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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Ingersoll Rand Inc. (IR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Low · Gem Score -19 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 43 · Value -60 · Sentiment -43 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $42.96 vs $79.97 at analysis
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Ingersoll Rand Inc.
IR NYSEIngersoll Rand Inc. is a diversified industrial company that provides mission-critical air, fluid, energy, and medical technologies to customers worldwide. The company focuses on engineered equipment and related services that support essential operations across industries. Its Industrial Technologies and Services segment designs, manufactures, markets, and services air and gas compression systems, vacuum and blower products, fluid transfer equipment, loading systems, power tools, and lifting equipment, along with associated aftermarket parts, consumables, controls, and air treatment solutions. The Precision and Science Technologies segment offers a broad portfolio of pumps, gas boosters, hydrogen compression systems, automated liquid handling systems, odorant injection systems, software, and control solutions for precise dosing, transfer, compression, and flow control. These products serve medical, laboratory, life sciences, industrial manufacturing, water and wastewater, chemical processing, energy, food and beverage, and agriculture markets. Ingersoll Rand Inc. goes to market through an integrated network of direct sales representatives and independent distributors and is headquartered in Davidson, North Carolina, United States.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.45
Total Equity: $10.15B
Shares: 401,000,000
Total Debt: $4.78B
Cash: $1.25B
EBITDA: $1.65B
Total Debt: $4.78B
Cash: $1.25B
Revenue: $7.65B
Revenue: $7.65B
Revenue: $7.65B
Total Equity: $10.15B
Tax Rate: 23.5%
Equity: $10.15B
Total Debt: $4.78B
Cash: $1.25B
Current Liabilities: $2.07B
Long-Term Debt: $4.78B
Total Debt: $4.78B
Total Equity: $10.15B
Shares: 401,000,000
Shares: 401,000,000
CapEx: -$135.60M
Shares: 401,000,000
Stock Price: $78.57
Net Income: $581.40M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 27, 2026 2:23am (41d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.2B | $5.9B | $6.9B | $7.2B | $7.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.2B | $3.6B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.3B |
| Gross Profit | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.2B |
| Operating Income | $565.7M | $817.3M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.1B |
| Net Income | $562.5M | $604.7M | $778.7M | $838.6M | $581.4M |
| EBITDA | $987.8M | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.7B |
| EPS | $1.36 | $1.49 | $1.92 | $2.08 | $1.46 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.34 | $1.47 | $1.90 | $2.06 | $1.45 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 27, 2026 2:00am (41d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.1B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $4.1B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.2B | $4.2B |
| Total Assets | $15.2B | $14.8B | $15.6B | $18.0B | $18.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.4B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $4.8B | $4.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $6.1B | $5.5B | $5.7B | $7.8B | $8.1B |
| Total Equity | $9.1B | $9.3B | $9.8B | $10.2B | $10.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $378.6M | $950.9M | $1.7B | $2.5B | $3.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 27, 2026 2:23am (41d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | — | — | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.4B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$64.1M | -$94.6M | -$105.4M | -$149.1M | -$135.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$974.8M | -$246.8M | -$963.0M | -$3.0B | -$525.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$435.7M | -$655.6M | -$27.6M | $2.1B | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | -$8.2M | -$32.4M | -$32.4M | -$32.3M | -$31.8M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$736.8M | -$261.1M | -$263.0M | -$260.7M | -$1.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | $358.7M | -$496.6M | -$17.5M | -$54.3M | -$292.4M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 27, 2026 2:23am (41d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +14.8% | +16.2% | +5.2% | +5.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +17.0% | +23.9% | +10.0% | +5.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +44.5% | +42.5% | +11.7% | -12.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +7.5% | +28.8% | +7.7% | -30.