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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Gold Fields Ltd. (GFI) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -21 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 31 · Value -63 · Sentiment 37 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $10.98 vs $47.81 at analysis
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Gold Fields Ltd.
GFI NYSEGold Fields Ltd. Sponsored ADR represents shares in Gold Fields Limited, a prominent gold producer operating a diversified portfolio of mining operations across key gold-producing regions including South Africa, Ghana, Australia, Chile, and Peru. The company focuses on extracting and producing gold through its underground and open-pit mines, leveraging substantial reserves to support long-term production capabilities. Gold Fields Ltd. Sponsored ADR provides investors with exposure to the global gold mining sector, which plays a critical role in supplying precious metals for jewelry, investment products, industrial applications, and central bank reserves. Committed to sustainable mining practices, operational efficiency, and community engagement, the company maintains a strong emphasis on innovation to enhance resource recovery and environmental stewardship. Headquartered in Sandton, South Africa, Gold Fields Limited continues to be a significant participant in the international gold market, contributing to the stability and growth of the precious metals industry.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.38
Total Equity: $5.37B
Shares: 895,503,589
Total Debt: $2.50B
Cash: $860.20M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $2.50B
Cash: $860.20M
Revenue: $5.20B
Revenue: $5.20B
Revenue: $5.20B
Total Equity: $5.37B
Tax Rate: 35.1%
Equity: $5.37B
Total Debt: $2.50B
Cash: $860.20M
Current Liabilities: $1.71B
Long-Term Debt: $1.78B
Total Debt: $2.50B
Total Equity: $5.37B
Shares: 895,503,589
Shares: 895,503,589
CapEx: -$1.18B
Shares: 895,503,589
Stock Price: $47.81
Net Income: $1.25B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:58pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.9B | $4.2B | $4.3B | $4.5B | $5.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.8B |
| Gross Profit | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.4B |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $723.0M | $789.3M | $711.0M | $703.3M | $1.2B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $0.82 | $0.89 | $0.80 | $0.79 | $1.39 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.81 | $0.88 | $0.78 | $0.77 | $1.38 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:57pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $886.8M | $524.7M | $769.4M | $648.7M | $860.2M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.7B | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $7.5B | $7.3B | $7.3B | $8.2B | $10.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $916.5M | $822.4M | $785.4M | $1.5B | $1.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.4B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $653.4M | $1.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.6B | $3.2B | $3.0B | $3.6B | $4.8B |
| Total Equity | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.3B | $4.6B | $5.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $3.0B | $3.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:57pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$583.7M | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.2B |
| Free Cash Flow | $527.7M | $141.5M | $309.9M | $138.1M | $423.6M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | $0 | $0 | -$1.5B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$324.4M | -$436.7M | $8.6M | $153.9M | $1.3B |
| Dividends Paid | -$137.7M | -$322.3M | -$304.4M | -$368.6M | -$350.9M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $364.2M | -$350.8M | $250.1M | -$94.5M | $229.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:58pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.8% | +2.2% | +5.0% | +15.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +4.5% | -7.8% | +4.4% | +34.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +9.2% | -9.9% | -1.1% | +77.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 16, 2026 12:03am (7d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-13 | $1.44 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-13 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-07 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-16 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-15 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-10 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-09 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2021-03-11 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2020-09-10 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2020-03-12 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2019-09-05 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2019-03-14 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2018-09-06 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2018-03-08 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2017-09-07 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2017-03-08 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2016-09-07 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2016-03-09 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-22 16:21The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a clean cyclical story: revenue up from $3.89B (2020) to $5.20B (2024), a 7.5% CAGR (the 10.2% figure looks juiced by endpoint selection), but net income is the real tell — $723M → $1.25B, with 2024 alone showing 77% earnings YoY on 15.6% revenue growth. Gross margin expanded from ~44.7% in 2020 to 45.3% in 2024 (and was only 38.9% in 2023), which is the fingerprint of operating leverage on a rising gold price, not structural improvement. FCF is $423.6M against $1.61B in operating cash flow — capex of $1.18B is eating over 70% of OCF, so the FCF yield on a $42.76B cap is barely 1%. Debt/equity of 0.47 and $860M cash against $2.5B debt is fine but not a fortress. ROE of 23.2% is a cycle-peak number, not a through-cycle number.
