For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for AppLovin Corporation Class A Common Stock (APP) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score -8 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 83 · Value -68 · Sentiment -64 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $147.86 vs $321.54 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
AppLovin Corporation Class A Common Stock
APP NASDAQAppLovin Corporation Class A Common Stock represents equity in AppLovin Corporation, a Palo Alto, California-based advertising technology company. The company develops and operates software and artificial intelligence-powered marketing solutions that help businesses reach, measure, and monetize audiences across mobile and connected TV environments. Its current product suite includes tools for user acquisition, in-app monetization, campaign management, analytics, and streaming-advertising distribution, serving advertisers, app developers, publishers, and digital content companies. AppLovin’s business is organized around advertising technology and app-related services, giving it a role in both the demand and supply sides of digital advertising. The Class A common stock is the company’s primary publicly traded equity class and is used by investors to gain exposure to its operating performance and capital structure.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Jun 30, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 13.01
Total Equity: $3.16B
Shares: 338,911,333
Total Debt: $3.52B
Cash: $3.05B
EBITDA: $5.42B
Total Debt: $3.52B
Cash: $3.05B
Revenue: $6.83B
Revenue: $6.83B
Revenue: $6.83B
Total Equity: $3.16B
Tax Rate: 15.4%
Equity: $3.16B
Total Debt: $3.52B
Cash: $3.05B
Current Liabilities: $1.25B
Long-Term Debt: $3.52B
Total Debt: $3.52B
Total Equity: $3.16B
Shares: 338,911,333
Shares: 338,911,333
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 338,911,333
Stock Price: $321.54
Net Income: $4.41B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 17, 2026 5:00pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.8B | $2.8B | $3.3B | $4.7B | $5.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $988.1M | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $665.1M |
| Gross Profit | $1.8B | $1.6B | $2.2B | $3.5B | $4.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $663.7M |
| Operating Income | $150.0M | -$47.8M | $648.2M | $1.9B | $4.2B |
| Net Income | $35.4M | -$192.7M | $356.7M | $1.6B | $3.3B |
| EBITDA | $581.1M | $499.3M | $1.1B | $2.3B | $4.3B |
| EPS | $0.10 | $-0.52 | $1.01 | $4.68 | $9.84 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.09 | $-0.52 | $0.98 | $4.53 | $9.75 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 17, 2026 5:00pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | — | $1.1B | $502.2M | $741.4M | $2.5B |
| Total Current Assets | — | $1.9B | $1.6B | $2.3B | $4.4B |
| Total Assets | — | $5.8B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $7.3B |
| Current Liabilities | — | $579.0M | $944.1M | $1.1B | $1.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | $3.2B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $3.6B |
| Total Liabilities | — | $3.9B | $4.1B | $4.8B | $5.1B |
| Total Equity | — | $1.9B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $2.1B |
| Retained Earnings | — | -$1.2B | -$813.0M | $599.2M | $1.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 17, 2026 5:00pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $361.9M | $412.8M | $1.1B | $2.1B | $4.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.4M | $-662,000 | -$4.2M | -$4.8M | — |
| Free Cash Flow | $360.5M | $412.1M | $1.1B | $2.1B | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.2B | -$1.3B | -$63.9M | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$719.8M | -$25.8M | -$102.7M | $389.6M | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$338.9M | -$1.2B | -$981.3M | -$2.2B |
| Net Change in Cash | $2.3B | -$1.5B | -$578.3M | $239.3M | $1.7B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 17, 2026 5:00pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +0.9% | +16.5% | +43.4% | +16.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -13.5% | +42.5% | +59.3% | +35.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -131.9% | +1,456.3% | +189.0% | +121.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -643.8% | +285.1% | +342.9% | +111.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | -14.1% | +127.8% | +104.2% | +87.2% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-02 02:03A +1σ run of quarters pays -50%; a −1σ run costs 86%. Ratio -0.6:1 (μ 40.8%, σ 40.3% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 0.0 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($321.54) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +82% | 35.0% | $324.32 | +1% |
| Base — stabilizes | +55% | 35.0% | $179.49 | -44% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +27% | 35.0% | $92.87 | -71% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -21% | 35.0% | $23.47 | -93% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +50% | 35.0% | $161.02 | -50% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +1% | 35.0% | $45.04 | -86% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-17 17:11The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw print is genuinely spectacular: TTM revenue tracks to roughly $6.83B ($1.92+$1.84+$1.66+$1.41B) vs $5.27B a year prior — 30% YoY — and TTM net income of ~$4.42B implies a 64.7% net margin. Sequential quarterly revenue has climbed every quarter for six straight (ex the Q4-24 anomaly, which reflects the divested apps business rolling off). Operating margin at the annual line went from -1.7% (2022) to 75.7% (2025) — that is not a normal mature-earner curve, it is what happens when a high-fixed-cost algorithmic platform crosses scale and sheds a hardware/games segment. The rule-based "mature earner" tag is wrong; pre-flight's "high-growth" is right. ROIC of 1.23 and ROE of 2.04 as shown are nonsensical numbers — those are almost certainly reported as multiples (123% ROIC, 204% ROE), which is consistent with $4.42B NI on $2.13B equity and reinforces just how capital-light this is.