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +26.6% | +29.9% | +9.8% | -7.4% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 8:18am (42d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-13 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-14 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-04 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-13 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-14 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-15 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-05 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-14 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-15 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-15 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-06 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-17 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-22 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-23 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-28 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-15 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-16 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-19 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-08 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-09 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-05 02:00A +1σ run of quarters pays -63%; a −1σ run costs 78%. Ratio -0.8:1 (μ 7.5%, σ 3.9% floored by sector, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.7 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($79.97) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +13% | 17.3% | $39.02 | -51% |
| Base — stabilizes | +9% | 15.0% | $30.08 | -62% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +4% | 12.8% | $22.74 | -72% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +8% | 10.8% | $21.73 | -73% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +11% | 13.3% | $29.43 | -63% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +4% | 9.6% | $17.46 | -78% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-27 02:52The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Starting from the raw numbers: TTM revenue is roughly $7.95B (2Q26 $2.05B + 1Q26 $1.85B + 4Q25 $2.09B + 3Q25 $1.96B) with TTM net income around $959M ex-the Q2'25 -$115M charge, or ~$844M reported. That gets you to trailing EPS of roughly $2.09-$2.37 on ~388M shares, so the "54x" headline P/E is real but understates normalized earnings — ex-charge you're closer to 33-37x. Still rich for a machinery name, but not the cartoon multiple the synthesis implies. Revenue growth is holding at 5-8% YoY across the last four quarters, margins recovered to 12.5% net in Q2'26 (best print in the series), and FCF conversion at $1.22B on $581M GAAP NI is genuinely strong — the accounting NI is depressed by acquisition amortization, which is why ROE looks like 5.7% while ROIC prints 9.8% and cash generation stays robust. This is not a company falling apart; it's a serial acquirer whose GAAP earnings understate cash economics.
Where I diverge from the synthesis: the $38.50 signal-adjusted fair value implies IR should trade at ~12x EBITDA and ~16x normalized earnings, which is roughly Parker-Hannifin/Dover territory before their own re-ratings. IR's aftermarket mix (~35%+ recurring), 44% gross margins vs. 30-35% for classic diversified industrials, and mid-single-digit organic + M&A algorithm legitimately deserve a premium — just not this premium. My own read anchors fair value at 18-20x EBITDA on $1.7B TTM EBITDA less net debt of $3.53B, so roughly $55-62/share. The $78.57 price embeds ~30-40% narrative premium, not 107%. The Market Forces "deteriorating competitive position" and "debt-fueled acquisition" claims aren't supported in this file — debt/equity is negligible on the tag (0.0001 looks like a data error; real leverage is $4.78B debt / $10.15B equity = 0.47), current ratio 2.06, and FCF covers M&A comfortably. Market Forces looks like it's pattern-matching, not reading the balance sheet.
The contrarian bear case that actually has teeth: earnings CAGR is -13.6% and recent earnings YoY is -30.7%, which the models flag but underweight. Q2'25's -$115M charge tells you something non-recurring hit — likely acquisition-related — but the pattern of GAAP earnings not compounding while revenue does is exactly the "roll-up masking organic weakness" tell. Organic growth ex-M&A is probably 2-3%, not the 5.5% consolidated CAGR. If hydrogen/life-sciences optionality slips (bear narrative), you're left with a low-single-digit organic grower at 20x+ EBITDA — a painful re-rate. The insider "significant buying" tag is misleading: what I see in the file is option exercises and in-kind tax withholding, which is neutral-to-mildly-bearish, not buying. That's a real error in the secondary signals layer. Also worth flagging: the pre-flight and narrative layers contradict each other on company type (traditional mature vs. platform-monopoly narrative) — the truth is a traditional industrial wearing platform clothing, and which layer you believe determines whether $78 is 30% or 100% overvalued.
Net: the models are directionally right that IR is overvalued but the magnitude is overstated because they're anchoring on GAAP EPS instead of FCF and mislabeling insider activity. Fair value in my frame is $55-62 based on 18-20x EBITDA — a premium industrial multiple justified by aftermarket mix and margin structure, but not the current 22x. Downside to $55 is -30%; upside requires the hydrogen/semi cooling thesis to actually convert to revenue within 24 months, which is not visible in the current mix. Q3'26 will matter — if revenue decelerates below 5% YoY and margins can't hold 12%+, the narrative premium collapses fast. I'd wait for either a $60-handle entry or a print that validates the platform thesis; at $78, risk-reward is skewed negative but not disastrous.
