizing should reflect the fragility flagged by the narrative model — this is a 2-3% starter, not a table-pound, because the FCF/net income gap is real and the market's discount, while excessive, isn't irrational.

GPT Reading
Independent reading · gpt-5.4 · generated 2026-08-20 10:52:54
Verdict Undervalued at $12.29 — the market is pricing Oddity like a deteriorating DTC asset despite 25% growth, 14% net margins, and net cash; fair value is closer to $20-25 even with conservative durability assumptions.

The first thing that jumps out is how extreme the disconnect is between price and the reported earning power of the business. On 2025 numbers, Oddity did $809.8M of revenue, $118.8M of operating income, $110.7M of net income, and $83.6M of free cash flow, yet the whole company is valued at just $0.60B. With $402.2M of cash and no debt, enterprise value is roughly $200M, which means the stock is trading around 0.42x revenue and 2.6x EBITDA. For a business that has grown revenue from $222.6M in 2021 to $809.8M in 2025, while maintaining gross margin of 72.7% and net margin of 13.7%, that is not “cheap for growth”; it is distressed-multiple pricing. The market is acting as if these earnings are either temporary, low-quality, or on the verge of collapsing.

But the raw financials do not look like a collapsing DTC beauty story. Revenue growth has remained strong each year: 45.8% in 2022, 56.8% in 2023, 27.2% in 2024, and 25.2% in 2025. Operating income rose from $19.5M in 2021 to $118.8M in 2025, and net income from $13.9M to $110.7M over the same period. Even more important, this is not growth bought with leverage or capex-heavy spending: capex was only $3.9M in 2025, current ratio is 5.2x, debt is zero, and cash equals about two-thirds of the market cap. At the current price, investors are paying roughly 7.3x earnings and barely 5x ex-cash earnings for a company still compounding revenue above 25%. That multiple would make sense for a shrinking, low-margin brand with balance-sheet stress; it does not fit a 73% gross margin business with triple-digit millions of annual profit.

The main thing tempering my enthusiasm is that cash conversion is not as pristine as the income statement. Operating cash flow of $87.6M lagged net income of $110.7M in 2025, and the momentum table showing free cash flow CAGR of -1% versus revenue CAGR of 26.2% suggests that working capital or customer acquisition economics may be absorbing more cash than the P&L implies. Operating margin also barely increased from $115.6M in 2024 to $118.8M in 2025 despite $162.8M of incremental revenue, so the business did not get much incremental operating leverage last year. That matters because if this were a true software-like consumer platform, you would expect stronger flow-through. Still, even if I haircut earnings quality and assume normalized net income is more like $80M than $110M, the equity is trading at about 7.5x ex-cash normalized earnings for a debt-free branded growth company. That still looks materially too low.

The best bear case is straightforward and serious: this may be a single-hit beauty brand that has already passed its best economics, with marketing costs rising fast enough to flatten future profits. The market may be correctly saying that 2025 is close to peak margin, that 25% top-line growth is the last easy comp, and that the “AI/tech platform” framing deserves no premium at all. If customer acquisition costs are inflating, retention is weaker than advertised, or a second brand/adjacency fails, then 0.99x sales and 7x earnings are less absurd than they look because the earnings base would prove cyclical and promotional rather than durable. I take that bear case seriously because the discrepancy between NI and OCF, the weak incremental operating leverage in 2025, and the tiny capex profile mean most of the debate is really about whether demand quality and marketing efficiency hold up. If they break, this rerates not upward but toward liquidation-value logic where the cash pile is the only real support.

What would change my mind is not a narrative event but a numbers event. If revenue growth falls below 15% while operating margin slips from 14.7% toward 10%-11%, or if free cash flow drops materially below $60M despite continued reported profits, then I would conclude the market was right to distrust the earnings. Likewise, if the cash balance starts shrinking because the company has to spend aggressively just to hold growth, the ex-cash valuation argument weakens fast. Conversely, if the next annual print shows revenue above roughly $950M, operating income above $140M, and free cash flow back above $100M, then this stock should not remain near 1x sales. At that point, even a modest 12x earnings or 1.5x sales framework would imply a share price far above $12.29.

