Business Description
AstraZeneca PLC operates as a global biopharmaceutical leader, dedicated to the entire process of bringing prescription medicines to market, from their initial discovery and development through manufacturing and commercialization. The company's extensive portfolio of treatments, including prominent examples like Tagrisso, Farxiga, and Symbicort, addresses critical areas such as cardiovascular, renal, metabolic, and oncological conditions. Furthermore, it provides essential solutions for COVID-19 and various rare diseases, with products like Vaxzevria and Soliris. AstraZeneca engages with primary and specialty care physicians worldwide, facilitating distribution through a robust network of representatives and local offices across the United Kingdom, continental Europe, the Americas, Asia, Africa, and Australasia. The firm actively drives innovation through strategic collaborations, partnering with entities such as Neurimmune AG for the development and commercialization of NI006, BenevolentAI for systemic lupus erythematosus drug discovery, Lunit for AI-powered digital pathology risk assessment in NSCLC, and Absci Corporation for AI-driven oncology target identification. Founded in 1992, the company was initially known as Zeneca Group PLC, subsequently rebranding to AstraZeneca PLC in April 1999, and maintains its headquarters in Cambridge, United Kingdom.
Business History
Generated: Jun 25, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.60
Total Equity: $48.67B
Shares: 1,562,000,000
Total Debt: $27.90B
Cash: $5.71B
EBITDA: $19.83B
Total Debt: $27.90B
Cash: $5.71B
Revenue: $58.74B
Revenue: $58.74B
Revenue: $58.74B
Total Equity: $48.67B
Tax Rate: 17.5%
Equity: $48.67B
Total Debt: $27.90B
Cash: $5.71B
Current Liabilities: $30.62B
Long-Term Debt: $24.72B
Total Debt: $27.90B
Total Equity: $48.67B
Shares: 1,562,000,000
Shares: 1,562,000,000
CapEx: -$5.91B
Shares: 1,562,000,000
Stock Price: $183.02
Net Income: $10.26B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Revenue grew from 37.4B in 2021 to 58.7B in 2025 (about 12% CAGR), with gross margin expanding from 66.8% to 81.9% and operating margin stepping up from 2.8% to 23.4%. Net income scaled from 0.1B to 10.3B while FCF rose from 3.8B to 8.7B, indicating real operating leverage rather than accounting flattery. Earnings-quality checks back this up: accruals -5% of assets, OCF/NI 12.2x, Beneish M -2.33, Altman Z 3.63 (safe) - no mechanical red flags. Balance sheet is the soft spot: net debt of roughly 22B against only 5.7B liquid cash (cash/mktcap 2%), a legacy in part of the Alexion deal era. With 8.7B annual FCF this is comfortably serviceable, so debt is a constraint not a threat. Dilution is mild but persistent - diluted shares went from 1.43B to 1.56B (about 2.3% CAGR), a real per-share headwind, though SBC as a % of revenue is negligible. Insider tape shows only routine awards and a single 2.2M sale by one officer - no directional signal. Overall this reads as a well-run, durable large-cap pharma with strengthening profitability and clean earnings, not a fortress only because of the net debt load.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Pipeline concentration and patent cliff timing for top oncology and rare-disease franchises (Tagrisso, Farxiga, Soliris/Ultomiris).
- Debt maturity ladder and weighted cost of debt to confirm the 22B net debt is comfortably termed out.
- R&D capitalization vs. expensing policy and any non-GAAP adjustments behind the reported operating margin jump.
- Recent M&A and licensing commitments that could increase leverage or share issuance.
- Geographic and product concentration risk, especially China exposure and any pricing/reimbursement headwinds.
