Business Description
MongoDB, Inc. provides general purpose database platform worldwide. The company offers MongoDB Enterprise Advanced, a commercial database server for enterprise customers to run in the cloud, on-premise, or in a hybrid environment; MongoDB Atlas, a hosted multi-cloud database-as-a-service solution; and Community Server, a free-to-download version of its database, which includes the functionality that developers need to get started with MongoDB. It also provides professional services comprising consulting and training. The company was formerly known as 10gen, Inc. and changed its name to MongoDB, Inc. in August 2013. MongoDB, Inc. was incorporated in 2007 and is headquartered in New York, New York.
Business History
Generated: Jun 1, 2026 7:59pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 7:56pm (25d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.88
Total Equity: $2.95B
Shares: 81,246,520
Total Debt: $9.26M
Cash: $1.08B
EBITDA: -$29.32M
Total Debt: $9.26M
Cash: $1.08B
Revenue: $2.46B
Shares: 81,246,520
Revenue: $2.46B
Revenue: $2.46B
Revenue: $2.46B
Total Equity: $2.95B
Tax Rate: -27.8%
Equity: $2.95B
Total Debt: $9.26M
Cash: $1.08B
Current Liabilities: $669.50M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $9.26M
Total Equity: $2.95B
Shares: 81,246,520
Shares: 81,246,520
CapEx: -$4.96M
Shares: 81,246,520
Stock Price: $403.88
Net Income: -$71.15M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The headline trajectory is genuinely improving: revenue $873M → $2.46B over five years, FCF inflected from $(1)M to $500M, GAAP losses narrowing from -33% op margin to -5.6%, and Altman Z at 24.8 with $2.38B net cash. Earnings-quality mechanicals are clean (Beneish -2.89, no accrual red flags) and the business is self-funding. That is the bull case in numbers, not narrative.
The catch is two-fold. First, dilution is structural, not transient: diluted shares 64.6M → 81.2M (+25.7% in four years, ~5.9% CAGR), SBC at 22.3% of revenue (~$549M/yr), and buybacks recapture only 18.8% of SBC. Strip SBC out of the $500M FCF and the true owner-economics FCF is roughly breakeven — the 'cash flow inflection' is partly an SBC-funded mirage. Second, the price. $32.5B mcap / $2.46B revenue = ~13x sales on a business growing ~22% with decelerating Atlas consumption, against AI's own model fair value of $280-$310. The insider tape confirms the discomfort: 76 sales, zero open-market buys, and the recent Merriman cluster is a relentless drip on 5/14 and 5/18 with no offsetting P-code prints.
Net: this is a real franchise with a real balance sheet, priced as if the reacceleration is already in the bag. The forensic picture neither confirms 'trap' (no accounting games, no survival risk) nor 'winner' (per-share math + valuation are stretched). Honest mixed.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 8:04pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $873.8M | $1.3B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $259.5M | $349.3M | $424.5M | $535.3M | $696.1M |
| Gross Profit | $614.3M | $934.7M | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $903.7M | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.9B |
| Operating Income | -$289.4M | -$346.7M | -$233.7M | -$216.1M | -$137.0M |
| Net Income | -$306.9M | -$345.4M | -$176.6M | -$129.1M | -$71.2M |
| EBITDA | -$267.1M | -$294.3M | -$122.3M | -$96.5M | -$29.3M |
| EPS | $-4.75 | $-5.03 | $-2.48 | $-1.73 | $-0.88 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 7:59pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $473.9M | $455.8M | $803.0M | $490.1M | $1.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.9B | $3.1B |
| Total Assets | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.4B | $3.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $526.7M | $588.5M | $564.2M | $562.0M | $669.5M |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $0 | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $648.1M | $806.5M |
| Total Equity | $666.7M | $739.5M | $1.1B | $2.8B | $3.0B |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.2B | -$1.5B | -$1.7B | -$1.8B | -$1.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 8:04pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $7.0M | -$13.0M | $121.5M | $150.2M | $505.1M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$8.1M | -$7.2M | -$6.1M | -$29.6M | -$5.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$1.1M | -$20.2M | $115.4M | $120.6M | $500.2M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$4.5M | $0 | -$15.0M | $0 | -$2.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$400.3M |
