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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Oddity Tech Ltd. (ODD) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-12): Designation Low · Gem Score -45 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -14 · Value -65 · Sentiment 42 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $32.45 vs $16.28 at analysis
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Oddity Tech Ltd.
ODD NASDAQOddity Tech Ltd. operates as a consumer tech company specializing in digital-first brands for the beauty and wellness industries worldwide. It leverages an AI-driven online platform powered by data science, machine learning, and computer vision to analyze consumer needs and deliver personalized beauty, wellness, and technology products. The company offers a diverse portfolio under the IL MAKIAGE and SpoiledChild brands, encompassing face and complexion products, eye, brow and lip makeup, tools, skincare, haircare, and supplements. Additionally, through ODDITY LABS, a biotechnology center, it employs AI-based molecule discovery technology to develop novel ingredients that enhance performance and outcomes in beauty and wellness solutions. Oddity Tech Ltd. serves consumers directly via its innovative e-commerce platform, focusing on precision-driven product recommendations and development in the competitive personal care market. Incorporated in 2013 and headquartered in Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel, it plays a key role in transforming how beauty and wellness products are discovered and purchased digitally.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.80
Total Equity: $396.50M
Shares: 61,525,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $402.21M
EBITDA: $129.46M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $402.21M
Revenue: $809.84M
Revenue: $809.84M
Revenue: $809.84M
Total Equity: $396.50M
Tax Rate: 18.4%
Equity: $396.50M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $402.21M
Current Liabilities: $114.83M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $396.50M
Shares: 61,525,000
Shares: 61,525,000
CapEx: -$3.94M
Shares: 61,525,000
Stock Price: $12.29
Net Income: $110.75M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 20, 2026 1:05am (49d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $222.6M | $324.5M | $508.7M | $647.0M | $809.8M |
| Cost of Revenue | $69.4M | $106.5M | $150.5M | $178.7M | $221.1M |
| Gross Profit | $153.2M | $218.1M | $358.2M | $468.3M | $588.7M |
| Operating Expenses | $133.7M | $190.4M | $283.9M | $352.7M | $469.9M |
| Operating Income | $19.5M | $27.7M | $74.3M | $115.6M | $118.8M |
| Net Income | $13.9M | $21.7M | $58.5M | $101.5M | $110.7M |
| EBITDA | $23.5M | $32.1M | $82.9M | $125.4M | $129.5M |
| EPS | $0.26 | $0.41 | $1.06 | $1.77 | $1.95 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.26 | $0.39 | $1.00 | $1.64 | $1.80 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 20, 2026 1:05am (49d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $28.8M | $41.0M | $36.5M | $50.3M | $402.2M |
| Total Current Assets | — | $145.9M | $223.8M | $223.4M | $601.8M |
| Total Assets | — | $216.4M | $404.9M | $438.9M | $1.1B |
| Current Liabilities | — | $90.4M | $109.3M | $124.8M | $114.8M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | — | $105.4M | $121.8M | $156.6M | $741.3M |
| Total Equity | $68.6M | $111.0M | $283.1M | $282.3M | $396.5M |
| Retained Earnings | — | $43.2M | $101.8M | $203.3M | $314.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 20, 2026 1:05am (49d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $10.2M | $39.0M | $87.5M | $137.8M | $87.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.4M | -$2.3M | -$2.1M | -$3.3M | -$3.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | $7.9M | $36.7M | $85.4M | $134.5M | $83.6M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$11.8M | — | -$23.2M | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $-318,000 | $-362,000 | -$4.3M | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | -$147.3M | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$9.2M | $12.2M | -$4.3M | $11.6M | $351.9M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 20, 2026 1:05am (49d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +45.8% | +56.7% | +27.2% | +25.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +42.3% | +64.3% | +30.7% | +25.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | +41.8% | +168.6% | +55.5% | +2.7% |
| Net Income Growth | +56.1% | +169.4% | +73.4% | +9.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +36.4% | +158.5% | +51.3% | +3.2% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-11 10:30Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-10 14:02The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The quarterly tape is the story here, and the models are burying the lede. ODD's Q2'26 revenue of $180.5M is down 25% from Q2'25's $241.1M, and Q1'26 at $197.9M is off 26% from Q1'25's $268.1M. That's not "5% recent YoY" — the momentum module is averaging stale comps. Trailing four quarters sum to roughly $679M vs. FY2025's $809.8M, meaning the business has contracted ~16% on a TTM basis while the models still cite a 15.5% revenue CAGR. Worse, TTM net income is around $15M (vs. $110.7M in FY25) — an 86% collapse — and Q1'26 printed a $21.4M loss despite $198M in revenue. At $16.28 and a $760M cap, you're paying ~50x collapsing TTM earnings for a business whose growth engine visibly seized in the last two quarters.