The e2e composite pegs deserved value at $134 (signal-adjusted $129) against a $183 print - roughly 30-37% above fair. The DCF at $159 is the most generous credible input and still sits ~13% below price; the EPV floor of $73 confirms that a meaningful chunk of today's cap is pipeline/growth optionality rather than steady-state earnings. The anchored P/E of $147 corroborates the DCF read that the multiple has run ahead of the earnings stream.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Tagrisso and Farxiga LOE timing and biosimilar erosion curves
- Pipeline NPV assumptions baked into DCF terminal growth
- Forward operating margin guidance vs the expansion already in the model
- M&A capital allocation - any large deal would reset the FV math
The macro tape is mildly cautious (S&P off 3.3%, VIX 18.6, 10y at 4.41%) but AZN's 0.21 beta means the tape barely registers here. In a neutral-to-jittery market, large-cap defensive pharma with durable cash flows tends to catch a bid as capital rotates away from high-beta tech (today's headlines literally show 'Wall Street tech sells off' while FTSE 100 grinds higher) - that rotation lands squarely in AZN's lap. The active narrative is platform-monopoly, strong intensity, durable - exactly the kind of story that holds up when risk appetite softens. News flow is constructive and on-message: Ultomiris label expansion in rare disease, a high-profile YMCA cancer-care partnership reinforcing the oncology halo, and inclusion in 'best weight-loss drug' lists keep AZN tied to multiple in-favor therapeutic narratives (oncology, rare disease, GLP-1 adjacency). Analyst tone is the one soft spot: Buy consensus but a meaningful Hold/Sell tail (15H/6S) and the target ($186.67) essentially pinned to spot - zero revisions this month. That signals the sell side sees the story as fully priced, capping near-term multiple expansion even as the narrative pressure stays positive.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any Tagrisso/Farxiga patent or biosimilar headlines that could crack the durability story
- Sell-side target revisions post next oncology readout - silence here is the bigger risk than a downgrade
- Whether the tech-to-defensive rotation persists or reverses on a VIX cool-down
- Pipeline trial readouts that either validate or undercut the platform-monopoly narrative
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:04am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $37.4B | $44.4B | $45.8B | $54.1B | $58.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $12.4B | $12.4B | $8.3B | $10.2B | $10.6B |
| Gross Profit | $25.0B | $32.0B | $37.5B | $43.9B | $48.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $23.9B | $28.2B | $29.4B | $33.9B | $34.4B |
| Operating Income | $1.1B | $3.8B | $8.2B | $10.0B | $13.7B |
| Net Income | $112.0M | $3.3B | $6.0B | $7.0B | $10.3B |
| EBITDA | $5.1B | $9.1B | $13.4B | $15.4B | $19.8B |
| EPS | $0.08 | $2.12 | $3.81 | $2.27 | $6.60 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $6.3B | $6.2B | $5.8B | $5.5B | $5.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $26.2B | $22.6B | $25.1B | $25.8B | $28.7B |
| Total Assets | $105.4B | $96.5B | $101.1B | $104.0B | $114.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $22.6B | $26.3B | $30.5B | $27.9B | $30.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $28.1B | $23.0B | $22.4B | $26.5B | $24.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $66.1B | $59.4B | $62.0B | $63.2B | $65.4B |
| Total Equity | $39.3B | $37.0B | $39.1B | $40.8B | $48.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.7B | -$574.0M | $4.5B | $3.2B | $11.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 2:57pm (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $6.0B | $9.8B | $10.3B | $11.9B | $14.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.2B | -$2.6B | -$3.8B | -$4.6B | -$5.9B |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.8B | $7.2B | $6.6B | $7.3B | $8.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$9.4B | -$1.1B | -$1.2B | -$3.9B | -$1.2B |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.5B | -$55.0M | -$346.0M | -$208.0M | $269.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$67.9B $64.5B – $69.7B
|
$72.3B $71.9B – $72.7B
|
$77.6B $73.1B – $79.9B
|
$83.1B $78.3B – $85.5B