Now the pushback. At $321.54 and $108B market cap, the stock trades at ~24.5x TTM earnings and ~15.8x TTM revenue. For a business compounding earnings above 80% YoY with 65% net margins and $4B+ operating cash flow, 24x earnings is not obviously expensive — it's actually cheap relative to any software comp growing half as fast. The synthesis DCF fair value of $148–170 requires believing margins mean-revert hard and growth collapses to mid-single-digits fast; that's the bear case, not a base case. The thesis-evaluation framing ("60% margin is peak-cycle artifact") is the right worry but the quarterly data doesn't corroborate mean reversion — Q2-26 margin of 65.8% is the highest print on record, not a fade. If AXON's edge were eroding you'd see it in ARPDAU/take-rate compression showing up as gross margin softening; instead gross margin sits at 88.5%.
The contrarian case that actually bites is not valuation multiple — it's concentration and reflexivity. AppLovin's revenue is heavily tied to a relatively small set of mobile gaming advertisers whose LTV models are themselves calibrated against AXON's own attribution. That's a closed loop that works beautifully until (a) Apple/Google tighten SKAdNetwork or Privacy Sandbox further, (b) a major advertiser cohort saturates and pulls spend, or (c) e-commerce vertical expansion (the growth narrative for 2026-27) underdelivers versus the implied ramp. Insider activity is mixed — the F-InKind and gift transactions here are tax/estate-related, not the "massive insider selling" the market-forces module flags; if there's real selling it's earlier and not in this window. I'd downweight that signal.
Where I land: the synthesis "overvalued -47%" verdict rests on a DCF that under-models both the operating leverage still visible in the quarterly cadence and the reinvestment optionality of $4B annual OCF against $1.1B net debt. But the thesis-eval bear-mass tilt is directionally right that any price above ~$300 assumes the AXON edge holds for 4-5+ years — a real bet, not a free lunch. At 24x earnings on a business printing 30% top-line and 80% bottom-line growth, I can't call this overvalued; I can call it priced for continued execution with a fat left tail if the algorithm advantage compresses. A fair-value range of $260-360 seems defensible depending on whether you haircut the margin to 50% (bear) or hold 60%+ (base). Current $321 sits in the upper half of that range — fairly valued to modestly rich, not the -47% mispricing the composite claims. I dissent from the synthesis verdict on magnitude while acknowledging the risk profile it's flagging.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not just that AppLovin is growing fast, but that the income statement has become almost absurdly efficient. On a trailing twelve-month basis through 2026-06-30, revenue is about $6.83B from quarterly sales of $1.41B, $1.66B, $1.84B, and $1.92B, up roughly 47% versus the prior TTM of about $4.65B. Net income over the same span is about $4.42B, implying a 64.6% net margin, and operating margin is flagged at 77.4%. Those are software-monopoly margins appearing inside ad-tech, which is why the stock still commands $108B despite having already corrected from prior highs. The recent quarterly progression also matters: revenue rose sequentially every quarter from $1.41B to $1.92B, while net income climbed from $835.5M to $1.27B. This does not look like a business rolling over. The core fact a bear has to explain away is that AppLovin has converted incremental revenue into extraordinary profit at scale, and cash generation supports it: 2025 operating cash flow was $3.97B against $5.48B of revenue.