The pre-flight module calling this "high-growth" and citing "consistent revenue acceleration" is looking at 2021-2024 and hasn't updated for 2026. The rule-based "mature earner" tag is closer but still wrong — mature earners don't post -10.8% net margins one quarter and +7.1% the next on shrinking revenue. This is a deteriorating earner. The synthesis fair value of $5.06-$6.69 and Market Forces' "avoid at any price" are directionally right but the reasoning ("accrual accounting," "debt-fueled CAC") is speculative; the simpler read is that Oddity's IL Makiage/SpoiledChild cohort is churning and new brand launches (Brand 3) haven't scaled. The balance sheet is not a fortress the way the thesis eval claims — $584M debt vs. $402M cash is net debt of $182M against contracting EBITDA, and D/E of 2.2x on a consumer discretionary business (yes, it's classified defensive, but DTC beauty is cyclical) is not trivial.
The contrarian case: gross margin is genuinely 70%, FY25 FCF was $83.6M (implying ~9x P/FCF on trailing peak), and Q2'26 already showed a sequential margin snapback to +7.1% NI from -10.8%. If Q1'26's loss was a one-time inventory/launch write-down and the business stabilizes at $700M revenue with 10% net margins, that's $70M earnings and the stock is at ~11x — reasonable. Insider selling is 100% option-exercise-and-sell mechanics, which is neutral-to-slightly-negative but not the "unusual" red flag the module flags; these are small ticket sizes. And the narrative module's "cult coefficient: high" is stale — a stock down 75% from highs no longer has a cult; it has forced sellers.
Still, I can't get to synthesis's $5-7 fair value without assuming permanent impairment, and I can't get to the current $16.28 without assuming the Q1-Q2 revenue decline reverses. Splitting the difference: if TTM revenue holds ~$680M and normalized net margin recovers to 8% ($54M NI), 15x gets you $810M cap or ~$17/share — roughly where it trades. So the market is pricing a soft-landing scenario that requires the H2'26 comps to stop deteriorating. Given Q2'26 revenue was down 25% YoY and the model that generated the $5 fair value used inputs that assume this trend continues, the synthesis is too bearish; the pre-flight is too bullish. I partially dissent from synthesis: overvalued yes, but closer to $10-12 fair value than $6, and the asymmetry isn't attractive on either side until the next quarterly print clarifies whether the DTC beauty deceleration is cyclical or structural. Insider option-sales don't help but aren't decisive. I would not short at $16 given the FCF cushion and net cash-ish balance sheet, and I would not buy without seeing revenue stabilize.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is how violently the trailing-twelve-month picture has deteriorated versus the annual 2025 snapshot, and how badly some of the prebuilt takes misread that transition. On the stated TTM basis through 2026-06-30, revenue is $679.0M, down about 16% from the 2025 annual run rate of $809.8M, and net income is just $15.1M, which is a 2.2% net margin versus 13.7% in 2025. The quarterly sequence shows why: after two very strong quarters a year ago ($268.1M and $241.1M of revenue with 14.1% and 20.4% net margins), the last four came in at $147.9M, $152.7M, $197.9M, and $180.5M, with one outright loss quarter of -$21.4M. That is not a “mature earner”; it is a business that hit a wall. But it is also not the catastrophic value trap the harsher models imply. At a $0.76B market cap and roughly $182M net debt using the provided balance sheet, enterprise value is around $0.94B, or only about 1.4x this TTM revenue. For a beauty/personal care business still carrying a 70.0% gross margin and positive TTM earnings, that multiple is not obviously expensive.
The key issue is whether the earnings collapse is cyclical, lapping an exceptional prior period, or structural. I lean structural enough to stay cautious. TTM gross profit, using the 70.0% gross margin on $679.0M revenue, is still roughly $475M, which means the real damage happened below gross profit. The canonical TTM operating margin is -1.1%, implying operating loss despite high gross margin; that suggests either sharply higher customer acquisition, fulfillment, overhead, or some combination that the top line can no longer absorb. The conflict between annual 2025 operating income of $118.8M and TTM operating margin turning negative is exactly the sort of inflection that headline valuation screens miss. A stock on 62x TTM earnings with shrinking revenue is not cheap just because EV/revenue is low. If the right normalized earnings power is closer to the current $15M TTM than the old $100M+ level, then $760M equity value is still demanding.
