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AGING Analysis Report
Jun 3, 2026
23 days ago · 93% complete · +4 refreshed

Gold Fields Limited

GFI NYSE Categories PDF
Basic Materials · Gold
Sandton, 2196, South Africa IPO 1980 goldfields.com Updated Jun 3, 6:13pm
Price
$37.93
Market Cap
$33.9B
Employees
6,560
Beta
0.64
Avg Volume
3,344,900
CEO
Michael John Fraser
Business Description

Gold Fields Limited operates as a gold producer with reserves and resources in Chile, South Africa, Ghana, West Africa, Australia, and Peru. The company also explores for copper deposits. It holds interests in 9 operating mines with an annual gold-equivalent production of approximately 2.34 million ounces, as well as gold mineral reserves of approximately 48.6 million ounces and mineral resources of approximately 111.8 million ounces. Gold Fields Limited was founded in 1887 and is based in Sandton, South Africa.

Business History
Generated: Jun 3, 2026 8:31pm
Price Overview
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:47pm (23d ago)
$37.93
-0.63 (-1.63%)
Day Range
$37.86 – $38.64
52-Week Range
$22.40 – $61.64
50-Day MA
$43.89
200-Day MA
$43.95
Volume
2,373,572.00
Analyst Price Targets
Low $57.25
Consensus $59.13
High $61.00
(10 analysts)
Share Structure
Outstanding 895,024,000.00
Float 895,013,259.00
Free Float 100.0%
High free float — 100.0% of shares trade freely, ~0% held by insiders/institutions
Very liquid — most shares trade freely. Low insider ownership can mean less management alignment, but makes large position sizing straightforward.
Price History (1 Year)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:53pm (23d ago)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
The directional story — useful even when net income is negative.
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:53pm (23d ago)
Revenue
The top line — total sales before any costs or taxes are subtracted. A measure of how much business the company is doing.
Net Income
The bottom line — profit left after subtracting all expenses, interest, and taxes from revenue. Reflects accounting profitability, but includes non-cash items like depreciation, so it isn't the same as cash earned.
Operating Cash Flow
The real cash generated by the day-to-day business — selling products, paying suppliers, collecting from customers. Calculated from net income by adding back non-cash items and adjusting for timing (unpaid bills, unsold inventory). When OCF consistently lags net income, the reported profit may not be converting to real money.
Period Revenue Net Income Net Margin YoY/QoQ
Key Metrics
API Direct from provider CALC Derived from statements
Industry comparison last run: Jun 3, 2026 8:49pm
P/E Ratio (Price per dollar of earnings)
API
Stock Price / EPS (Diluted)
9.24
Stock Price: $37.93
EPS (Diluted): 4.00
P/B Ratio (Price vs net asset value)
API
Stock Price / Book Value Per Share
4.63
Stock Price: $37.93
Total Equity: $8.43B
Shares: 897,339,333
EV/EBITDA (Total value vs operating profit)
API
Enterprise Value / EBITDA
6.68
Market Cap: $33.95B
Total Debt: $3.22B
Cash: $1.78B
EBITDA: $5.29B
Enterprise Value (Takeover price (cap + debt - cash))
API
Market Cap + Total Debt - Cash
$40.9B
Market Cap: $33.95B
Total Debt: $3.22B
Cash: $1.78B
Gross Margin (Revenue left after direct costs)
API
Gross Profit / Revenue
54.2%
Gross Profit: $4.76B
Revenue: $8.78B
Operating Margin (Revenue left after all operations)
API
Operating Income / Revenue
49.4%
Operating Income: $4.33B
Revenue: $8.78B
Net Margin (Revenue left as actual profit)
API
Net Income / Revenue
40.8%
Net Income: $3.58B
Revenue: $8.78B
ROE (Profit from shareholder equity)
API
Net Income / Total Equity
50.8%
Net Income: $3.58B
Total Equity: $8.43B
ROIC (Profit from all invested capital)
API
NOPAT / Invested Capital
24.3%
Operating Income: $4.33B
Tax Rate: 31.1%
Equity: $8.43B
Total Debt: $3.22B
Cash: $1.78B
Current Ratio (Can it pay short-term bills)
API
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
1.75
Current Assets: $2.97B
Current Liabilities: $1.70B
Debt/Equity (Leverage — debt vs equity)
CALC
Total Debt / Total Equity
0.38
Short-Term Debt: $282.60M
Long-Term Debt: $2.94B
Total Debt: $3.22B
Total Equity: $8.43B
Rev/Share (Top-line per share)
CALC
Revenue / Shares Outstanding
$9.78
Revenue: $8.78B
Shares: 897,339,333
Book Value/Share (Net assets per share)
CALC
(Total Assets - Total Liabilities) / Shares
$9.40
Total Equity: $8.43B
Shares: 897,339,333
FCF/Share (Real cash generated per share)
CALC
(Operating Cash Flow + CapEx) / Shares
$3.48
Operating CF: $4.55B
CapEx: -$1.43B
Shares: 897,339,333
CapEx is negative (outflow) — added to OCF to get FCF
Div Yield (Annual income from holding)
API
Last Annual Dividend / Stock Price
1.8%
Last Dividend: N/A
Stock Price: $37.93
Payout Ratio (Earnings paid out as dividends)
Dividends Paid / Net Income
Dividends Paid: N/A
Net Income: $3.58B
Dividends paid not available in cash flow statement
Industry Benchmarks
Last run: Jun 3, 2026 8:49pm
Compares GFI against LLM-researched typical ranges for its industry. One research call per industry, cached indefinitely — every stock in the same industry reuses the same baseline.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The "final boss" read — Opus reviews every forensic module + the full e2e analysis · 2026-06-03 20:57:34
Legacy single-score read — re-run the extended pipeline to get the two-lens split.
Gold Fields is a leveraged bet on the gold price wearing a fortress-balance-sheet costume — 2025's blowout numbers are real but not the run-rate.
+0 Hold / Neutral

