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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Tapestry Inc. (TPR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Low · Gem Score -16 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 57 · Value -65 · Sentiment -62 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $93.73 vs $125.49 at analysis
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Tapestry Inc.
TPR NYSETapestry Inc. is a global house of luxury accessories and lifestyle brands focused on designing and marketing handbags, leather goods, footwear, jewelry, ready-to-wear, fragrance, watches, and related accessories. The company’s portfolio is centered on Coach, Kate Spade, and Stuart Weitzman, which together serve consumers through direct-to-consumer stores, e-commerce, wholesale channels, and licensing arrangements. Tapestry Inc. reaches customers across North America, Greater China, the rest of Asia, and other international markets, positioning itself as a significant participant in premium fashion and accessories retail. Its products combine brand identity, craftsmanship, and seasonal design across categories that appeal to everyday and occasion-based use. Headquartered in New York, Tapestry Inc. operates as a diversified branded business within the global personal luxury market.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.27
Total Equity: $692.10M
Shares: 210,200,000
Total Debt: $2.40B
Cash: $974.70M
EBITDA: $2.08B
Total Debt: $2.40B
Cash: $974.70M
Revenue: $8.00B
Revenue: $8.00B
Revenue: $8.00B
Total Equity: $692.10M
Tax Rate: 17.9%
Equity: $692.10M
Total Debt: $2.40B
Cash: $974.70M
Current Liabilities: $1.65B
Long-Term Debt: $2.40B
Total Debt: $2.40B
Total Equity: $692.10M
Shares: 210,200,000
Shares: 210,200,000
CapEx: -$166.00M
Shares: 210,200,000
Stock Price: $125.49
Net Income: $1.53B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 6:09am (38d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.7B | $6.7B | $6.7B | $7.0B | $8.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| Gross Profit | $4.7B | $4.7B | $4.9B | $5.3B | $6.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.5B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $4.9B | $4.3B |
| Operating Income | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $415.0M | $1.9B |
| Net Income | $856.3M | $936.0M | $816.0M | $183.2M | $1.5B |
| EBITDA | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $577.9M | $2.1B |
| EPS | $3.24 | $3.96 | $3.56 | $0.84 | $7.49 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.17 | $3.88 | $3.50 | $0.82 | $7.27 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 6:00am (38d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $789.8M | $726.1M | $6.1B | $1.1B | $974.7M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.6B | $2.4B | $8.8B | $2.9B | $2.9B |
| Total Assets | $7.3B | $7.1B | $13.4B | $6.6B | $6.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.7B | $1.6B | $7.0B | $2.4B | $2.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.0B | $4.8B | $10.5B | $5.7B | $6.0B |
| Total Equity | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.9B | $857.8M | $692.1M |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.2B | -$1.2B | -$722.2M | -$2.6B | -$3.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 6:22am (38d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $853.2M | $975.2M | $1.3B | $1.2B | $2.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$93.9M | -$184.2M | -$108.9M | -$122.7M | -$166.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $759.3M | $791.0M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $98.5M | -$31.2M | $5.6B | -$4.9B | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | -$264.4M | -$283.3M | -$321.4M | -$299.3M | -$326.1M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.6B | -$703.5M | $0 | -$1.7B | -$1.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.2B | -$63.7M | $5.4B | -$5.0B | -$125.3M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 6:09am (38d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -0.4% | +0.2% | +5.1% | +14.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +1.4% | +3.7% | +8.2% | +17.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -0.3% | -2.8% | -63.6% | +361.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +9.3% | -12.8% | -77.5% | +733.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -1.2% | -3.0% | -56.0% | +259.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 6:00am (38d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-05 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-06 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-05 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-05 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-06 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-06 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-06 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-06 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-07 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-07 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-07 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-07 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-08 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-09 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-08 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-08 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-02 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-03 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-02 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-03 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-18 02:44A +1σ run of quarters pays -29%; a −1σ run costs 65%. Ratio -0.5:1 (μ 10.0%, σ 7.3% , 16 pairs).
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($125.49) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +20% | 22.0% | $101.64 | -19% |
| Base — stabilizes | +14% | 19.1% | $73.85 | -41% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +7% | 16.2% | $52.60 | -58% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +17% | 21.0% | $89.33 | -29% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +3% | 15.4% | $44.50 | -65% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-30 06:31The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw trajectory here is more interesting than the "mature earner" label suggests. FY2026 revenue of $8.00B vs $7.01B prior is +14% growth — that's not mature-earner behavior, that's a genuine acceleration off a depressed FY25 base. But the quarterly cadence tells a different story: the four most recent quarters run $1.70B → $2.50B (holiday) → $1.92B → $1.88B. Sequential decline in the two most recent quarters, and Q4 FY26 ($1.88B) is only ~9% above Q4 FY25 ($1.72B) — deceleration is real. Net income compares are flattered by the FY25 impairment quarter (-$517M in Jun-25), so the "733% earnings YoY" is arithmetic noise, not signal. Underlying: margins genuinely improved (17-22% net vs 12-14% a year ago), and $1.81B FCF on a $25B cap is a ~7.2% FCF yield, which is not what you pay for a fading brand.