I also don’t buy the most bearish machine narrative that this is “headed for structural losses as the model collapses.” The balance sheet is not distressed: current ratio is 3.45, cash is $402.2M, and even against $584.4M debt the company retains liquidity and flexibility. Free cash flow in the latest annual period was $83.6M on only $3.9M of capex, which is excellent conversion for an asset-light model; whatever has gone wrong recently, this is not a capital-intensive business burning cash to stand still. The revenue history from $222.6M in 2021 to $809.8M in 2025 also says there is real product-market fit somewhere underneath the recent stumble. So I reject both extremes: it is neither a software-like compounder deserving a premium narrative multiple, nor an obvious zero. It looks more like a good consumer brand platform that over-earned in 2025 and is now being repriced toward more ordinary economics.
The best argument against my caution is that the market cap is now only about 1.1x the latest annual free cash flow and roughly 0.9x annual net debt-adjusted gross profit, while the recent quarter returned to profitability with $12.9M of net income on $180.5M of sales after the ugly March quarter. If that March loss was an aberration and the June quarter is the new base, annualized earnings power could quickly recover into the $50M+ range, which would make the current price look undemanding at around 15x earnings. A smart bull would also point out that the top-line collapse may be overstated by tough comparisons to exceptionally large quarters last year; sequentially, revenue improved from $152.7M in December to $197.9M in March before settling at $180.5M in June, so the business may simply be normalizing rather than imploding. I weigh those points less heavily because the year-over-year math is still ugly, the margin structure has plainly worsened, and the TTM operating line crossing below zero is a serious warning sign until disproven.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next two quarters show revenue back above $190M consistently and net margin back into even the 8%-10% range, then the current valuation would start to look too low because the business could earn $60M-$75M again without needing heroic assumptions. I would also want confirmation that cash generation remains solid in the current TTM window, not just in the 2025 annual report, because that would rebut the concern that profitability deterioration is consuming cash. On the other hand, if revenue slips back toward $150M-$160M quarters or another loss quarter appears, then the right framing is not “cheap on sales” but “a shrinking premium-beauty brand with broken opex discipline,” and the stock should trade materially lower.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a growth story that has already broken. Oddity’s revenue compound from $223M in 2021 to $810M in calendar 2025 was real and impressive; the trailing twelve months through mid-2026 reverse that arc. Summing the four most recent quarters yields only $679M of sales and $15.1M of net income—versus $111M of profit on the 2025 annual print. The year-over-year quarter comparisons are unambiguous: June 2026 revenue of $180.5M is 25% below the $241M printed a year earlier, and March 2026’s $198M is 26% below the prior-year $268M. Operating margin has flipped from double-digit positive to –1.1% on a TTM basis even while gross margin holds at a pristine 70%. That combination says the product unit economics are intact and the P&L is being crushed by operating spend, customer-acquisition costs, or both. Free cash flow of $84M in 2025 looks healthy in isolation, yet ROIC has gone negative on the TTM window and earnings quality flags are flashing for a reason—accruals and the gap between peak-year FCF and current run-rate profit are large. Net debt of roughly $182M against a $760M equity market cap is manageable only if cash generation stabilizes; with D/E above 2.2x it is not a fortress.
Valuation does not price the deterioration. At $16.28 the stock trades at 62× trailing earnings, 1.4× sales and nearly 1.9× EV/sales. Those multiples would be rich for a mid-teens compounder; they are indefensible for a business whose recent revenue is contracting mid-twenties percent and whose operating profit has disappeared. The prior quantitative fair-value work that lands near $6–7 is directionally consistent with a normalized mid-single-digit free-cash-flow yield on a shrinking top line. Insider activity—repeated option exercises immediately followed by sales—adds no support. The “AI-driven beauty platform” narrative that once justified a premium is now unsupported by either growth or returns on capital; the market is still paying a residual cult premium for a story the income statement has already abandoned.
The strongest counter-argument is that $16 already embeds a 75% drawdown from the highs and that a 70% gross-margin DTC franchise with $400M of cash can re-accelerate once marketing spend is recalibrated. If the June quarter’s sequential improvement and return to black ($12.9M NI) mark the bottom rather than a dead-cat bounce, and if TTM revenue merely flattens in the high-$600Ms while operating margin recovers to the low teens, the earnings power could re-approach $60–80M. On that path a mid-teens multiple would justify something closer to today’s price, and the EV/EBITDA multiple of ~8.5× on the old annual peak would look merely fair rather than expensive. Capital efficiency versus legacy beauty brands remains a genuine positive, and the balance-sheet liquidity buys time. That case requires believing the last four quarters are an aberration caused by temporary over-investment rather than structural saturation or rising CAC in the core channels—possible, but the magnitude of the revenue drop and the speed of the margin collapse make it the lower-probability reading.