Grok Reading
Independent reading · grok-4.5 · generated 2026-08-20 10:53:36
Verdict Undervalued at $12.29 on ~0.4× EV/sales and ~7× earnings with $402M net cash, but $38–42 targets overstate durability given 2025 op-margin compression

The raw financials describe a business that has compounded revenue from $223M to $810M in four years while staying solidly profitable and building a fortress balance sheet: zero debt, $402M cash against a $600M market cap, and $84M of free cash flow on only $4M of capex. Gross margin holds near 73% and net margin sits at 14%, producing a trailing P/E of roughly 7×, EV/sales of 0.4× and EV/EBITDA under 3×. At an enterprise value of roughly $200M you are paying less than 2.5× current FCF for a company still growing the top line 25% year-over-year. That is not a growth multiple; it is a no-growth, mild-distress multiple attached to a still-expanding, cash-generative consumer franchise. The market has clearly abandoned the old AI-platform story and now prices Oddity as a one-brand DTC beauty name whose best days are behind it.

What stands out inside the growth is the sharp operating-income stall: revenue rose 25% in 2025 yet operating profit barely moved, from $116M to $119M, compressing operating margin from roughly 18% to 14.7%. Earnings CAGR remains strong at 38% over the longer window, but the most recent year shows only 9% net-income growth and a flat-to-negative FCF CAGR. That pattern is consistent with rising customer-acquisition costs eating the incremental dollar of sales—the precise risk the market is discounting. Rule-based models labeling this a “mature earner” while the pre-flight still calls it high-growth capture the tension correctly: the income statement still looks like a scaler, the margin trajectory looks like a maturing brand fighting CAC inflation.

The valuation synthesis fair value near $38–$42 therefore overstates the case. It treats the historical growth and current margins as durable and largely ignores the latest year’s operating leverage failure. A more sober read still leaves the stock cheap—net cash covers two-thirds of the market cap and the earnings yield is double-digit—but the gap to $40 requires a re-rating that only arrives if margins stabilize and a second brand or international channel proves the platform is not a single-SKU wonder. Until then the stock can remain a value trap even while printing mid-teens net margins.

The strongest opposing argument is straightforward: the market is correctly reading the 2025 margin compression and the single-brand concentration as permanent rather than cyclical. If CAC continues to rise, revenue growth will decelerate toward low double digits or worse while operating margins drift toward high single digits; at that point 7× earnings becomes fair or even rich for a no-moat beauty name, and the $402M cash pile simply funds a slow fade. Insider activity is neutral-to-slightly-negative (option exercises followed by a sale), offering no endorsement, and the narrative durability is explicitly fragile—DTC beauty turnarounds that fail to show sequential margin or brand traction within 12–18 months usually reprice lower, not higher. I weigh this less heavily than the bulls’ DCF because the absolute earnings power and net-cash cushion already price in a great deal of that deterioration; you need an outright collapse, not mere deceleration, to justify today’s enterprise value.

I would reverse to a more constructive stance if the next two quarters show operating margin re-expanding above 16% while revenue growth stays above 20%, or if a second brand contributes meaningful incremental revenue without proportional CAC spike. I would turn decisively negative if 2026 revenue growth falls below 10% or free cash flow drops under $50M, confirming the saturation thesis the market already embeds.

Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Each AI above independently stated a direction (undervalued, fairly valued, or overvalued) and how strongly it believes it (conviction, 0–5). We combine those into a Bull-Bear Index on a 0–10 scale: 5 is neutral, 10 is maximum bullish (undervalued at full conviction), 0 is maximum bearish. We compute the score ourselves with the same arithmetic for every seat — the models never grade their own bullishness — so the three are directly comparable. Δ shows how far each seat sits from the panel average of 8.3; a large Δ marks the dissenting voice, usually the one worth reading.
Claude claude-opus-4-7 8.0
undervalued · conviction 3/5 · Δ -0.3 vs panel · self: 7.0
GPT gpt-5.4 9.0
undervalued · conviction 4/5 · Δ +0.7 vs panel · self: 8.0
Grok grok-4.5 8.0
undervalued · conviction 3/5 · Δ -0.3 vs panel · self: 6.0
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Separate reads — Company Quality (is it a great business?), Valuation (is it mispriced?), and General Sentiment (how macro + narrative are pushing it), plus AI Impact (how the AI wave reshapes it), kept deliberately apart · 2026-08-20 11:06:21
Delvantic - Cairn AI
Crushed-but-real — scale-in starter 6/10
Genuinely cheap, genuinely profitable, but the AI edge is exactly what's most commoditizable — this is a value nibble, not a conviction load-up.
The cruxWhether the 2025 op-margin dip and FCF halving are reinvestment into ODDITY LABS (real optionality) or the first sign the DTC/AI-matching moat is being competed away.
Forensic checks Derived mechanically from ODD's filed financials — not from the AI lenses
Liquidity & RunwayFortress Balance Sheet
DilutionModerate Dilution
Earnings QualityHigh Earnings Quality
The four lensesswitch a tab for its full read — score + evidence
Company Quality
+61
Strong
edge √Σ 147 · risk √Σ 75 · conf 8/10