The synthesis verdict of $11.10 fair value (-76.8%) is analytically lazy and I dissent from its magnitude even while agreeing with its direction. A DCF that spits out $11 on a company generating $1.25B in net income and $424M FCF is almost certainly using a long-term gold price near $1,400–1,600/oz and punishing the terminal multiple. That's a defensible bear case but not "fair value" — it's one scenario. The Market Narrative layer is far more honest: the premium IS the gold-price bet, and GFI is a levered call on spot. At $47.81 with 34.6x earnings and 8.2x sales, you are paying peak-cycle multiples on peak-cycle earnings, which is the classic commodity-producer trap Peter Lynch warned about — low P/E is dangerous at cycle troughs, high P/E at cycle tops means you're buying right before the collapse.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: central bank gold buying (1,000+ tonnes/year for three consecutive years) is a genuine structural shift, not a narrative fad, and if gold holds $2,400+ then GFI's 2025 earnings could print $1.5–1.8B, taking the trailing P/E to 24–28x on a business with a 3.8% dividend and real reserves. Salares Norte ramp adds production growth on top of price. The Market Forces note that GFI is a "below-average gold producer" is important — GFI has had operational stumbles (South Deep, Salares Norte commissioning delays), so it doesn't deserve a peer premium; if anything it should trade at a discount to Newmont/Agnico. Insider buying is two tiny 500-share purchases — statistically meaningless, ignore it. The "Net Insider Buying" tag is signal-noise.
My read: overvalued but not by 77%. Normalizing gold to $2,000/oz (still above the 10-year average, below spot) and assuming GFI can sustain ~40% gross margins with $1.1B capex, I get normalized FCF of ~$600–800M and normalized earnings of ~$850M–$1.0B. At a fair 15x mid-cycle earnings that's $13–15B market cap, or $14–17/share. Give it credit for the dividend and optionality on continued gold strength and you can stretch to $22–28. The current $47.81 requires gold to stay above $2,500 essentially permanently AND for GFI's execution to improve — that's two bets, not one. I'd fade this into strength, and I'd be a buyer sub-$25. The synthesis's $11 anchor is too aggressive but directionally correct; the Market Forces "neutral/appropriately valued" call is too generous to the multiple. The narrative layer nails it: this is a macro bet dressed up as an equity, and the fragility flag is the right flag.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say Gold Fields is being valued less like a miner and more like a levered claim on an unusually favorable gold tape. In 2024 it did $5.20B of revenue, up from $4.50B, and net income jumped to $1.25B from $703M; that is a real improvement, not accounting noise. Gross margin expanded to 45.3% from 38.9%, net margin to 23.9% from 15.6%. ROE at 23.2% is excellent. But the crucial tell is cash conversion: operating cash flow was $1.61B, yet free cash flow was only $424M after $1.18B of capex. That means the equity is capitalizing the business at $42.8B, or about 101x trailing FCF and 8.2x sales, for a company whose economics are still fundamentally commodity- and reinvestment-driven. Even using earnings, 34.6x P/E is rich for a gold producer unless one assumes today’s gold price and margins are not just sustainable but improve further.
The balance sheet is not distressed, but it also does not justify this multiple. Net debt is roughly $1.64B against $5.37B of equity, so leverage is manageable, yet not trivial in a cyclical business. Price-to-book at 8.0x is the real warning sign. For miners, book value and reserve replacement matter because depreciation, depletion, jurisdictional risk, and sustaining capital are central to the franchise. Paying nearly 8x book for a company that generated $424M of free cash flow on $1.18B of annual capex suggests investors are looking through the heavy reinvestment burden and underwriting a much higher through-cycle cash yield than the trailing data actually show. The dividend yield of 3.8% is decent and the 28% payout ratio is conservative, but that is not enough to make the valuation self-supporting.
What stands out most is the mismatch between quality and price. Gold Fields is clearly not a bad business: five straight years of profitability, revenue rising from $3.89B in 2020 to $5.20B in 2024, and net income well above the 2020-2023 range in the latest year. But that history also argues against paying a hyper-premium. From 2020 through 2023, net income ranged between $703M and $789M despite varying gold conditions; 2024 at $1.25B looks like a step-up year, but one year of outsized profitability in a commodity producer should not command software-like multiples. If anything, the data suggest a business with strong operational leverage to the metal price, which is exactly why the market should be cautious about capitalizing peak-ish earnings too aggressively. I think the model output calling the stock overvalued is directionally right even if its exact fair value is too punitive. A stock at $47.81 needs either a structurally higher gold price, a major FCF inflection, or both. On the numbers given, that case is not yet proven.