The forensic picture is genuinely clean on the mechanical checks: Beneish M of -5.41, Altman Z of 5.34, OCF/NI of 1.88x, and accruals at -9.5% of assets all say the 2025 earnings are cash-backed, not manufactured. Diluted share count has crept from 893.5M to 897.3M over five years (CAGR 0.1%) and buybacks exceed SBC 110% — this is not a dilution story. FCF of $3.12B against a $33.9B market cap is a ~9% FCF yield, which on the surface looks cheap.

But the numbers vs. narrative reconciliation is where it gets uncomfortable. Revenue jumped from $5.20B (2024) to $8.78B (2025) — a 69% YoY surge — while operating margin expanded from 40.2% to 49.4% and net income nearly tripled from $1.25B to $3.58B. That is not operating leverage from a mature miner; that is the gold price doing the work. Production is ~2.34M oz, so realized prices and grade/cost timing explain essentially all of it. Strip gold back to $2,000 and the FCF yield collapses toward 4-5%, and the 'reasonable premium' valuation becomes a full premium.

The insider tape is also weaker than the upstream 'net buying' label suggests — a single $18.9K purchase by McGill is symbolic, not a signal. Everything else on the tape is zero-value award activity (code A-equivalent), not directional. Net debt of $1.44B is manageable against $3.12B FCF but it's a constraint, not a moat. South Africa/Ghana jurisdictional risk and water/tailings ESG exposure are real and unpriced in the mechanical modules.

Deep Analysis
Last run: Jun 3, 2026 8:52:44 pm

Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.