Oddity has compounded revenue from $223M (2021) to $810M (2025), a ~38% CAGR, while gross margin expanded from 68.8% to 72.7% and operating margin ran from 8.8% to a peak of 17.9% in 2024 before easing to 14.7% in 2025. Net income scaled from $14M to $111M and cumulative FCF over the five years exceeds $348M, with 2025 FCF of $83.6M still positive despite the operating-margin dip - suggesting reinvestment (likely R&D/new brands) rather than deterioration. Earnings quality is clean: OCF/NI 1.23x, accruals -5.3% of assets, Beneish M -2.02, and no accrual-driven earnings inflation.

Strengths 4
m85
Fortress balance sheet, self-funding
$413M cash, zero debt, and $83.6M FCF in 2025 - survival risk is essentially nil and growth is entirely internally funded.
m80
Elite revenue compounding with margin expansion
Revenue 3.6x from 2021 to 2025 ($223M to $810M) while gross margin expanded 400bps to 72.7% - operating leverage is real.
m70
Clean earnings quality
OCF/NI 1.23x, accruals -5.3% of assets, Beneish M -2.02 - reported profits are cash-backed and mechanical checks show no manipulation signals.
m55
Profitable scale rare for DTC beauty
Net income grew from $14M to $111M in 4 years; 2024 op margin of 17.9% is unusually high for a digital-native beauty brand.
Concerns 3
m55
Persistent dilution
Diluted shares 53.5M to 61.5M (~15% cumulative); SBC 4.2% of revenue is a real per-share drag even with 160% buyback coverage starting to offset.
m45
Operating margin contraction in 2025
OpM fell from 17.9% to 14.7% and FCF dropped from $134.5M to $83.6M despite 25% revenue growth - reinvestment or early margin roll-over needs monitoring.
m25
No insider conviction buying
Zero open-market P buys in last 12 months; only awards, option exercises, and one small $173K S-sale - neutral but not supportive.
This is a genuinely high-quality business: rare combination of hyper-growth, real GAAP profits, strong cash conversion, and a debt-free balance sheet with cash equal to two-thirds of the market cap. The earnings look real - accruals and Beneish confirm it. What keeps me from grading higher is that it's still young as a public company, the 2025 margin dip and FCF halving vs 2024 hint that reinvestment intensity is rising, and shareholders are steadily diluted at ~3.5%/yr. It clears 'Strong' comfortably but hasn't earned 'Fortress' - durability of the brand portfolio and category economics are still an open question.
Verify before trusting this (5)
  • Cause of 2025 operating margin compression (320bps) - new brand launches, marketing intensity, or core-brand slowdown?
  • Customer/brand concentration - what share of revenue comes from IL MAKIAGE vs SpoiledChild vs newer brands?
  • Repeat-purchase and cohort economics disclosed in 10-K to gauge durability of the DTC model
  • SBC vesting schedule and outstanding option overhang beyond reported diluted share count
  • Sustainability of ~72% gross margin as product mix broadens into new categories
Valuation / Mispricing
+45
Undervalued
edge √Σ 101 · risk √Σ 53 · conf 6/10
price $12.53 vs deserved ~$20-26 (EPV floor to DCF midpoint), roughly 60-100% margin - undervalued but not deep-value once you discount the anchored-PE outlier attractive below $14.00

The composite fair value of $37.33 and signal-adjusted $41.78 imply 200%+ upside, but the anchored-PE input at $80 is clearly a runaway - beauty peers do not sustain those multiples and I would discount that leg heavily. The more defensible anchors are the EPV floor at $16.56 and the DCF at $26.32, which bracket a deserved value somewhere in the high-teens to high-twenties. Against a $12.53 price, that is a real gap - roughly 30-100% - not the 219% headline. Critically, the company-quality lens flags cash near two-thirds of market cap; strip that out and the operating business trades at a mid-single-digit EV/earnings multiple despite growing and generating GAAP profit. Earnings quality is clean, so no haircut is warranted. The bear case (commoditized DTC, CAC blowout, biotech vaporware) is real and explains the de-rating, but the current price already assumes those bear points largely play out. For the stock to be fairly valued here, you have to believe growth stalls hard AND margins compress AND the cash gets wasted - a stacked-negative scenario. That is why I lean undervalued rather than fairly valued, though I hold confidence at 6 given the fallen-angel tape and unproven public-company track record.