GPT Reading
At $78.57, Ingersoll Rand is being priced like a high-quality secular compounder, but the reported economics look much more like a solid industrial roll-up whose earnings base has gotten noisier, not stronger. The headline that jumps out is the mismatch between revenue growth and profit growth. Revenue has risen from $5.15B in 2021 to $7.65B in 2025, a healthy 10% annualized clip over that span, and the last four quarters annualize to roughly $7.95B, so the top line is still moving forward. But net income peaked at $838.6M in 2024 and then fell to $581.4M in 2025 despite higher sales, while operating income also slipped from $1.30B to $1.14B. That is not the pattern you want to see in a stock on 54x earnings and 18.2x EBITDA. Even the quarterly cadence reinforces that concern: the most recent quarter was fine at $2.05B of revenue and $256.8M of net income, but trailing profitability is still distorted by the June 2025 quarter’s $115.3M loss, and recent earnings growth remains materially negative year over year.
The better part of the story is cash flow, and that is why I do not think this is a broken company, only an overvalued one. On 2025 numbers, $1.36B of operating cash flow and $1.22B of free cash flow on just $135.6M of capex confirm this is a capital-light industrial model with real conversion. Gross margin at 43.6% is unusually strong for industrial machinery, and a current ratio above 2.0 plus $1.25B of cash against $4.78B of debt gives the company room to keep doing acquisitions and bolt-ons. But that quality is already more than reflected in the valuation. A $30.5B market cap on roughly $7.6B of sales is 4.1x revenue; for a business with 7.6% net margin, 9.8% ROIC, and 5.5% revenue CAGR, that is rich. If this were a clean mid-teens EPS grower with expanding returns, maybe you could defend a premium. Instead, the data show declining annual earnings, modest recent sales growth of 5.8%, and recent earnings down 30.7%.
What stands out most is that the market seems to be capitalizing a margin-expansion and secular-optionality story that is not evident in the annual income statement. From 2021 to 2024, the operating story was genuinely improving: gross profit climbed from $1.99B to $3.17B and operating income from $565.7M to $1.30B. But 2025 broke that progression. Gross profit increased only modestly to $3.34B while operating income fell by about $160M and net income fell by over $250M. That suggests either acquisition-related noise, restructuring, amortization, or some other non-operating drag — but when the stock is this expensive, investors do not get to hand-wave through an earnings reset. The low reported ROE of 5.7% and ROA of 3.2% are also hard to reconcile with a “hidden elite compounder” narrative. This looks more like a very good business whose quality has been overcapitalized by the market.
The strongest case against my view is straightforward: quarterly results after the 2025 stumble have re-stabilized, and if that ugly June 2025 quarter was truly a one-time accounting or transaction event, then the annual P/E is flattering the bear case by using depressed net income. The last four reported quarters produced about $959M of net income if you sum them directly, which would imply the stock is trading closer to 32x run-rate earnings, not 54x. On that lens, 18x EBITDA for a high-margin, low-capex industrial with recurring aftermarket revenue and strong free cash flow is expensive but not absurd. A bull would also point out that revenue has stepped up from $1.72B in March 2025 to $2.05B in June 2026, and margins in the last three quarters have returned to a 12%-13% range. If management can keep compounding revenue near 6%-8%, tuck in acquisitions, and normalize net margin toward 12%, today’s price may simply be paying up for durability.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2025 was a temporary earnings hole rather than a sign that the business cannot convert revenue growth into higher owner earnings. Specifically, I would want to see two or three more quarters with revenue above $2.0B, net margin sustained at 12%+, and annualized net income above $1.0B without a deterioration in free cash flow. If operating income recovers back above the 2024 level of $1.30B while FCF stays around or above $1.2B, then a premium multiple becomes more defensible. Absent that, I think the stock needs a material de-rating: not because the business is poor, but because the current price assumes a cleaner, faster, and more profitable compounding path than the reported numbers justify.