The pb_ratio of 38 and D/E of 3.46 both point to the same thing: Tapestry blew down equity via the aborted Capri deal breakup and aggressive buybacks — $692M equity against $2.4B debt. That distorts ROE (2.2 reported is nonsense given $1.53B NI on $692M equity should be >200% — the FMP tag is stale or mid-period averaged). ROIC of 74% is more honest and reflects a genuinely capital-light handbag business. So the balance sheet optics are ugly but the earnings power is real; this is a buyback-driven equity compression, not distress. EV/EBITDA of 13 and EV/Sales of 3.4 are the metrics that matter, and both are reasonable-not-cheap for a luxury-adjacent name growing double digits.
Where I part ways with the synthesis: the $84.94 composite fair value looks anchored to trailing/normalized numbers that under-weight the FY26 step-change. If you take $1.81B FCF, assume 5% growth and 9% discount, you get ~$45B EV — well above the current $26.4B EV. Even haircutting for the deceleration in H2 FY26 ($1.88B run-rate quarters imply ~$7.5B forward, not $8B), a 15-17x FCF multiple on $1.7B run-rate FCF gets you to $25-29B — right around the current cap. So "fairly valued to modestly cheap" is more defensible than "32% overvalued." The narrative layer's "fallen-angel/fragile" framing is the right frame but the conclusion is too bearish — Tapestry actually executed on the Capri-collapse pivot (capital return + Coach brand heat), which is different from a story-only rerating.
The contrarian case that gives me pause: Coach is having a genuine cultural moment (Gen Z, Tabby bag) that H2 FY26 quarterly deceleration may be signaling has already peaked. Handbag cycles are brutal — Michael Kors was here in 2014 at 20x earnings before a decade of decline. Kate Spade remains a persistent drag (management has hinted at strategic review), and Stuart Weitzman is immaterial. Insider activity is entirely awards and tax-withholding (F-InKind) — no open-market buying, which for a stock down 24% from highs with insiders sitting on grants is a mild negative tell. Macro: aspirational luxury (Tapestry's zone) is the most cyclically exposed segment; a US consumer rollover hits Coach before it hits Hermès. Given decelerating quarterlies and no insider conviction, I'd want a lower entry than current $125.
Net: I dissent from "overvalued to $85" — that's too harsh given $1.81B FCF and 14% revenue growth — but I don't think this is a screaming buy at $125 either. Fair value is closer to $105-115 (13-14x FCF, in line with EV/EBITDA of ~13, small discount for aspirational-luxury cyclicality and Kate Spade drag). Wait for either a Q1 FY27 print confirming the Coach momentum is durable, or a pullback to $105 on macro fears.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say Tapestry is not the sleepy, no-growth handbag roll-up the “mature earner” label implies. Fiscal 2026 revenue reached $8.00B, up 14% from $7.01B, and that growth was not bought at the expense of profitability: operating income rebounded to $1.91B from just $415M, net income to $1.53B from $183M, operating margin to 23.9%, and net margin to 19.1%. Quarterly progression also looks much healthier than the headline volatility suggests. After the ugly June 2025 quarter with a -$517M net loss, the next four quarters produced $1.70B, $2.50B, $1.92B, and $1.88B of revenue with net margins of 16.1%, 22.4%, 17.9%, and 18.5%. That is not a fragile recovery; it looks like a reset year followed by a very strong normalization. Most important, cash confirms earnings. Operating cash flow was $1.98B and free cash flow was $1.81B against $1.53B of net income, so this is not an accrual mirage.
At $125.49, the stock is expensive versus its own history as a mid-tier luxury name, but not obviously expensive versus what the business is earning right now. A 17.3x P/E on $1.53B of net income for an asset-light branded company generating 22.6% FCF margins is not absurd; in fact, if fiscal 2026 is close to sustainable, that multiple is closer to fair than overhyped. EV/EBITDA at 13.0x and EV/revenue at 3.38x are not bargain levels, but they are also not the kind of heroic valuations that require years of double-digit top-line growth. The market cap is $25.0B, net debt is only about $1.4B after offsetting $974.7M of cash against $2.40B of debt, and annual FCF of $1.81B implies roughly a 7.2% FCF yield on equity value. For a branded consumer company with gross margin near 78%, that is respectable. The giant P/B of 38x and 221% ROE are balance-sheet artifacts from only $692M of book equity, not useful evidence of overvaluation.