Cheap signals 3
m72
Cash cushions most of the market cap
With cash at roughly two-thirds of the $604M cap, the enterprise value implied for the operating business is around $200M against a profitable, growing beauty platform - an EV/earnings multiple in the mid-single digits.
m55
DCF and EPV both above price
Even the conservative EPV floor at $16.56 sits 32% above the $12.53 price; the DCF at $26.32 implies 110% upside. Two independent methods agreeing on undervaluation is meaningful.
m45
Clean earnings, no haircut needed
Earnings-quality score of 2 (high quality) means the reported profits are real - no accrual games or Beneish flags - so the deserved value does not need to be marked down for accounting risk.
Rich / priced-in 2
m40
Anchored-PE at $80 is not credible
The $80.12 anchored-PE reading pulls the composite up to $37.33 but beauty comps do not support that multiple durably; treat this leg as an outlier and the true composite is closer to $20-25.
m35
Fallen-angel tape and unproven longevity
The stock collapsed for reasons - 2025 margin dip, FCF halving, SBC dilution, and unproven biotech optionality. The market is pricing real deceleration risk, which caps how aggressively I can call this cheap.
I think this is genuinely cheap, not just optically cheap. Strip out the cash and you are paying a mid-single-digit multiple for a profitable, growing brand with clean accounting - that is the kind of setup where the math works even if growth halves. I discount the $37 composite heavily because the anchored-PE leg is a runaway, but even my skeptical deserved value of $20-26 leaves 60-100% upside. The catch is it is a fallen angel for reasons and could stay hated - so I would size it as a value bet with real risk, not a slam-dunk. Attractive here, more attractive under $11.
Verify before trusting this (4)
  • Q4 and forward guidance on revenue growth and gross margin - is the 2025 margin dip a one-off reinvestment or structural
  • SBC as % of revenue and share count trajectory - dilution eats deserved value
  • Cash deployment plans - buybacks would confirm the value; a large biotech acquisition would destroy it
  • Customer acquisition cost trends and repeat purchase rates to test the bear DTC-commoditization thesis
General Sentiment
-53
Headwind
tail √Σ 45 · head √Σ 104 · conf 6/10

ODD sits in the worst kind of narrative slot: a fallen-angel with moderate intensity but fragile durability and no cult following. The bull case (AI personalization moat, biotech molecule engine) is essentially unbelieved by the tape - the stock trades near 12.53 versus a 41.78 DCF, meaning sentiment, not fundamentals, is doing the pricing. Recent action is choppy and news-light (multiple insufficient_data big-move days), which is classic of an orphaned name being pushed around by flows and shorts rather than any coherent story. With a 2.38 beta into a Risk-On tape that is already 1.2% off highs and VIX creeping, any wobble hits this name 2x. The modest tailwind of a risk-on backdrop is more than offset by the fragility of the story and the absence of a positive narrative catalyst. Analyst tone is muted (a small fair-value upgrade was sold), which tells you the marginal buyer is not there. Net: persistent, ordinary-to-moderate headwind pressure - not a collapse, but a name that has to fight the tape to hold a bid.