0 Company Classification — What type of company is this?
1 Industry Landscape — Where is the industry headed?
2 Company Momentum — Where is this company trending?
3 Forward Projection — 1Y & 2Y projected metrics (requires Layer 1 + 2)
4a DCF Valuation — Present value of future cash flows
4b Earnings Power Value — Floor value — worth with zero growth
4c Anchored PE — Industry PE adjusted for growth differential
4d Reverse DCF — What growth is the market pricing in?
4e Revenue-Based DCF — For growth/narrative companies (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4f Anchored P/S — Price-to-Sales peer comparison (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4g Scenario Analysis — Bull / Base / Bear (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4h Dividend Discount Model — For dividend/income stocks only
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4i Book Value Analysis — For deep value / turnaround stocks only
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4j Insider Activity — Are insiders buying or selling?
4f Cash Flow Quality — How trustworthy is the FCF?
4g Debt Maturity Risk — Can it handle its debt?
4h Macro Environment — Rates, market valuation, volatility
4i Sector Intelligence — How does this company compare within its sector?
4j Revenue Confidence — How reliable is the growth projection?
4k Sensitivity Analysis — How fragile is the fair value estimate?
4l Sector Demand Cycle — Is the sector in a boom, steady state, or contraction?
5 AI Investigation — Adaptive research engine (Claude)
5b Thesis Evaluation — What does the market believe? (narrative/platform stocks only)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
6 Valuation Synthesis — Weighted verdict from all methods (requires Layer 4)
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:53pm (23d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue $4.2B $4.3B $4.5B $5.2B $8.8B
Cost of Revenue $2.5B $2.7B $2.9B $3.0B $4.0B
Gross Profit $1.7B $1.6B $1.6B $2.2B $4.8B
Operating Expenses $341.2M $371.4M $411.7M $117.0M $423.5M
Operating Income $1.5B $1.4B $1.4B $2.1B $4.3B
Net Income $789.3M $711.0M $703.3M $1.2B $3.6B
EBITDA $2.1B $2.0B $2.1B $2.7B $5.3B
EPS $0.92 $0.78 $0.77 $1.39 $4.00
EPS (Diluted)
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:31pm (23d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Cash & Equivalents $524.7M $769.4M $648.7M $860.2M $1.8B
Total Current Assets $1.4B $1.8B $1.9B $1.9B $3.0B
Total Assets $7.3B $7.3B $8.2B $10.1B $15.2B
Current Liabilities $822.4M $785.4M $1.5B $1.7B $1.7B
Long-Term Debt $1.1B $1.1B $653.4M $1.8B $2.9B
Total Liabilities $3.2B $3.0B $3.6B $4.8B $6.6B
Total Equity $4.1B $4.3B $4.5B $5.2B $8.4B
Retained Earnings $2.2B $2.6B $3.0B $3.9B $6.7B
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:53pm (23d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Operating Cash Flow $1.6B $1.7B $1.6B $2.0B $4.5B
Capital Expenditure -$1.1B -$1.1B -$1.1B -$1.2B -$1.4B
Free Cash Flow $463.8M $614.3M $437.6M $709.2M $3.1B
Acquisitions (net) $31.5M $28.3M -$316.2M -$1.4B -$2.1B
Debt Repayment
Dividends Paid
Stock Buybacks $0 $0 $0 $0 -$36.4M
Net Change in Cash -$362.1M $244.7M -$120.7M $211.5M $919.1M
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:29pm (23d ago)
Metric 2027 2028 2029 2030
Revenue $13.5B
$12.2B – $15.5B
$12.7B
$12.6B – $12.7B
$11.8B
$10.7B – $13.6B
$15.6B
$14.1B – $18.0B
EBITDA $6.9B
$6.2B – $7.9B
$6.4B
$6.4B – $6.5B
$6.0B
$5.4B – $6.9B
$8.0B
$7.2B – $9.2B
Net Income $5.1B
$4.6B – $6.1B
$4.3B
$4.2B – $4.7B
$3.5B
$3.1B – $4.2B
$3.1B
$2.7B – $3.7B
EPS
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:53pm (23d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue Growth +2.2% +5.0% +15.6% +68.8%
Gross Profit Growth -8.2% +4.4% +35.0% +115.3%
Operating Income Growth -9.5% +1.4% +47.2% +107.1%
Net Income Growth -9.9% -1.1% +77.0% +187.4%
EBITDA Growth -6.3% +3.7% +28.4% +99.1%
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:52pm (23d ago)
Type codes PPurchase SSale AAward / grant MOption exercise FIn-kind (tax) CConversion GGift DReturn to issuer
All SEC Form 4 codes
Open market
P Purchase
Open-market or private purchase of shares.
S Sale
Open-market or private sale of shares.
Compensation (Rule 16b-3)
A Award / grant
Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
D Return to issuer
Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
F In-kind (tax)
Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
I Discretionary
Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
M Option exercise
Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
Derivatives
C Conversion
Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
E Short expiration
Expiration of a short derivative position.
H Long expiration
Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
O OTM exercise
Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
X ITM exercise
Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
Other exempt
G Gift
Bona fide gift of securities.
L Small acquisition
Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
W Inheritance
Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
Z Voting trust
Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
Other
J Other
Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
K Equity swap
Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
U Tender / buyout
Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.

Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.