But valuation is now asking investors to underwrite those extraordinary economics as durable rather than merely current. At $321.54, the stock trades at 24.7x trailing earnings, which superficially is not crazy for a business growing revenue ~47% and earnings ~80%+. The problem is that the “E” itself appears unusually elevated. Quarterly net margins of 59.5%-66.5% are so far above normal ad platform economics that I have a hard time capitalizing them at face value. Even if AppLovin has built a real algorithmic edge, ad-tech advantages tend to attract budget shifts, competition, copycats, and platform dependence risk. On TTM revenue of $6.83B, the company trades at roughly 15.8x sales and 16.0x EV/revenue. For that to be cheap, you have to believe today’s 65% net margin is not peak-ish but sustainable or even expandable. I don’t. If normalized net margin were, say, 35%-45% instead of mid-60s, the apparent P/E cheapness disappears quickly.
The balance sheet is healthier than many critics will admit, which is why I’m not outright bearish on the business. Debt of $3.62B against $2.49B of cash is manageable for a company producing billions in earnings and nearly $4B in annual operating cash flow. This is not a speculative AI story burning capital; it is a highly cash-generative platform. Revenue has also re-accelerated versus the annual cadence: 2024 revenue was $4.71B, 2025 was $5.48B, then the TTM through mid-2026 is already $6.83B. So I do not buy the lazy critique that this is merely a “mature earner” with no runway. The business may well deserve a premium multiple because something real has improved operationally. My issue is price, not quality: the market is still paying a premium usually reserved for businesses with both exceptional margins and unquestioned durability, and AppLovin only clearly has the first of those two today.
The best argument against my caution is straightforward: the stock may actually be cheaper than it looks because the business mix has structurally changed faster than conventional valuation frameworks can digest. Annual net income went from $356.7M in 2023 to $1.58B in 2024 to $3.33B in 2025, and the TTM run-rate is already $4.4B+. If AXON/APEX-style optimization is genuinely improving advertiser ROI in a way rivals cannot match, then AppLovin is not an ad intermediary with cyclical margins; it is closer to a scaled decision engine monetizing a proprietary feedback loop. On that view, 24.7x trailing earnings is not expensive at all, especially with gross margin near 88% and sequential revenue growth still strong. I weigh that argument less heavily because the burden of proof is higher when margins move to levels that imply near-frictionless economics in a competitive auction-driven market. Great models in ad-tech can persist, but they rarely stay unchallenged.
What would change my mind in a bullish direction is simple: another two to three quarters showing revenue still compounding above 25%-30% year over year while net margin stays above 55% and operating cash flow tracks earnings without slippage. If AppLovin can push the revenue run-rate toward $8B without margin collapse, then the current multiple is much easier to defend and $321 would not look demanding. What would make me more bearish is revenue decelerating into the teens while margins revert sharply below 50%, because that would reveal how much of today’s valuation rests on peak profitability. For now I think the business is elite, but the stock still embeds too much confidence that these astonishing economics are the new normal.
Grok Reading
AppLovin’s trailing four quarters tell a story the composite models are refusing to price cleanly. Revenue ran $1.41B → $1.66B → $1.84B → $1.92B, a TTM top line of roughly $6.83B, while net income stacked to about $4.42B at a 65% net margin. That is not “ad-tech cyclicality” in any conventional sense; operating margin sits at 77% and gross margin at 88%, with 2025 operating cash flow of $3.97B against $5.48B of revenue. Year-ago comparisons remain explosive—latest quarter revenue up ~52% versus the $1.26B printed in the June 2025 quarter, earnings up ~55%—even after the company shed its games portfolio and became a pure-play AXON/MAX advertising engine. At $321 and a $108B enterprise, the stock trades at ~25× TTM earnings, ~16× sales and ~20× EBITDA. For a business converting nearly every incremental dollar at software-like margins and still growing mid-to-high teens-plus on a multi-billion base, those multiples are ordinary, not euphoric. The 203% ROE and 123% ROIC simply confirm an asset-light machine that needs almost no capital to compound. The rule-based “mature earner” tag and the $170 fair-value anchor both look like they are still modeling the pre-2024 AppLovin.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and quantitative. Sequential growth has already slowed—from +18% in the December quarter to +11% then only +4% in the June 2026 quarter—so the 38% revenue CAGR and 27% recent YoY figures will keep decelerating unless AXON keeps taking share. Net margins above 60% have almost no precedent in advertising and could prove peak-cycle once Apple or Google tighten identity or self-preferential inventory; the single 2024 December quarter that showed $2.10B of revenue at only 28.5% margin is a reminder that mix and one-time items can swing results hard. Debt of $3.62B against $2.13B of book equity produces a 1.1× levered balance sheet and a 34× P/B that will look absurd if earnings power mean-reverts even halfway toward historical ad-tech norms. The valuation committee’s unanimous “overvalued” call and the –47% gap to signal-adjusted fair value of $170 are therefore coherent if you assume mid-single-digit terminal growth and mid-30s margins; under that regime $321 is pricing perfection that the next privacy change or macro ad-spend cut can erase. Insider activity, while mostly gifts and conversions rather than open-market dumps, still nets supply into a stock that has already halved from its $746 high.