What stands out to me is that the bearish model conclusion leans too hard on a fair value framework that seems anchored to the depressed 2025 year rather than the restored 2026 earnings power. If I haircut 2026 and assume net income settles closer to $1.2B-$1.3B rather than $1.53B, the current market cap still implies about 19x-21x earnings, which is demanding but not irrational for a business that just grew revenue 14% and converted that into an 18%-22% quarterly net margin run-rate. The contradiction is simple: the narrative layer says the stock trades nearly 48% above DCF because of speculative rerating, yet the hard data show a business that just produced its best year in this dataset by a wide margin, with cash flow even stronger than accounting profit. I don’t see evidence here of a meme rerating; I see a cyclical consumer brand owner whose earning power has stepped up meaningfully, and the stock has rerated accordingly. My read is that the shares are around fair value to modestly rich, not 32% overvalued.
The best case against this view is that I may be giving too much credit to one excellent year that benefited from unusually favorable comparisons and whatever drove the June 2025 impairment-like collapse. Revenue over the prior four fiscal years was basically flat around $6.66B-$7.01B before the 2026 jump to $8.00B, so the long-run growth profile is still suspect. The quarterly trend also softened slightly from $2.50B in holiday quarter revenue to $1.92B and then $1.88B, and while seasonality matters, the “recent revenue yoy” figure of 14.2% is less impressive than the earnings surge, suggesting margin expansion did more of the work than durable demand acceleration. If margins fall back from 23.9% operating toward the 17%-18% area more typical of a good but not elite accessories house, then today’s 17x earnings quickly becomes 22x+ on normalized earnings. Add in leverage of 3.46x debt-to-equity, macro headwinds in discretionary spending, and the strategic risk that Coach is carrying the portfolio while other brands lag, and a bear can plausibly argue this is a peak-margin stock wearing too generous a multiple.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next two quarters show revenue stalling around $1.8B-$1.9B while net margins slip below 16%, I would conclude 2026 was a high-water mark and the stock above $120 is too rich; in that case, fair value would likely compress into the $95-$105 range. Conversely, if Tapestry can hold annualized revenue above $8B, keep operating cash flow near or above $1.8B, and sustain operating margin above 21% without another one-off distortion, then the market is not overpaying and a case for $135-$145 becomes defensible. For now, the business looks materially better than the skeptical models imply, but the current price already reflects most of that improvement.
Grok Reading
Tapestry’s FY2026 numbers tell a clean turnaround-to-earner story that the composite fair-value print of $85 largely refuses to credit. Revenue stepped up from a multi-year $6.7B plateau to $8.0B (+14% YoY), operating income nearly doubled to $1.91B, and net income landed at $1.53B with a 19.1% net margin and 23.9% operating margin—levels the company has not sustained in the prior four years. Free cash flow of $1.81B on only $166M of capex is the standout: FCF conversion exceeds reported earnings, the trailing FCF yield at $125.49 is roughly 7.2%, and net debt of ~$1.43B is less than one turn of FCF. Gross margin at 77.8% is genuine luxury territory. The ugly FY2025 net income of $183M was an accounting crater (the –$517M June quarter), not the run-rate; stripping that noise, the earnings CAGR looks less miraculous and more like a business that finally converted brand pricing power into cash. At 17.3× trailing earnings and 13.0× EV/EBITDA, the multiple is not demanding if the $1.5B+ earnings power holds. The 38× P/B and 220% ROE are artifacts of a $692M equity base after years of buybacks and intangibles—they are not economic signals. Debt-to-equity of 3.5 looks alarming until you notice absolute leverage is modest and serviceable.
The sequential and seasonal pattern still supports the mature-earner label rather than a hypergrowth rerating. Holiday quarter revenue of $2.50B and 22.4% net margin are the high-water mark; the two most recent quarters ($1.92B and $1.88B) show the normal post-holiday step-down, and the secondary signal flagging decelerating quarterly revenue trend is visible in the print. Coach remains the cash engine; Kate Spade and Stuart Weitzman are not carrying the multiple. Insider activity is pure award and withholding noise—no open-market accumulation to confirm management’s conviction at these levels. Macro headwinds in discretionary luxury, especially any China re-acceleration that fails to materialize, sit on top of a balance sheet that has little tangible book value cushion if sentiment turns.