Date Insider Type Shares Price Value
2026-06-23 MacKenzie John Fraser P-Purchase 500.00 $33.31 $16,655
2026-06-02 McGill Jacqueline Elizabeth P-Purchase 500.00 $37.70 $18,850
2026-03-18 McCrae Shannon Leigh 0.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 Andani Alhassan 0.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 Smit Carel Albert Tecumseh 0.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 Suleman Yunus Goolam Hoosen 0.00 $0.00 $0
2028-03-01 Steyn Mariette 4,451.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 Maluk Maria Cristina Bitar 0.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 Magagula Jongisa 0.00 $0.00 $0
2028-03-01 Magagula Jongisa 2,893.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 Goodlace Terence Philip 0.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 Fraser Michael John 0.00 $0.00 $0
2028-03-01 Fraser Michael John 13,312.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 Bassa Zarina Bibi Mahomed 0.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 McGill Jacqueline Elizabeth 0.00 $0.00 $0
2028-03-01 Dall Alexander Thomas 3,317.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 Sander Jason 0.00 $0.00 $0
2028-03-01 Swanepoel Francois 4,493.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 MacKenzie John Fraser 0.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-18 Sibiya Philisiwe Gugulethu 0.00 $0.00 $0
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:29pm (23d ago)
Date Dividend Declaration Record Payment
2026-03-13 $1.37 2026-03-02 2026-03-13 2026-03-26
2025-09-12 $0.40 2025-08-25 2025-09-12 2025-09-25
2025-03-14 $0.39 2025-03-03 2025-03-14 2025-03-27
2024-09-13 $0.17 2024-08-26 2024-09-13 2024-09-26
2024-03-14 $0.22 2024-02-27 2024-03-15 2024-03-28
2023-09-07 $0.17 2023-08-21 2023-09-08 2023-09-21
2023-03-16 $0.24 2023-02-28 2023-03-17 2023-03-30
2022-09-15 $0.17 2022-08-29 2022-09-16 2022-09-29
2022-03-10 $0.14 2022-02-17 2022-03-11 2022-03-24
2021-09-09 $0.12 2021-08-19 2021-09-10 2021-09-23
2021-03-11 $0.22 2021-02-18 2021-03-12 2021-03-25
2020-09-10 $0.07 2020-08-21 2020-09-11 2020-09-24
2020-03-12 $0.07 2020-02-19 2020-03-13 2020-03-26
2019-09-05 $0.04 2019-09-06 2019-09-19
2019-03-14 $0.01 2019-03-05 2019-03-15 2019-03-28
2018-09-06 $0.01 2018-08-23 2018-09-07 2018-09-20
2018-03-08 $0.04 2018-02-20 2018-03-09 2018-03-22
2017-09-07 $0.03 2017-08-17 2017-09-08 2017-09-21
2017-03-08 $0.05 2017-02-17 2017-03-10 2017-03-23
2016-09-07 $0.03 2016-08-23 2016-09-09 2016-09-22
Narrative Economics
The story the market is telling about this stock — the intangible X-factor (founder mythology, cult dynamics, TAM-of-imagination) that moves price beyond what cash flows alone explain. After Shiller, Narrative Economics.
No narrative profile yet for GFI — it's generated by the pipeline (market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Independent analyst synthesis · Delvantic - Cairn AI · generated 2026-06-03 20:53:22
Reviews the pipeline's own verdicts
Verdict Modestly undervalued as a gold-price call option — fair value $45-50 if gold holds $2,300+, but Q4 2025's 48% margin is not the run-rate; starter position only, trim above $42, and reject any

The raw numbers tell a story the synthesis models are underweighting: GFI just printed a $5.29B revenue quarter against a $3.49B Q2 — that single quarter is 60% of 2024's full-year revenue. Net margin went from 11.8% (Q4 2023) to 48.2% (Q4 2025), and FCF compounded at 167%. But Q4 2025 revenue of $5.29B on a 48% margin generated ~$2.55B of NI — annualize that and you get $10B+ NI run-rate against a $34B market cap, implying a forward P/E of ~3.4x if (huge if) Q4 is sustainable. It is not. Gold averaged ~$2,650/oz in Q4 2025 and spiked toward $2,900 — the Q4 print is a gold-price spike plus Salares Norte ramp converging, not a new baseline. The H1-to-H2 2025 revenue jump from $3.49B to $5.29B in a single quarter is almost mathematically impossible from production alone; this is price realization, period.

Where I disagree with the prior models: the synthesis calls this a "Reasonable Premium" at 9.2x TTM P/E, but TTM earnings are inflated by the Q4 anomaly. Strip Q4 back to a normalized $3.5B quarterly run-rate at 30% margins (closer to Q2 2025) and you get ~$4.2B normalized NI, or ~8x normalized — still cheap, but not the 9.2x that's already in the tile. The pre-flight call ("commodity-leveraged-producer") is correct and the narrative layer ("anchored, thin narrative, macro-driven") is the most honest read here. The Market Forces "Neutral" verdict is too soft — it assumes mean-reversion symmetry. Gold producers don't mean-revert symmetrically; operating leverage cuts both ways, and at $1,800 gold this same company prints sub-20% margins like it did in 2022-2023 ($188M NI quarters). The "Sector Leader" tag is fine but irrelevant to the trade — every major gold producer is printing record quarters right now.