The best argument against this view is that the market may be correctly discounting a new gold regime rather than mispricing a cyclical peak. If gold remains structurally elevated because of central-bank buying, fiscal stress, real-rate volatility, and geopolitical risk, then trailing earnings are not “peak” but a new baseline. On that reading, 2024’s 15.6% revenue growth and 77% earnings growth are less a one-off and more the start of a cash-harvest phase after prior investment. Operating cash flow of $1.61B against net income of $1.25B is healthy, and if capex normalizes below the 2024 level, free cash flow could rise sharply without any heroic volume assumptions. Net insider buying, even if tiny, does not contradict that thesis. A smart bull would also note that a 23.9% net margin and 23.2% ROE are not the profile of a struggling operator, and that miners often look optically expensive on backward P/E precisely when the market is anticipating sustained commodity strength.
What would change my mind is not another narrative about gold scarcity; it is evidence that Gold Fields can convert current favorable pricing into durable owner earnings. Specifically, I would want to see free cash flow move convincingly above $1.0B with capex easing from $1.18B while revenue holds near or above $5B and net margins stay above 20%. If the company can show that 2024’s $1.25B of net income translates into a much higher steady-state cash yield, today’s price could be more defensible. Conversely, if revenue or earnings slip back toward the 2021-2023 range while capex remains heavy, the multiple should compress hard. At $47.81, the stock is priced for a favorable commodity regime to persist and for execution to be clean; that is too much to pay for this setup.
Grok Reading
Gold Fields printed a genuine step-change in 2024: revenue climbed to $5.20B from $4.50B (+15.6% YoY) while net income nearly doubled to $1.25B from $703M, lifting net margin to 23.9% and gross margin to 45.3% from the high-30s that characterized 2020–2023. That is real operating leverage on elevated gold, not accounting noise—ROE hit 23.2% and operating cash flow reached $1.61B. Yet free cash flow was only $423.6M after $1.18B of capex, so the market is capitalizing a business that converts less than 35% of net income into unlevered cash. At a $42.76B enterprise footprint, that FCF equates to a sub-1% free-cash yield against a 3.8% dividend that is covered but thin. The balance sheet is serviceable—$2.50B debt, $860M cash, debt-to-equity 0.47—but it does not justify paying 34.6× trailing earnings, 8.2× sales, or 8.0× book for a pure-play gold producer whose multi-year revenue CAGR is a respectable but unspectacular 10.2%.
The numbers tell a late-cycle commodity story, not a compounding franchise story. Earnings CAGR of 32% over five years is almost entirely the gold price and margin expansion; volume and cost discipline are secondary. With PE at 35× and EV/revenue above 8.5×, the equity is priced as if $2,600-plus gold and mid-40s gross margins are the new permanent base rather than a peak of the cycle. The prior models’ ~$11 DCF is severe, but even a generous 18–20× multiple on the $1.25B of peak earnings only supports a mid-$20s equity value—still roughly 45–50% below the $47.81 print. FCF-based math is harsher still. The premium is narrative: structural gold bull, central-bank bid, de-dollarization. That narrative can persist, but it is not embedded in the cash-flow durability of the company itself.
The strongest counter-case is that 2024 is not a one-off spike but the first year of a structurally higher gold regime, and that heavy capex (Salares Norte and sustaining) will convert into multi-year production growth that lifts FCF well above $1B. Bulls will correctly note that net income has already more than doubled from the $700M plateau of 2020–2023, ROE is excellent, insider prints show small purchases, and a 3.8% yield with a 28% payout leaves room to grow the dividend if gold holds. If spot gold stays above $2,400 and all-in costs remain contained, a 25× earnings multiple on rising EPS could theoretically justify prices in the high $30s to low $40s and make today’s level merely expensive rather than absurd. I weigh that less heavily because FCF conversion remains weak, the stock already sits at a large premium to any normalized commodity multiple, and sector intelligence flags the name as below-benchmark on execution and jurisdiction risk—meaning GFI does not fully capture the upside of the metal even when the narrative is working.