The strongest case against this read is the valuation synthesis itself: composite fair value near $84–$85 implies the stock is ~32% overvalued at $125, and that gap is exactly what a disciplined skeptic would cite. They would argue the market is already paying for the margin expansion and China/optionality narrative (the “fallen-angel” rerating the narrative layer describes), that 9.5% revenue CAGR is the best case rather than the base case going forward, and that a 17× earnings multiple on a consumer cyclical with fragile narrative durability and no cult brand moat leaves no margin of safety. They would also note that pre-FY2026 normalized earnings were closer to $800–900M; if operating margins mean-revert even partway from 24% back toward the historical mid-teens, the $1.53B profit pool shrinks fast and $125 becomes expensive in a hurry. I weigh that less heavily because the FCF engine and gross-margin structure look structural, not one-cycle, and because a sub-1× net-debt-to-FCF balance sheet plus 7%+ FCF yield already embeds a meaningful discount to higher-quality luxury peers—yet I cannot dismiss the risk that FY2026 is peak margin.
What flips the verdict: two consecutive quarters of revenue growth reaccelerating above 10% YoY with operating margins holding ≥22%, or a clear capital-return step-up (larger buyback or dividend) that deploys the $1.8B FCF without empire-building M&A. Conversely, a print showing gross margin compression below 74% or FCF falling under $1.2B would confirm the $85 camp and force a decisive overvalued call.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Tapestry's most recent year is a step-change: revenue up to $8.00B from $7.01B (+14%), operating margin expanding to 23.9%, net income of $1.53B and FCF of $1.81B. Gross margin has climbed every year from 69.6% (2022) to 77.8% (2026), consistent with mix shift toward Coach and pricing power in accessible luxury. Earnings quality checks are clean: OCF/NI of 2.3x, accruals -5.3% of assets, Beneish M -2.79, Altman Z 4.19 — cash is clearly backing reported profit.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Nature of FY25 operating margin collapse — confirm Capri termination fee and any litigation charges vs. underlying operating trend
- Brand-level revenue and margin split (Coach vs. Kate Spade vs. Stuart Weitzman) to gauge concentration
- Debt maturity schedule and interest coverage given $1.24B net debt position
- Whether the FY26 23.9% operating margin includes any one-off gains (e.g., Capri breakup fee receipt) that inflate the run-rate
- Inventory and receivables trend behind the -5.3% accruals to ensure it is not channel-stuffing reversal
The composite fair value of $83.45 and signal-adjusted $84.94 both sit roughly 32% below the $125.49 price. The DCF at $91.58 and anchored P/E at $120.38 bracket a deserved-value band roughly in the $90-120 range once you give the business credit for its strong quality grade, clean earnings, and margin transformation. Even at the generous end (anchored-pe $120), today's price barely clears fair; at the DCF anchor it needs ~35% to come down. The EPV floor at $30 is a runaway low-end input and I discount it - it assumes no reinvestment value in three real brands.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- FY26 guidance on gross margin durability post-FY25 scare
- Coach same-store/AUR trends to test 'commoditization' bear
- Kate Spade revenue trajectory and any impairment risk
- Buyback pace vs net debt reduction priorities
- Any renewed M&A signaling after the Capri deal collapse
The tape itself is mildly risk-on, but that barely helps TPR because the pressure on this specific name is idiosyncratic and negative. The narrative is a fragile fallen-angel rerating story with low cult support, and it took a direct hit on 8/13 when the stock dropped 16.4% on soft FY guidance and continued Kate Spade weakness. News flow over the last 72 hours is uniformly ambivalent-to-cautious, framing the setup as Coach strength versus Kate Spade execution risk, tariffs, and a premium valuation, which is exactly the tone that keeps a rerating narrative from re-igniting. Momentum is broken (-13.2% in the past month) even as the S&P sits near highs, so this name is underperforming the tape, not riding it. With beta 1.46, any macro wobble (10y at 4.67%, market PE 25.9) hits TPR harder than average, and there is no euphoric story cushion here. Analyst tone reads as split-with-caveats rather than upgrading, which typically caps rallies and lets drawdowns run. Net: the non-fundamental pressure leans clearly negative, though not catastrophic.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether Kate Spade shows any stabilization in next quarterly print - the single lever that can flip the narrative
- Tariff commentary from peers (LVMH, Capri) that could re-rate the entire cohort
- Analyst target revisions post the 8/13 guide - a wave of cuts would deepen the headwind
- Consumer discretionary sector relative strength vs SPX - rotation signal
Global luxury has bifurcated: the top houses hold pricing while the aspirational tier stalls under rate pressure and a stretched middle-income consumer. Tapestry sits in the accessible-luxury slot that theoretically gets squeezed from both sides — but Coach has re-earned desirability with product rather than price, which is the one defense that works in that slot. The offsets are policy and geography: Asia-heavy sourcing under an unsettled tariff regime, and Greater China demand that can turn on its own clock. Net, the world is neutral-to-mildly-hostile and the company's growth is idiosyncratic, not borrowed from the cycle — which is a higher-quality source of growth but also one that must be re-proven every product season.
When we made this prediction on Aug 30, 2026, TPR was $125.49. We expect it to be $108.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $95.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 30, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips down 25%
adjusted_pe
flips down 25%