Tailwinds 2
m35
Risk-on backdrop offers some cover
A +38 risk-on regime with VIX 14.9 is a mild positive for a beaten-down high-beta name - if the tape holds, short-covering rallies (like the recent 6.4% pop) can persist.
m28
Sentiment washout may be mature
Trading 70% below DCF with fragile-but-not-collapsing narrative intensity suggests peak pessimism may be behind; any small positive datapoint could produce outsized reflex rallies.
Headwinds 4
m62
Fallen-angel with fragile narrative
Archetype is fallen-angel, durability fragile, cult low - the market has stopped believing the AI/biotech story and there is no loyal holder base to defend drawdowns.
m58
High beta into a slipping tape
Beta 2.38 means every 1% S&P wobble hits ODD 2.4x; the tape is risk-on but already 1.2% off highs, so any regime crack is amplified brutally here.
m45
Analyst tone not rescuing the name
A recent fair-value upgrade was met with a 7.78% drop - the marginal analyst voice is not moving the stock, signaling buyers are absent.
m40
News vacuum, flow-driven prints
Multiple recent 3-10% moves have no identifiable catalyst - the tape is being driven by short covering, thin liquidity, and sector rotation rather than any narrative build.
This is a name the market has left for dead but has not fully buried - fragile narrative, no cult, high beta, and analyst voices that no longer move the stock. The risk-on tape offers modest cover and the washout may be mature, but I do not see a story bid forming. Net leans headwind - ordinary persistent pressure, not a crisis, with the whole setup hostage to whether the AI/biotech story gets any external validation.
Verify before trusting this (4)
  • Whether the biotech/AI narrative gets any credible external validation (partnership, molecule milestone) that could reignite intensity
  • Short interest and days-to-cover - flow-driven pops suggest crowded short that could squeeze
  • Any sell-side upgrade with a price target well above spot that actually sticks in the tape
  • VIX breaking above 18 or S&P losing another 2% - would hammer this 2.4-beta name disproportionately
The market-wide tape + this name's exposure to it (beta / sector / narrative durability). Context on the non-fundamental pressure — not a call on the business or the price. processId: detail-general-sentiment
AI Impact
+4
Mixed - the product survives, the tech premium may not
opp √Σ 68 · thr √Σ 56 · conf 6/10

The underlying need — buying makeup and skincare without trying it on — persists and is arguably strengthened by better AI matching, and the monetized unit is a physical shipped product, which is durable. But Oddity is not paid for compliance, liability, or workflow ownership; it is paid because it acquires customers online more cheaply than incumbents and converts them without a store. Cheap intelligence attacks that specific advantage from two sides: it lets AI-native entrants stand up equivalent quiz/vision/creative stacks for near zero, and it lets platform ad systems capture the efficiency gains as higher clearing prices. Simultaneously, agentic shopping threatens to move discovery from bought social feeds — where Oddity is strong — to assistants that rank on efficacy, ingredients, and reviews, where a scaled prestige brand or a clinically differentiated ingredient wins. The favorable path runs through ODDITY LABS: AI applied to molecules produces excludable, patentable scarcity; AI applied to funnels produces a commodity.

AI opportunities 4
m53
Underlying Need Persistence
Demand for cosmetics, skincare and haircare is durable and non-informational.
m19
Solution Persistence
Buying beauty online sight-unseen persists, but not necessarily through Oddity's funnel.
m15
Customer DIY Preference
Consumers cannot self-manufacture cosmetics; DIY is not the threat vector.
m36
Revenue Unit Durability
The monetized unit is a shipped physical good — no seats, no tokens to deflate.
AI threats 4
m31
Intelligence Commoditization
Cheap models copy Oddity's stated moat more than they power it.
m4
Responsibility Transfer
Consumers pay for a product, not for someone to absorb liability.
m22
AI Intermediation Position
Agentic shopping likely routes around a paid-social-dependent DTC brand.
m41
Entrant Compression
AI collapses the cost of launching a credible digital-first beauty brand.
Oddity's product economics are durable but its advertised AI edge is the single most commoditizable asset it owns — the opportunity only exists if ODDITY LABS turns intelligence into patented molecules rather than better ad targeting. Position 47 with a 24-75 range: the physical, repeat-purchase revenue unit scores 78 while intelligence commoditization (33) and entrant compression (27) attack the differentiator the equity story is built on, and agentic discovery (36) threatens a business whose only distribution is bought attention. Watch marketing spend as a percentage of revenue against operating margin — the 17.9%→14.7% step down in 2025 is the first observable that the funnel advantage is being arbitraged. The re-rate trigger is narrow and specific: a shipped SKU containing a LABS-derived proprietary active with patent coverage and gross margin pushing past 75%.
Verify before trusting this (8)
  • Competitors launching vision matching tools
  • Cost per creative asset disclosed
  • Conversion rate trend vs prior years
  • Number of AI-native beauty launches
  • CAC inflation across DTC beauty
  • Growth deceleration toward industry flat
  • LABS patents filed or granted
  • Proprietary ingredient in shipped SKU
The structural effect of the AI wave on this specific business over the next ~5 years — demand, cost leverage, moat, barriers to entry, position in the AI stack. The reality beneath the AI story, not the story's market pressure (General Sentiment owns that) — and not a call on the business today or the price.
Growth Outlook
-15
Growing
edge √Σ 95 · risk √Σ 110 · conf 6/10