I would reverse to neutral or constructive only if free cash flow sustains above ~$900M–$1.0B for two consecutive years while gold holds above $2,400, or if the company delivers a clear multi-year production ramp that drops the forward PE below 18× without a collapse in the metal price. A sharp break in gold back toward $2,000 without an offsetting cost collapse would confirm the overvaluation thesis decisively.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Gold Fields shows a stable operating profile: revenue grew from $3.89B in 2020 to $5.20B in 2024 (~7.5% CAGR), with a strong 2024 rebound in gross margin to 45.3% from 39.0% in 2023, and net income jumping to $1.25B. FCF is positive but lumpy ($527M, $141M, $309M, $138M, $423M across 2020-2024), consistent with a capital-intensive gold miner. Earnings quality checks are clean: OCF/NI of 1.6x, accruals -6% of assets, Beneish M of -2.48, and Altman Z of 6.22 place it firmly in the safe zone.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- All-in sustaining cost (AISC) per ounce trend and reserve life across key mines (South Deep, Tarkwa, St Ives, Salares Norte).
- Debt maturity schedule and covenants against the $1.64B net debt.
- Whether the 2024 GM% jump to 45.3% is gold-price driven vs unit-cost improvement.
- Salares Norte ramp-up progress and capex commitments in 2025-2026.
- Hedging policy and any commodity/currency derivative exposure.
- Dividend policy and payout sustainability against variable FCF.
The e2e composite fair value of $10.98 and signal-adjusted $11.10 imply -77% downside, but I don't take that literally - a gold miner's DCF anchored to a mean-reverting long-term gold price will always look absurdly cheap or absurdly rich versus spot, and right now spot is elevated. That said, even generously marking gold to today's strip and giving GFI credit for its clean earnings quality, solid FCF, and disciplined capital allocation, deserved value plausibly lands in the $30-$38 range, not $48. The stock is embedding a scenario where gold stays at or above current levels for years, production costs behave, and the $1.64B net debt is a non-issue.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- long-term gold price assumption inside the DCF - is it $1800 or $2400?
- AISC guidance and cost inflation trajectory for 2025
- reserve life and sustaining capex intensity by mine
- hedging book if any
- net debt trajectory and dividend policy through cycle
The dominant force on GFI right now is the gold narrative itself: a strong-intensity, cyclical-late-stage story where central bank accumulation, geopolitical tension, and monetary-instability fears are pulling capital into gold miners. GFI is a direct expression of that trade, and the tape shows it - 15.6% recent momentum vs a 10.2% long-term CAGR, riding well above trend. With a low 0.6 beta and defensive/hedge positioning, this name is largely insulated from the mild risk-on equity tape and actually benefits from any wobble in the broader index (S&P off its high, VIX creeping up). That is a genuine tailwind applied to this specific ticker. The catch is durability. The narrative is flagged fragile and the price sits at a large premium to intrinsic anchors, meaning sentiment is doing most of the lifting. Any cooling in gold spot, a hawkish rates surprise (10y already at 4.69%), or a rotation out of the crisis-hedge trade would hit GFI disproportionately because there is no cult following or sticky retail base to defend it - cult coefficient is low. For now the wind is at its back, but it is the kind of wind that can turn quickly.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Gold spot price behavior and any break of the recent uptrend
- Central-bank gold purchase data - continued accumulation vs pause
- Real yields and any hawkish Fed repricing that would compress the gold trade
- ETF flows into GLD/GDX as a proxy for narrative intensity
- Analyst target revisions on GFI specifically vs the sector
The world backdrop is unusually favourable to the product and indifferent to the producer: central bank accumulation, fiscal-deficit anxiety and a 4.69% 10-year that has stopped suppressing bullion mean the metal's bid is structural rather than cyclical-only. That lifts every miner's revenue line, which is exactly why relative performance now hinges on ounces and cost control rather than on the macro thesis. GFI's specific position — recovering volumes, a repaired Chilean asset, heavy-capex legacy mines in high-tax jurisdictions — means it participates in the upcycle with a lag and with more of the windfall retained by governments and sustaining capital than at leaner peers.
When we made this prediction on Aug 23, 2026, GFI was $47.81. We expect it to be $41.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $34.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 23, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.