|
| EBITDA |
$35.2B $33.4B – $36.1B
|
$37.5B $37.3B – $37.7B
|
$40.2B $37.9B – $41.4B
|
$43.1B $40.6B – $44.3B
|
| Net Income |
$14.1B $10.4B – $20.0B
|
$16.1B $15.0B – $22.6B
|
$23.6B $21.8B – $24.5B
|
$26.4B $24.4B – $27.4B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:04am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +18.5% | +3.3% | +18.0% | +8.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +27.9% | +17.5% | +16.8% | +9.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | +255.8% | +118.1% | +22.1% | +37.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +2,835.7% | +81.1% | +18.1% | +45.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | +77.7% | +47.7% | +15.0% | +28.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:04am (2d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-08 | Sharma Mani | A-Award | 1.00 | $179.75 | $180 |
| 2026-05-20 | Sharma Mani | S-Sale | 11,893.00 | $185.78 | $2.2M |
| 2026-05-06 | Sharma Mani | A-Award | 1.00 | $186.28 | $186 |
| 2026-04-07 | Sharma Mani | A-Award | 1.00 | $196.03 | $196 |
| 2026-03-18 | Sharma Mani | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Sharma Mani | 2,996.31 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Sharma Mani | 31.30 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2028-12-01 | Sharma Mani | 195.00 | $123.98 | $24,176 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 2:57pm (2d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-02-20 | $2.17 | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-20 | 2026-03-23 |
| 2025-08-08 | $0.52 | 2025-07-29 | 2025-08-08 | 2025-09-08 |
| 2025-02-21 | $1.05 | 2025-02-06 | 2025-02-21 | 2025-03-24 |
| 2024-08-09 | $0.50 | 2024-07-25 | 2024-08-09 | 2024-09-09 |
| 2024-02-22 | $0.99 | 2024-02-08 | 2024-02-23 | 2024-03-25 |
| 2023-08-10 | $0.47 | 2023-07-28 | 2023-08-11 | 2023-09-11 |
| 2023-02-23 | $0.97 | 2023-02-09 | 2023-02-24 | 2023-03-27 |
| 2022-08-11 | $0.46 | 2022-08-01 | 2022-08-12 | 2022-09-12 |
| 2022-02-24 | $0.97 | 2022-02-10 | 2022-02-25 | 2022-03-28 |
| 2021-08-12 | $0.44 | 2021-07-30 | 2021-08-13 | 2021-09-13 |
| 2021-02-25 | $0.95 | 2021-02-12 | 2021-02-26 | 2021-03-29 |
| 2020-08-13 | $0.44 | 2020-07-30 | 2020-08-14 | 2020-09-14 |
| 2020-02-27 | $0.95 | 2020-02-18 | 2020-02-28 | 2020-03-30 |
| 2019-08-08 | $0.45 | 2019-07-29 | 2019-08-09 | 2019-09-09 |
| 2019-02-28 | $0.95 | 2019-02-14 | 2019-03-01 | 2019-03-27 |
| 2018-08-09 | $0.45 | 2018-07-26 | 2018-08-10 | 2018-09-10 |
| 2018-02-15 | $0.95 | 2018-02-02 | 2018-02-16 | 2018-03-19 |
| 2017-08-09 | $0.45 | 2017-07-28 | 2017-08-11 | 2017-09-11 |
| 2017-02-15 | $0.95 | 2017-02-02 | 2017-02-17 | 2017-03-20 |
| 2016-08-10 | $0.45 | 2016-07-28 | 2016-08-12 | 2016-09-12 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue went $12.94B → $13.59B → $14.46B → $15.19B → $15.50B → $15.29B over six quarters, a clean ~18% YoY run rate at the recent end, decelerating slightly sequentially in the March 2026 quarter. Net income is lumpier — $1.43B, $1.50B, $2.92B, $2.45B, $2.53B, $2.33B, $3.08B — but the annual progression is unambiguous: NI went from $112M (2021) to $3.29B → $5.96B → $7.04B → $10.26B. That's a 4-year tripling of net income on a 57% revenue increase, meaning operating leverage is real: op margin went from 2.8% (2021) to 23.4% (2025). Gross margin sits at 82%, FCF $8.67B on $14.58B OCF. This is not a "mature earner" coasting — it's a business that's been re-rating its own earnings power.
So I disagree with the synthesis verdict that fair value is $128.98 (a 30% haircut). That model appears to anchor on a DCF with conservative terminal assumptions and treats the recent earnings ramp as cyclical rather than structural. At $183 and a $284B cap, AZN trades at ~28x trailing FCF and ~26x TTM earnings — for a business compounding earnings 31% CAGR with 82% gross margins and accelerating revenue, that's not obviously rich versus LLY (~35x), NVO (~22x post-derate), or MRK (~14x but with Keytruda cliff). The narrative model's framing — "$55B of premium beyond conservative fundamentals" — is more honest: it acknowledges the DCF is conservative. The thesis evaluator's "25.3% implied FCF growth" hurdle is the right way to frame it, and given trailing FCF CAGR is 14.9% and earnings CAGR is 31%, that hurdle is demanding but not absurd.