Grok Reading
The numbers on Ingersoll Rand describe a competent, capital-light industrial franchise that the market has re-rated into fantasy territory. Revenue has compounded at roughly 5.5% from $5.15B in 2021 to $7.65B in 2025, with recent quarterly run-rates still advancing—$2.05B in the June 2026 quarter versus $1.89B a year earlier and $1.85B in the prior quarter. Gross margin holds at 43.6% and free cash flow of $1.22B on only $136M of capex confirms the light asset model and ~16% FCF conversion. That is the attractive part. Everything else undercuts a $30.5B equity value at $78.57. Operating income fell from $1.30B to $1.14B even as sales rose; net income collapsed from $838.6M to $581.4M (dragged by the -$115M June 2025 quarter), producing a -13.6% earnings CAGR and -30.7% recent earnings YoY. ROE sits at 5.7%, ROIC at 9.8%, and net margin at 7.6%. Paying 54x trailing earnings and 18.2x EV/EBITDA for mid-single-digit growth and sub-10% returns on capital is not a quality premium—it is a narrative multiple. At $1.22B of FCF the cash yield is about 4.0%, which is what a slow-growth industrial should yield, not what a 54x PE stock should.
The prior models’ overvalued call and ~$39–46 fair-value range are directionally correct; the gap to $79 is almost pure story. The market is capitalizing hydrogen, life-sciences pumping, and semiconductor cooling optionality as if they already dominate the mix. They do not. The platform-monopoly archetype and “SaaS-like economics” framing are marketing, not the P&L. Debt of $4.78B against $1.25B cash and $10.15B equity is manageable (true D/E roughly 0.47, not the garbled 0.0001 metric), current ratio 2.06 is fine, and the dividend is a rounding error. None of that justifies doubling a DCF anchor. The “significant insider buying” signal is also noise: the last ten filings are option exercises and withhold-to-cover, not open-market accumulation.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward. Gross margins have structurally improved into the mid-40s, aftermarket and service attach rates are sticky, and FCF quality is genuinely high. If the compression and precision-flow franchises keep taking price and the secular end-markets compound faster than the 5–6% corporate average, earnings power could re-accelerate toward the $850M–$1B net-income zone of 2023–24 without needing heroic multiple expansion. EV/EBITDA of 18x is rich versus industrial peers at 12–14x, but not absurd if the market believes IR has already become a higher-quality compounder and rates cooperate. A smart bull also notes that the 2025 earnings trough includes an obvious one-off hit; strip that and the PE compresses, though still not into value territory. I weigh this less because the operating-income decline is real, FCF is already flat-to-down on a multi-year CAGR basis (-2.1%), and nothing in the reported mix yet shows hydrogen or semis becoming large enough to rewrite the growth algorithm. Optionality is not cash flow.
