Business Description
Tapestry, Inc. provides luxury accessories and branded lifestyle products in the United States, Japan, Greater China, and internationally. The company operates in three segments: Coach, Kate Spade, and Stuart Weitzman. It offers women's accessories, including handbags, such as wallets, money pieces, wristlets, and cosmetic cases; novelty accessories comprising address books, time management and travel accessories, sketchbooks, and portfolios; and key rings and charms. The company also provides bag collections, including business cases, computer bags, messenger-style bags, backpacks, and totes; small leather goods, such as wallets, card cases, travel organizers, and belts; and footwear, watches, fragrances, sunglasses, novelty accessories, and ready-to-wear for men. In addition, it offers women's footwear; sunglasses; bracelets, necklaces, rings, and earrings; fragrances and watches; women's seasonal lifestyle apparel collections, including outerwear and ready-to-wear, and cold weather accessories, which comprise gloves, scarves, and hats. Further, the company provides footwear items; and housewares and home accessories for kids, such as fashion bedding and tableware; and stationery and gifts. Additionally, it licenses rights to market and distribute its tech and soft accessories, jewelry, watches, eyewear, and fragrances under the Coach brand; and tableware and housewares, fashion beddings, tech accessories, watches, sleepwear, eyewear, stationery and gifts, and fragrances under the Kate Spade brand. As of July 2, 2022, the company operated through a network of 945 Coach stores, 398 Kate Spade stores, and 100 Stuart Weitzman stores. It sells its products through e-commerce sites and concession shop-in-shops, and wholesale customers, as well as through independent third-party distributors. The company was formerly known as Coach, Inc. and changed its name to Tapestry, Inc. in October 2017. Tapestry, Inc. was founded in 1941 and is headquartered in New York, New York.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 5:25pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:22pm (19d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.85
Total Equity: $857.80M
Shares: 222,500,000
Total Debt: $2.39B
Cash: $1.10B
EBITDA: $526.40M
Total Debt: $2.39B
Cash: $1.10B
Revenue: $7.01B
Revenue: $7.01B
Revenue: $7.01B
Total Equity: $857.80M
Tax Rate: 15.2%
Equity: $857.80M
Total Debt: $2.39B
Cash: $1.10B
Current Liabilities: $1.56B
Long-Term Debt: $2.38B
Total Debt: $2.39B
Total Equity: $857.80M
Shares: 222,500,000
Shares: 222,500,000
CapEx: -$122.70M
Shares: 222,500,000
Stock Price: $140.10
Net Income: $183.20M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:29pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.7B | $6.7B | $6.7B | $6.7B | $7.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.7B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.7B |
| Gross Profit | $4.1B | $4.7B | $4.7B | $4.9B | $5.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $4.9B |
| Operating Income | $968.0M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $415.0M |
| Net Income | $834.2M | $856.3M | $936.0M | $816.0M | $183.2M |
| EBITDA | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $526.4M |
| EPS | $3.00 | $3.24 | $3.96 | $3.56 | $0.85 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:23pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.0B | $789.8M | $726.1M | $6.1B | $1.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $3.4B | $2.6B | $2.4B | $8.8B | $2.9B |
| Total Assets | $8.4B | $7.3B | $7.1B | $13.4B | $6.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $6.9B | $2.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.1B | $5.0B | $4.8B | $10.5B | $5.7B |
| Total Equity | $3.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.9B | $857.8M |
| Retained Earnings | -$158.5M | -$1.2B | -$1.2B | -$722.2M | -$2.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:29pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.3B | $853.2M | $975.2M | $1.3B | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$116.0M | -$93.9M | -$184.2M | -$108.9M | -$122.7M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.2B | $759.3M | $791.0M | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.1M | -$380.7M | -$154.7M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$1.6B | -$703.5M | $0 | -$2.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | $581.4M | -$1.2B | -$63.7M | $5.4B | -$5.0B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:23pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$7.0B $7.0B – $7.0B