The contrarian case I'd actually press: pharma earnings inflections this sharp usually compress when (a) a blockbuster faces LOE, (b) FX tailwinds reverse — AZN reports in USD but earns globally, and the weak dollar through 2025 likely flattered the print, (c) the oncology pricing environment in the US softens under IRA negotiation expansion. Tagrisso faces composition-of-matter expiry around 2032 but generic erosion modeling typically starts pricing 3-4 years prior. Farxiga is already in IRA negotiation. The Q1 2026 sequential revenue dip ($15.50B → $15.29B) and the "decelerating" quarterly trend flag are the first cracks in the supercycle narrative — small, but worth watching. Current ratio of 0.94 and undisclosed total debt are mild concerns; a pharma with $5.7B cash and $8.7B FCF servicing what's likely $25-30B in net debt is fine, but not a fortress.
Insider activity is essentially noise — a single 11,893 share sale in May 2026 against tiny award grants tells me nothing, and the 2028-dated entry is a data error worth flagging. The "macro headwinds" and "below sector benchmarks" secondary signals don't move me much given the absolute numbers are strong. Where I land: the synthesis model's $129 fair value is too pessimistic — it's pricing AZN like 2022 AZN, not 2025/2026 AZN. But the narrative-implied $183 requires believing the 31% earnings CAGR doesn't mean-revert toward the 13% revenue CAGR, which it eventually must. Splitting the difference: fair value in the $160-170 range on a blended 22-24x forward earnings multiple, implying ~10% downside, not 30%. Not cheap enough to buy, not expensive enough to short or trim aggressively if held. The Q2 2026 print is the tell — if revenue re-accelerates above $15.5B and margins hold above 18%, the bull narrative survives; another sequential decline and the multiple compresses fast.
GPT Critique
In examining AstraZeneca's financials, I see a company that has significantly enhanced its profitability profile over the past few years. The revenue has grown from $37.42 billion in 2021 to $58.74 billion in 2025, a substantial increase of approximately 57%. More striking, however, is the tripling of net income from $3.29 billion in 2022 to $10.26 billion in 2025, demonstrating robust operating leverage. This shift is underscored by a rise in operating margins from a mere 2.8% in 2021 to 23.4% in 2025, reflecting a transition from a lower-margin operation to a high-margin business. The company's gross margin of 82% further emphasizes its strong pricing power and operational efficiency.
Opus argues that AstraZeneca is "modestly overvalued," suggesting a fair value of $160-$170 versus the current price of $183. I agree with this assessment to an extent, as the high P/E ratio of approximately 27x TTM earnings does seem steep for a company facing potential headwinds such as patent cliffs and regulatory pricing pressures. However, the comparison with peers like Eli Lilly and Merck shows AstraZeneca's valuation is not excessively out of line, given its superior earnings growth trajectory. Opus rightly points out the potential risks of mean reversion in earnings growth, and I concur that the 31% earnings CAGR is unlikely to be sustainable indefinitely. However, the company's strong cash flow generation, evidenced by a $8.67 billion FCF, provides a buffer against some of these risks.
I disagree with Opus's dismissal of the valuation synthesis verdict that suggests a fair value of $128.98. While this figure appears conservative, it highlights the importance of anchoring valuations in fundamental cash flow metrics, particularly in a high-stakes sector like pharmaceuticals where narrative-driven premiums can evaporate quickly. Opus notes the sequential revenue dip from $15.50 billion to $15.29 billion in Q1 2026 as a potential warning sign. I agree that this warrants attention, as it could indicate early signs of growth deceleration, especially in the context of macroeconomic uncertainties and sector-specific challenges such as the Inflation Reduction Act's impact on drug pricing.
A cautious skeptic might argue that both Opus's and my assessments underestimate the potential impact of AstraZeneca's pipeline and M&A strategies. The company has a history of successful drug development and strategic acquisitions, which could counterbalance the risks of patent expiration and competitive pressures. Furthermore, the demographic trends favoring increased demand for healthcare products could sustain growth longer than anticipated. However, the skeptic would also point out the persistent macro headwinds and sector-wide regulatory challenges that could constrain margins and growth prospects more severely than currently priced in.