| Net Change in Cash | $44.2M | -$18.1M | $347.3M | -$310.9M | $593.9M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 7:56pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$3.5B $3.4B – $3.6B
|
$4.2B $4.1B – $4.2B
|
$4.8B $4.8B – $5.0B
|
$5.7B $5.6B – $5.9B
|
| EBITDA |
$960.1M $943.0M – $982.8M
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.2B
|
$1.3B $1.3B – $1.4B
|
$1.6B $1.5B – $1.6B
|
| Net Income |
$593.3M $583.1M – $603.5M
|
$241.1M $154.6M – $1.5B
|
$1.3B $1.2B – $1.3B
|
$1.0B $1.0B – $1.1B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 8:04pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +47.0% | +31.1% | +19.2% | +22.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +52.2% | +34.6% | +16.9% | +20.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | -19.8% | +32.6% | +7.6% | +36.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -12.6% | +48.9% | +26.9% | +44.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -10.2% | +58.4% | +21.1% | +69.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 8:03pm (25d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-17 | Cochran Hope F | M-Exempt | 3,916.00 | $7.58 | $29,683 |
| 2026-06-17 | Cochran Hope F | S-Sale | 1,566.00 | $344.05 | $538,782 |
| 2026-06-17 | Cochran Hope F | M-Exempt | 3,916.00 | $7.58 | $29,683 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 198.00 | $345.42 | $68,393 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 309.00 | $346.19 | $106,973 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 223.00 | $347.55 | $77,504 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 650.00 | $348.74 | $226,681 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 899.00 | $349.59 | $314,281 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 1,142.00 | $350.62 | $400,408 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 477.00 | $351.51 | $167,670 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 98.00 | $352.51 | $34,546 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 252.00 | $353.85 | $89,170 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 127.00 | $354.84 | $45,065 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 85.00 | $355.65 | $30,230 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 48.00 | $356.65 | $17,119 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 108.00 | $357.91 | $38,654 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 113.00 | $359.35 | $40,607 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 29.00 | $360.67 | $10,459 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 105.00 | $362.22 | $38,033 |
| 2026-06-16 | BERRY MICHAEL J | S-Sale | 134.00 | $363.07 | $48,651 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Starting from the raw tape: FY26 revenue $2.46B vs FY22 $873.8M is a 29% four-year CAGR, not the 47% the pre-flight memo claims, and the more relevant number is the deceleration — recent YoY is 22.8% and the latest two quarters ($687.6M and $695.1M) are essentially flat sequentially. Gross margin holds at 71.7%, and the operating loss narrowed from -$346.7M (FY23) to -$137M (FY26), so the operating leverage story is real. FCF of $500M on $2.46B revenue is a 20% FCF margin — that's the genuinely impressive datapoint and it's why the stock isn't $200. But sequential revenue stalling at ~$690M is the single most important number on this page and it directly contradicts the "category-defining platform compounding at 25-30%" narrative the synthesis is leaning on.
On valuation: $32.5B market cap / $500M FCF = 65x trailing FCF, and EV/Revenue of ~12x on a business decelerating through 20% YoY is not "priced for success not perfection" — it's priced for re-acceleration that isn't visible in the quarterly print. The synthesis verdict ("High Conviction Required") is doing a lot of euphemistic work; what it actually means is "expensive unless you believe three things that aren't in the numbers." I'd push harder than the synthesis did. If MongoDB grows 20% for three years and reaches ~25% FCF margins, you get ~$4.25B revenue and ~$1.06B FCF in FY29 — at a generous 30x FCF that's $32B, i.e., zero return from here over three years. The bull case requires either growth re-acceleration above 25% or a terminal multiple above 35x sustained FCF, both of which the market-forces signal (hyperscaler share loss) and the decelerating quarterly trend argue against.