The contrarian case the models are missing: this stock is down 38% from highs *despite* the best operating quarter in company history. That's the market telling you it doesn't believe Q4 sticks. Either (a) gold rolls over as real rates normalize and Fed cuts get priced out, or (b) cost inflation in South Africa/Ghana/Peru compresses the margin even if gold holds. South Deep, Tarkwa, and Cerro Corona are not low-cost assets; the company's AISC has been creeping up for years. Also worth flagging: the balance sheet tile shows "—" for total debt and equity — that's a real data gap on a company carrying ~$1B+ of net debt historically, and you can't responsibly underwrite a commodity producer without the leverage picture. The insider data is garbage (a single 500-share purchase and a bunch of zero-share entries with future dates in 2028 — clearly malformed); the "Net Insider Buying" signal should be discarded entirely.

My verdict: I dissent mildly from "Reasonable Premium" and lean toward modestly undervalued, but only if you underwrite gold at $2,400+ sustained. At 9.2x TTM and ~8x normalized, with $3.12B FCF and a 1.8% dividend, GFI is priced for gold to fall meaningfully — that's the asymmetry. If you believe central bank buying, fiscal deficits, and de-dollarization keep gold bid above $2,300, fair value is $48-52 (10-11x normalized $4.2B NI on 894M shares ≈ $4.70 EPS × 10-11). If gold mean-reverts to $1,900, margins collapse to 2023 levels and fair value is $28-30. The stock at $37.93 is roughly splitting the difference, which is why the synthesis says "reasonable" — but reasonable for a 50/50 macro bet isn't a reason to own it unless you have a gold view. I have a mild gold view (structurally bid), so I'd take a starter position, size it small (1-2%), and treat it as a macro hedge rather than a compounder. Do not extrapolate Q4 2025. Do not pay up above $42.

GPT Critique
Second-opinion review · gpt-4o · generated 2026-06-03 20:53:29
Reviews the Opus findings above
Verdict I largely agree with Opus — modestly undervalued at $37.93, but I'd peg fair value closer to $42-45, factoring in the reliance on gold price sustainability and geopolitical risks.

Gold Fields Limited's recent financial performance presents a compelling picture of a company experiencing substantial growth, but one heavily influenced by external factors, notably gold prices. In 2025, the company reported a striking increase in revenue to $8.78 billion, a 69% jump from the previous year, with a net income of $3.58 billion, indicating a robust net margin of 40.8%. This growth trajectory is further highlighted by the quarterly revenue surge to $5.29 billion in Q4 2025, with an impressive net income margin of 48.2%. However, this exceptional performance coincided with a period where gold prices spiked to around $2,650/oz, suggesting that the results might not be sustainable if gold prices normalize. The company's free cash flow of $3.12 billion and a PE ratio of 9.24x also underscore its current profitability and market valuation, albeit under the influence of favorable commodity pricing.

Opus contends that Gold Fields appears modestly undervalued, treating it as a call option on gold prices sustaining above $2,300/oz. I concur with Opus's assessment that Q4 2025's performance should not be seen as a baseline. The extraordinary revenue and margin expansion in this quarter were driven by unprecedented gold prices and the strategic ramp-up of Salares Norte, not by an underlying shift in operational efficiency. Opus rightly points out that if Q4 were to be normalized to reflect more typical gold prices and operational circumstances, the valuation multiples would be less compelling. I agree with this view, as the historical performance in 2022 and 2023, where margins were sub-20%, reflects the company's vulnerability to gold price fluctuations.

Where I diverge from Opus is on the degree of undervaluation. While Opus suggests a fair value of $45-50 if gold holds at $2,300+, I am more conservative in my valuation. Given the company's dependency on high gold prices and geopolitical risks in its operating regions, I would peg the fair value closer to $42-45. This range accounts for the potential downside if gold prices retreat or cost inflation in South Africa and other regions compresses margins further. Additionally, I agree with Opus's critique of the insider transaction data and the importance of a clearer debt picture for a comprehensive risk assessment.

A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are overly focused on recent strong performance, potentially overlooking longer-term structural challenges such as increasing production costs or geopolitical risks. They might also question the reliance on continued high gold prices and whether the macroeconomic factors supporting these prices will persist.

Community AI Feedback
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My Notes personal — only you see this
Data via Financial Modeling Prep · Cached for performance · fmp
v1.1.352 · d1100787 · 2026-06-26 11:39:30