|
$8.0B $8.0B – $8.0B
|
$8.4B $8.3B – $8.8B
|
$8.9B $8.9B – $8.9B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.2B $1.2B – $1.2B
|
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.4B
|
$1.5B $1.5B – $1.6B
|
$1.6B $1.6B – $1.6B
|
| Net Income |
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.1B
|
$1.6B $1.5B – $1.6B
|
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.8B
|
$1.7B $1.7B – $2.1B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:29pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +16.3% | -0.4% | +0.2% | +5.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +13.9% | +1.4% | +3.7% | +8.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +21.5% | -0.3% | -2.8% | -63.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +2.6% | +9.3% | -12.8% | -77.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +10.5% | +6.3% | -2.1% | -61.5% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:28pm (19d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-26 | Kahn Todd | M-Exempt | 57,286.00 | $42.31 | $2.4M |
| 2026-05-26 | Kahn Todd | S-Sale | 19,557.00 | $140.02 | $2.7M |
| 2026-05-26 | Kahn Todd | F-InKind | 37,729.00 | $140.02 | $5.3M |
| 2026-05-26 | Kahn Todd | M-Exempt | 57,286.00 | $42.31 | $2.4M |
| 2026-05-20 | Kahn Todd | G-Gift | 426.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Kahn Todd | G-Gift | 1,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-13 | Crevoiserat Joanne C. | M-Exempt | 30,291.00 | $15.83 | $479,507 |
| 2026-05-13 | Crevoiserat Joanne C. | S-Sale | 13,047.00 | $132.90 | $1.7M |
| 2026-05-13 | Crevoiserat Joanne C. | S-Sale | 14,729.00 | $132.88 | $2.0M |
| 2026-05-13 | Crevoiserat Joanne C. | M-Exempt | 35,770.00 | $20.97 | $750,097 |
| 2026-05-13 | Crevoiserat Joanne C. | F-InKind | 17,244.00 | $132.90 | $2.3M |
| 2026-05-13 | Crevoiserat Joanne C. | F-InKind | 21,041.00 | $132.88 | $2.8M |
| 2026-05-13 | Crevoiserat Joanne C. | M-Exempt | 35,770.00 | $20.97 | $750,097 |
| 2026-05-13 | Crevoiserat Joanne C. | M-Exempt | 30,291.00 | $15.83 | $479,507 |
| 2026-04-06 | Madrigal Matthew | A-Award | 1,392.00 | $143.70 | $200,030 |
| 2026-04-06 | Madrigal Matthew | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-03 | Dadlani Manesh | S-Sale | 975.00 | $156.05 | $152,149 |
| 2026-02-18 | Crevoiserat Joanne C. | M-Exempt | 30,292.00 | $15.83 | $479,522 |
| 2026-02-18 | Crevoiserat Joanne C. | S-Sale | 13,300.00 | $154.79 | $2.1M |
| 2026-02-18 | Crevoiserat Joanne C. | S-Sale | 15,123.00 | $154.78 | $2.3M |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:23pm (19d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-05 | $0.40 | 2026-05-07 | 2026-06-05 | 2026-06-22 |
| 2026-03-06 | $0.40 | 2026-02-05 | 2026-03-06 | 2026-03-23 |
| 2025-12-05 | $0.40 | 2025-11-06 | 2025-12-05 | 2025-12-22 |
| 2025-09-05 | $0.40 | 2025-08-14 | 2025-09-05 | 2025-09-22 |
| 2025-06-06 | $0.35 | 2025-05-08 | 2025-06-06 | 2025-06-23 |
| 2025-03-06 | $0.35 | 2025-02-06 | 2025-03-06 | 2025-03-24 |
| 2024-12-06 | $0.35 | 2024-11-07 | 2024-12-06 | 2024-12-23 |
| 2024-09-06 | $0.35 | 2024-08-15 | 2024-09-06 | 2024-09-23 |
| 2024-06-07 | $0.35 | 2024-05-09 | 2024-06-07 | 2024-06-24 |
| 2024-03-07 | $0.35 | 2024-02-08 | 2024-03-08 | 2024-03-25 |
| 2023-12-07 | $0.35 | 2023-11-09 | 2023-12-08 | 2023-12-26 |
| 2023-09-07 | $0.35 | 2023-08-11 | 2023-09-08 | 2023-09-25 |
| 2023-06-08 | $0.30 | 2023-05-19 | 2023-06-09 | 2023-06-26 |
| 2023-03-09 | $0.30 | 2023-02-21 | 2023-03-10 | 2023-03-27 |
| 2022-12-08 | $0.30 | 2022-11-17 | 2022-12-09 | 2022-12-27 |
| 2022-09-08 | $0.30 | 2022-08-18 | 2022-09-09 | 2022-09-26 |
| 2022-06-02 | $0.25 | 2022-05-12 | 2022-06-03 | 2022-06-27 |
| 2022-03-03 | $0.25 | 2022-02-17 | 2022-03-04 | 2022-03-28 |
| 2021-12-02 | $0.25 | 2021-11-11 | 2021-12-03 | 2021-12-27 |
| 2021-09-03 | $0.25 | 2021-08-19 | 2021-09-07 | 2021-09-27 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: TPR printed $1.92B/$2.50B/$1.70B/$1.72B for the last four quarters versus $1.51B/$2.20B/$1.58B/$1.59B the year prior — that's roughly $7.84B TTM revenue, up ~12% YoY, not the 5% the momentum table suggests. More importantly, margins inflected hard: 17.9%, 22.4%, 16.1% net margins in the three clean quarters versus 12.4%, 14.1%, 12.8% a year earlier. Strip the -$517M Q4 FY25 charge (the Capri breakup/restructuring kitchen sink) and TTM net income is roughly $1.7B, putting real P/E closer to 17x — not 42.8x. The TTM ratio is mechanically broken by one quarter that everyone knows was non-recurring. This matters because every downstream model anchored on the 42.8 P/E and 2.6% net margin.