What would flip the view is two consecutive quarters of positive organic revenue growth restoring the TTM run-rate above $750M together with operating margin back above 8%, or clear evidence that FCF is holding above $70M annualized while net debt is paid down. Absent that, the stock remains a value trap priced for a recovery the recent fundamentals have not begun to deliver.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that should stop you cold is the balance sheet. Oddity sits on $402.2 million of cash with zero debt, against a $630 million market cap. That means the enterprise value of the operating business is roughly $228 million, and you are buying $810 million of revenue at 73% gross margin for 0.28x sales. Even if I strip out every dollar of growth, every shred of the "AI personalization" narrative, and every biotech option on ODDITY LABS, I am paying 2.1x trailing earnings on an EV basis for a company that generated $110.7 million in net income last year and $83.6 million in free cash flow. The P/E of 7.6x, the P/S of 1.04x, the EV/EBITDA of 2.87x — these are multiples you see on mature, zero-growth consumer staples, not on a company that grew revenue from $222.6 million in 2021 to $809.8 million in 2025, a 26.2% CAGR. The market is pricing this as a dying DTC brand, and I think that's wrong, but I'll get to why it's not as wrong as the valuation synthesis's $39 fair value implies.
What genuinely concerns me, and what the prior models underweight, is the 2025 margin compression. Operating margin fell from 17.9% in 2024 to 14.7% in 2025, and net margin slipped from 15.7% to 13.7%. Revenue grew 25.2% but operating income grew only 2.8% ($115.6M to $118.8M). That is the signature of a company buying growth with customer acquisition spend that is not converting into proportional contribution margin. The FCF-to-net-income gap of roughly $27 million ($83.6M vs $110.7M) is consistent with working capital investment in a growing DTC operation, but the -1% FCF CAGR flagged in the momentum data, if it reflects a real trend rather than a one-year working capital swing, tells me the cash engine is not scaling as fast as the P&L suggests. The Pre-Flight Intelligence layer calls this "high-growth" and the Market Forces layer calls it "deteriorating cash generation" — both are reading the same data and reaching opposite conclusions, and I think the truth is that growth is real but the quality of that growth is degrading.
The insider tape is a minor negative but not a signal. The pattern — 23,929-share option exercises followed by ~9,600-share sales on a monthly cadence, plus a 100,000-share exercise-and-sell on June 30 — looks like routine post-vesting liquidity management, not a coordinated exit. At $13.63, a 100,000-share sale is $1.36 million, trivial against a $630 million float. I would flag it if I saw a 5-million-share block or a CEO tender offer, but this is noise. The ROIC figure of -1696% in the canonical metrics is a data artifact — with zero debt, $402 million in cash, and positive operating income, a negative ROIC is arithmetically impossible — and I'm discarding it entirely.
The strongest case against my read is the sector context and the narrative collapse. The market narrative layer correctly identifies this as a "fallen-angel" with "fragile" durability: the IPO-era story of AI-driven precision beauty and biotech molecule discovery has been discounted out, and what's left is a DTC cosmetics company in a sector where Revlon, Procter & Gamble's beauty division, and a dozen VC-backed startups are all fighting for the same shelf space. The bear case is that 25% growth is the last gasp, that CAC inflation will compress margins below 10% operating within two years, and that the "platform" language is marketing for what is fundamentally a single-brand (IL MAKIAGE) e-commerce operation. I take this seriously. But I weigh it differently because the downside is structurally limited: even if revenue flatlines at $810 million and operating margin compresses to 8%, that's $65 million of operating income on a $228 million EV, or 3.5x. The $402 million cash pile is a 64% floor on the equity value. You would need a 60% drawdown before the cash position becomes the dominant story, and I don't see a credible path to that in a company with zero debt and positive FCF.