I would flip to outright bearish if two consecutive quarters print revenue growth below 15% YoY while net margin compresses under 50%, or if management signals that AXON’s edge is being competed away by Meta or Google’s own bidding models. I would flip aggressively bullish if the next two prints re-accelerate above 35% revenue growth with margins still north of 60%, confirming the platform is still in land-grab mode rather than harvest mode. Until then the raw cash generation at a mid-20s earnings multiple outweighs the narrative-premium warning.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The most glaring contradiction in this dataset is not the valuation multiple, but the fundamental disconnect between the reported profitability and the balance sheet reality. The briefing cites a TTM net margin of 64.6% and an operating margin of 77.4%, which are figures typically reserved for the most efficient software companies in history, yet the balance sheet shows total equity of only $2.13B against a market cap of $108B. This results in a Price-to-Book ratio of 34.5x and an ROE of 203.7%. While high ROE is often a sign of excellence, in this context, it is a mathematical artifact of a balance sheet that has been hollowed out by massive buybacks and debt accumulation. The company is generating $3.97B in operating cash flow, but it is carrying $3.62B in total debt against only $2.49B in cash. The "mature earner" classification assigned by the rule-based model is a dangerous mislabel; this is a high-growth, high-leverage entity that is using its cash flow to shrink its equity base rather than reinvest in a capital-intensive infrastructure. The 65% net margin is not a reflection of operational superiority in the traditional sense, but rather the result of extreme financial engineering and a potentially unsustainable cost structure that has been stripped of its historical overhead.
The revenue trajectory is impressive on the surface—$1.92B in Q2 2026, up from $1.26B a year prior—but the quality of that growth is suspect when viewed against the "platform-monopoly" narrative. The market is pricing AppLovin at 16x EV/Revenue, a multiple that assumes the company is a tollbooth with zero competition. However, the "bear story" cited in the narrative layer is not merely a contrarian view; it is a structural reality. AppLovin is a middleman in a zero-sum game where the ultimate value accrues to the platforms (Apple, Google) and the developers. The 44% revenue CAGR is decelerating in absolute terms as the base grows, and the 60%+ margins are likely peak-cycle artifacts of a mobile gaming boom that is now maturing. The "AI-driven" moat is a narrative premium, not a structural barrier to entry. Meta and Google have superior data sets and distribution channels; AppLovin’s advantage is currently a speed and optimization edge, which is inherently ephemeral in the machine learning arms race. The 50% drawdown from the $746 high is not a correction; it is the market beginning to price in the reality that this "winner-take-most" thesis is fragile.
The strongest case against my bearish read is the sheer velocity of the cash flow generation. $3.97B in operating cash flow is a real, tangible number that supports the current earnings power. If AppLovin can maintain 60%+ net margins, the P/E of 24.7x is not actually expensive for a company growing earnings at 81.5% YoY. The "unusual selling activity" by insiders is a red flag, but it is also a rational response to a stock that has been bid up by momentum and narrative rather than fundamental re-rating. The insiders know the ceiling of this model. However, I weigh the balance sheet risk and the competitive fragility more heavily than the current cash flow. The debt-to-equity ratio of 1.11x is manageable today, but if the "AI moat" erodes and margins compress to a more sustainable 30-40%, the equity base will shrink further, and the leverage will become a significant drag on shareholder value. The market is pricing in perfection, and perfection is a high bar to clear in a competitive ad-tech landscape.