So I disagree sharply with the Synthesis and Market Forces verdicts. "Disconnected from Fundamentals" and "Strong Market Headwinds" are reading a one-time charge as the run rate. The 40.3% implied FCF growth in the reverse DCF is an artifact of using depressed FY25 FCF as the base; FCF was $1.09B reported but operationally closer to $1.4B normalized. The Market Forces note about "failed M&A strategy" and "dangerous leverage" is also stale — TPR walked away from Capri in late 2024, got the $6.1B authorization redeployed into buybacks, and the balance sheet shows $1.1B cash with no debt crisis evident in a 1.87 current ratio. Calling this "structurally impaired" while Coach is posting accelerating comps and 75% gross margins is the wrong tape read. The Pre-Flight note is closer to right: this is a kitchen-sink reset story, and the most recent three quarters are validating it.
The contrarian case — which the bear models articulate but I want to steelman properly — is that Coach's pricing-led growth is cyclical demand pulled forward from aspirational luxury consumers who will retrench in a downturn, and that the margin expansion (gross margin from 73% to 75.4%) is mix shift that mean-reverts. Insider activity supports caution: the May 2026 cluster of M-Exempt + S-Sale pairs is classic option-exercise-and-dump, ~100k+ shares net sold near recent highs, not insiders buying the "turnaround." Also worth flagging: revenue CAGR of 2.6% over five years is real — this isn't a growth company, and a re-rating above ~20x normalized earnings requires believing the recent acceleration sticks through a consumer cycle. ROIC of 13.3% is decent but not exceptional for an asset-light brand business; the $28B market cap already capitalizes meaningful operating leverage.
Where the data is thin: no debt figure disclosed in the tile (TPR carries ~$7B gross debt post-bond issuance for the aborted Capri deal, much of which has been retired — material to EV/EBITDA of 29.5x which is also TTM-distorted), no equity number, and the annual FY25 net income of $183M is entirely a charge artifact. The ROE of 106% is mathematical noise from a depleted equity base post-buyback. My read: fair value on normalized $5.50-6.00 EPS at 20-22x (justified by mid-single-digit organic growth, buyback-driven double-digit EPS growth, and luxury-adjacent margins) is $115-130. At $140 the stock is modestly rich but not "disconnected" — it's pricing in continued execution of a real turnaround that the last three quarters are delivering. I'd be a buyer in the $115-120 zone, a holder here, and a trimmer above $155 absent another quarter of >20% net margin. The synthesis models are anchoring on broken TTM denominators; the narrative layer correctly identifies this as anchored-to-cash-flows, which is the right frame.
GPT Critique
In my independent analysis of Tapestry, Inc., several key points emerge from the raw data. Notably, the company experienced a significant drop in net income in 2025 to $183.2 million from $816 million in 2024, largely due to a one-time charge. This distortion is evident when considering the quarterly results, where a $517.1 million loss occurred in Q4 2025. This anomaly skews the trailing twelve-month (TTM) P/E ratio to an inflated 42.8x, whereas the normalized earnings suggest a more reasonable multiple around 17x. Tapestry's recent revenue growth, approximately 12% YoY, contrasts with the 2.6% CAGR over five years, highlighting its recent momentum but also underscoring its historical stagnation. The company's strong cash position, with $1.1 billion and no reported debt, adds a layer of financial stability.
I find myself in agreement with Opus on several fronts. Opus correctly identifies the P/E distortion due to the non-recurring charge, arguing that the real earnings backdrop supports a fair valuation range of $115-130, given normalized earnings. Their dismissal of the "strong market headwinds" narrative as outdated is also valid, given the recent operational improvements and the absence of a current debt crisis. Opus's point about insider selling activities, which suggest a cautious stance by management, aligns with my interpretation of the recent transactions as not indicative of insider confidence in a sustained turnaround.
However, I diverge from Opus in my assessment of market forces. While Opus downplays the "structurally impaired" label, I contend that Tapestry's position between fast-fashion and true luxury segments poses ongoing strategic challenges. The growth story, heavily reliant on Coach's pricing power and international expansion, may face headwinds from shifting consumer trends and increasing competition. Furthermore, the narrative of a turnaround requires sustained margin improvements and revenue growth, which might not be as robust as Opus suggests, given the moderate narrative durability and the cyclical nature of consumer spending in luxury goods.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and my assessments overestimate Tapestry's ability to sustain its recent operational improvements. They could question the durability of Coach's growth, given its reliance on aspirational luxury consumers who may cut back spending in an economic downturn. Additionally, the skeptic might highlight the lack of clarity around debt and equity figures, suggesting that the financial health is not as solid as it appears.