Where I diverge from the prior models: the narrative layer calls this "platform-monopoly / unanchored" — I think that's overstated. MongoDB is not a monopoly in any segment; PostgreSQL with pgvector is eating the low end, DynamoDB owns AWS-native workloads, and Snowflake/Databricks own the analytics layer. Atlas is a real business but it's a strong product in a fragmenting market, not a Visa-like toll booth. The market-forces "Neutral" call is too generous given it simultaneously flags "accelerating market share loss to hyperscalers" — those two statements don't reconcile. The insider activity (ten S-Sales clustered on 2026-05-14) is consistent with scheduled 10b5-1 plans but the cluster timing right after the strong Q4/Q1 prints is worth noting; nobody is buying. The contrarian argument worth taking seriously is the opposite one: MongoDB just printed two quarters of GAAP profitability ($15.5M and $4.4M) and $500M FCF — if AI-driven vector workloads inflect Atlas consumption in FY27, the decel narrative breaks and the stock re-rates. That's a real call option, but it's an option, not a base case.
Data quality flags: the ev_to_ebitda of -3117 is noise, ignore it. ROE/ROIC TTM negatives are stale relative to the now-positive quarterly NI trajectory — the company is at the inflection where TTM ratios mislead. Balance sheet is missing total debt and equity in the tile, which matters for a name where stock-based comp is likely the real cost — $500M FCF with heavy SBC dilution is a lower-quality $500M than it looks, and the "Poor Cash Flow Quality" secondary signal is pointing at exactly this. The revenue confidence flag ("decelerating") is the one signal I'd weight most heavily; it aligns with the sequential print and undermines the platform-monopoly narrative more than any competitive analysis. Net: I dissent mildly from the synthesis's "High Conviction Required" framing — that's a hold-in-disguise. The numbers say overvalued by 25-35% relative to a realistic 18-22% growth + 22% FCF margin trajectory; fair value sits closer to $280-$310, and you need either a vector-search inflection or a multiple compression entry to make this work.
GPT Critique
In reviewing MongoDB's financial data, what stands out to me is its significant revenue growth trajectory over the past few years, with FY26 revenue reaching $2.46 billion from $873.8 million in FY22. This translates to a 29% four-year CAGR, which is remarkable but slightly lower than the 47% CAGR claimed in the pre-flight analysis. However, it's the recent sequential stagnation in revenue—$687.6 million followed by $695.1 million—that poses a concern, suggesting a potential plateau in growth momentum. MongoDB's gross margin is robust at 71.7%, but the company's journey towards profitability is still unfolding, evident from an operating loss of $137 million in FY26, albeit much improved from previous years. The $500 million free cash flow on $2.46 billion in revenue, yielding a 20% FCF margin, is indeed a strength, reflecting effective cash management despite ongoing net losses.
I agree with Claude Opus's assessment that MongoDB is currently overvalued given its decelerating revenue growth and high valuation multiples. Opus's critique of the synthesis's "High Conviction Required" stance is apt; the valuation demands belief in a growth re-acceleration that isn't evident in the current numbers. The market is pricing MongoDB at a premium, expecting either a growth rebound or substantial FCF margin expansion to justify a 65x trailing FCF multiple, which seems optimistic without clear catalysts. Opus rightly points out the competitive pressures from other database solutions like PostgreSQL and AWS's DynamoDB, which challenge MongoDB's market dominance narrative.
Where I diverge slightly from Opus is on the market narrative's classification as "platform-monopoly." While Opus suggests this is overstated, I see the potential for MongoDB to consolidate its position through AI-driven applications and vector search capabilities, potentially leading to a re-acceleration in growth. The recent quarters of GAAP profitability also offer a glimmer of hope that MongoDB could pivot more decisively towards sustained profitability if these new avenues gain traction.
A careful skeptic of both our views might argue that the insider selling activity, although clustered, isn't necessarily indicative of insider pessimism given the potential for preset 10b5-1 plans. Additionally, they might contend that MongoDB's strategic investments in AI and multi-cloud capabilities could eventually pay off, positioning the company to capture a larger share of the expanding database-as-a-service TAM, which could justify its high valuation in the long run.