What would flip me: a single quarter where revenue growth drops below 10% while operating margin simultaneously falls below 10%, which would confirm the CAC-spiral thesis and break the "growth is still real" assumption. A block insider sale exceeding 2 million shares, or a CEO/insider open-market purchase (which would actually confirm my read). And the ODDITY LABS pipeline: if the biotech/ingredient-discovery arm starts consuming more than $15 million annually in R&D without generating any revenue contribution, it becomes a cash drain that the current FCF profile can't absorb indefinitely. Conversely, if the next two quarters show revenue growth re-accelerating above 30% with operating margin stabilizing at 15%+, the 7.6x P/E becomes a screaming buy and my conviction jumps to 5.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
ODD compounded revenue from $222M (2021) to $647M (2024) with expanding gross margin (68.8 to 72.4) and operating margin reaching 17.9 percent and $134.5M FCF in 2024 - genuinely elite unit economics for a young consumer brand. The TTM window (through 2026-06-30) is a sharp break: revenue growth stalled to $679M (about 5 percent over 2024), operating margin swung to -1.1 percent, net income collapsed to $15.2M, and FCF flipped to -$23.3M. Gross margin held at 70 percent, so the damage is below the gross line - opex outran revenue, consistent with heavy reinvestment (new brand launches, tech/AI, possibly physical footprint) rather than a demand collapse, but the magnitude is real.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Whether the TTM opex jump is discretionary reinvestment (new brands, Brand 3, ODDITY LABS) or structural cost inflation - management commentary and segment detail in the latest 10-Q/earnings call
- Composition of the ~$537M implied non-cash liabilities: real debt vs operating lease liabilities vs deferred consideration
- Whether the insider option-exercise-and-sell pattern is under a 10b5-1 plan
- Customer concentration and channel mix (DTC vs any wholesale/retail expansion)
- Inventory and receivables trends behind the OCF/NI drop to 0.82x
- Guidance on when reinvestment normalizes and margins recover
The e2e stack lands harshly: composite FV $5.06, signal-adjusted $6.69, with DCF at $4.71 and an EPV floor that is literally negative. Only the anchored-PE at $12.02 gets within shouting distance of the $16.28 tape, and even that implies roughly 26% downside. The market cap of $760M against a business that just printed negative operating margin and negative FCF in the TTM means investors are paying for the bull narrative - ML-driven product velocity, platform economics, Brand 3/4 optionality - not for what the P&L currently shows.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the TTM margin compression is guided reinvestment (Brand 3/4 launch spend) or ongoing customer-acquisition-cost inflation
- Brand 2 (Spoiled Child) revenue trajectory and contribution margin disclosure
- Repeat purchase rate and cohort economics in the latest shareholder letter
- Cash burn runway and any signals on capital raise or debt paydown
- Guidance revisions - any cut would collapse the anchored-PE support
The dominant force on ODD right now is a narrative reset in its favor: a 26-28% single-day surge on a Q2 earnings/revenue beat and raised FY26 guide has re-energized the 'software company wearing beauty clothes' cult story, exactly the archetype (visionary-founder, high cult coefficient, strong intensity) that trades on belief rather than DCF. The market cheerfully looked through a 25% revenue decline in IL MAKIAGE because management handed the bulls what they needed - profit upside, sequential H2 improvement, and SpoiledChild traction to keep the platform-scaling thesis alive. With a 2.38 beta into a neutral tape (VIX 16.5, S&P barely off highs), the macro is not fighting the move; if anything, a calm regime lets a high-beta story stock run. Caveats keep this from being a Strong Tailwind: narrative durability is flagged fragile, longer-term momentum is negative (5% recent vs 15.5% CAGR, -9.3pp over 3y), and the price sits at a 143% premium to DCF - so any second data point that undercuts the platform story (another IL MAKIAGE miss, ad-account issues resurfacing) can flip sentiment hard. For now, though, the tape, the tone, and the news flow are all pushing up on this specific name.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether IL MAKIAGE revenue actually inflects sequentially in Q3 as guided - the single biggest narrative crack risk
- Analyst target revisions and estimate changes in the next 2-3 weeks post-print (magnitude of upgrades will confirm/deny the sentiment shift)
- SpoiledChild and international brand traction data points that keep the 'platform' story alive
- VIX/regime shift - a risk-off turn would hit this 2.38-beta name disproportionately
Beauty demand overall is not collapsing — the category is flat-ish with expanding gross margins but sharply compressing net margins, which is the signature of rising customer-acquisition and promotional costs across the whole industry. Oddity's model is the most leveraged version of that dynamic: it monetizes online discovery, and online discovery is being re-plumbed by AI assistants and shifting social platform economics, raising the cost and lowering the predictability of the funnel that produced its compounding. Macro is a secondary headwind — 10y at 4.8 pressures discretionary trade-up and makes step-function launch investment more expensive to fund. The bull case rests on the launch engine being a repeatable machine; the bear case rests on it being a series of hits. The last two quarters are the first hard evidence favoring the bear reading, though one bad cycle does not yet prove the engine is broken.
When we made this prediction on Sep 11, 2026, ODD was $18.79. We expect it to be $18.90 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $9.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 11, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.