I would flip if trailing-twelve-month net income recovers above ~$900M with operating margins sustained above 16–17%, if management discloses that energy-transition and life-science/semiconductor process equipment together exceed 20% of revenue with double-digit organic growth, or if FCF pushes through $1.6B+ while the multiple compresses toward 14x EBITDA on its own. Absent those, the stock is priced for a story the income statement has not delivered.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Ingersoll Rand runs like a well-oiled industrial platform: revenue grew from $5.15B (2021) to $7.65B (2025), a ~10% CAGR, while gross margin expanded from 38.6% to 43.6% and operating margin from 11% to a peak of 18% in 2024. FCF stepped up from negative in 2021-22 to $1.27B/$1.25B/$1.22B in 2023-25, and OCF/NI at 1.92x with accruals at -3.7% of assets signals genuinely cash-backed earnings. Beneish M of -2.57 and Altman Z of 3.25 (safe zone) show no mechanical red flags. Capital discipline is real: diluted shares fell from 421.2M to 401.0M (-1.2% CAGR), SBC is a modest 0.7% of revenue, and buyback-to-SBC of 770% means management is a net retirer of stock. The blemish is 2025: net income dropped to $581.4M from $838.6M and operating margin compressed to 15% from 18%, even as revenue kept climbing - a warning that either mix, one-timers, or cost pressure is biting. Net debt of $3.54B against $1.25B cash means the balance sheet is workable but not a cushion; interest and M&A capacity depend on continued FCF. Insider tape is mostly option exercises with tax withholding (M/F codes) - not directional - and the single $1M open-market buy is a mild positive but not a signal of unusual conviction.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Drivers of 2025 op-margin compression to 15% and net income drop to $581.4M - one-time charges, acquisition integration, or underlying mix/pricing pressure?
- Debt maturity ladder and rate profile behind the $3.54B net debt position
- Organic vs acquired revenue growth split - how much of the 10% CAGR is M&A driven and what the associated goodwill/intangibles look like
- Customer/end-market concentration in the compression and industrial technology segments
- Identity and role of the single $1M open-market insider buyer
The composite fair value sits at $45.93 and the signal-adjusted at $38.50, implying -52% downside, but that math leans heavily on an EPV floor of $12.32 that looks like a runaway low-end method for a business generating this much cash and is not a credible deserved price. The more defensible anchors are the DCF at $46.11 and the anchored-PE at $79.17. Averaging the two credible anchors puts deserved value near $55-65, versus a price of $79.97 — a clear premium, though not a catastrophic one. The market is paying for a Strong-quality industrial with aftermarket recurring revenue and hydrogen/life-sciences optionality; that narrative is already in the multiple. To justify $80 you need mid-teens EPS compounding sustained for years plus flawless M&A execution — plausible but heroic given 2025's margin/NI slippage. Earnings quality is high, so no additional haircut is warranted, but the quality does not create a discount — it merely defends the DCF anchor. Net: fully valued to modestly rich, not a shorting setup, but no margin of safety for a fresh buyer.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Organic vs M&A revenue split in latest 10-Q to test the compounding story
- Aftermarket/recurring revenue mix and pricing versus volume
- Segment margin trajectory to see if 2025 NI slippage is transitory or structural
- Free cash flow conversion and capital deployment cadence (buybacks vs deals)
The macro tape is mildly supportive - VIX 15, S&P near highs, a nascent risk-on regime - and with a 1.16 beta IR would normally ride that. But the sentiment pressure on THIS name is running the other way. The bull narrative (platform monopoly, hydrogen/life-sci secular tailwinds, aftermarket compounder) is strong but its durability is only moderate and the price is sitting roughly 2x a base-case DCF, meaning the story is doing all the work. When the story is that stretched, even small cracks bite.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether sell-side target revisions turn negative or stay stable through the conference circuit
- Any hydrogen or semi-capex headline that either validates or punctures the platform-tailwind story
- Sector rotation signals - if industrials start lagging materially, IR's premium multiple gets pressured fast
- VIX behavior: a break above 18 would sharply amplify the headwind on a 1.16-beta name priced for perfection
A steady, unspectacular industrial world: no boom, no bust, with pricing and mix supporting industry-wide margin expansion while higher long rates (10y 4.64) squeeze capex approvals and the cost of acquisitive growth. In that world an installed-base annuity business with pricing power grinds out mid-single-digit organic growth and buys a couple more points — respectable, dull, and far from the inflection the price-implied 27.5% demands. The genuine question is not whether IR grows but why a decade of acquired revenue has not compounded into cash earnings; a steady macro removes the excuse of cycle and puts that squarely on conversion.
When we made this prediction on Aug 27, 2026, IR was $79.32. We expect it to be $73.60 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $55.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 27, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips up 25%
adjusted_pe
flips up 25%