What would change my mind is a clear demonstration of margin durability in a down-cycle. If AppLovin can show that its 60%+ net margins are maintained even as mobile ad spend normalizes or declines, that would prove the "AI moat" is real and not just a cyclical tailwind. Additionally, a significant reduction in debt and a halt to the aggressive buybacks would signal management confidence in the long-term equity value rather than short-term EPS manipulation. Until then, the stock is a high-risk, high-reward bet on a narrative that is increasingly vulnerable to competitive and structural headwinds.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The financial trajectory is extraordinary: revenue grew from $2.92B (2022) to $6.83B (2026), while gross margin expanded from 62.2% to 88.5% and operating margin exploded from 1% to 77.4%. Net income went from a $105M loss to $4.41B profit, and FCF scaled from $283M to $4.53B - a 16x jump in four years. OCF/NI of 8.76x and negative accruals (-8.2% of assets) indicate reported earnings are more than fully backed by cash, and the Beneish M of -2.25 plus Altman Z of 16.68 show no manipulation flags and fortress-level solvency.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Concentration of ad revenue by top advertisers/customers and mobile gaming exposure
- Sustainability of AXON AI-driven margin expansion - is the 88.5% GM structural or peak-cycle
- Nature of insider selling - 10b5-1 plan disclosures vs discretionary
- Composition and terms of debt driving the net debt position
- Segment breakdown between Apps and Advertising post-portfolio divestitures
The e2e composite pegs deserved value at $147.86 and the signal-adjusted FV at $169.83, implying roughly -47% downside from $321.54. The DCF ($137) and EPV floor ($55) both scream rich; only the anchored P/E ($262) gets within shouting distance, and even that is 19% below spot. Even after generously tilting toward the anchored-PE method to reflect Fortress-grade quality (83) and clean earnings (score 3), a quality-weighted deserved value lands in the $200-230 zone - still 30%+ below the market price.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward ad-spend guidance and APEX take-rate trends in the next 10-Q
- Any disclosure on impact of Apple/Google ad-network competition or iOS attribution changes
- Segment detail on e-commerce vertical ramp - a key bull-case driver
- Buyback pace vs SBC dilution to confirm continued share-count shrink
- Customer concentration and cohort retention in advertiser base
APP is 55% off its high with a beta of 2.49 into a nascent Risk-Off tape (VIX 17.7, S&P off highs, 10y at 5%). That macro setup is designed to punish exactly this profile: a former mania stock (800% peak, still up 400%), platform-monopoly narrative, medium cult coefficient, moderate durability. When the story is intact, high beta cuts both ways; when it is cracking, beta only amplifies the downside. The narrative itself is the biggest force here. The bull case (closed-loop AI adtech monopoly) is being actively contested by the bear case (cyclical middleman, iOS attribution risk, platform encroachment), and the August BofA downgrade questioning the 30% growth target crystallized that doubt into price action. Analyst tone is bifurcated - Street targets still imply ~50-100% upside, but the marginal note is skeptical, and Cramer publicly wobbling on air is the kind of tell that the retail cult is thinning. News flow is mixed-negative: 'why it fell more than the market,' '36% in 3 months,' offset by the Wurl CTV launch and bottom-fisher chatter. Net: the narrative is fading faster than it is being defended, and the tape magnifies it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether any additional sell-side analyst joins BofA in cutting the growth target - a second downgrade would confirm the narrative crack
- Q3 print and guide - the last chance to reassert the 30%+ growth story before the narrative fully fades
- VIX direction and whether the Risk-Off regime deepens or resolves - decisive for a 2.49-beta name
- Retail flow / options positioning to gauge whether the cult is still defending the stock or capitulating
Performance advertising budgets are migrating toward whoever can prove incremental return without third-party identifiers, and that shift rewards closed-loop operators with first-party supply. The macro is a headwind at the margin — a 5% 10-year rate pressures venture-funded app advertisers and discretionary e-commerce spend — but the category is in expansion phase with margins widening across the board, which means AppLovin is growing into a rising, not contracting, pool. The structural question for the world is whether general e-commerce advertisers accept an auction outside the Meta/Google/Amazon triangle; early evidence in the revenue reacceleration says a meaningful minority will, and that is the single variable that determines whether this is a 2-year story or a 5-year one.
When we made this prediction on Sep 18, 2026, APP was $312.92. We expect it to be $225.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $210.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 18, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips up 25%
adjusted_pe
flips up 25%