The world is moving purchase discovery for beauty from shelf and store associate to algorithmic matching, and Oddity is one of the few operators whose entire cost structure is built for that channel rather than retrofitted into it. That is a durable tailwind for share. The offset is that the same world has raised the price of digital attention: acquisition costs are now the binding constraint on how fast an online-only brand can compound, and the profit pool of the broader category is contracting (industry earnings -38.6% CAGR, net margins -4pp). Macro is neutral — 10y at 4.71 with a positive curve — so this is not a demand-shock story; it is a unit-economics story. The forward question is not whether the channel shift continues (it does) but whether Oddity can widen the gap between lifetime value and rising acquisition cost while funding new brands and a biotech arm at the same time.

Growth drivers 4
m72
Share gain in a stagnant category
Recent revenue +25.2% YoY versus industry -1.6% and category median -1.3%: a ~27pp gap. Digital-first direct model takes share from shelf-space incumbents rather than depending on category expansion, so growth does not require the cycle to turn.
m47
Repeat/subscription economics on owned data
IL MAKIAGE and SpoiledChild are online-only with first-party matching data; repeat purchase and replenishment revenue lowers the marginal cost of each incremental cohort and gives visibility into the next two prints independent of new-customer intake.
m34
Brand and product pipeline (new brands + ODDITY LABS)
Multi-brand playbook plus a molecule-discovery arm gives a mechanism for growth beyond the two existing brands. Optionality is real but unproven commercially — it funds the years 2-3 case, not the next two quarters.
m20
Industry-wide gross margin expansion
+2.0pp gross margin trend industry-wide plus a DTC price architecture supports high gross margin, giving room to absorb marketing inflation before revenue growth breaks.
Growth risks 5
m65
Earnings growth decaying far faster than revenue
Recent earnings YoY +9.1% versus a 37.6% multi-year earnings CAGR, and FCF CAGR is slightly negative (-1.0%). The gap between 25% revenue and 9% earnings is the clearest evidence that incremental growth is being purchased.
m60
Customer acquisition cost dependence
Growth is a function of paid digital media efficiency, an input the company does not control. Platform pricing or algorithm shifts translate almost immediately into either slower revenue or thinner margins — the single most likely mechanism for a step-down.
m44
Launch-spend volatility versus models
The newest print missed sharply (-0.17 vs -0.05 estimate) while prior quarters were near or above. That pattern says new-brand and lab investment is lumpy and poorly modelled, so near-term earnings prints are unreliable.
m35
Category slowdown and industry earnings decline
Sector phase is slowdown (demand score -1), industry earnings CAGR -38.6% and net margins -4.0pp. A share gainer inside a contracting profit pool eventually faces a shrinking absolute opportunity and rational discounting by incumbents.
m32
Concentration in one flagship brand
A large share of revenue still rides IL MAKIAGE. If its cohort quality erodes, no other asset is yet large enough to carry growth.
vs expectations: ~6m inline · 1y inline · 2-3y above
The forward growth verdict — is the business itself likely to grow (next 2 quarters / year 1 / years 2–3), judged against its category and against printed expectations. The full horizon ladder + creme renders on the Growth Outlook card above. Not a call on the price (Valuation owns that) or the tape (Sentiment owns that).
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Lenses kept deliberately separate — Company Quality (price-agnostic), Valuation (price-conditional), General Sentiment (non-fundamental macro/narrative pressure), AI Impact (structural ~5yr AI exposure), and Growth Outlook (the forward growth verdict). The scores are not blended. Filing-level items (convertibles, lock-ups, customer concentration) are v2 — see each lens's "verify."
Price Prediction
Higher +36.4% v0.6.0 View full prediction →

When we made this prediction on Aug 20, 2026, ODD was $12.46. We expect it to be $17.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $14.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 20, 2026.

Price when predicted$12.46
Our estimate for Feb 2027$17.00+36.4%
Great value below$14.00
Price history shown (6 Months)

Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.

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My Notes personal — only you see this
v1.1.562 · 9b2927c4 · 2026-08-22 16:52:06